JUDGMENT : Ali Mohammad Magrey, J. This petition under Section 561-A Cr.P.C, filed by the petitioners, seeks dismissal of the criminal complaint titled Dr. Mohammad Sultan Khuroo v. Firdous Ahmad Wani and ors., and quashment of order dated 23.09.2017, whereby the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Srinagar, took cognizance of the offences under Sections 406, 417, 469, 471, 500 and 506 Ranbir Penal code and ordered issue of bailable warrants for securing presence of the accused. 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the record and considered the matter. 3. Petitioner no. 1 and the contesting respondent have an in-law relationship with each other former being the son-in-law and the latter the father-in-law. The matrimonial relationship between petitioner no. 1 and his wife, i.e., the daughter of the contesting respondent, has turned incongruous, strained and landed in extreme disharmony, so much so petitioner no. 1's wife is said to have also filed a complaint under the provisions of the J&K Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2010 before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate which is stated to be pending trial, and, in para 3 of this petition, the petitioners allege that she did it at the instance of her father, i.e., the complainant-contesting-respondent herein. 4. The case of the petitioners is that not satisfied (with the aforesaid vengeful complaint filed by complainant's daughter), the complainant-respondent, with a view to wreaking vengeance and harassing petitioner no. 1, filed the instant, impugned complaint against him, other petitioners and proforma respondent no. 2, concocting a false and fabricated story of which the petitioners have no knowledge, nor are they related to the functioning of the respondent's clinic. This is the brief, backdrop of the factual side and the case of the petitioners as delineated in paras 2, 3 and 4 of the petition. 5. So far as the impugned order dated 23.09.2017 passed by the learned trial Magistrate is concerned, before stating the challenge of the petitioners thereto, I deem it appropriate to give a brief resume of the complaint filed by the complainant-respondent no. 1 before the trial court. 6. In his complaint, the complainant, the contesting respondent herein, stated that he is a globally renowned and acclaimed Doctor, having specialized field of Gastroenterology, with Degrees and achievements at local, national and international levels specified in para 1 of the complaint. 1 before the trial court. 6. In his complaint, the complainant, the contesting respondent herein, stated that he is a globally renowned and acclaimed Doctor, having specialized field of Gastroenterology, with Degrees and achievements at local, national and international levels specified in para 1 of the complaint. He is presently discharging his duties as Director, Digestive Diseases Centre, Dr. Khuroo's Medical Clinic, Srinagar, which is a day-care tertiary medical facility dealing with management of gastrointestinal and liver diseases. The Centre/Medical Facility/Clinic is stated to be a family-funded and sponsored trust, operational since 2006. Presently, it is said to be following over 55,000 patients. 7. Petitioner no. 1 (accused no. 2 in the complaint), as already mentioned above, is the complainant's son-in-law and their relations are strained. He is said to be a Doctor an ENT Specialist practicing at Handwara. It is alleged that petitioner no. 1 and proforma respondent no. 2 (accused nos. 1 and 2 in the complaint) are bosom friends and petitioners 2 and 3 (accused 3 and 4) are petitioner no. 1's employees; whereas petitioner no. 4 (accused no. 5) is said to be father of petitioner no. 1 and petitioner no. 5 (accused no. 6) is a Chemist, running his medical/drug shop at Langate Market, Handwara. 8. It is alleged that petitioner no. 1 is having old matrimonial issues with the complainant's daughter and that the matter is being fought and litigated in courts of law, and that the endeavour of petitioner no. 1 has been to blight the complainant's reputation, respect, honour and integrity and, in that connection, he has been filing false and frivolous complaints/applications before various authorities. It is alleged that accused no. 2 had been referring his relatives, friends, colleagues and acquaintances to the complainant's clinic for tertiary care, opinion and treatment, mostly on complimentary basis. As such he had comprehensive knowledge about the patients from Handwara town being treated by the complainant. Mother of accused no. 1, Mst. Fatima, is said to be one of the patients of the complainant. 9. It is alleged that some three months back, accused nos. 1 and 2 (proforma respondent and petitioner no. 1 herein) fraudulently and deceptively spread a word in the township of Handwara that the complainant was holding consultation camp at Handwara for the convenience and benefit of patients living in Handwara and the adjoining localities. 9. It is alleged that some three months back, accused nos. 1 and 2 (proforma respondent and petitioner no. 1 herein) fraudulently and deceptively spread a word in the township of Handwara that the complainant was holding consultation camp at Handwara for the convenience and benefit of patients living in Handwara and the adjoining localities. The concerned patients were informed to submit their medical record relating to the complainant's treatment, to petitioner no. 1. It is stated that the complainant had neither authorized any person to convey any such message to any patient, nor had he any such plan of holding a consultation camp at Handwara. It is alleged that the accused, in connivance with each other, approached some patients under the treatment of the complainant, asked for, and obtained their medical records concerning the treatment prescribed to them by the complainant, tampered therewith and made copies thereof, without any authorization, to use the same for unlawful and illegal purpose by presenting the same before various authorities for causing damage to the reputation and honour of the complainant. In this regard, the complaint contains the details of how the accused approached the complainant's patients, which included one Ghulam Nabi Kaboo, and obtained the medical records from them. It is alleged that the medical record of Ghulam Nabi Kaboo was taken from his home from his wife on the aforesaid misrepresentation and when Ghulam Nabi Kaboo came to know about it, he approaches accused nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5 to explain the reason and that accused no. 5 told him that he wanted to teach the complainant a lesson. Another patient of the complainant, named, Haji Mohd Maqool Lone, is said to have placed the medical record with accused no. 6 who, in connivance with other accused, handed over it to accused nos. 1 and 2 for facilitating them to use the same for unlawful and illegal purposes by tampering with the same and presenting it before various authorities. 10. It is stated that, thereafter, accused no. 1, i.e., the proforma respondent herein, acting in criminal conspiracy, and conniving with other accused, filed a false and frivolous application before SHO Police Station, Parimpora, accompanied by the USG reports of his mother, Mst. 10. It is stated that, thereafter, accused no. 1, i.e., the proforma respondent herein, acting in criminal conspiracy, and conniving with other accused, filed a false and frivolous application before SHO Police Station, Parimpora, accompanied by the USG reports of his mother, Mst. Fatima, and the copies of USG reports of Ghulam Nabi Kaboo and Haji Mohd Maqool Lone, alleging that the USG scans were full of discrepancies, the Sonologist did not have the requisite qualifications, and that the patients were not satisfied. The complainant was informed by the SHO about the complaint. It is stated that the complainant has been maintaining the records relating to his patients treated at the Clinic. After retrieving and examining the relevant records, it was found by the complainant that the USG reports accompanying the complaint filed by accused no. 1 before the Police had been tampered with and forged, with a sinister motive to defame and lower the reputation, respect and honour of the complainant in the estimation of the right thinking members of the society. It is stated in the complaint that the tampering of the USG Reports and accusations levelled by the accused in clandestine criminal conspiracy with each other have, in fact, lowered the honor, esteem and respect of the complaint in the estimation of the right thinking members of the society. It is alleged that the news of the complaint against complainant filed at Police Station Parimpora spread like wild fire and the complainant became the subject of unhealthy discussions and debates and his integrity and credibility as a world class Doctor and of his clinic has been called in question. The defamation has also called in question the great values to which the complainant's clinic ascribes. The complainant is stated to have been put to humiliation and embarrassment. It is stated that he has been receiving calls from shocked friends, acquaintances, students, colleagues and associates, expressing surprise at the allegations so made against him; hence the complaint. 