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2018 DIGILAW 337 (RAJ)

SHANKARDAS SWAMI v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

2018-01-25

P.K.LOHRA

body2018
ORDER : P.K. Lohra, J. These three revision petitions, under Section 397/401 Cr.P.C., are directed against common order dated 28th of January, 2017, passed by Special Judge, Anti Corruption Act Cases, Sri Ganganagar (for short, 'learned trial Court'), framing charge against all the petitioners, therefore, all are heard together and disposed of by a common order. 2. Petitioner Shankardas Swami is a retired Executive Officer of Municipal Board Sadulsahar, District Sri Ganganagar, petitioner Smt. Manisha Khichar is former Chairperson of the Municipal Board and the third petitioner Ramniwas, a private individual, is alleged beneficiary of dubious transaction. The learned trial Court, by the order impugned, framed charges against them for offence under Section 13(1)(d) r/w with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act r/w Section 120-B IPC and Sections 420 or 420 r/w Section 120-B IPC, 477 or 477A r/w Section 120-B IPC, 167 r/w Section 120-B IPC, 193 or 193 r/w Section 120-B IPC, 196 or 196 r/w Section 120-B IPC and 109 IPC. 3. The facts, in brief, giving rise to these revision petitions, are that respondent-complainant Madanlal submitted a written report at Police Station Sadulshahar against petitioners Ramniwas Agrawal, Shankardas Swami and one Badri Prasad Suthar, a Clerk of Municipal Board, Sadulshahar, inter-alia, alleging therein that one house with the plot size 50x60 ft., situated in Ward No.5 of Sadulshahar, is recorded in the name of Bhagwan Singh S/o Banta Singh for last so many years as per records of Municipal Board. Report also unfurled that on the plot in question shops and rooms are constructed and the building was let out to one Ramniwas Agarwal, who subsequently purchased the plot and building without any formal documentation. It is also borne out from the report that for the purpose of soliciting requisite entry in the record of Municipal Board, Ramniwas in connivance with Shankardas Swami and Badri Prasad Suthar hatched a conspiracy for entertaining his application dated 25th of October 2004 alongwith affidavit. In the application, Ramniwas averred that a land measuring 60x28 ft is in his possession, which is Nazul land (Government land) and his possession over the land be regularized. 4. In the application, Ramniwas averred that a land measuring 60x28 ft is in his possession, which is Nazul land (Government land) and his possession over the land be regularized. 4. The report also disclosed that petitioner Shankardas Swami, as the Executive Officer of Municipal Board, taken the application on record and initiated proceedings for regularization by calling report of the concerned Junior Engineer and Clerk Badri Prasad completed all the formalities, which eventually led to regularization of the land in dispute and execution of lease-deed after charging stamp duty of Rs. 1020. The precise allegation of the complainant was that Ramniwas was already having Plot No.211 measuring 20x45 ft in municipal area, recorded in his name, and therefore, proceedings for regularization was dehors the law. It is also categorically averred in the complaint that wife of Ramniwas was also owner of Plot No. 246A/4 measuring 20x50 ft. With all these allegations, the complainant insinuated petitioner Shankardas Swami for issuing illegal Patta in the name of Ramniwas. With the advent of time, the report was sent to Police Station Sadulshahar through Superintendent of Police, Sri Ganganagar. Upon investigation Sadulshahar police concluded that no offence is made out, and therefore, the application was sent to Anti Corruption Bureau and later on FIR No. 312/08 was registered by the Anti Corruption Bureau, Jaipur. 5. Although, in the complaint, names of Ramniwas Agarwal, Shankardas Swami and Badri Prasad were mentioned, but the Anti Corruption Bureau after investigation submitted charge-sheet against present petitioners and also against one Ramesh Chandra Gupta, a neighbour of petitioner Ramniwas Agrawal, who submitted application before the Municipal Board which was in fact processed by Badri Prasad Clerk and duly acknowledged by J.En. Purshottam Jain by submitting his report but both of them were charge-sheeted. This sort of situation arose because the Govt. did grant sanction for prosecution of J.En. Purshottam Jain and Clerk Badri Prasad Suthar. 6. After submission of charge-sheet, learned trial Court heard arguments by resorting to Section 228 Cr.P.C., 1973 and by the order impugned framed aforesaid charges against all the three petitioners but discharged Ramchandra. 7. It is submitted by learned counsel for petitioner Shankardas Swami that he has retired from the services on 30th of April 2012, and therefore, being Govt. 6. After submission of charge-sheet, learned trial Court heard arguments by resorting to Section 228 Cr.P.C., 1973 and by the order impugned framed aforesaid charges against all the three petitioners but discharged Ramchandra. 