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2018 DIGILAW 331 (GUJ)

JASWANTBHAI NARSIHBHAI BARIA v. STATE OF GUJARAT

2018-01-31

BELA M.TRIVEDI, SONIA GOKANI

body2018
JUDGMENT : SONIA GOKANI, J. 1. This is an appeal against the judgment and order of conviction passed by the learned 8th Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Panchmahal at Godhra, in Sessions Case No. 1 of 2012, Dated: 14.02.2013, in connection with the FIR registered as I-C.R. No. 94 of 2011, with Morva (H) Police Station for the offence punishable under Sections 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1881 (for short, ‘the IPC’) read with Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act. FACTUAL MATRIX: 2. The case of the prosecution, as unfurled is as follows: Paruben, the widow of the deceased Arjunbhai, was residing at Taviyad Faliya, at Morva. Her husband was the eldest amongst the siblings, whereas, the appellant was the youngest and was residing with his parents, he being unmarried. The father of the deceased had partitioned the agricultural land amongst all the siblings. Out of the same, the deceased was holding one portion of the land and the appellant was holding another portion, whereas, their parents and other brothers were holding the rest. Both the deceased and the appellants also used to raise the cattle. 2.1 It is the case of the prosecution that a buffalo owned by the deceased, entered the field of the appellant and caused damage to the standing crop of paddy. On account of that, acrimonious exchanges between the appellant and the deceased took place. 2.2 On 28.08.2011, at around 11:00 a.m., the deceased told his wife that he was going to Dangariya Gidra Faliya for some work. In the evening, at about 07:00 p.m., she heard shouts near the house of her father-in-law. Therefore, she rushed to that place along with her daughter. On her reaching there, she found that her brother-in-law, i.e. the appellant, was giving threat to her husband and he also inflicted blows on him with a wooden stick. Consequently, her husband, fell down and started bleeding. The brother-in-law continued to inflict blows, and therefore, the complainant along with her daughter rushed to the police station and intimated the police force about the incident and conveyed that her husband needed immediate medical treatment and help. 2.3 The injured was then taken to the hospital, however, he succumbed to the injuries during the course of treatment. The brother-in-law continued to inflict blows, and therefore, the complainant along with her daughter rushed to the police station and intimated the police force about the incident and conveyed that her husband needed immediate medical treatment and help. 2.3 The injured was then taken to the hospital, however, he succumbed to the injuries during the course of treatment. Therefore, an FIR being I-C.R. No. 94 of 2011 for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC and under Section 135 of the B.P. Act on 28.08.2011, itself. On completion of the investigation, the chargesheet came to be filed before the Court of the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, which eventually committed it before the Sessions Court, Panchmahal at Godhra, under Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘the Code’) and the same was numbered as Sessions Case No. 1 of 2012. 2.4 At the time of trial, the charges were explained to the appellant-accused. However, he did not plead guilty and claimed to be tried. 2.5 The prosecution, therefore, examined as many as 21 witnesses to bring home the charges framed against the appellant. The details of the witnesses examined by the prosecution are as under: PROSECUTI ON WITNESS NUMBER NAME OF THE WITNESS Role / Identity of Witness EXHIB IT NUMBER 1 Dr. Anil Ratansinh Makwana, Medical Officer, Who had carried out the PM of the person of the deceased 5 2 Ashokbhai Shankarbhai Taviyad, Witness of the inquest panchnama of the person of the deceased 9 3 Dr. Anil Ratansinh Makwana, Medical Officer, Who had carried out the PM of the person of the deceased 5 2 Ashokbhai Shankarbhai Taviyad, Witness of the inquest panchnama of the person of the deceased 9 3 Dr. Rameshchandra Kodarji Chauhan, Medical Officer, who had given treatment to the injured 11 4 Himmatsinh Anopsinh Chauhan, Witness of the panchnama of seizure of clothes of the deceased 17 5 Hasmukhbhai Mohansinh Bariya Witness of the inquest panchnama of the person of the deceased 22 6 Ranjansinh Mansukhbhai Patel Witness of the panchnama of the place of offence 23 7 Kiritsinh Punambhai Pargi Witness of the panchnama of the place of offence 27 8 Dipsingbhai Maganbhai Bariya Witness of the panchnama of seizure of clothes of the deceased 28 9 Dhanabhai Kanabhai Vankar Witness of the panchnama of seizure of clothes of the deceased 34 10 Paruben Arjunbhai Baria, the Complainant The first informant and the wife of the deceased 35 11 Prabhatsinh Kalubhai Patel Witness of the panchnama of discovery of weapon 37 12 Babubhai Galabhai Patel Witness of the panchnama of discovery of weapon 40 13 Naarsinghbhai Dalabhai Baria, Witness Father of the convict 41 14 Bhaaratsinh Narsinh Baria Brother of the convict 42 15 Surekhaben Bhaaratsinh Baria Sister-in-law of the convict 43 16 Rupliben Narsingbhai Baria Mother of the convict 44 17 Juwansinh Kalubhai Patel, Police Station Officer 45 18 Surajben Gulabsinh Baria, Witness Sister-in-law of the convict 46 19 Gulabsinh Narsinh Baria Brother of the convict 47 20 Hiriben Mathurbhai Patel, Mother of the first informant and mother-in-law of the deceased 49 21 Haribhai Limbabhai Sangada, IO Investigating Officer 52 DEFENCE WITNESS 1 Sirajbhai Yusufbhai Shaikh, Witness, Sarpanch of the Village 68 2.6 Over and above the oral evidence, the prosecution also adduced the following documentary evidences: DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE NUMBER PARTICULARS EXHIBIT NUMBER 1 PM Report 6 2 Inquest Panchnama 10 3 Treatment certificate of the deceased Arjunsinh, issued by General Civil Hospital, Godhra 12 4 Memorandum sent by Medical Officer to PSI, Godhra Town, for registering a medico legal case 13 5 Memorandum sent to PSI, Godhra Town, for carrying out necessary procedure after the death of Arjunbhai 15 6 Arrest Panchnama and the Panchnama of seizure of the clothes of the accused, Jaswantbhai 18 7 Panchnama of place of offence 24 8 Panchnama of the clothes recovered from the person of the deceased 29 9 FIR 36 10 Discovery panchnama under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 38 11 Primary report of FSL 38 12 Report of a serious offence 53 13 A copy of the memorandum sent for adding Section 302 of the IPC 54 14 Memorandum sent to Executive Magistrate, Godhra, for carrying out inquest panchnama of the person of the deceased 57 15 Receipt issued in respect of handing over the dead body 58 16 Memorandum with regard to the production of the clothes found on the person of the deceased in police station 59 17 Office copy of the memorandum sent for carrying out PM of the dead body 60 18 Despatch note 61 19 Receipt issued by FSL on receiving muddamal articles 62 20 Report of analysis of FSL 63 21 Serological report 64 2.7 After once the recording of the evidence was over, the further statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Code came to be recorded, where, the only defence taken by him was that the case is wrongly put up against him. In support of his case, the appellant also examined one Sirajbhai Yusufbhai Shaikh as the defence witness, who acted as Sarpanch, at the relevant time. It was also the case of the appellant that in the presence of 3-4 leaders of the village and of his community, a compromise was arrived at between the parties, wherein, the first informant allegedly stated that her husband sustained injuries accidentally and passed away and she shall deposed accordingly. It was also emphasised, therein, that now no dispute remains between the parties. 