11. The case of the petitioners is that the learned Magistrate, without appreciating the essence of criminal jurisprudence, has straightaway proceeded to issue bailable warrants against the petitioners. It is stated that he has been receiving calls from shocked friends, acquaintances, students, colleagues and associates, expressing surprise at the allegations so made against him; hence the complaint. 11. The case of the petitioners is that the learned Magistrate, without appreciating the essence of criminal jurisprudence, has straightaway proceeded to issue bailable warrants against the petitioners. The order is challenged as being patently illegal and unlawful on the grounds: (i) that the material alleged in the complaint and the statements recorded are insufficient, incoherent and seem on their face to be cooked/fabricated to implicate the petitioners; (ii) that it suffers from legal improprieties, illegalities and irregularities; (iii) that the essential ingredients of the alleged offences are neither made out from the complaint nor from the statements; (iii) that the learned Magistrate has failed to appreciate that the complaint is only an abuse of the process of law, aimed at making petitioner no. 1 to submit himself to the will of the contesting respondent; (iv) that the impugned order has been passed on mere surmises and conjectures and that the learned Magistrate ought to delay the issuance of process and, before proceeding in the matter, ought to have sought a Police report to find out the truthfulness of the allegations; (v) that going by the complaint, the place of occurrence of the offences and entire transaction falls outside the territorial jurisdiction of the trial Magistrate; (vi) that there is not even an allegation made in the complaint about the petitioners having entered into any conspiracy, yet the learned Magistrate has proceeded to issue warrants against the petitioners. 12. The acerbity of the in-law relationship, otherwise meant to be sacred and generating serenity in life, was conspicuous during the course of arguments in this case, and what is most unfortunate and painful is that the main three persons involved in the family feud are highly qualified and belonging to, conceivably, the noblest of professions medical profession all the three being well qualified Doctors. One cannot but only exclaim: Alas! 13. Mr. Z. A. Qureshi, learned Senior counsel for the petitioners, reiterating the grounds taken in the petition, argued that the complaint does not disclose commission of any of the offences alleged against the petitioners. In this regard, he submitted that the essential ingredient of offence punishable under Section 406 Ranbir Penal code is 'entrustment' of property. 13. Mr. Z. A. Qureshi, learned Senior counsel for the petitioners, reiterating the grounds taken in the petition, argued that the complaint does not disclose commission of any of the offences alleged against the petitioners. In this regard, he submitted that the essential ingredient of offence punishable under Section 406 Ranbir Penal code is 'entrustment' of property. He submitted that medical records of a patient cannot be said to be property within the meaning of Section 405 Ranbir Penal code and, even if it can, in any sense, be said to be property, yet it cannot be said to be the property of a Doctor, but is that of the patient. He submitted that nothing comes forth from the contents of the complaint or the statements recorded by the trial Magistrate that there was an entrustment of any such property by the complainant to any of the accused. On that count, the learned counsel submitted that even if the allegations made in the complaint are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, they do not prima facie constitute the offence punishable under Section 406 Ranbir Penal code against the accused. It was further argued by the learned counsel that on the same ground and analogy the offence of cheating punishable under Section 417 Ranbir Penal code is also not made out, since there is no allegation that the complainant was cheated vis-a-vis his property. So far as the offences under Sections 469, 471 500 and 506 Ranbir Penal code are concerned, the learned counsel argued that these offences are also not made out, especially so when the tampering is alleged vis-a-vis the property of the mother of one of the accused, who is not a complainant herself. Learned counsel submitted that the trial Magistrate has fallen into a grave error in taking cognizance and issuing warrant against the petitioners; the complaint and the proceedings, according to the learned senior counsel, thus, tantamount to abuse of process of the court. 14. Mr. Qureshi next argued that the complaint filed by the respondent is barred under Section 205(E) Cr.P.C. as one of the accused, namely, the proforma respondent, has already filed a complaint before Police Station, Parimpora with reference to scandal of unauthorised scanning processes undertaken under the supervision of complainant's daughter, Dr. Naira, and that the complaint is still under investigation. 15. Qureshi next argued that the complaint filed by the respondent is barred under Section 205(E) Cr.P.C. as one of the accused, namely, the proforma respondent, has already filed a complaint before Police Station, Parimpora with reference to scandal of unauthorised scanning processes undertaken under the supervision of complainant's daughter, Dr. Naira, and that the complaint is still under investigation. 15. The learned senior counsel further submitted that since the offences are alleged to have been committed at Handwara, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Srinagar, did not have the jurisdiction to try the offences. He argued that the cognizance taken by the learned trial Magistrate is wholly without jurisdiction and, therefore, the proceedings are liable to be quashed. 16. At the hearing, Mr. Qureshi cited and sought to derive support from the following decision of the Supreme Court and this Court: (i) State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 AIR(SC) 604; (ii) S. W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar, 2002 1 SCC 241 (iii) U. Dhar v. State of Jharkhand, 2003 2 SCC 219 ; (iv) B. S. Joshi v State of Haryana, 2003 4 SCC 675 ; v) State of Orissa v Saroj Kumar Sahoo, 2005 13 SCC 540 (vi) Reshma Bano v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2008 5 SCC 791 ; (vii) Divine Retreat Centre v. State of Kerala, 2008 3 SCC 542 ; (viii) Fakhruddin Ahmad v State of Uttaranchal, 2008 17 SCC 157 ; (ix) L. Narayana Swamy v. State of Karnataka, 2016 AIR(SC) 4125; (x) IRIS Computers Ltd v. Askari Infotec (P) Ltd., 2015 14 SCC 399 ; (xi) Iqbal Malhotra v Trans Asian Industries Exposition Pvt. Ltd.,2017 1 SriLJ 150 (HC); (xii) Basant Rath v. Ch. Nagar Singh, 2012 3 SriLJ 948 (HC); (xiii) R. K. Zalpuri v. State, 2011 1 SriLJ 149; (xiv) Ramesh Chander v Sonika Gupta, 2012 1 JKJ 404 [HC]. 17. On the other hand, apart from reiterating the statements and allegations made in the complaint, Mr. M.A. Qayoom, learned counsel for the contesting respondent submitted that it is not for the High Court to see whether the complaint discloses the offences or not; it is a matter of trial and that the High Court, at this stage, cannot say that no case is made out. M.A. Qayoom, learned counsel for the contesting respondent submitted that it is not for the High Court to see whether the complaint discloses the offences or not; it is a matter of trial and that the High Court, at this stage, cannot say that no case is made out. The learned counsel further submitted that the High Court cannot also go into the sufficiency or otherwise of the content of the complaint or material placed before the Magistrate and that the complaint is always to be read as a whole. He submitted that the High Court cannot substitute its own view for the prima facie satisfaction arrived at by the trial Magistrate. Referring to Sections 177 and 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the learned counsel submitted that the plea of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the learned trial Magistrate did not have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complainant does not hold true. He submitted that Section 205-E Cr.P.C., as referred to and relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners, is not at all applicable in the instant case. He submitted that the object of the present petition is only to strangulate the proceedings initiated by the respondent against the accused. 