7. It is submitted by learned counsel for petitioner Shankardas Swami that he has retired from the services on 30th of April 2012, and therefore, being Govt. Servant requirement of sanction for his prosecution vis-a-vis offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act may have vanished but still he is entitled for protection under Section 197 Cr.P.C., 1973 vis-a-vis offences under the Indian Penal Code. It is argued by Mr. Sandhu that in fact the land in dispute was Nazul (Govt. land) but a private property recorded as House No.545 in the name of one Bhagwan S/o Banta Singh as per Municipal record. Learned counsel further submits that petitioner Shankardas as Executive Officer filed a civil suit for cancellation of Patta issued in favour of Ramniwas and the Patta was cancelled even before registration of FIR by the Anti Corruption Bureau. It is also argued by learned counsel that petitioner as the Executive Officer of Municipal Board simply sent the matter for inquiry and therefore prima facie it is rather difficult to comprehend his criminal delinquency under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Learned counsel would contend that the Government has granted sanction for prosecution against Junior Engineer Purshottam Jain and Clerk Badri Prasad further goes to show that prima facie there was no incriminating material against them for prosecution, and therefore, in that background, prosecuting petitioner and the then Chairperson of the Municipal Board is wholly unwarranted. 8. Learned counsel further submits that the learned trial Court has at all cared to examine protection available to petitioner vis-a-vis offences under the Indian Penal Code and if his prosecution for these offences is barred in want of sanction, per se his prosecution for offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act is at all tenable. Elaborating his submissions in this behalf, learned counsel submits that in the backdrop of facts and circumstances of the instant case none of the ingredients for offence under clause (b) of Section 13(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is prima facie discernible. Elaborating his submissions in this behalf, learned counsel submits that in the backdrop of facts and circumstances of the instant case none of the ingredients for offence under clause (b) of Section 13(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is prima facie discernible. Lastly, learned counsel contends that proper investigation was conducted in the matter and the learned trial Court has also completely eschewed the facts and circumstances, which were having direct ramification on the case besides superannuation of the petitioner way back in April 2012. In support of his arguments, learned counsel has placed reliance on following judgments : (1) M/s. Shastri Sales Corporation & Ors. v. Income Tax officer [1996 Cr.L.J. 449] (2) State of Punjab v. Labh Singh [2015 (1) RLW 236 (SC)]. 9. Mr. Kaushal Gautam, learned counsel appearing for petitioner Smt. Manisha Khichar, has reiterated all the submissions made by learned counsel Mr. Sandhu. Mr. Gautam submits that petitioner as Chairperson of Municipal Board has demitted the office way back in the year 2009 and during investigation nothing has unfurled to castigate her for the alleged offence. Mr. Gautam submits that even after demitting the office as Chairperson, being public servant at the relevant point of time, she is enjoying protection under Section 197 Cr.P.C., 1973 vis-a-vis IPC offences. Learned counsel further submits that a bare perusal of the impugned order makes it abundantly clear that in issuance of Patta petitioner has played any role much less proactive role at the cost of causing loss to Municipal Board. It is also argued by learned counsel Mr. Gautam that Municipal Board instituted a civil suit for cancellation of Patta and same was got cancelled before registration of the FIR by Anti Corruption Bureau, was itself a vital fact which ought to have been examined by the learned trial Court. 10. Mr. N.K. Sharma, appearing for petitioner Ramniwas, submits that being a private person his prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act is at all permissible, more particularly when the other two petitioners public servants cannot be prosecuted for IPC offences in want of requisite sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C., 1973 Learned counsel, Mr. Sharma, submits that granting sanction by Government for prosecution of Junior Engineer Purshottam Jain and Clerk Badri Prasad Suthar, sufficiently demonstrates that it has found prima facie incriminating evidence against them. Sharma, submits that granting sanction by Government for prosecution of Junior Engineer Purshottam Jain and Clerk Badri Prasad Suthar, sufficiently demonstrates that it has found prima facie incriminating evidence against them. Lastly, learned counsel has urged that when the Government has granted sanction for prosecuting public servants, i.e., petitioner Shankardas Swami and Smt. Manisha Khichar, for their prosecution under Section 197 Cr.P.C., 1973 for IPC offences, framing charge for these offences would be futile exercise and sheer abuse of the process of the Court. 11. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor has vehemently opposed the revision petitions. It is submitted by learned Public Prosecutor that the learned trial Court has evaluated the materials available on record in right perspective for framing charges against the petitioners, and therefore, no interference with the impugned order is called for. Learned Public Prosecutor would contend that when the alleged offences were committed by petitioners Shankardas Swami and Smt. Manisha Khichar, they were public servants but after their retirement no sanction for prosecution vis-a-vis offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act is envisaged under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. It is also argued by learned Public Prosecutor that mere cancellation of Patta issued in favour of Ramniwas cannot absolve all the petitioners from offences for which charges are framed. 12. Learned counsel for the complainant, Mr. Rajendra Soni, has reiterated the submissions made by learned Public Prosecutor. It is also argued by learned counsel for the complainant that earlier petitioners Shankardas Swami and Smt. Manisha Khichar filed two separate criminal misc. petitions for quashing FIR but the same were dismissed on 1st of October 2011, therefore, it would be appropriate to interfere with the impugned order framing charges against them. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused impugned order and the materials available on record. 13. Upon consideration of the alleged criminal delinquencies of the petitioners for which charges are framed against them, it has emerged out that when Patta of the disputed land was issued both Shankardas Swami and Smt. Manisha Khichar were enjoying status of "Public Servant" within the meaning of Section 21 of the IPC as well as Section 2(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Section 197 Cr.P.C., 1973 envisages prosecution of Judges and Public Servants. Section 197 Cr.P.C., 1973 envisages prosecution of Judges and Public Servants. As per mandate of Section 197 Cr.P.C., 1973 if a public servant has allegedly committed any offence while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction of the Government. The protection under Section 197 Cr.P.C., 1973 available to Government servants against institution of possible vexatious criminal proceedings for the offences alleged to have been committed by them while acting or purporting to act as public servants. Therefore, when the offence complained of against public servant is attributable to discharge of public duty or has a direct nexus therewith, obtaining sanction is pre-requisite. 14. It goes without saying that at the relevant point of time when Patta of disputed land was issued, petitioners Shankardas Swami and Manisha Khichar were in helm of affairs as Executive Officer and Chairperson of Municipal Board, Sadulshahar respectively, therefore, their act or omission had direct nexus with discharge of their official duty. In these circumstances, sanction for prosecution of both of them as public servants for offences under IPC was necessary is a question which requires consideration. 15. With the advent of time petitioner Shankardas Swami was superannuated as Executive Officer and other petitioner Smt. Manisha Khichar also demitted office of Chairperson on expiry of her term before submission of charge-sheet in the matter. Therefore, in that background, the Court is required to see whether both of them after ceasing to be public servants can enjoy the protection under Section 197 Cr.P.C., 1973. The legal position is no more res integra inasmuch as the Supreme Court in case of R. Balakrishna Pillai v. State of Kerala & Anr. [ (1996) 1 SCC 478 ], while considering this issue, held : "We may mention that the Law Commission in its 41st Report in paragraph 15.123 while dealing with Section 197, as it then stood, observed "it appears to us that protection under the section is needed as much after retirement of the public servant as before retirement. The protection afforded by the section would be rendered illusory if it were open to a private person harbouring a grievance to wait until the public servant ceased to hold his official position, and then to lodge a complaint. The protection afforded by the section would be rendered illusory if it were open to a private person harbouring a grievance to wait until the public servant ceased to hold his official position, and then to lodge a complaint. The ultimate justification for the protection conferred by Section 197 is the public interest in seeing that official acts do lead to needless or vexatious prosecutions. It should be to the Government to determine from that point of view the question of the expediency of prosecuting any public servant". It was in pursuance of this