2.8 The trial Court, on hearing both the sides, held the present appellant guilty for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. He was, however, given the benefit of doubt for the offence punishable under Section 135 of the G.P. Act.. 3. Hence, the present appeal, challenging the judgment and order of conviction. ORAL SUBMISSIONS: 4. Learned Advocate, Mr. H. Ahmed, appearing for and on behalf of the appellant-convict through the High Court Legal Services Committee, made his submissions extensively. He urged this Court that the conduct of the first informant, i.e. the widow of the deceased, is quite strange and also leaves much to be desired. On having found her husband being attacked and fallen down on account of serious injuries, a person would not have rushed to the police station and instead would have surely intervened or could have called for the medical aid, more particularly, when she was aware of the distance of the police station from her residence. He also argued, further, that the explanation given by her for such a rush to the police station is also unacceptable that she was apprehensive of threat upon her own life and that of her daughter. Moreover, on the question of the weapon also, the panch witnesses have not corroborated. There is serious infirmity and discrepancy going to the root of the matter. More particularly, bearing in mind the details of search and seizure. The trial Court also failed to appreciate that, though, there were independent eye-witnesses, the prosecution chose not to examine any such witness. Therefore, the case of the prosecution, which hinges on the thin evidence of interested witnesses, must not be believed and the appellant could not have been convicted for the grave offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. The trial Court also failed to appreciate that, though, there were independent eye-witnesses, the prosecution chose not to examine any such witness. Therefore, the case of the prosecution, which hinges on the thin evidence of interested witnesses, must not be believed and the appellant could not have been convicted for the grave offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. 4.1 The reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex Court in ‘MOHAR SINGH AND OTHERS VS. STATE OF PUNJAB’, AIR 1981 SC 1578 , wherein, the Apex Court has held that if inconsistency between the ocular and the medical evidence, while appreciating the evidence is found, the conviction cannot be based upon such evidence. 5. Per contra, learned APP, Mr. J.K. Shah, appearing for the State argued vehemently that the trial Court took into consideration all the aspects, which eventually led it to hold the charges duly proved. Moreover, the situation of the place of the incident is such that to expect an independent witness to put up the fight and withstand the onslaught of blows would be virtually asking for impossible. It is, further, argued that the evidence of the prosecution need not be appreciated from the angle of a person with educational background. The first informant is hailing from a rural background and it is quite natural for anybody to get perplexed and apprehensive on sudden witnessing of such an incident. He, further, urged that merely because the appellate Court can reach to a different conclusion from the very set of the evidence, it should not interfere. APPELLATE COURTS’ POWERS: DISCUSSION: 6. Upon thus hearing both the sides and also on close consideration of the material on record, at the outset, it is needed to be recorded that it is a well settled law that the appellate Court should not change the trial Court’s decision only because there is a possibility of the appellate Court to arrive at a separate and different conclusion. The trial Court once appreciates the evidence and comes to its own decision, such a decision of the trial Court can be reversed by the appellate Court, if it finds the legal mistake in the proceedings before the trial Court. The burden is on the appellant to prove the serious illegality going to the root of the matter. The trial Court once appreciates the evidence and comes to its own decision, such a decision of the trial Court can be reversed by the appellate Court, if it finds the legal mistake in the proceedings before the trial Court. The burden is on the appellant to prove the serious illegality going to the root of the matter. Further, there is material distinction between an erroneous judgment and the perverse judgment so also between the wrong verdict and the perverse verdict. 6.1 The Apex Court in the case of ‘M/S. INDIAN IRON AND STEEL CO., LTD. AND ANOTHER Vs. THEIR WORKMEN’, AIR 1958 SC 130 , considered the very issue to hold that the Court of appeal can substitute its own judgment, but, it will interfere only when there is material to hold that the finding is completely baseless or perverse. 6.2 In the case of ‘GOVINDARAJU @ GOVINDA VS. STATE OF SRIRAMAPURAM AND ANOTHER’, 2012 (4) SCC 722 , the appeal was directed against the judgment and order of conviction and sentence recorded under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The grounds raised for reversal of the judgment of the acquittal by the High Court were as follows: (i) The judgment of the High Court is contrary to the settled principles of criminal jurisprudence governing the conversion of order of acquittal into one that of conviction. (ii) The judgment of the High Court suffers from palpable errors of law and appreciation of evidence. All the witnesses had turned hostile and the conviction of the appellant could not be based upon the sole testimony of a Police Officer, who himself was an interested witness. It is contended that the appellant Govindaraju alias Govinda has been falsely implicated in the case. (iii) No independent or material witnesses were examined by the prosecution. Recovery of the alleged weapons of crime have not been proved in accordance with the provisions of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereafter referred to as "the Act"). (iv) No seizure witness was examined and the statement of the Police Officer cannot by itself be made the basis for holding that there was lawful recovery, admissible in evidence, from the appellant. (v) The ocular evidence is not supported by the medical evidence, even in regard to the injuries alleged to have been caused and found on the body of the deceased. (v) The ocular evidence is not supported by the medical evidence, even in regard to the injuries alleged to have been caused and found on the body of the deceased. The story put forward by PW1 is not only improbable but is impossible of being true. (vi) The case of the prosecution is not supported by any scientific evidence. (vii) Lastly, it is the contention of the appellant that they were charged with an offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. The trial court acquitted them. Leave to appeal preferred by the State qua one of the accused, i.e. Govardhan alias Gunda was not granted. Thus, the acquittal of the said accused attained finality. Once the accused Govardhan alias Gunda stands acquitted and the role attributable to the appellant-Govindaraju is lesser compared to that of Govardhan, the present appellant was also entitled to acquittal. The judgment of the High Court, thus, suffers from legal infirmities. 