JUDGMENT : 1. This second appeal filed under section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (in short ‘CPC’) is directed against the judgment and decree dated 24-9-2010 passed in Regular Civil Appeal No. 10-A/2010 whereby the lower Appellate Court has affirmed the judgment and decree passed in Civil Suit No. 127-A/09 decided on 30-11-2009. 2. The respondent/plaintiff instituted a civil suit seeking eviction under section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (in short ‘Act of 1961’). The stand of the plaintiff was that Late Abdul Razak, father of present appellant was given the disputed premises on rent which was enhanced upto Rs. 700/- p.m. The plaintiff pleaded that he is owner of the suit premises which is required for his unemployed son Mohd. Zamal, who intends to carry-out the business of sale of auto parts etc. The eviction was prayed for on the ground that the plaintiff had no other reasonable non-residential accommodation in the city of Bhopal. The appellants filed the written statement before the Court below. They categorically denied that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit premises. Thereafter, the Court below framed the issues, recorded evidence of parties and by judgment and decree dated 31-1-2006 allowed the aforesaid civil suit. Aggrieved, the appellants filed RCA under section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code before the Court below. The said appeal was dismissed on 24-12-2010. 3. Mrs. Shobha Menon, Senior Counsel assisted by Shri Rahul Choubey, counsel for the appellants contended that for seeking a decree under section 12(1)(f) of the Act of 1961, the plaintiff was required to establish that he was the landlord as well as “owner” of the suit property. In view of the categorical denial in the written statement about ownership of suit premises by the plaintiff, the Court below has erred in passing the decree in favour of the plaintiff. It is further urged that the plaintiff gave power of attorney to his son who, in turn, entered the witness box and deposed on behalf of plaintiff. Learned Senior Counsel argued that no doubt, plaintiff can give such power of attorney to his son but while making statement, the power of attorney holder could have deposed only about such factual things which were within his knowledge. If any statement of fact was deposed which was beyond his personal knowledge, such evidence is wholly impermissible and unreliable. Learned Senior Counsel argued that no doubt, plaintiff can give such power of attorney to his son but while making statement, the power of attorney holder could have deposed only about such factual things which were within his knowledge. If any statement of fact was deposed which was beyond his personal knowledge, such evidence is wholly impermissible and unreliable. It is submitted that admittedly, as per the case of the plaintiff, the alleged partition on the strength of which plaintiff claimed title of the suit property, took place more than 35 years back whereas the age of the deponent/power of attorney holder was less than 35 years on the date of deposition. Thus, the factum of partition could not have been deposed by him and such deposition is totally untrustworthy. Hence, factum of ownership is not proved. In support of said contention reliance is placed on Janaki v. Indus Ind Bank, (2005) 2 SCC 217 and Man Kaur (dead) by LRs. v. Hartar Singh Sangha, 2011 (2) M.P.L.J. (S.C.) 1 : (2010) 10 SCC 512 . 4. The next contention of learned Senior Counsel is that the plaintiff could not establish the factum of ownership on the suit premises and, therefore, decree under section 12(1)(f) of the Act could not have been passed. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on the case of Dayal Das v. Rajendra Prasad Gautam, 2012 (2) M.P.L.J. 460. To elaborate, it is contended that there was no element of admission on the part of the defendants on the question of ownership of plaintiff on the suit property and, therefore, necessary ingredients of section 12(1)(f) of the Act were not satisfied. It is submitted that section 116 of the Evidence Act is general provision whereas section 12 of the Act of 1961 is part of special enactment. Section 12 of the Act has an overriding effect on any other law including Evidence Act. Thus, section 116 of Evidence Act cannot be pressed into service. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on the case of Rajendra Kumar Mahawar v. Smt. Shakuntala Makhanlal Kesarwani, 2000 (1) M.P.L.J. 44. Section 12 of the Act has an overriding effect on any other law including Evidence Act. Thus, section 116 of Evidence Act cannot be pressed into service. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on the case of Rajendra Kumar Mahawar v. Smt. Shakuntala Makhanlal Kesarwani, 2000 (1) M.P.L.J. 44. Learned Senior Counsel, during the course of her arguments, attacked the findings of learned lower Appellate Court whereby the Court below opined that even if the plaintiff has not filed any partition deed or Will, it will have no adverse impact on his case because in that event, the plaintiff shall be treated to be a co-owner of the property. The co-owner is entitled to institute a suit as per settled legal position. Criticizing this finding, it is urged that it was nobody's case and the Court below has travelled beyond the record while giving such finding. In other words, the Appellate Court has carved-out a new case pertaining to co-ownership of the disputed property by plaintiff which per se was never pleaded by the respondent. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent supported the judgments passed by the Courts below. He submits that the plaintiff did not set-up a new case of co-ownership, indeed, it was an alternative way of argument which was advanced and accepted by the lower Appellate Court. By taking this Court to the statement of appellant No. 1, it is argued that appellants are bound by section 116 of the Evidence Act and it cannot be said that plaintiff was not the landlord and owner of the suit property. In addition, learned counsel for the respondent has taken pains to submit that respondent is entitled to get the benefit of mesne profit in the present case. The relief relating to mesne profit was claimed in the plaint. The trial Court erred in not granting the said benefit. For the purpose of grant of mesne profit reliance is placed on the case of Gopalkrishna Pillai v. Meenakshi Aval, AIR 1967 SC 155 wherein the Apex Court held that it is discretion of the Court to direct inquiry for deciding the aspect of mesne profit. He also placed reliance on the case of Fateh Chand v. Balkishan Dass, AIR 1963 SC 1405 to contend that the mesne profit must include the element of interest and compensation. He also placed reliance on the case of Fateh Chand v. Balkishan Dass, AIR 1963 SC 1405 to contend that the mesne profit must include the element of interest and compensation. Reference is made to (1977) 4 SCC 393 : AIR 1977 SC 2270 , Shyam Charan v. Sheoji Bhai where the question was whether mesne profit can be awarded for the period between termination of contractual tenancy and passing of eviction decree. 6. The claim of appellants for grant of mesne profit is based on AIR 1979 Patna 11, Dwarka Rai v. Babu Lakshmi Narain Singh, AIR 1985 Bombay 202, Smt. Purificacao Fernandes v. Dr. Hugo Vicente de Perpetuo Socorro Andrade Menezes and judgment of this Court reported in 2000 (1) M.P.L.J. 547, Rajendra Kumar Mahawar v. Smt. Shakuntala Makhanlal Kesarwani. For the purpose of determining rate of mesne profit, reliance is placed on the case of Shyamacharan Raghubar Prasad Tiwari v. Sheojee Bhai Jairam Chattri, 1971 M.P.L.J. 78 : AIR 1971 M.P. 120 . (2012) 6 SCC 460, Padmawati v. Harijan Sewak Sangh is heavily relied upon to contend that even if no appeal is preferred by the present appellants against the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, in this second appeal also preferred by the appellants/defendants, this Court can grant mesne profit. It is strenuously contended that in view of judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramarameshwari Devi v. Nirmala Devi, 2011 (4) M.P.L.J. 281, the defendant who has put the plaintiff into difficulty, compelled him to fight a long drawn battle in the corridors of the Court must be compensated. Several adjournments were taken by the defendants before the Court below. The cost/mesne profit must be awarded which should be a deterrent for such unscrupulous litigants. 7. Faced with this, in rejoinder submission, learned counsel for the present appellants contended that appellants/defendants preferred the first appeal. The plaintiff did not prefer any appeal against the portion of the judgment of the trial Court whereby mesne profit was not granted to him. He did not raise any objection or argument before the lower Appellate Court in relation to his claim about grant of mesne profit. In this second appellate stage and in appeal preferred by the present appellants, the plaintiff's claim is not tenable. He did not raise any objection or argument before the lower Appellate Court in relation to his claim about grant of mesne profit. In this second appellate stage and in appeal preferred by the present appellants, the plaintiff's claim is not tenable. Reliance is placed on 1989 M.P.L.J. 178, Abdul Karim v. Hafij Mohammad and (2003) 9 SCC 606 , Banarsi v. Ram Phal. It is contended that the decree or order for eviction of the tenant must mean final decree or final order of eviction. For the same purpose, reliance is placed on 1980 M.P.L.J. 346 : 1980 JLJ 300 , Bhimandas v. Nagibai. As per section 13(5) of the Act of 1961, mesne profit can be directed to be given only when conditions mentioned in section 13(5) of the Act are satisfied. In the present case, the appellants have paid the rent continuously. The rent was paid during entire trial and appellate proceedings. The plaintiff, at no point of time, informed the Court about any nonpayment of monthly rent by the appellants, hence question of grant of mesne profit does not arise in this appeal. 