18. To buttress his arguments, the learned counsel referred to and relied upon the following judgments of the Supreme Court: (i) Maninder Kaur v. Rajinder Singh, 1992 Supp2 SCC 25: (ii) State of T. N. V. Thirukkural Perumal, 1995 2 SCC 449 : (iii) Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi, 1999 AIR(SC) 1216: (iv) State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa, 2002 3 SCC 89 : (v) State of U. P. v. Neeraj Awasthi, 2006 1 SCC 667 [wrongly cited as (2006) 1 SCC 672]: (vi) Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Incorporated, 2011 AIR(SC) 20: (vii) Taramani Parakh v. State of M. P., 2015 CrLJ 2031 with specific reference to paras 11 and 14: and (viii) Rakhi Mishra v State of Bihar, 2017 AIR(SC) 4019. 19. Though the proforma respondent impleaded by the petitioners in this petition, who figures as accused no. 19. Though the proforma respondent impleaded by the petitioners in this petition, who figures as accused no. 1 in the complaint filed before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, does not seem to be aggrieved of the complaint, the cognizance taken by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, and the issue of warrants against him to secure his appearance before the trial court, for, he has not chosen to file any 561-A Cr.P.C. petition, nor has sought his impleadment as a petitioner in the present petition, yet Mr. Salih Pirzada, learned counsel, appeared on his behalf and argued that no cognizance could be taken on the complainant for the alleged offences as the same is barred under Section 195 Cr.P.C. He also submitted that in terms of Section 239 Cr.P.C. the accused should not have been tried together for all the offences and further, referring to exception clause VIII under Section 499 RPC, the learned counsel submitted that the accused is covered by the said exception. 20. Let me first attend to the point of jurisdiction of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Srinagar, to entertain the complaint. The argument put forth on behalf of the petitioners is that the conspiracy and various steps attributed to the accused, cooked up and contained in the complaint, allegedly took place at Handwara. Therefore, if at all, any offence was committed, in relation thereto, the Magistrate at Handwara alone, within whose territorial jurisdiction the offences are alleged to have been committed, would have jurisdiction to entertain any complaint in relation to such offences, enquire into and try the same. He submitted that since no offence is alleged to have been committed within the local limits of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Srinagar, he did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the complaint, and enquiry into and try the offences. As already mentioned above, to negate this argument, the learned counsel for the complainant-contesting-respondent, referred to Sections 177 and 179 Cr.P.C. 21. Part 'A' under Chapter XV “of the jurisdiction of the criminal courts in inquiries and trials” contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with the place of inquiry or trial. Sections 177 and 179 fall under the said Chapter of the Code. These Sections read as under: “177. Ordinary place of inquiry and trial: Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction was committed. Sections 177 and 179 fall under the said Chapter of the Code. These Sections read as under: “177. Ordinary place of inquiry and trial: Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction was committed. “ “179. Accused triable in district where act is done or where consequence ensues: When a person is accused of the commission of any offence by reason of anything which has been done, and of any consequence which has ensued, such offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any such thing has been done, or any such consequence has ensued. “ The illustration (a) under Section 179 reads as under: “(a) A is wounded within the local limits of the jurisdiction of Court X, and dies within the local limits of the jurisdiction of Court Z. The offence of the culpable homicide of A may be inquired into or tried either by X or Z. “ 22. In the instant case, though the conspiracy is alleged to have been hatched at Handwara and many fraudulent, deceitful and illegal etc. acts and steps following such conspiracy, as detailed in the complaint, are also alleged to have been taken and offences committed at Handwara, in view of the Explanation (a) appended to Section 179 Cr.P.C., it can be safely said that the consequence of all such steps also ensued within the territorial limits of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Srinagar, inter alia, when accused no. 1 filed the complaint before SHO Police Station, Parimpora, supported by such documents as are alleged to have been obtained by cheating, deceit, and by inducement, and dishonestly copied and forged at Handwara and, thereafter, allegedly used as genuine for purpose of harming the reputation and fame of the complainant which he alleges to have been, in fact, put to, inasmuch as it is alleged that the complainant was also called at the Police Station on such complaint and the word about such complaint also spread widely among his friends and patients at Srinagar which in the complaint is alleged to have been the mens rea of the accused and, therefore, integral to the commission of the offences. That being the position, the submission on the point of jurisdiction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Srinagar, is held to be not tenable; it is rejected. That being the position, the submission on the point of jurisdiction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Srinagar, is held to be not tenable; it is rejected. 23. The next argument put forth by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners is that the complaint is barred under Section 205-E Cr.P.C. Section 205-E Cr.P.C., as becomes axiomatic from its caption, prescribes the procedure to be followed when there is a complaint case and police investigation in respect of the same offence. The words used are 'same offence'. The complaint filed by accused no. 1 named in the complaint, i.e., proforma respondent herein, before SHO Police Station, Parimpora, is that he had taken his mother for Ultrasound Scanning at Dr. Khuroo's Medical Clinic, Qamerwari, but he was not satisfied with the scan and the report was full of discrepancies. He sought information under RTA from Chief Medical Officer, Srinagar, which showed that the qualified Sonologist for the Clinic was Dr. Mushtaq Ahmad; whereas the USG on his mother was performed by Dr. Naira Sultan who did not have the requisite qualification for the same and that the PDT registration of the said clinic had expired on 29.04.2016. The complainant further expressly stated in the complaint that, 'to strengthen my application, I collected USG reports of some of my neighbours/friends done at Khuroo's Medical Clinic and I was found that all the USG scans from 2013-2017 has been performed and signed by Dr. Naira Sultan'. The complainant enclosed copies of the said report with the complaint and requested the Police for taking cognizance of the matter and initiate proceedings against the Centre. Obviously, the allegations contained in the two complaints the one filed by accused no. 1 before the Police Station, Parimpora, and the one filed by the contesting respondent herein before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Srinagar and, naturally, the two sets of offences alleged are entirely different and distinct. Section 205-E Cr.P.C. is, therefore, not attracted, at all. The argument is noted only to be rejected. 24. Now, coming to the submission of Mr Salih Pirzada, representing the accused no. 1 in the complaint, i.e., the proforma respondent herein, that cognizance could not be taken on the complaint for the offences as the same is barred under Section 195 Cr.P.C. I may at the very out-set say that this argument is wholly in air, devoid of any merit, substance and legally-tenable force. 