6.3 The Apex Court, therefore, observed and held as under: “5. Keeping in view the submissions made by learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the State, now we may proceed to examine the first contention. In the present case, the trial Court had acquitted both the accused. As already noticed, against the judgment of acquittal, the State had preferred application for leave to appeal. The leave in the case of the present appellant, Govindaraju was granted by the High Court while it was refused in the case of the other accused, Govardhan. Thus, the judgment of acquittal in favour of Govardhan attained finality. We have to examine whether the High Court was justified in over-turning the judgment of acquittal in favour of the appellant passed by the Trial Court on merits of the case. The law is well-settled that an appeal against an order of acquittal is also an appeal under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'Cr.P.C.') and an appellate Court has every power to re-appreciate, review and re-consider the evidence before it, as a whole. It is no doubt true that there is presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and that presumption is reinforced by an order of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. But that is not the end of the matter. It is no doubt true that there is presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and that presumption is reinforced by an order of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. But that is not the end of the matter. It is for the Appellate Court to keep in view the relevant principles of law to re-appreciate and re-weigh the evidence as a whole and to come to its own conclusion on such evidence, in consonance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. {Ref. Girja Prasad (Dead) by L.Rs. v. State of M.P. [ (2007) 7 SCC 625 : ( AIR 2007 SC 3106 : 2007 AIR SCW 5589)]}. 6. Besides the rules regarding appreciation of evidence, the Court has to keep in mind certain significant principles of law under the Indian Criminal Jurisprudence, i.e. right to fair trial and presumption of innocence, which are the twin essentials of administration of criminal justice. A person is presumed to be innocent till proven guilty and once held to be not guilty of a criminal charge, he enjoys the benefits of such presumption which could be interfered with by the courts only for compelling reasons and not merely because another view was possible on appreciation of evidence. The element of perversity should be traceable in the findings recorded by the Court, either of law or of appreciation of evidence. The Legislature in its wisdom, unlike an appeal by an accused in the case of conviction, introduced the concept of leave to appeal in terms of Section 378, Cr.P.C. This is an indication that appeal from acquittal is placed at a somewhat different footing than a normal appeal. But once leave is granted, then there is hardly any difference between a normal appeal and an appeal against acquittal. The concept of leave to appeal under Section 378, Cr.P.C. has been introduced as an additional stage between the order of acquittal and consideration of the judgment by the appellate Court on merits as in the case of a regular appeal. Subsection (3) of Section 378 clearly provides that no appeal to the High Court under sub-section (1) or (2) shall be entertained except with the leave of the High Court. This legislative intent of attaching a definite value to the judgment of acquittal cannot be ignored by the Courts. Subsection (3) of Section 378 clearly provides that no appeal to the High Court under sub-section (1) or (2) shall be entertained except with the leave of the High Court. This legislative intent of attaching a definite value to the judgment of acquittal cannot be ignored by the Courts. Under the scheme of the Cr.P.C., acquittal confers rights on an accused that of a free citizen. A benefit that has accrued to an accused by the judgment of acquittal can be taken away and he can be convicted on appeal, only when the judgment of the trial court is perverse on facts or law. Upon examination of the evidence before it, the Appellate Court should be fully convinced that the findings returned by the trial court are really erroneous and contrary to the settled principles of criminal law. In the case of State of Rajasthan v. Shera Ram alias Vishnu Dutta [ (2012) 1 SCC 602 : ( AIR 2012 SC 1 )], a Bench of this Court, of which one of us (Swatanter Kumar, J.) was a member, took the view that there may be no grave distinction between an appeal against acquittal and an appeal against conviction but the Court has to keep in mind the value of the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused duly endorsed by order of the Court, while the Court exercises its appellate jurisdiction. In this very case, the Court also examined various judgments of this Court dealing with the principles which may guide the exercise of jurisdiction by the Appellate Court in an appeal against a judgment of acquittal. We may usefully refer to the following paragraphs of that judgment: "8. The penal laws in India are primarily based upon certain fundamental procedural values, which are right to fair trial and presumption of innocence. A person is presumed to be innocent till proven guilty and once held to be not guilty of a criminal charge, he enjoys the benefit of such presumption which could be interfered with only for valid and proper reasons. An appeal against acquittal has always been differentiated from a normal appeal against conviction. Wherever there is perversity of facts and/or law appearing in the judgment, the appellate court would be within its jurisdiction to interfere with the judgment of acquittal, but otherwise such interference is not called for. 9. An appeal against acquittal has always been differentiated from a normal appeal against conviction. Wherever there is perversity of facts and/or law appearing in the judgment, the appellate court would be within its jurisdiction to interfere with the judgment of acquittal, but otherwise such interference is not called for. 9. We may refer to a recent judgment of this Court in the case of State of Rajasthan, Through Secretary, Home Department v. Abdul Mannan [ (2011) 8 SCC 65 : ( AIR 2011 SC 3013 : 2011 AIR SCW 4551)], wherein this Court discussed the limitation upon the powers of the appellate court to interfere with the judgment of acquittal and reverse the same. 11. This Court referred to its various judgments and held as under:- "12. As is evident from the above recorded findings, the judgment of conviction was converted to a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. Thus, the first and foremost question that we need to consider is, in what circumstances this Court should interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Against an order of acquittal, an appeal by the State is maintainable to this Court only with the leave of the Court. On the contrary, if the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court is set aside by the High Court, and the accused is sentenced to death, or life imprisonment or imprisonment for more than 10 years, then the right of appeal of the accused is treated as an absolute right subject to the provisions of Articles 134(1) (a) and 134(1)(b) of the Constitution of India and Section 379 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In light of this, it is obvious that an appeal against acquittal is considered on slightly different parameters compared to an ordinary appeal preferred to this Court. 13. When an accused is acquitted of a criminal charge, a right vests in him to be a free citizen and this Court is very cautious in taking away that right. The presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by the fact of acquittal of the accused under our criminal jurisprudence. The courts have held that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, then the one favourable to the accused, may be adopted by the court. The presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by the fact of acquittal of the accused under our criminal jurisprudence. The courts have held that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, then the one favourable to the accused, may be adopted by the court. However, this principle must be applied keeping in view the facts and circumstances of a case and the thumb rule is that whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. If the prosecution has succeeded in discharging its onus, and the error in appreciation of evidence is apparent on the face of the record then the court can interfere in the judgment of acquittal to ensure that the ends of justice are met. This is the linchpin around which the administration of criminal justice revolves. 14. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the burden of proof lies on the prosecution and it has to prove a charge beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence and the right to fair trial are twin safeguards available to the accused under our criminal justice system but once the prosecution has proved its case and the evidence led by the prosecution, in conjunction with the chain of events as are stated to have occurred, if, points irresistibly to the conclusion that the accused is guilty then the court can interfere even with the judgment of acquittal. The judgment of acquittal might be based upon misappreciation of evidence or apparent violation of settled canons of criminal jurisprudence. 15. We may now refer to some judgments of this Court on this issue. In State of M.P. v. Bacchudas ( AIR 2007 SC 1236 : 2007 AIR SCW 1302), the Court was concerned with a case where the accused had been found guilty of an offence punishable under Section 304, Part II read with Section 34, IPC by the trial court; but had been acquitted by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. The appeal was dismissed by this Court, stating that the Supreme Court's interference was called for only when there were substantial and compelling reasons for doing so. After referring to earlier judgments, this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 138-39, paras 9-10) : (Paras 9 and 10 of AIR, AIR SCW) "9. The appeal was dismissed by this Court, stating that the Supreme Court's interference was called for only when there were substantial and compelling reasons for doing so. After referring to earlier judgments, this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 138-39, paras 9-10) : (Paras 9 and 10 of AIR, AIR SCW) "9. There is no embargo on the appellate court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to re-appreciate the evidence where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused really committed any offence or not. (See Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P. ( AIR 2003 SC 1088 : 2003 AIR SCW 617) ) The principle to be followed by the appellate court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable and relevant and convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason for interference. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable and relevant and convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason for interference. These aspects were highlighted by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1973 SC 2622 ); Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat ( AIR 1996 SC 2035 : 1996 AIR SCW 2438); Jaswant Singh v. State of Haryana ( AIR 2000 SC 1833 : 2000 AIR SCW 1430); Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar ( AIR 2003 SC 4664 : 2003 AIR SCW 5095); State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh ( AIR 2003 SC 3609 : 2003 AIR SCW 4065); State of Punjab v. Pohla Singh ( AIR 2003 SC 4407 : 2003 AIR SCW 5044); Suchand Pal v. Phani Pal ( AIR 2004 SC 973 : 2003 AIR SCW 6573) and Sachchey Lal Tiwari v. State of U.P. ( AIR 2004 SC 5039 : 2004 AIR SCW 5672) 10. When the conclusions of the High Court in the background of the evidence on record are tested on the touchstone of the principles set out above, the inevitable conclusion is that the High Court's judgment does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference." 16. In a very recent judgment, a Bench of this Court in State of Kerala v. C.P. Rao decided on 16-5-2011, discussed the scope of interference by this Court in an order of acquittal and while reiterating the view of a three- Judge Bench of this Court in Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1961 SC 715 ), the Court held as under: “13. In coming to this conclusion, we are reminded of the well-settled principle that when the court has to exercise its discretion in an appeal arising against an order of acquittal, the court must remember that the innocence of the accused is further re-established by the judgment of acquittal rendered by the High Court. Against such decision of the High Court, the scope of interference by this Court in an order of acquittal has been very succinctly laid down by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1961 SC 715 ). At SCR p. 129, Subba Rao, J. (as His Lordship then was) culled out the principles as follows: (Para 9 of AIR) “9. At SCR p. 129, Subba Rao, J. (as His Lordship then was) culled out the principles as follows: (Para 9 of AIR) “9. The foregoing discussion yields the following results: (1) an appellate court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) the principles laid down in Sheo Swarup case (AIR 1934 PC 226 (2)) afford a correct guide for the appellate court's approach to a case in disposing of such an appeal; and (3) the different phraseology used in the judgments of this Court, such as (i) "substantial and compelling reasons", (ii) "good and sufficiently cogent reasons", and (iii) "strong reasons", are not intended to curtail the undoubted power of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion; but in doing so it should not only consider every matter on record having a bearing on the questions of fact and the reasons given by the court below in support of its order of acquittal in its arriving at a conclusion on those facts, but should also express those reasons in its judgment, which lead it to hold that the acquittal was not justified'." 17. Reference can also be usefully made to the judgment of this Court in Suman Sood v. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 2007 SC 2774 : 2007 AIR SCW 5013), where this Court reiterated with approval the principles stated by the Court in earlier cases, particularly, Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (AIR 2007 SC (Supp) 111 : 2007 AIR SCW 1850). Emphasising that expressions like "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal, the Court stated that such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with the acquittal. Thus, where it is possible to take only one view i.e. the prosecution evidence points to the guilt of the accused and the judgment is on the face of it perverse, then the Court may interfere with an order of acquittal." 10. There is a very thin but a fine distinction between an appeal against conviction on the one hand and acquittal on the other. There is a very thin but a fine distinction between an appeal against conviction on the one hand and acquittal on the other. The preponderance of judicial opinion of this Court is that there is no substantial difference between an appeal against conviction and an appeal against acquittal except that while dealing with an appeal against acquittal the Court keeps in view the position that the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused has been fortified by his acquittal and if the view adopted by the High Court is a reasonable one and the conclusion reached by it had its grounds well set out on the materials on record, the acquittal may not be interfered with. Thus, this fine distinction has to be kept in mind by the Court while exercising its appellate jurisdiction. The golden rule is that the Court is obliged and it will not abjure its duty to prevent miscarriage of justice, where interference is imperative and the ends of justice so require and it is essential to appease the judicial conscience. 11. Also, this Court had the occasion to state the principles which may be taken into consideration by the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against acquittal. There is no absolute restriction in law to review and relook the entire evidence on which the order of acquittal is founded. If, upon scrutiny, the appellate court finds that the lower court's decision is based on erroneous views and against the settled position of law then the said order of acquittal should be set aside. {See State (Delhi Administration) v. Laxman Kumar and Ors. [ (1985) 4 SCC 476 : ( AIR 1986 SC 250 )]; Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar and Ors. [ AIR 2003 SC 4664 ]; Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu v. John David [JT 2011 (5) SC 1 : (AIR 2011 SC (Cri) 1135 : 2011 AIR SCW 2764)]}. 