8. No other point is pressed by learned counsel for the parties. 9. I have bestowed my anxious consideration on the rival contentions and perused the record. This Court while admitting the appeal framed following substantial questions of law:— 2. “1. Whether the word “acts” employed in Order III, Rule 1 and 2 of Civil Procedure Code does not include deposing in place and instead of the principal? 2. Whether the plaintiff was required to prima facie establish the factum of ownership insofar as the suit premises was concerned and could it be said that the ingredients of section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 have been complied? 3. Whether the Appellate Court, has acted, beyond its jurisdiction, in carving out a new case, pertaining to co-ownership of disputed premises. which per se, was never pleaded by respondent?” 10. As to question No. 1 and 2: The Supreme Court in 2005 (1) M.P.L.J. (S.C.) 421 : (2005) 2 SCC 217 : AIR 2005 SC 439 , Janki Vashideo Bhojwani v. Indusind Bank Ltd. has drawn the curtains on the question upto what extent a power of attorney holder can depose in place and instead of principal. As to question No. 1 and 2: The Supreme Court in 2005 (1) M.P.L.J. (S.C.) 421 : (2005) 2 SCC 217 : AIR 2005 SC 439 , Janki Vashideo Bhojwani v. Indusind Bank Ltd. has drawn the curtains on the question upto what extent a power of attorney holder can depose in place and instead of principal. It was held as under:— “Order III, Rules 1 and 2, Civil Procedure Code, empowers the holder of power of attorney to “act” on behalf of the principal. In our view the word “acts” employed in Order III. Rules 1 and 2, Civil Procedure Code, confines only in respect of “acts” done by the power of attorney holder in exercise of power granted by the instrument. The term “acts” would not include deposing in place and instead of the principal. In other words, if the power of attorney holder has rendered some “acts” in pursuance to power of attorney, he may depose for the principal in respect of such acts, but he cannot depose for the principal for the acts done by the principal and not by him. Similarly, he cannot depose for the principal in respect of the matter which only the principal can have a personal knowledge and in respect of which the principal is entitled to be cross-examined.” (Emphasis supplied) The ratio decidendi of aforesaid case was followed in 2011 (2) M.P.L.J. (S.C.) 1 : (2010) 10 SCC 512 , Man Kaur (dead) by LRs. v. Hartar Singh Sangha. This Court also followed this principle in 2005 (2) M.P.L.J. 230 , Bashir v. Smt. Hussain Bano. 11. In the light of aforesaid principles laid down by the Supreme Court, there is no doubt that the power of attorney holder can depose for the principal in respect of such “acts” which were done by him or which were within his personal knowledge. The ancillary issue is whether this principle gives any benefit to the present appellants in the present case. The argument relating to the extent of deposition by power of attorney holder is raised to contend that the plaintiff is claiming ownership on the basis of a partition which had taken place during the period when the deponent/power of attorney holder was not even bom. Thus, by no stretch of imagination, the deponent could have any personal knowledge about any such oral or written partition or execution of any Will. Thus, by no stretch of imagination, the deponent could have any personal knowledge about any such oral or written partition or execution of any Will. Thus, factum of ownership, is not proved. The aforesaid argument, on the first blush, appears to be attractive. However, on a deeper scrutiny, I find no substance in the said contention. No doubt, in section 12(1)(f), the Legislature has used the words “landlord” and “owner” both. This Court in Dayal Das (supra) considered the said aspect and opined that the intention of Legislature is clear while using both the words aforesaid that the plaintiff has to establish that he is “landlord and owner” both. In the present case, although the factum of ownership was denied in the written statement by