observation that the expression 'was' came to be employed after the expression is' to make the sanction applicable even in cases where a retired public servant is sought to be prosecuted." A similar view is reiterated in case of Labh Singh (supra), wherein the Supreme Court held : "However as regards charges for the offences punishable under the IPC concerned the High Court was absolutely right in setting aside the order of the Special Judge. Unlike section 19 of the POC Act, the protection under section 197 of Cr.P.C., 1973 is available to the concerned public servant even after retirement. Therefore, if the matter was considered by the sanctioning authority and the sanction to prosecute was rejected first on 13.09.2000 and secondly on 24.09.2003, the court could have taken cognizance insofar as the offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code are concerned. As laid down by this Court in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Nishant Sareen (2010) 14 SCC 527 , the recourse in such cases is either to challenge the order of the Sanctioning Authority or to approach it again if there is any fresh material. In the circumstances, in our view the order under appeal passed by the High Court is correct insofar as charges under Indian Penal Code are concerned but must be set aside as regards charge under POC Act is concerned. Before we part, we must record that we do approve the stand taken by the appellant in the petition. The prosecution cannot keep waiting till a public servant retires and then choose to file charge-sheet against him after his retirement, thereby setting at naught the protection available to him under Section 19 of the POC Act. The appeal thus stands allowed partly. No order as to costs." 16. The prosecution cannot keep waiting till a public servant retires and then choose to file charge-sheet against him after his retirement, thereby setting at naught the protection available to him under Section 19 of the POC Act. The appeal thus stands allowed partly. No order as to costs." 16. Undeniably, sanction for prosecution vis-a-vis IPC offences has been granted by the State Government against petitioners Shankardas Swami and Manisha Khichar, therefore, by virtue of ratio decidendi of the Supreme Court judgments, cognizance of these offences itself is barred which has obviously rendered impugned order vulnerable to the extent both of them are charged for offences under the Indian Penal Code. 17. So far as petitioner Ramniwas is concerned, being private individual and alleged beneficiary of dubious transaction, his prosecution for offences of IPC and consequent framing of charge for those offences by any stretch of imagination cannot be termed as infirm. I am at loss to say that alleged criminal delinquency of an individual cannot be tonned down by subsequent events. Under criminal jurisprudence, ramification of such altered situation, at the stage of framing charges, is absolutely alien. However, may be at the final stage of trial, its relevance/significance as a mitigating circumstance can be examined by the Court. 18. There remains no quarrel that it was petitioner Ramniwas, who had initiated the proceedings for regularization, entered into alleged conspiracy by prima facie manipulating falsification of accounts, cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property, and fraudulent cancellation/destruction of valuable security. In this view of the matter, subsequent cancellation of Patta, issued in his favour by Municipal Board, itself cannot absolve him from the alleged offences so as to find fault with the impugned order. 19. Now switching on to the charge under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act read with Section 120-B IPC, which is framed against petitioner Shankardas Swami and Smt. Manisha Khichar, it would be appropriate to refer Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, which prescribes necessity of previous sanction for prosecuting a public servant for offence punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 & 15 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Although Section 197 Cr.P.C., 1973 also envisage sanction for prosecution but there is mark distinction between Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 197 Cr.P.C., 1973 Section 197 Cr.P.C., 1973 only speaks about public servants in office but also speaks about public servants who have demitted the office, or retired. However, under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 Section 19 though speaks about previous sanction for prosecution, but it does speak about a public servant, who ceases to be in office at the time of launching prosecution. 