12. To put it appropriately, we have to examine, with reference to the present case whether the impugned judgment of acquittal recorded by the High Court suffers from any legal infirmity or is based upon erroneous appreciation of evidence. 13. In our considered view, the impugned judgment does not suffer from any legal infirmity and, therefore, does not call for any interference. In the normal course of events, we are required not to interfere with a judgment of acquittal." 7. 13. In our considered view, the impugned judgment does not suffer from any legal infirmity and, therefore, does not call for any interference. In the normal course of events, we are required not to interfere with a judgment of acquittal." 7. The Court also took the view that the Appellate Court cannot lose sight of the fact that it must express its reason in the judgment, which led it to hold that acquittal is not justified. It was also held by this Court that the Appellate Court must also bear in mind the fact that the trial court had the benefit of seeing the witnesses in the witness box and the presumption of innocence is not weakened by the order of acquittal and in such cases if two reasonable conclusions can be reached on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the findings of the trial court. [See C. Antony v. K. G. Raghavan Nair [ (2003) 1 SCC 1 : ( AIR 2003 SC 182 : 2002 AIR SCW 4617)]; and Bhim Singh Rup Singh v. State of Maharashtra [ (1974) 3 SCC 762 : ( AIR 1974 SC 286 )]. 8. If we analyze the above principle somewhat concisely, it is obvious that the golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in a case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. There are no jurisdictional limitations on the power of the Appellate Court but it is to be exercised with some circumspection. The paramount consideration of the Court should be to avoid miscarriage of justice. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from the acquittal of guilty is no less than that from the conviction of an innocent. If there is miscarriage of justice from the acquittal, the higher Court would examine the matter as a Court of fact and appeal while correcting the errors of law and in appreciation of evidence as well. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from the acquittal of guilty is no less than that from the conviction of an innocent. If there is miscarriage of justice from the acquittal, the higher Court would examine the matter as a Court of fact and appeal while correcting the errors of law and in appreciation of evidence as well. Then the Appellate Court may even proceed to record the judgment of guilt to meet the ends of justice, if it is really called for.” [Emphasis Supplied] 6.4 It is, thus, to be concluded that where the judgment suffers from serious legal infirmity which is based upon erroneous appreciation of the evidence, unless there are substantial and compelling reasons and very strong circumstances that distorted conclusions have been arrived at and serious and glaring legal mistakes are committed, there would be no reason for the Appellate Court to interfere. APPRECIATION OF EVIDENCE: 7. With this legal background, if, one examines the evidence, which has been adduced by the prosecution, the post mortem was carried out by PW-1, Dr. Makwana, who found depressed fracture of the scalp of the deceased ( of occipital bone) and such injury was ante mortem in nature. The cause of death mentioned in the post mortem note is ‘Shock due to head injury’. The external injuries mentioned at Column No.17 were corresponding to the internal injuries reflected in the Column No.19. Thus, from post mortem note (Exhibit-6), it can be seen that the prosecution succeeded in establishing that the death occurred on account of the head injury. According to PW-1, the doctor performing PM of the body of the deceased muddamal article No.9, i.e. dhariya, was capable of causing the said injury. Further, as opined medically, the injuries sustained by the deceased were sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature. 7.1 The Panchnama of the body of the deceased, Exhibit-10, which was drawn in the presence of PW-2, did not support the case of the prosecution. However, the same was proved through the IO, Mr. H. L. Sanghada-PW-21. It also reflects the injuries on the head. The bandage applied by the hospital on the head of the deceased is also mentioned, therein. The clothes worn by the deceased also had been seized and the obvious reason for the death was the serious injuries on the head. However, the same was proved through the IO, Mr. H. L. Sanghada-PW-21. It also reflects the injuries on the head. The bandage applied by the hospital on the head of the deceased is also mentioned, therein. The clothes worn by the deceased also had been seized and the obvious reason for the death was the serious injuries on the head. 7.2 Here, relevant it would be to refer to the deposition of PW-3, Dr. Chauhan, who was discharging duties as Medical Officer at Civil Hospital, before whom the injured was brought as a patient. The patient was unconscious and the history was given by the relatives of having been assaulted at around 07:00 p.m.. He also has spoken of the injuries to the deceased on the head near the ear. It was 8 X 1 cms., deep upto to the occipital bone. The blood was oozing out from the left ear. He was advised to be taken to the SSG Hospital, since, the injuries were serious and had been inflicted with sharp weapon. However, the injured passed away while in transit, and therefore, his body was brought back to the Civil Hospital, Godhra and the inquest panchnama was carried out. The MLC certificate issued by Dr. Chauhan certifies that a patient, namely Arjunbhai, was brought to the hospital and the history was given of assault. The injuries were said to have been caused with an axe and the wooden stick by the opposite party. 7.3 The clothes were also recovered from the body of the deceased through panchnama (Exhibit-29), but, panch witnesses-PW-8 (Exhibit-28) did not support the prosecution case. Of course, he identified his signature on the panchnama. The clothes were recovered, after once the post mortem was performed. 7.4 PW-9 (Exhibit-34) also identified his signature on the panchnama (Exhibit-29), but, he denied of the panchnama having been drawn in his presence. The clothes of the deceased were eventually sent to the FSL for examination. As is apparent from the report of FSL (Exhibit-63), the blood was found on the said clothes, which was of group ‘B’ and the blood group of the deceased was ‘B’. 8. Thus, the evidence which have been discussed herein above go to prove the injury occipital bone deep, caused to the deceased, which was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature for causing death of the deceased. 