appellant No. 1 but during cross-examination, he categorically admitted that plaintiff is the owner. Interestingly, during the course of arguments, reliance was placed by the appellants on (1922) 24 Bom. L.R. 576, Mussammat Sasiman Chowdhurain v. Shib Narayan Chowdhury. The learned Judge opined that the Urdu word which he has translated “of a landlord” is “Malikiyat”. The word “Malik” was also considered by holding that “Malik” is one who holds “mulk” or “land”. It was treated to be in relation to the terms of the deed. In my opinion, the word “Malik” is an Urdu word which is being used commonly. The dictionary meaning of word “Malik” is “owner” (See : Legal Glossary published by Law and Justice Ministry, Rajbhasha Division, 1988). In common parlance also, the word “Malik” is used in relation to “owner”. Thus, I am unable to hold that the judgment of Shib Narayan (supra) is of any assistance to the appellants. 12. The Courts below have considered the statement of appellant No. 1 who unequivocally admitted that he treats the plaintiff as owner of the suit shop. In view of this candid and specific admission of appellant No. 1, it can be safely concluded that he admitted that plaintiff is the owner of the property. This is not in dispute that the factum of landlord was already established by the plaintiff. No attack was made by the appellants on that aspect. In the case reported in 2002 MPLJ Online (S.C.) 4 : (2002) 3 SCC 375 , Sheela v. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, the Apex Court opined as under:— 11. “10. This is not in dispute that the factum of landlord was already established by the plaintiff. No attack was made by the appellants on that aspect. In the case reported in 2002 MPLJ Online (S.C.) 4 : (2002) 3 SCC 375 , Sheela v. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, the Apex Court opined as under:— 11. “10. While seeking an ejectment on the ground of bona fide requirement under clause (f) abovesaid the landlord is required to allege and prove not only that he is a ‘landlord’ but also that he is the ‘owner’ of the premises. The definition of ‘landlord’ and ‘tenant’ as given in clauses (b) and (i) of section 2 of the Act make it clear that under the Act the concept of landlordship is different from that of ownership. A person may be a ‘landlord’ though not an ‘owner’ of the premises. The factor determinative of landlordship is the factum of his receiving or his entitlement to receive the rent of any accommodation. Such receiving or right to receive the rent may be on the own account of the landlord or on account of or for the benefit of any other person. A trustee, a guardian and a receiver are also included in the definition of landlord. Such landlord would be entitled to seek an eviction of the tenant on one or more of such grounds falling within the ambit of section 12(1) of the Act which do not require the landlord to be an owner also so as to be entitled to successfully maintain a claim for eviction. Clause (f) contemplates a claim for eviction being maintained by an owner-landlord and not a landlord merely. Though of course, we may hasten to add, that the concept of ownership in a landlord-tenant litigation governed by Rent Control Law has to be distinguished from the one in a title suit. Ownership is a relative term the import whereof depends on the context in which it is used. In Rent Control Legislation, the landlord can be said to be owner if he is entitled in his own legal right, as distinguished from for and on behalf of someone else, to evict the tenant and then to retain, control, hold and use the premises for himself. In Rent Control Legislation, the landlord can be said to be owner if he is entitled in his own legal right, as distinguished from for and on behalf of someone else, to evict the tenant and then to retain, control, hold and use the premises for himself. What may suffice and hold good as proof of ownership in a landlord tenant litigation probably may or may not be enough to successfully sustain a claim for ownership in a title suit. In M.M. Quasim v. Manoharlal Sharma, (1981) 3 SCC 36 , it was held that an ‘owner-landlord’ who can seek eviction on the ground of his personal requirement is one who has a right against the whole world to occupy the building in his own right and exclude anyone holding a title lesser than his own. In Dilbagrai Punjabi v. Sharad Chandra, 1988 Supp SCC 710, this Court held that it was essential to sustain a claim of eviction under section 12(1)(f) of the Act to establish that the plaintiff was the owner of the premises. However, the Court upheld the ownership of the landlord having been proved on the basis of an admission of the ownership of the plaintiff made by the defendant in reply to