20. Supreme Court, in case of Kalicharan Mahapatra v. State of Orissa [ (1998) 6 SCC 411 ], discussed in detail the distinction between Section 197 Cr.P.C., 1973 and provisions under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The Court held : "It must be remembered that in spite of bringing such a significant change to Section 197 of the Code in 1973, Parliament was circumspect enough to change the wording in Section 19 of the Act which deals with sanction. The reason is obvious. The sanction contemplated in Section 197 of the Code concerns a public servant who "is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty", whereas the offences contemplated in the P.C. Act are those which cannot be treated as acts either directly or even purportedly done in the discharge of his official duties. Parliament must have desired to maintain the distinction and hence the wording in the corresponding provision in the former P.C. Act was materially imported in the new P.C. Act, 1988 without any change in spite of the change made in Section 197 of the Code. The result of the above discussion is thus: A public servant who committed an offence mentioned in the Act, while he was a public servant, can be prosecuted with the sanction contemplated in Section 19 of the Act if he continues to be a public servant when the court takes cognizance of the offence. But if he ceases to be a public servant by that time the court can take cognizance of the offence without any such sanction. But if he ceases to be a public servant by that time the court can take cognizance of the offence without any such sanction. In other words, the public servant who committed the offence while he was a public servant, is liable to be prosecuted whether he continues in office at the time of trial or during the pendency of the prosecution." 21. The said view is also reiterated by the Supreme Court in Labh Singh (supra), wherein the Court held : "In the present case the public servants in question had retired on 13.12.1999 and 30.04.2000. The sanction to prosecute them was rejected subsequent to their retirement i.e. first on 13.09.2000 and later on 24.09.2003. The public servants having retired from service there was no occasion to consider grant of sanction Under Section 19 of the POC Act. The law on the point is quite clear that sanction to prosecute the public servant for the offences under the POC Act is required if the public servant had already retired on the date of cognizance by the court. In S.A. Venkataraman v. State ( 1958 SCR 1040 ) while construing Section 6(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 which provision is in pari materia with Section 19(1) of the POC Act, this Court held that no sanction was necessary in the case of a person who had ceased to be the public servant at the time the court was asked to take cognizance. The view taken in S.A. Venkataraman (supra) was adopted by this Court in C.R. Bansi v. State of Maharashtra (1970) 3 SCC 537 and in Kalicharan Mahapatra v. State of Orissa : (1998) 6 SCC 411 and by the Constitution Bench of this Court in K. Veeraswamy v. Union of India (1977) 3 SCC 440 . The High Court was therefore justified in setting aside the order passed by the Special Judge insofar as charge under the POC Act was concerned." 22. Thus, the legal position, which has emerged out, has per se cleared decks for prosecution of petitioners Shankardas Swami and Manisha Khichar for offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act even without previous sanction. Thus, the legal position, which has emerged out, has per se cleared decks for prosecution of petitioners Shankardas Swami and Manisha Khichar for offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act even without previous sanction. Therefore, framing of charges against petitioners Shankardas Swami and Manisha Khichar for offence under Section 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act read with Section 120-B IPC, cannot be categorized as infirm or improper in the backdrop of facts and circumstances of the instant case. 23. The contention of the learned counsel for petitioners that Patta of the disputed land, issued in the name of petitioner Ramniwas, was cancelled before submission of charge-sheet by Anti Corruption Bureau in the matter, therefore, requisite materials for framing charges against them are available, cannot be decided in isolation to the facts of the case. As in the instant case, prima facie, Court has noticed any infirmity regarding charges framed against petitioners Shankardas Swami and Mrs. Manisha Khichar for offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, the framing of aforesaid charges against the third petitioner Ramniwas cannot be faulted. More so, his role as one of the conspirators has also prima facie come to the fore during investigation. 24. It is true that Court while exercising power under Section 227 Cr.P.C., 1973 can discharge an accused person, if it is convinced that there is no sufficient ground for prosecuting accused but then, at that stage, Court is required to see prima facie case against an individual and to examine it from the stand-point of proof beyond reasonable doubt for an offence. If the Court comes to the conclusion that commission of offence is probable consequence, it can proceed to frame charges sans probative value of materials on record. The learned trial Court, in my considered opinion, while framing charge against petitioners Shankardas Swami and Manisha Khichar, has, therefore, rightly analyzed the materials available on record in the light of powers under Section 227 Cr.P.C., 1973 Likewise, learned Court below has rightly examined the material for framing charge against petitioner Ramniwas. 