8. Thus, the evidence which have been discussed herein above go to prove the injury occipital bone deep, caused to the deceased, which was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature for causing death of the deceased. The blood was oozing out from the ear on the account of the said injury on the occipital bone and the same had also stained his clothes, which had been recovered by the police after recording the panchnama. This is not an injury, which was caused either due to accident or was self-in-flicter injury. It was by all means the homicidal in nature. The only vital question that needs to be addressed is, as to whether the prosecution succeeded in proving beyond reasonable doubt that such homicidal death amounted to murder, linking the same with the complicity of the appellant. The wife of the deceased, according to the prosecution, is an eye-witness of the incident. She rushed to the place of the incident on the fateful day in the evening with her daughter on hearing hue and cry. It is she, who had given the background of the dispute between the deceased and the appellant. She also stated of the her husband having gone for work on the fateful day and it is only when she overhead the shouts in the neighbourhood that she rushed to the place of incident to find her husband being assaulted by the appellant with a dhariya. The cause of dispute was that the land belonging to one of their uncles was tilled both by the appellant and the deceased. About four days prior to the date of the incident, a buffalo of the deceased had entered the field of the appellant and had grazed paddy crop. The appellant had, therefore, complained about the same and her late husband had assured the appellant to compensate him for his loss. She also stated that her father-in-law had divided the land amongst four siblings. She was residing separately with her husband, whereas, her mother-in-law and father-in-law were residing with the appellant, who was unmarried. She also had emphasized that she rushed to the police station, as she was scared of the appellant, and intimated the police of her brother-in-law, i.e. the appellant, having inflicted blows on her husband. 8.1 In her cross-examination, this witness denied that residence of her father-in-law is half a kilometer away from her own house. She also had emphasized that she rushed to the police station, as she was scared of the appellant, and intimated the police of her brother-in-law, i.e. the appellant, having inflicted blows on her husband. 8.1 In her cross-examination, this witness denied that residence of her father-in-law is half a kilometer away from her own house. In the question raised in the cross-examination, she answered that the father-in-law had about 2 acres of the land, which he had divided amongst the siblings. She did not agree to the suggestion that four days prior to the incident of buffalo, the deceased and the appellant shared good terms. She also denied that the deceased and the appellant used to jointly till the agricultural land. She had no clue, as to why her husband had gone to the residence of the appellant. The only suggestion, which was put forth to her, was that she was keen to grab the land of her father-in-law and for that the appellant is wrongly and falsely implicated, which of course, was firmly denied by her. 9. Naarsinghbhai Dalabhai Baria-PW-13 is the father of the deceased and the appellant. According to him, there was no heated exchange between the appellant and the deceased. However, he agreed that the buffalo had grazed paddy from the field of the appellant. He, further, stated that on the date of the incident, it was raining and on hearing shouts, when he reached to the place he found his son dead. He was not aware as to who had killed his son. This witness, since, did not support the case of the prosecution, he was declared hostile. 9.1 In his cross-examination, he stated that at nights, they used to go to the residence of his another son, namely Gulabsinh-PW-19. However, on hearing the shouts they returned home and found Arjunji lying in injured condition. He did not agree to the suggestion that because of grazing of the paddy, the dispute had arisen. He was unaware as to, who had gone to the police station, but, confirmed that it was the wife of the deceased and his daughter, who had taken him to the Civil Hospital, Godhra. While taking his son to the SSG Hospital, his son was declared brought dead. 10. Bhaaratsinh Naarsinh Baria-PW-14 is the brother, who was residing in the neighbourhood. He also has not supported the case of the prosecution. 11. While taking his son to the SSG Hospital, his son was declared brought dead. 10. Bhaaratsinh Naarsinh Baria-PW-14 is the brother, who was residing in the neighbourhood. He also has not supported the case of the prosecution. 11. Surekhaben Bhaaratsinh Baria-PW-15, who was the sister-in-law of the deceased, also chose not to support the case of the prosecution. 11.1 During the cross-examination of this witness, learned Advocate appearing for the accused-appellant before the trial Court had agreed that the injuries were caused to the deceased with the horn of the cattle. 12. Rupliben Naarsinh Baria-PW-16 is the mother of the deceased, who was examined vide Exhibit-44, also did not support the case of the prosecution. She too deposed along the line of PW-15 and stated that the injury was caused due to cattle. 13. Surajben Gulabsinh Baria-PW-18 also is a sister-in-law of the deceased. She too lent no support to the case of the prosecution and pleaded ignorance about the reason and cause of the death of Arjunbhai. 14. Gulabsinh Naarsinh Baria-PW-19 is one of the siblings of the deceased so also of the appellant. He also along the same line deposed and chose not to support the case of the prosecution. 15. Hiriben Mathurbhai Patel-PW-20 is the mother of the first informant, who too turned hostile to the case of the prosecution. According to her, her daughter had conveyed to him that her son-in-law had been inflicted injury with the horn of the cattle and that resulted into his removing to the hospital, where he breathed his last. Thus, it is quite obvious that, except, the first informant, no one supported the case of the prosecution. The siblings of the deceased and his parents chose not to lend any support to the prosecution case for obvious reasons. When the deceased and his family suffered at the hands of his own brother and therefore, to expect any other family member to support the cause, is asking for the impossible virtually. 16. Mr. H.L. Sanghada-PW-21 was discharging duties as PSI at Morva Police Station on the date of the incident. It was in his presence that the first information report had been given by the wife of the deceased. Initially, the case was registered for the offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC. 16. Mr. H.L. Sanghada-PW-21 was discharging duties as PSI at Morva Police Station on the date of the incident. It was in his presence that the first information report had been given by the wife of the deceased. Initially, the case was registered for the offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC. However, after the injured passed away, during the course of treatment, the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC came to be added. 16.1 PSO registered the same as I-C.R. No. 494 of 2011 and sent it to PW-21 for investigation. 17. Before appreciating the evidence of the close relatives, i.e. the wife of the deceased-PW 10, the arrest panchnama of the appellant so also the seizure of the weapon would assume importance. 17.1 After once the FIR was lodged, the appellant came to be arrested and in the presence of PW-4, Exhibit-17, his clothes were seized. PW-4 did not support the case of the prosecution. However, the said panchnama came to be proved through the IO, in whose presence, the same came to be drawn. The clothes of the accused also had been seized. 18. Another panch witness-PW-6, namely Ranjansinh Mansukhbhai Patel, also did not support the case of the prosecution and he merely identified his signature on the panchnama. 19. The panchnama of the scene of offence (Exhibit-24) was drawn on 29.08.2011 and none of the panch witnesses of the said panchnama, supported the prosecution case. The control sample and the sample of the mud / soil had been collected in the presence of the IO. The same had been, thereafter, sent to the FSL. The panch witnesses of this panchnama also did not support the case of the prosecution. 19.1 The clothes of the deceased had been forwarded to the FSL and from the shirt of light blue colour with strips and stitching work contained the blood with blood group ‘B’, which was the blood group of the deceased. There is no blood group of the appellant on the record. However, the same may assume importance only when, there is any injury caused to the person of the accused, where, the prosecution is required to explain such injury else, it may prove fatal to the case of the prosecution. There is no blood group of the appellant on the record. However, the same may assume importance only when, there is any injury caused to the person of the accused, where, the prosecution is required to explain such injury else, it may prove fatal to the case of the prosecution. However, in the case on hand, there being no injury found on the person of the appellant, in the opinion of this Court, the presence of the blood of blood group ‘B’ on the shirt of the appellant would assume much importance. 