notice given before the institution of the suit and the recital of the name of the plaintiff as the owner of the property contained in the receipts issued by the landlord to the tenant over a period of time. Thus, the burden of proving ownership in a suit between landlord and tenant where the landlord-tenant relationship is either admitted or proved is not so heavy as in a title suit and lesser quantum of proof may suffice than what would be needed in a suit based on title against a person setting up a contending title while disputing the title of the plaintiff. Nevertheless pleading and proving ownership, in the sense as it carries in Rent Control Law, is one of the ingredients of the ground under section 12(1)(f) of the Act. (Emphasis supplied) 13. Nevertheless pleading and proving ownership, in the sense as it carries in Rent Control Law, is one of the ingredients of the ground under section 12(1)(f) of the Act. (Emphasis supplied) 13. This Court in its recent judgment passed in F.A. No. 92/2009, Prakash Pahuja v. Devendra Kumar Jain decided on 15-2-2018 [2018 (3) M.P.L.J. 68] opined that “A bare perusal of principle laid down in this judgment makes it clear that in a suit for eviction, the plaintiff is not required to prove his title on the basis of same principles which are applicable in the suit for declaration of title. The Apex Court considered the aspect of ownership in this judgment and opined that in landlord tenant litigation, the landlord can be said to be owner if he is entitled in his own legal right to evict the tenant and then to retain, control, hold and use the premises for himself. To determine these aspects, the Court has to examine the facts and circumstances of each case and no straight jacket formula can be laid down. Thus, the core issue is whether the Court below was justified in answering the Issue No. 1 in favour of the plaintiff. No doubt, the Court below erroneously opined that Ex.P/1 and P/2 shows that these documents are related with partition. These documents also became reason to hold that the plaintiff is the landlord. A plain reading of Ex.P/1 and P/2 shows that these documents were executed way back on 21-2-1958 and 10-6-1959. Thus, these documents, by no stretch of imagination, can be said to be related with partition of the suit property. To this extent, I find substance in the argument of learned counsel for the appellant. These documents cannot be basis to decide Issue No. 1 in favour of the plaintiff. However, a minute reading of para 6 of the impugned judgment shows that the Court below has taken into account the statement of present appellant wherein it was categorically admitted by him that rent has been continuously paid to the plaintiff. It was specifically admitted that plaintiff has been recognized by the defendant as his landlord. In view of this candid admission of present appellant during cross-examination, the Court below opined that after having admitted the relationship and factum of payment of rent to the plaintiff, the appellant is “estopped” under section 116 of the Evidence Act. It was specifically admitted that plaintiff has been recognized by the defendant as his landlord. In view of this candid admission of present appellant during cross-examination, the Court below opined that after having admitted the relationship and factum of payment of rent to the plaintiff, the appellant is “estopped” under section 116 of the Evidence Act. The deposition of the appellant shows that his admission regarding payment of rent to the plaintiff is clear and unequivocal. The appellant clearly stated that he treats Shri Devendra Kumar Jain as the landlord. He paid rent to plaintiff since beginning. He did not pay rent to anybody else. He received receipts of rent from plaintiff and he is still treating the plaintiff as the landlord. 14. In view of the common string of principle available in aforesaid cases, I have no scintilla of doubt that the power of attorney holder can depose to a limited extent and in relation to his personal knowledge but this aspect is of no help to the appellants because the Courts below have rightly decided the factum of ownership. The said finding of fact is based on the candid statement/deposition of Rashid. In view of aforesaid statement of appellant No. 1, the appellants are estopped under section 116 of the Evidence Act and they cannot question that plaintiff is not landlord and owner. I find support in my view from the case reported in (1996) 8 SCC 632 , Padmini Chandrasekharan v. R. Rajagopal Reddy. The Apex Court held that in the face of conduct of the appellant and her husband in paying the rent to one Shri Reddy, this amounts to attorn said Shri Reddy as owner of the demised property. In (2000) 1 