1 in the complaint, i.e., the proforma respondent herein, that cognizance could not be taken on the complaint for the offences as the same is barred under Section 195 Cr.P.C. I may at the very out-set say that this argument is wholly in air, devoid of any merit, substance and legally-tenable force. The bar prescribed by Section 195 Cr.P.C. is principally contained in the three clauses [(a), (b) and (c)] of its first subsection. These clauses of sub-Section (1) of Section 195 Cr.P.C. say: that no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under, first, Sections 172 to 185 Ranbir Penal code except on a complaint in writing of the public servant concerned; or, second, Sections 193, 194 195, 196, 199, 200, 205, 206, 207, 208 209, 210, 211 and 228 Ranbir Penal code when such offences are alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Curt, except on the complaint in writing of such court or of some other court to which such court is subordinate; or, third, any offence described in Section 463 or punishable under Sections 471, 475 or 476 Ranbir Penal code when such offence is alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in any court in respect of the document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding, except on the complaint in writing of such court, or of some other court to which such court is subordinate. So far as the first two clauses of the sub-section are concerned, it become axiomatic that the same are not attracted to the present case, for, there is neither any allegation contained in the complaint against the accused, nor the trial court has taken cognizance for the commission of any offence mentioned therein. So far as the third clause is concerned, it is true that it mentions Section 471 RPC, of which offence the trial Magistrate has taken cognizance in the instance case, but the bar, as per the provision of law itself, would come into play only if such offence was alleged to have been committed by the accused, being a party to any proceeding in any court in respect of the document(s) produced or given in evidence in such proceeding. The words 'in such proceeding' used in the clause have reference to the proceeding in the court, not investigation by the Police. The words 'in such proceeding' used in the clause have reference to the proceeding in the court, not investigation by the Police. Admittedly, neither the accused have not produced any such document(s) before the court in any proceeding on the basis of which the offence is alleged to have been committed, nor the complainant has alleged commission of the offence on the basis of the document(s) having been produced in any such proceeding before the court by the accused. The argument put forth is simply fallacious. 25. Again, the argument put forth by Mr. Salih Pirzada that the accused should not have been tried together for all the offences in terms of Section 239 Cr.P.C., is equally erroneous, for, inter alia, the learned counsel seems to be playing oblivious of the fact that there is something called an offence of criminal conspiracy alleged against the accused. It hardly needs a mention that if there is a criminal conspiracy to commit different offences, the persons, who are members of that conspiracy, can be charged and tried together. Otherwise also, the provision of Section 239 Cr.P.C. is an enabling provision, not preventive or prohibitive in its scope and application. 26. Coming to the other argument of Mr. Pirzada that the accused-proforma-respondent is excepted of the offence of defamation in terms of Eighth Exception to Section 499 RPC, the learned counsel, again, seems to be exhibiting lack of knowledge that there is an allegation that the documents were deceitfully made to be delivered and dishonestly forged and then, with a mens rea of defamation, put up before the Police. This all cannot be said to be done in good faith. The Eighth Exception speaks of and vouchsafes a conduct in good faith, not anything else, muchless a deceit or dishonesty. 27. Now, I come to the case law cited and relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners and the contesting respondent in support of their respective arguments concerning the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court under Section 561- A Cr.P.C etc. As mentioned above, the learned senior counsel for the petitioners in all cited 14 judgments of which 10 are of the Supreme Court and 4 are of the different Benches of this Court. Let me refer to each of these judgments chronologically hereunder: 28. State of Haryana v. Ch. As mentioned above, the learned senior counsel for the petitioners in all cited 14 judgments of which 10 are of the Supreme Court and 4 are of the different Benches of this Court. Let me refer to each of these judgments chronologically hereunder: 28. State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 AIR(SC) 604: This is the judgment wherein the Supreme Court gave illustration of the categories of cases in which the Courts could exercise the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Central Code of Criminal Procedure, corresponding to Section 561-A of the State Code, either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. That was an appeal filed by the State of Haryana and two others, assailing the judgment dated 08.09.1989 of a Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana rendered in a writ petition, quashing the entire criminal proceedings, inclusive of the registration of the Information Report, and directing payment of costs. In that case, an FIR under Sections 161, 165 IPC and 5(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was registered at Police Station, Saddar, Hissar, against Chowdhary Bhajan Lal, who had been Chief Minister of the State of Haryana, on the complaint of one Dharam Pal made by him on 12.11.1987 to the Chief Minister of the time, namely Chowdhary Devi Lal a political rival of Chowdhary Bhajan Lal making certain serious allegations of corruption. The Officer on Special Duty in the Chief Minister's secretariat had endorsed the complaint to the Director General of Police, who, in turn, endorsed it to the Superintendent of Police, Hissar. The Superintendent of Police, Hissar, recorded an endorsement reading 'register a case and investigate. The SHO registered the case under Sections 161, 165 IPC and 5(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. While the SHO, after forwarding a copy of the FIR to the Magistrate and other officers concerned, himself took up the investigation, Chowdhary Bhajan Lal filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India seeking issuance of a writ of certiorari to quash the FIR and also of a writ of prohibition restraining the respondents therein from proceeding with the investigation. The High Court held that the allegations made were imaginary and fanatic, outcome of a desperate frustrated mind, the same appeared to have been levelled by Dharm Pal, to avenge his insult of defeat in elections against the petitioner's wife and that the charges were all groundless; that mala fides, if at all attributable, could be attributed to the SP and Inspector, not to Chaudhary Devi Lal, the Chief Minister; that there was non-application of mind by the SHO; that the allegations did not constitute a cognizable offence for commencing the lawful investigation. Before the Supreme Court, the central issue involved for scrutiny, as reflected in para 64 of the judgment, was whether the order of the Court in quashing the First Information Report and the proceeding of the investigation was legally sustainable and if not, to what extent the said order suffered from legal infirmity? The Supreme Court, on consideration of the provisions of law on the subject, the facts of that case and the series of its earlier, relevant judgments, in paras 107 to 111of the judgment illustrated the categories of cases where the power could be exercised, observing and laying down as under: “107. Mr. Parasaran, according to whom the allegations in the present case do not make out an offence, drew our attention to a recent judgment of this Court in State of U.P. v. V. R. K. Srivastava and Anr., 1989 CrLJ 2301 to which one of us (S. Ratnavel Pandian, J.) was a party. In that case, it has been ruled that if the allegations made in the FIR, taken on the face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute an offence, the criminal proceedings instituted on the basis of such FIR should be quashed. The principle laid down in this case does not depart from the proposition of law consistently propounded in a line of decisions of this Court and on the other hand it reiterates the principle that the Court can exercise its inherent jurisdiction of quashing a criminal proceeding only when the allegations made in the FIR, do not constitute an offence and that it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case. 108. 108. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extra-ordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. 1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima-facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers Under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated Under Section 155(2) of the Code. 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 109. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the F. I. R. or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice. 110. It may be true, as repeatedly pointed out by Mr. Parasaran, that in a given situation, false and vexatious charges of corruption and venality may be maliciously attributed against any person holding a high office and enjoying a respectable status thereby sullying his character, injuring his reputation and exposing him to social ridicule with a view to spite him on account of some personal rancour, predilections and past prejudices of the complaint. In such a piquant situation, the question is what would be the remedy that would redress the grievance of the verily affected party? The answer would be that the person who dishonestly makes such false allegations is liable to be proceeded against under the relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code-namely Under Sections 182 or 211 or 500 besides becoming liable to be sued for damages. 111. The answer would be that the person who dishonestly makes such false allegations is liable to be proceeded against under the relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code-namely Under Sections 182 or 211 or 500 besides becoming liable to be sued for damages. 111. Reverting to the present case, the allegations made in the complaint, in our considered opinion, do clearly constitute a cognizable offence justifying the registration of a case and an investigation thereon and this case does not fall under any one of the categories of cases formulated above calling for the exercise of extraordinary or inherent powers of the High Court to quash the F. I. R. itself. “ Then in para 114 of the aforesaid judgment, the Supreme Court further observed and laid down as under: “... Even assuming that Dharam Pal has laid the complaint only on account of his personal animosity, that, by itself, will not be a ground to discard the complaint containing serious allegations which have to be tested and weighed after the evidence is collected. In this connection, the following view expressed by Bhagwati, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar, 1987 1 SCC 288 may be referred to: 'It is well established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise justifiable and based upon adequate evidence does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or the complainant'. The learned counsel for the petitioners argued the case in an attempt and endeavour to persuade the Court that it falls within the first and the last (7th) categories of cases mentioned by the Supreme Court, in as much as his case, as already mentioned above, is that the offences are not made out and that there has been an acrimony going on between the parties which prompted the respondent to lodge the instant complaint with a malicious design. I will come to the first part of the argument a bit later in this judgment. I will come to the first part of the argument a bit later in this judgment. So far as his attempt to bring it within the 7th category of cases, that the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spiting them due to private and personal grudge, the Supreme Court in the very same judgment, has dealt with this point in para 113 wherein the Court cited and relied upon with approval the view expressed by the then Chief Justice in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar, 1987 1 SCC 288, quoted by me in this judgment above wherein it was expressed that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise justifiable and based upon adequate evidence does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or vendetta of the first informant or the complainant. After quoting the views of the then Chief Justice, the Hon'ble Bench concluded para 113 of the judgment with the following observation: “Beyond the above, we do not wish to add anything more.” So, the condition illustrated in the 7th category of cases mentioned under para 108 of the judgment has to be read with what was observed and laid down by the Supreme Court in para 113 of the judgment, i.e., if the criminal prosecution is otherwise justifiable and based upon adequate evidence, it is not vitiated on account of mala fides or vendetta of the complainant. That being so, at the stage of taking cognizance what the Magistrate is required to see is whether the complaint is justifiable and based upon adequate evidence. Such justifiability and adequacy of evidence, at the stage of taking cognizance, would have reference to the contents of the complaint and statement of witness/witnesses recorded at that time, which certainly would not refer to all the evidence that the complainant would be proposing to tender and produce at the trial for sustaining the allegations. So the judgment in that context and regard, as relied upon by the learned senior counsel, does not help the petitioners. 29. S.W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar, 2002 1 SCC 241 : In that case there had been a contract of consignment stockist between the appellant-Company (appellant before the Supreme Court) and respondent no. 2. Respondent no. So the judgment in that context and regard, as relied upon by the learned senior counsel, does not help the petitioners. 29. S.W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar, 2002 1 SCC 241 : In that case there had been a contract of consignment stockist between the appellant-Company (appellant before the Supreme Court) and respondent no. 2. Respondent no. 2- complainant served a notice on the Marketing and Regional Manager of the Company to make payment of Rs. 15 lakhs to it within 15 days or in the alternative to refer the disputes and differences to arbitration as per clause 29 of the agreement. Thereafter, the parties met and the Company had offered to supply ammonium sulphate to the complainant for a certain period on certain terms. The complainant rejected the offer and filed a complaint alleging offences under Sections 406 and 420 read with Section 120-B IPC. The Magistrate by his order dated 06.01.1998 issued summons against the appellants. The appellants approached the Patna High Court, invoking its inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the aforesaid order. The High Court dismissed the said petition. The appellant's case before the Supreme Court was that the disputes between it and the respondent no. 2 was purely civil in nature, arising out of contractual relationship relating to commercial transactions; that even looking to the sworn statements, terms of the agreement and the notice, no case was made out to proceed against the appellants on the criminal side, and that the essential ingredient of the offence under Section 405 IPC was not made out as the appellants were not entrusted with any property or with domain over property, and similarly the ingredients of the offence under Sections 415 and 120-B IPC also were not satisfied. The Supreme Court in paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of the judgment spelled out the ingredients of the offence of criminal breach of trust and of the offence of cheating as under: “8. Before examining respective contentions on their relative merit, we think it is appropriate to notice the legal position. Every breach f trust may not result in a penal offence of criminal breach of trust unless there is evidence of a mental act o fraudulent misappropriation. Before examining respective contentions on their relative merit, we think it is appropriate to notice the legal position. Every breach f trust may not result in a penal offence of criminal breach of trust unless there is evidence of a mental act o fraudulent misappropriation. An act of breach of trust involves a civil wrong in respect of which the person wronged may seek his redress for damages in a civil court but a breach of trust with mens rea gives rise to a criminal prosecution as well. 9. The ingredients in order to constitute a criminal breach of trust are: (i) entrusting a person with property or with any dominion over property; (ii) that person entrusted (a) dishonestly misappropriating or converting that property to his own use or (b) dishonestly using or disposing of that property or wilfully suffering any other person so to do in violation (i) of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged; (ii) of any legal contract made, touching the discharge of such trust. 