25. The judgment in M/s. Shastri Sales Corporation (supra), on which learned counsel for the petitioners have placed reliance, is clearly distinguishable. In that case, the assessee was castigated for concealment of income and/or furnishing inaccurate particulars for particular assessment year, whereupon Income Tax Officer passed penalty order and ordered prosecution of the assessee. 25. The judgment in M/s. Shastri Sales Corporation (supra), on which learned counsel for the petitioners have placed reliance, is clearly distinguishable. In that case, the assessee was castigated for concealment of income and/or furnishing inaccurate particulars for particular assessment year, whereupon Income Tax Officer passed penalty order and ordered prosecution of the assessee. However, subsequently, the penalty order passed by Income Tax Officer was quashed by Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) and confirmed by the Income Tax Tribunal, therefore, in that background, the Bombay High Court held : "The gravamen of the charge in the complaint filed by the complainant-respondent is the concealment of income and/or furnishing of inaccurate particulars by the assessee for the assessment years 1983-84 and 1984-85 and on the self-same facts penalty orders were passed by the Income Tax Officer on 29-3-88, and 28-3-1988 respectively. The said orders of penalty passed by the concerned Income Tax Officer under section 271(1)(c) of the I.T. Act have been quashed by the Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) by its common order dated 31-5-1989, and the said order has been confirmed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal by its common order dated 23-9-92. In my view, therefore, there is absolutely no justification for continuing with the prosecution of the accused-petitioners pursuant to the complaint filed by the respondent-complainant on 30-12- 1988. The Incometax Appellate Tribunal has already held in its order dated 23-9-1992, that the Department has failed to prove that the assessee has concealed the particulars of any income or furnished inaccurate particulars for the assessment years 1983-84 and 1984-85 and the penalty orders were justified. Though at the time of the filing of the complaint it cannot be said that the said complaint was mis-conceived because the orders under section 271(1)(c) had attained finality, but now since the matter has attained finality at the stage of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and it has been held that accused-petitioners were guilty of concealment of income and/or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income and there was no justification in imposing penalty on them, further proceedings in the complaint cannot be permitted and the applicants have become eligible for discharge." 26. The fact situation in the instant case is entirely different inasmuch as initially report was submitted by the complainant on 10th of February 2008 before Police Station Sadulshahar, which was subsequently sent to Anti Corruption Bureau and it is after registration of FIR by Anti Corruption Bureau, the Municipal Board filed a suit for cancellation of Patta and the same was cancelled by judgment and decree dated 7th of July 2011. Therefore, unlike in Bombay case, gravamen of the charge, in the complaint filed by respondent-complainant, has been done away by any appellate forum rather the same has been set at naught by a competent civil Court upon initiation of a litigation by the Municipal Board allegedly to camouflage its serious omissions and commissions. Thus, in totality, while agreeing with the proposition laid down in M/s. Shastri Sales Corporation (supra), in my opinion, the ratio decidendi of the said verdict cannot render any assistance to the cause of the petitioners. 27. In view of foregoing discussion, the revision petitions filed by petitioners Shankardas Swami and Manisha Khichar are allowed in part and the charges, framed by learned trial Court, against them for offences under the Indian Penal Code, are quashed and set aside, entailing their discharge for these offences. However, the impugned order to the extent charges are framed against these petitioners for offence under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act read with Section 120-B IPC is maintained. The revision petition filed by petitioner Ramniwas, in the backdrop of facts and circumstances of the instant case is bereft of any merit and accordingly same is dismissed in toto. 28. Before parting, it is clarified that the learned trial Court may proceed with the trial against the petitioners dispassionately uninfluenced by the observations made in this order and decide the matter strictly in accordance with law.