SCC 451 , C. Chandramohan v. Sengottaiyan, the Apex Court held that the respondents started paying the rent to the appellant. The High Court has also referred to the evidence of the appellant in which he admitted that the respondents did not deny that he was the landlord when depositing the rent in the Court and that they were paying rent to him. The subsequent denial was held to be not bona fide. This Court in 2006 (1) M.P.L.J. 123 , Mahila Samiti v. Hola Ram Sindhi held that the factum of payment of rent to the plaintiff was admitted by the other side. The subsequent denial was held to be not bona fide. This Court in 2006 (1) M.P.L.J. 123 , Mahila Samiti v. Hola Ram Sindhi held that the factum of payment of rent to the plaintiff was admitted by the other side. The tenant once having admitted the tenancy is estopped from challenging the title of the landlord by virtue of section 116 of the Evidence Act. The doctrine of tenant's estoppel was considered and it was poignantly held that the said doctrine got statutory recognition in section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The judgment of Zehra Bai v. Jagmohan, reported in 2000 (2) MPWN 142 was considered whereby after paying the rent to plaintiff by tenant it was held that it does not lie in the mouth of defendant to dispute the ownership of the landlord. In 2008 (2) M.P.L.J. 365 , Karan Lal Kesharwani v. Sardar House it was again held that after having paid the rent to the plaintiff for long time, the principle of “estoppel” will come into play. Interestingly, in this case also during cross-examination, the tenant has admitted that he is paying rent to the appellant and therefore section 116 of the Evidence Act is rightly pressed into service. In a recent judgment reported in (2017) 5 SCC 451 , Om Prakash v. Mishri Lal, the Supreme Court opined that the original defendant having accepted Smt Chameli Devi as his landlady and thereafter continued to pay rent to her son Bhola Nath, the father of the appellants, in terms of definition of “landlord”, the respondents are estopped under section 116 of the Evidence Act. It was further held that a tenant during the continuance of the tenancy is debarred on the doctrine of estoppel from denying the title of his landlord as is enshrined in section 116 of the said Act. The inspiration is taken from the earlier judgments reported in (1999) 7 SCC 474 , S. Thangappan v. P. Padmavathy and (2006) 5 SCC 532 , Bhogadi Kannababu v. Vuggina Pydamma. Since factum of landlord and ownership was established before the Court below, essential ingredients flowing from section 12(1)(f) of the Act of 1961 were satisfied. Hence, the argument of appellant regarding overriding effect of section 12(1)(f) of said Act over the Evidence Act and contention that special Act of 1961 will prevail over Evidence Act pales into insignificance. Since factum of landlord and ownership was established before the Court below, essential ingredients flowing from section 12(1)(f) of the Act of 1961 were satisfied. Hence, the argument of appellant regarding overriding effect of section 12(1)(f) of said Act over the Evidence Act and contention that special Act of 1961 will prevail over Evidence Act pales into insignificance. The substantial question No. 1 and 2 are decided accordingly. 15. As to substantial Question No. 3: As analyzed above, it is clear that the plaintiff has established his ownership on the said disputed premises and, therefore, the substantial question of law No. 3 also pales into insignificance. Even otherwise, I find substance in the argument of learned counsel for the respondent that the argument advanced before the lower Appellate Court about co-ownership, was an alternative argument based on the pleadings of the parties. 16. This Court will be failing in its duty if it won't consider the argument advanced by learned counsel for the respondent regarding grant of mesne profit. As noticed, the principles, formula and methodology to determine and grant mesne profit was considered in great detail by the Supreme Court and various High Courts. Learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon those judgments which were referred hereinabove. Before dealing with the question of determination of mesne profit, the basic question is whether in this Second Appeal, any such benefit can be claimed by the respondent. If this question is answered in affirmative, then only the question of determining the quantum of mesne profit would arise. This Court in Abdul Karim v. Hafij Mohammad, 1989 M.P.L.J. 178 opined as under:— “9. Against this dismissal of claim in the suit, the plaintiffs ought to have preferred an appeal or cross-obiections, which having not been done, that finding of the dismissal