10. The ingredients of an offence of cheating are: (i) there should be fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a person by deceiving him; (ii) (a) the person so deceived should be induced to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property; or (b) the person so deceived should be intentionally induced to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and (iii) in cases covered by (ii)(b), the act of omission should be one which causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to the person induced in body, mind, reputation or property. Further, in para 21 of the judgment, the Court held that 'in order to constitute an offence of cheating, the intention to deceive should be in existence at the time when the inducement was made. It is necessary to show that a person had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise, to say that he committed an act of cheating. A mere failure to keep up promise subsequently cannot be presumed as an act leading to cheating'. It is necessary to show that a person had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise, to say that he committed an act of cheating. A mere failure to keep up promise subsequently cannot be presumed as an act leading to cheating'. The Supreme Court in that case found that there was nothing either in the complaint and/or in the sworn statements of the complainant and the three witnesses that any property was entrusted to any of the appellants at all or the appellants had domain over any of the properties of respondent no. 2 which they dishonestly converted to their own use so as to satisfy the ingredients of Section 405 IPC punishable under Section 406 IPC, and that the agreement also did not require entrustment of any property to the appellant. Taking the complaint and the statements of the witnesses as they were, the Supreme Court observed that it cannot be said even prima facie that the appellants had committed any offence punishable under Section 406 IPC, since the ingredients of that offence had not been satisfied. 30. Going by what the Supreme Court has laid down in paras 10 and 21 as mentioned above and keeping in view the sequence of events and the intention underlying thereto alleged by the complainant against the accused, this judgment, in effect and in essence, advances and supports the case of the complainant rather than rendering any kind of help to the petitioners. 31. U. Dhar v. State of Jharkhand, 2003 2 SCC 219 : This is a case where Bukaro Steel Plant, a unit of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (SAIL), allotted a contract of a certain work to Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. (TISCO). TISCO entrusted part of the work to Tata Construction and Project Ltd. (TCPL). TCPL, in turn, awarded the work to M/s Singh Construction Co., the complainant before the Magistrate. According to the complainant, after completing the work, TCPL failed to make payment to it. M/s Singh Construction Co., complainant, therefore, filed a criminal complaint under Sections 403, 406, 420 and 120-B IPC. The Magistrate took cognizance of the alleged offences and issued summons. The accused challenged the said order of cognizance before the High Court of Jharkhand. The High Court dismissed that petition. M/s Singh Construction Co., complainant, therefore, filed a criminal complaint under Sections 403, 406, 420 and 120-B IPC. The Magistrate took cognizance of the alleged offences and issued summons. The accused challenged the said order of cognizance before the High Court of Jharkhand. The High Court dismissed that petition. In the appeal, the Supreme Court found that the dispute between the parties was purely of civil nature. The complainant's case before the Supreme Court was that TCPL had already received the money for the work from SAIL and that TCPL had misappropriated the same for its own use instead of paying it to the complainant and further that it was for this reason that offences under Sections 403, 406 and 420 IPC etc were alleged. The Supreme Court held that the contract between the complainant and TCPL was altogether different from the contract between SAIL and TCPL. The contractual obligations under both the contracts wee separate and independent of each other. The rights and obligations of the parties were to be governed by the contract between them for which the contract between SAIL and TCPL had no relevance; therefore, even if SAIL had made the payment to TCPL under its contract with the latter, it would not give rise to plea of misappropriation of money because that money was not money or movable property of the complainant. The Court further held that Section 403 IPS uses the words 'dishonestly' and 'misappropriation' and that these are necessary ingredients of an offence under Section 403 IPC. Since neither of these ingredients were satisfied in the facts and circumstances of the case, the order of taking cognizance of the offence as well as the issue of summons to the appellants was held to be wholly uncalled for. The Court concluded as under: “8 So far as the appellants are concerned, when no case is made out for the alleged offences even as per the complaint filed by the complainant, there is no reason to permit the appellants to be subjected to trial for the alleged offences. Hence, the appeal is allowed. The impugned orders of the High Court as well as of the Chief Judicial Magistrate are hereby ordered to be quashed.” The judgment is not at all attracted to the facts and circumstances of the present case, more so when there has been no contract between the parties herein. Hence, the appeal is allowed. The impugned orders of the High Court as well as of the Chief Judicial Magistrate are hereby ordered to be quashed.” The judgment is not at all attracted to the facts and circumstances of the present case, more so when there has been no contract between the parties herein. So far as the observation and finding recorded by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment, that even if SAIL had made the payment to TCPL under its contract with the latter, it would not give rise to plea of misappropriation of money because that money was not money or movable property of the complainant, it does not lend any help to the petitioners to say that the Medical documents belonged to the patients, and that, if the entries made therein, of whatever nature, including the dates and Degrees, either printed or handwritten, by the complainant as a Doctor, were altered, to any extent, by committing forgery, such forgery would not have any effect on the Doctor, when, admittedly, such alleged forged documents were produced before the Police for taking action against the complainant. 32. B.S. Joshi v State of Haryana, 2003 4 SCC 675 This judgment is not even remotely relevant, for, therein the wife had filed a complaint for offence under Sections 498-A/323 and 406 IPC. The husband and wife, ultimately, resolved their matrimonial dispute by a mutual divorce. The husband sought quashing of the criminal proceedings and the wife supported the prayer. The High Court dismissed the petition on the ground that offences under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC were not compoundable. The Supreme Court held that where there was almost no chance of conviction, it would be improper to decline to exercise power of quashing on the ground that it would be permitting the parties to compound non-compoundable offences. 33. State of Orissa v Saroj Kumar Sahoo, 2005 13 SCC 540 : In that case, the High Court had quashed the proceedings against one of the accused in an FIR registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 420, 468 and 471 IPC read with Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(a) of Prevention of Corruption Act on the ground that on perusal of the statements recorded during the investigation it was clear that the ingredients of the offences alleged were not in existence. The Supreme Court held that it was impermissible for the High Court to look into materials, the acceptability of which is essentially a matter for trial. The Supreme Court further held that even at the stage where charge is framed, the court has to only prima facie be satisfied about the existence of sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and for that limited purpose it can evaluate material and documents on record, but it cannot appreciate the evidence. The Supreme Court further held that the High Court should not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry as to reliability of evidence to sustain the allegations which is the function of the trial Judge. Strictly speaking, in view of above, this judgment clearly goes against the accused-petitioners. 34. Reshma Bano v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2008 5 SCC 791 : In that case, the only reference of the appellant before the Supreme Court made in the FIR was that 'questioning from the sister of the boy (the boy being the main accused), Smt. Reshma Bano, might be advantageous'. The Supreme Court held that this did not indicate commission of any offence by her; it rather put her in the position of a witness. The Supreme Court quoted with approval the seven illustrative categories of cases indicated in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal wherein such power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. could be exercised, together with the caution indicated in para 103 of that judgment. So this judgment is of no help to the petitioners. 