20. Some of the important grounds raised by the learned Advocate for the appellant, in support of his case, deserve consideration at this stage. (i) The sole eye-witness is the wife of the deceased, whose presence is doubtful and that no other person having supported the case of the prosecution, she being an interested witness, she should not be believed. It is also urged that her conduct was quite strange, since, she left her husband, who was lying on the ground in injured condition, and went to police station instead of calling for any help and that also raises doubt about her presence at the time of incident. (ii) The identification of the weapon is also another issue. History given to the doctor and others about the weapon would go to the root of the matter. (iii) The officer, who had recorded the FIR, is the one, who had carried out the investigation in the case and that also could be held to be vital to the case of the prosecution. (iv) The appellant has emphasized all along that the case of the prosecution rests on the very thin evidence, which too is not tenable. The overall appreciation of the evidence and the conclusion drawn by the trial Court caused miscarriage of justice. 21. Before addressing the issues independently raised, appreciating the evidence led by the prosecution, the judgment of the trial Court is required to be considered on these aspects. 21.1 The trial Court has correctly and rightly appreciated the medical evidence, which had been duly proved through the witness PWs-1 and 3. It also held that the injuries caused on the person of the deceased were sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. The medical history also indicate inflicting of blows through diary. 21.1 The trial Court has correctly and rightly appreciated the medical evidence, which had been duly proved through the witness PWs-1 and 3. It also held that the injuries caused on the person of the deceased were sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. The medical history also indicate inflicting of blows through diary. 21.2 After discussing, at length, the evidence of the eye-witnesses, the trial Court concluded that the version given by the wife of the deceased is far more believable and trustworthy. The trial Court also did not endorse the view of the defence lawyer that the only witness is the wife who is an interested witness, and therefore, she should not be believed. On the contrary, her emphatic and appreciable stand against one and all and in favour of the truth received acclaim from the Court. 21.3 One of the grounds raised is of the version being questionable is on the aspect of the scene of offence as also from the presence, the incident is said to have occurred on the west side of the house of Naarsinhbhai Baria-PW-13. The first informant also had agreed that the incident took place on the western side of the house of her father-in-law and it concluded that the deposition of the IO is panchnama of Exhibit- 25 are read together, the place of incident was on the western side of the residence of Naarsinhbhai Baria-PW-13. It was on a slope of the residence of Naarsinhbhai--PW-13 and passing through the said slope, the place of offence is situated, and therefore also, it is believed the version of the first informant. 21.4 So far as the evidence of the defence witness, Sirajbhai Yusufbhai Shaikh, examined by the appellant is concerned, the Court found that the document of compromise, Exhibit-69, was the subsequent statement, where the first informant- PW-10 had agreed to the proposition of the incident having happened due to accident. On the ground that the deposition is of 21.04.2012, whereas, the statement is of 11.07.2012, when the defence found that there could be a possibility of conviction that they entered into a compromise. It was by way of a counter-blast that the said action had been taken of preparing a compromise document. 21.5 Here, vital would it be to consider, at this stage, the observations made by the Apex Court in case of ‘GOVINDARAJU @ GOVINDA VS. It was by way of a counter-blast that the said action had been taken of preparing a compromise document. 21.5 Here, vital would it be to consider, at this stage, the observations made by the Apex Court in case of ‘GOVINDARAJU @ GOVINDA VS. STATE OF SRIRAMAPURAM AND ANOTHER’ (Supra), which read thus: “11. Now, we come to the second submission raised on behalf of the appellant that the material witness has not been examined and the reliance cannot be placed upon the sole testimony of the police witness (eye-witness). It is a settled proposition of law of evidence that it is not the number of witnesses that matters but it is the substance. It is also not necessary to examine a large number of witnesses if the prosecution can bring home the guilt of the accused even with a limited number of witnesses. In the case of Lallu Manjhi and Anr. v. State of Jharkhand (2003) 2 SCC 401 : ( AIR 2003 SC 854 : 2003 AIR SCW 308), this Court had classified the oral testimony of the witnesses into three categories:- a. Wholly reliable; b. Wholly unreliable; and c. Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. 12. In the third category of witnesses, the Court has to be cautious and see if the statement of such witness is corroborated, either by the other witnesses or by other documentary or expert evidence. Equally well settled is the proposition of law that where there is a sole witness to the incident, his evidence has to be accepted with caution and after testing it on the touchstone of evidence tendered by other witnesses or evidence otherwise recorded. The evidence of a sole witness should be cogent, reliable and must essentially fit into the chain of events that have been stated by the prosecution. When the prosecution relies upon the testimony of a sole eye-witness, then such evidence has to be wholly reliable and trustworthy. Presence of such witness at the occurrence should not be doubtful. If the evidence of the sole witness is in conflict with the other witnesses, it may not be safe to make such a statement as a foundation of the conviction of the accused. These are the few principles which the Court has stated consistently and with certainty. Presence of such witness at the occurrence should not be doubtful. If the evidence of the sole witness is in conflict with the other witnesses, it may not be safe to make such a statement as a foundation of the conviction of the accused. These are the few principles which the Court has stated consistently and with certainty. Reference in this regard can be made to the cases of Joseph v. State of Kerala (2003) 1 SCC 465 : ( AIR 2003 SC 507 : 2002 AIR SCW 4933) and Tika Ram v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2007) 15 SCC 760. Even in the case of Jhapsa Kabari and others v. State of Bihar (2001) 10 SCC 94 : ( AIR 2002 SC 312 : 2001 AIR SCW 5037), this Court took the view that if the presence of a witness is doubtful, it becomes a case of conviction based on the testimony of a solitary witness. There is, however, no bar in basing the conviction on the testimony of a solitary witness so long as the said witness is reliable and trustworthy.” 