of the claim has become final. Not only this, no prayer was made by the plaintiffs before the lower Appellate Court for passing a decree in accordance with the provisions of Order 22, Rule 12 Civil Procedure Code and for a direction or for making an enquiry as to rent or mesne profits from the institution of the suit until the delivery of possession to the decree holder. Thirdly, even no prayer was made for exercising the power under Order 41, Rule 33, Civil Procedure Code. Thirdly, even no prayer was made for exercising the power under Order 41, Rule 33, Civil Procedure Code. Even if the prayer was made, which I do not find in the judgment of the lower Appellate Court, in that case too the Appellate Court could not have granted the relief of future mesne profits could not have been granted by exercising the powers under Order 41, Rule 33, Civil Procedure Code. The powers under Order 41, Rule 33 Civil Procedure Code can be used only in exceptional cases, enabling the Court to pass a decree as ought to have been passed or as the nature of the case required even in favour of a party who has not appealed but the powers are restricted to cases, where as a result of interference in favour of the appellant, further interference is rendered necessary in order to adjust the rights of the party according to justice, equity and good conscience.” (Emphasis supplied) 17. The Supreme Court in Banarshi v. Ramphal, (2003) 9 SCC 606 poignantly held that: “13. We are, therefore, of the opinion that in the absence of cross appeal preferred or cross objection taken by the plaintiff-respondent the First Appellate Court did not have jurisdiction to modify the decree in the manner in which it has done. Within the scope of appeals preferred by the appellants the First Appellate Court could have either allowed the appeals and dismissed the suit filed by the respondent in its entirety or could have deleted the latter part of the decree which granted the decree for specific performance conditional upon failure of the defendant to deposit the money in terms of the decree or could have maintained the decree as it was passed by dismissing the appeals. What the First Appellate Court has done is not only to set aside the decree to the extent to which it was in favour of the appellants but also granted an absolute and out and out decree for specific performance of agreement to sell which is to the prejudice of the appellants and to the advantage of the respondent who has neither filed an appeal nor taken any cross objection.” 18. In the light of these judgments, I am unable to hold that the respondents can claim benefit of mesne profit in the second appeal preferred by the appellants/defendants. In the light of these judgments, I am unable to hold that the respondents can claim benefit of mesne profit in the second appeal preferred by the appellants/defendants. Moreso, when appellants did not file any crossappeal/objection against the judgment and decree, to the extent mesne profit was not granted. He did not file any cross-objection before the lower Appellate Court. The judgment of lower Appellate Court does not reflect that even any oral argument/claim about mesne profit was advanced by the present respondent. So far judgment of Padmawati (supra) is concerned on which heavy reliance is placed, it is clear that the question whether at second appellate stage, for the first time, the respondent can orally raise the claim of mesne profit was not considered and decided. Thus, the said judgment is not an authority on this aspect. 19. This is trite law that the judgment of Supreme Court should not be read as euclid's theorem or like a statute. [See: Ashwani Kumar Singh v. U.P. Public Service Commission, (2003) 11 SCC 584 , Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 111 , Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Sanjay Dalia, (2015) 10 SCC 161 , Vishal N. Kalsaria v. Bank of India, 2016 MPLJ Online (S.C.) 7 : (2016) 3 SCC 762 ]. A judgment is a binding precedent on the principle which has been finally decided and not on something which is logically flowing therefrom. [See : State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra, AIR 1968 SC 647 , Regional Manager v. Pawan Kumar Dubey, (1976) 3 SCC 334 : AIR 1976 SC 1766 , Archana Kumar v. Purendu Prakash Mukherjee, 2000 (2) M.P.L.J. (F.B.) 491, Commissioner of Customs (Port), Chennai v. Toyota Kirloskar Motor (P) Ltd., (2007) 5 SCC 371 ]. 20. Thus, this Court is unable to hold that in the light of judgment of Padmawati (supra), mesne profit can be granted to the respondent in the present proceedings. 21. In view of foregoing analysis, I find no legal error in the impugned judgments. Resultantly, the second appeal is dismissed. No cost.