35. Divine Retreat Centre v. State of Kerala, 2008 3 SCC 542 That was a case where a Judge of the High Court of Kerala on acting on an anonymous complaint addressed to him, took a suo motu action and directed investigation of the crime to be taken away from the investigating officer concerned and entrusted the same to a special investigation team constituted by the learned Judge. The Supreme Court, in that context, discussed the nature and scope of the Courts' inherent power under Section 482 of the Central Cr.P.C. (which corresponds to Section 561-A Cr.P.C. of the State Cr.P.C.) and the various spheres thereof, including its suo motu exercise etc. The judgment is not attracted to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 36. The Supreme Court, in that context, discussed the nature and scope of the Courts' inherent power under Section 482 of the Central Cr.P.C. (which corresponds to Section 561-A Cr.P.C. of the State Cr.P.C.) and the various spheres thereof, including its suo motu exercise etc. The judgment is not attracted to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 36. Fakhruddin Ahmad v State of Uttaranchal, 2008 17 SCC 157 : In that case, the High Court had dismissed the appellant's petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing charge-sheet and consequent proceedings initiated against him by complainant for allegedly committing offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC, on the ground that it was not permissible for it to look into the materials placed before the Magistrate. The Supreme Court held that such an approach was not in consonance with the broad parameters enumerated in a series of decisions of the Court. It may also be relevant to point out here that in that case the appellant before the Supreme Court had been issued a cheque for a certain sum by the complainant and his partner in lieu of supply of chicken. That cheque, on being presented to the Bank, was returned for lacks of funds. The appellant filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and Section 420 IP\C against the complainant and his partner. The complainant cooked up a story that he had issued blank cheques to a third person, Salim Ali by name in lieu of a loan raised from him. Allegedly, Salim Ali had misplaced the cheques which had been found and misused by the appellant. The complaint made by the complainant in that regard was referred by the Magistrate to Police for registration of case and investigation. The Police registered a case and made a report to the Magistrate from which it appeared that the allegation of the complainant was found to be incorrect. It is in this context that the Supreme Court in paragraphs 20 and 21 of the judgment observed and laid down as under: “20. The Police registered a case and made a report to the Magistrate from which it appeared that the allegation of the complainant was found to be incorrect. It is in this context that the Supreme Court in paragraphs 20 and 21 of the judgment observed and laid down as under: “20. So far as the scope and ambit of the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code is concerned, the same has been enunciated and reiterated by this Court in a catena of decisions and illustrative circumstances under which the High Court can exercise jurisdiction in quashing proceedings have been enumerated. However, for the sake of brevity, we do not propose to make reference to the decisions on the point. It would suffice to state that though the powers possessed by the High Court under the said provision are very wide but these should be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the Courts exist. The inherent powers possessed by the High Court are to be exercised very carefully and with great caution so that a legitimate prosecution is not stifled. Nevertheless, where the High Court is convinced that the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused or where the allegations made in the F. I. R. or the complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, the powers of the High Court under the said provision should be exercised. [See: Bhajan Lal's case] 21. Bearing in mind the above legal position, we are convinced that the High Court was not justified in dismissing the petition on the afore-stated ground. In our opinion, in order to arrive at a conclusion, whether or not the appellant had made out a case for quashing of the charge-sheet against him, the High Court ought to have taken into consideration the material which was placed before the Magistrate. In our opinion, in order to arrive at a conclusion, whether or not the appellant had made out a case for quashing of the charge-sheet against him, the High Court ought to have taken into consideration the material which was placed before the Magistrate. For dismissal of the petition, the High court had to record a finding that the uncontroverted allegations, as made, establish a prima facie case against the appellant. In our judgment, the decision of the High Court dismissing the petition filed by the appellant on the ground that it is not permissible for it to look into the materials placed before the Magistrate is not in consonance with the broad parameters, enumerated in a series of decisions of this Court and briefly noted above, to be applied while dealing with a petition under Section 481 of the Code for discharge and, therefore, the impugned order is unsustainable. “ As seen above, the Supreme Court found that a story had been cooked up. Here, in the case at hand, the complaint submitted before the Police Station in clear words mentions that medical documents were obtained from other people whom the accused-proforma-respondent has styled as his neighbours. 37. L. Narayana Swamy v. State of Karnataka, 2016 AIR(SC) 4125: In that case, a complaint made to the Sessions Judge, involving offences under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act and Sections 120-B, 427, 447 and 506 read with Section 34 IPC, was referred to the Police Inspector of the jurisdictional Police for further investigation. The Police registered the crime for the said offences. The accused in the complaint filed a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. before the High Court of Karnataka seeking quashing of the said proceedings. The High Court dismissed the petition. The following two questions of law, as mentioned in para 7 of the judgment, arose for consideration before the Supreme Court: (i) Whether an order directing further investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. can be passed in relation to public servant in the absence of valid sanction and contrary to the judgment of this Court in Anil Kumar & ors. v. M.K. Aiyappa & anr. and Manharibhai Muljibhai Kakadia and anr. v. Shaileshbhai Mohanbhai Patel & ors? v. M.K. Aiyappa & anr. and Manharibhai Muljibhai Kakadia and anr. v. Shaileshbhai Mohanbhai Patel & ors? (ii) Whether a public servant who is not on the same post and is retransferred (whether by way of promotion or otherwise to another post) loses the protection under Section 19(1) of the P.C. Act, though he continues to be a public servant, albeit on a different post? Obviously, the judgment is not attracted to the facts of the present case. 38. Iris Computers Limited v. Askari Infotec (P) Ltd., 2015 14 SCC 399 This decision of the Supreme Court fundamentally concerns the question whether the Magistrate has power to review its order and it has been held that no, no such power of review exists in Cr.P.C., and that where the Magistrate lacks jurisdiction to entertain a complaint, the remedy lies before the High Court by way of a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Therein the Magistrate had returned the complaint after having issued process and the Supreme Court held that the Magistrate had erred in doing so. 39. Coming to the judgments of this Court cited by the learned counsel, I may at the outset say that these do not add anything the judgments of the Supreme Court, but are rather based on the judgments of the Supreme Court. Nonetheless, referred to the same, I may say that R. K. Zalpuri v. State, 2011 1 SriLJ 149 is a decision in a service matter, holding that supply of record of proceedings of inquiry alongwith show cause notice to the delinquent employee was mandatory, and that failure to do so amounted to violation of Rule 34 of the J&K Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1956 and Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. 40. Ramesh Chander v Sonika Gupta, 2012 1 JKJ 404 : In that case the complainant alleged that the petitioners had dishonestly misappropriated her 'Istridhan' and were still misappropriating it. The Court found that the statements of the complainant and her witness were significantly silent about any such act or omission on the part of the petitioners, and that no such facts on the basis of which even an inference of misappropriation could be drawn were indicated either in the complaint or in the statements. The Court found that the statements of the complainant and her witness were significantly silent about any such act or omission on the part of the petitioners, and that no such facts on the basis of which even an inference of misappropriation could be drawn were indicated either in the complaint or in the statements. The Court, therefore, held that mere reproduction of the wording of the Penal Section by the complainant and her witnesses in their statements does not satisfy the requirements of Section 204 Cr.P.C. and the process issued by the Magistrate was not justified. Such is not the case herein. 