21.6 It is not out of place to refer to Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which does not insist on the repeatative proof of any fact in issue. Of course, the IO recored the statement of the close relatives, who were supposed to be present at the time of the incident. None of the them, however, supported the case of the prosecution, except, the first informant, who, on hearing the shouts, had rushed to the place of incident along with her daughter, where she found the appellant inflicting blows on her husband and who, on account of that, had fallen down and was bleeding. It is not unusual for a wife to get scared of the person, who had dhariya in his hand and had inflicted injuries on her husband, to rush to the police station. It, of course, took her a little long to rush to the police station and come back with them. Ordinarily, if someone is found to be assaulted, he or she would either intervene or would call for medical aid, especially, when a wife finds that her husband is inflicted severe injuries. However, that alone cannot be a ground for the Court to hold this witness wholly unreliable. Ordinarily, if someone is found to be assaulted, he or she would either intervene or would call for medical aid, especially, when a wife finds that her husband is inflicted severe injuries. However, that alone cannot be a ground for the Court to hold this witness wholly unreliable. She was frank enough to admit that act of her brother-in-law scared her of her own life and that of her daughter and hence, she rushed to the police station. There could be no straight jacket formula for the behaviour and conduct of the human being in a particular situation. Each person would have his and her own in built constitution and if the response in the given situation is different than contemplated, that would not question their very presence. She has no reason to implicate her brother-in-law falsely. The dispute with regard to the grazing of paddy of the appellant by the buffalo of the deceased had happened only for days before the date of the incident and therefore, a serious concern was raised by the appellant. According to the first informant, therefore, her husband had assured the appellant of compensating his loss. However, when her husband did not come back in the evening, after leaving home in the morning at 11:00 a.m., she was unware as to how he reached to the place of the incident, i.e. at the residence of the appellant. Nonetheless, she heard the shouts and rushed to the place of incident, where she found the appellant having dhariya in his hand and inflicting blows on the head of the deceased. It is a trite law that the evidence of a solitary witness also can be believed to hold a person guilty, if, it inspires the confidence. In the instant case, the prosecution succeeded in proving through the evidence of the first informant-wife not only the infliction of blows by the appellant on the head of the deceased but also further that the such injuries caused were sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death of a person, which, otherwise, is a homicidal death. 22. In the instant case, the prosecution succeeded in proving through the evidence of the first informant-wife not only the infliction of blows by the appellant on the head of the deceased but also further that the such injuries caused were sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death of a person, which, otherwise, is a homicidal death. 22. The question that arises for the consideration of this Court is as to whether, the same is a homicidal death amounting to murder, the case, since, does not fall within any of the exceptions as incorporated in the provisions itself, the injuries found on the body of the deceased were rightly held to be caused by the appellant to the deceased, actuated by the motive of the annoyance on the ground of the buffalo, which was let loose. Her husband had four siblings, and therefore, had that been a case of the property, there are two other brothers-in-law are also there, who are not named in the complaint. Had there been an ill-intention or ill motive on the part of the first informant, she could have involved others as well. Since, the gravity of the offence is such that it would have made difficult for the others also to withstand. Instead of that, she stuck to the version of the appellant having inflicted blows with dhariya on her husband. 22.1 The evidence of the prosecution witnesses, which has been believed by the trial Court to hold that the appellant had caused injuries on the head of the deceased, which proved to be fatal and which was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death of a person. This Court sees no reason to interfere with such conclusion. 22.2 With regard to the weapon used by the appellant, the evidence of PW-10, who was the eye-witness of the incident, is very categorical of the appellant having used dhariya. Of course, Dr. Chauhan-PW-3 stated that the history was given by the relatives that the injuries were inflicted with a wooden stick. Dr. Makwana-PW-1, who carried out the PM on the body of the deceased, opined that the injuries were possible with dhariya and they were also sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. Of course, Dr. Chauhan-PW-3 stated that the history was given by the relatives that the injuries were inflicted with a wooden stick. Dr. Makwana-PW-1, who carried out the PM on the body of the deceased, opined that the injuries were possible with dhariya and they were also sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. 22.3 If, one looks at the panchnama of the discovery of the weapon, Exhibit-38, as per Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the appellant had agreed to show the dhariya. He had taken the IO, in the presence of the panchas, at the residence of Gulabsinh-PW-19 and had taken out the same from the shelf of the drawing room. 22.4 Of course, there is discrepancy in the FIR, which is given on 28.08.2011 by the first informant-PW-10, i.e. the wife of the deceased, who had stated of her husband having been inflicted blows with a wooden stick. However, later on, at the time of recording of her evidence before the trial Court, she categorically stated of the blows having been given by a dhariya. The two grounds, i.e. , firstly, in the first information given to the police, the reference is made of the wooden stick and secondly none of the panch witnesses supported the case of the prosecution in whose presence panchnama of discovery of weapon (Exhibit-38) was drawn, which have been much emphasized by the learned Advocate appearing for the appellant. 22.5 In the opinion of this Court, this can surely be called discrepancy, but, they are not so serious that it would shake the very basis of the case of the prosecution. The first informant, later on, in her deposition before the trial Court has spoken of the dhariya in the hands of the appellant. Thus, the prosecution not only has succeeded in establishing through this witness the presence of the appellant, at the time of incident, and his having inflicted blows on the head of her husband, i.e. the deceased- Arjunbhai and overwhelming other evidences indicate the happening of the incident near the residence of the complainant, which is also the residence of the appellant coupled with the fact that the evidence, which have been discussed herein above, it cannot be said that the discrepancy or infirmities are so vital that it would be possible to discard all the positive evidences, which have been led by the prosecution. 22.6 Moreover, though, from the very set of evidence, even if, the appellate Court can arrive at a conclusion, other than the one arrived at by the trial Court, then also unless there is patent illegality and complete miscarriage of justice, this need not be interefered. Conclusion: 23. Resultantly, this appeal fails and is DISMISSED. The judgment and order of the trial Court, Dated: 14.02.2013, passed by the learned 8th Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Panchmahal at Godhra, in Sessions Case No. 1 of 2012, is CONFIRMED. 24. While parting, the Court needs to refer to the Victim Compensation Scheme framed by the State government pursuant to the amendment in the Code, whereby, Section 357A is introduced into the Code. Let the Chairman, the District Legal Services Authority of the concerned district examine the case of the victim and provide her with the compensation. 24.1 Let such task be completed within a period of TWELVE WEEKS.