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2018 DIGILAW 332 (RAJ)

Puneet Chitlangiya v. Archana

2018-01-24

G.R.MOOLCHANDANI, PRADEEP NANDRAJOG

body2018
JUDGMENT : PRADEEP NANDRAJOG, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the appellant. 2. We note that the respondent did not contest the petition seeking divorce by the appellant. She has not even appeared in the appeal in spite of being served. 3. Case of the appellant was that at the time of the marriage he was working as an Associate Professor with Mahatma Gandhi Hospital, Jaipur. After marriage on 26.6.2012 the respondent lived in his ancestral house in Sikar. His job as a doctor gave him very little time to be with his wife and she did not like the same. Whenever he would go to Sikar, she would deny sex to him. Both of them resolved on 5.3.2014 to dissolve the marriage by consent on terms recorded in a deed of settlement. 4. Deposing as his witness the appellant said said facts. Needless to state he was not cross-examined. The deed of settlement has been marked as mark ‘A’, probably for the reason it is a photocopy. 5. The impugned decision shows that the learned Judge has looked into the settlement deed marked ‘A’ and has highlighted that unless the wife joined in filing an application under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, the document could not be considered. The learned Judge has held that it appears to be a case where the appellant seeks divorce on the ground of consent and has not joined the wife to cooperate with him in filing a petition under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act. 6. The reasoning of the learned Trial Judge is wrong. As pleaded by the appellant, the respondent was annoyed with him because he could not spend much time with her on account of he being preoccupied as a doctor. His work place was Jaipur. His house was in Sikar. Whenever he would visit his wife at Sikar she would be angry and deny sex to him. It is in this context that the appellant pleaded the consent between the parties. 7. The impugned judgment has not discussed the evidence of the appellant regarding denial of sex by the respondent. The disinterest of the respondent is apparent from the fact that she never contested the divorce petition nor appeared in the appeal. 8. It is in this context that the appellant pleaded the consent between the parties. 7. The impugned judgment has not discussed the evidence of the appellant regarding denial of sex by the respondent. The disinterest of the respondent is apparent from the fact that she never contested the divorce petition nor appeared in the appeal. 8. We allow the appeal holding that the appellant has been able to prove cruelty in the form of denial of sex by the respondent. Impugned judgment dated 19.11.2014 is set aside. Petition seeking divorce by the appellant on ground of cruelty is allowed. Marriage between the parties solemnized on 26.6.2012 is annulled. 9. No costs.