41. Basant Rath v. Ch. Nagar Singh, 2012 3 SriLJ 948 (HC). In that case the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate on recording the statement of the complainant and that of his witness, deferred issuance of process, observing that the matter deserved a thorough probe and in-depth inquiry. The issuance of process was postponed and, in terms of Section 202 Cr.P.C, inquiry was directed. to be conducted by Special Municipal Magistrate, Jammu. The Special Municipal Magistrate passed an order summoning two of the alleged accused persons, who were police officers, to tender their explanation regarding the alleged CD. The two alleged accused filed 561-A Cr.P.C. petition before the Court seeking quashment of the above order passed by the Inquiring Magistrate summoning them to explain, on the ground that the learned Magistrate in his capacity as Inquiry Officer lacked power to summon the alleged accused-petitioners, that too when cognizance of the offence was yet to be taken by the Magistrate before whom complaint was filed. It is in context of the above point involved in the case that the Court in the aforesaid judgment expounded the scope of Sections 202 and 203 of the Code. Such is not the point involved herein. The judgment is wholly irrelevant. 42. Iqbal Malhotra v Trans Asian Industries Exposition Pvt. Ltd., 2017 1 SriLJ 150 (HC). The basic point raised in that case before the High Court in 561-A Cr.P.C. petition, as reflected in para 4 of the judgment (wrongly numbered as para no. Such is not the point involved herein. The judgment is wholly irrelevant. 42. Iqbal Malhotra v Trans Asian Industries Exposition Pvt. Ltd., 2017 1 SriLJ 150 (HC). The basic point raised in that case before the High Court in 561-A Cr.P.C. petition, as reflected in para 4 of the judgment (wrongly numbered as para no. 19), was that the Magistrate had postponed the process and referred the complaint for police report and that there was nothing different contained in the report of the SHO than what had been stated in the complaint, and that once the Magistrate was not satisfied with the truth or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint when it was presented before it, on account of which it was referred to the Police for enquiry, the Magistrate could not issued process on the same basis as there was nothing new to assume such satisfaction. In this regard, the Court held that postponing the process and directing the SHO to conduct enquiry appears to have been done by the learned Magistrate to derive satisfaction about the e-mail (communication) to have reached to the J&K Bank, Corporate Headquarter at Srinagar. The Court further held that while entertaining a complaint, taking cognizance and then for issuing process a detailed order is not required to be passed. The judgment is not attracted to any of the points raised by the petitioners in this petition. 43. Now, I proceed to chronologically refer to the judgments cited by Mr. Qayoom. These are: 44. Maninder Kaur v. Rajinder Singh, 1992 Supp2 SCC 25: In that case, the appellant before the Supreme Court had filed a complaint under Sections 363, 366, 376 and 368 read with Section 34 of IPC before a Judicial Magistrate. Besides herself, she examined her father and a neighbour as her witnesses. The Magistrate, being of the opinion that there was sufficient ground for proceedings, issued process against the accused. Before the High Court, in the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. some probabilities, statedly of inherent nature, were pressed into service to disbelieve the complainant-appellant's version which had appealed the High Court which quashed the complaint. The Supreme Court, in para 4 of the short judgment, inter alia, observed and laid down as under: “... Before the High Court, in the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. some probabilities, statedly of inherent nature, were pressed into service to disbelieve the complainant-appellant's version which had appealed the High Court which quashed the complaint. The Supreme Court, in para 4 of the short judgment, inter alia, observed and laid down as under: “... The matter is plain and simple as on the statement of complainant and her two witnesses, the leaned Magistrate came to the opinion that there was sufficient ground for proceeding in that complaint and he issued process against the accused respondents. Now at that stage to judge the sufficiency or otherwise of the ground for proceeding was beyond the power of the High Court so as to quash the proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. From the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the High Court was not justified in quashing the proceedings at the initial stage so as to strangulate it at its inception...” 45. State of T. N. V. Thirukkural Perumal, 1995 2 SCC 449 : In that case, an FIR for certain offences had been lodged with the Police and investigation was under process while the Police had also collected some evidence. The alleged accused, respondent before the Supreme Court, filed a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The learned Singh Judge of the High Court quashed the proceedings emanating from the FIR. The Supreme Court found and laid down as under: “4... From a bare perusal of the order of the learned Single Judge it appears that while quashing the proceedings, reliance has been placed upon some evidence collected by the investigating agency during the investigation. The approach of the learned Judge in relying upon such evidence, which is yet to be produced before the trial court, to quash the criminal proceedings in Crime Case No. 246 of 1992 was not proper. The power of quashing an FIR and criminal proceedings should be exercised sparingly by the courts. Indeed the High Court has the extraordinary or inherent power to reach out injustice and quash the first information report and criminal proceedings. Keeping in view the guidelines laid down by this Court in various judgments (reference in this connection may be made with advantage to State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal) but the same has to be done with circumspection. Keeping in view the guidelines laid down by this Court in various judgments (reference in this connection may be made with advantage to State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal) but the same has to be done with circumspection. The normal process of the criminal trial cannot be cut short in a rather casual manner The court is not justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint on the basis of the evidence collected during investigation only while dealing with a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking the quashing of the FIR and the criminal proceedings. The learned Single Judge apparently fell into an error in evaluating the genuineness and reliability of the allegations made in the FIR on the basis of the evidence collected during the investigation... “ 46. Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi, 1999 AIR(SC) 1216: In that case the appellant had lodged an FIR under Section 420 IPC. A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal quashed the FIR on the ground that the complaint did not disclose the offence. The Division Bench had put forward three premises in this regard: first, that the complaint did not disclose commission of any offence of cheating punishable under Section 420 IPC; second, that there was nothing in the complaint to suggest that the accused-petitioner had dishonest or fraudulent intention at the time the respondent exported goods; and third, that there was nothing to indicate that the respondent by deceiving the complainant, induced him to export goods. The Supreme Court in para 9 of the judgment held as under: “9. It is not necessary that a complainant should verbatim reproduce in the body of his complaint all the ingredients of the offence he is alleging. Nor is it necessary that the complainant should state in so many words that the intention of the accused was dishonest or fraudulent. Splitting up of the definition into different components of the offence to make a meticulous scrutiny, whether all the ingredients have been precisely spelled out in the complaint, is not the need at this stage. Nor is it necessary that the complainant should state in so many words that the intention of the accused was dishonest or fraudulent. Splitting up of the definition into different components of the offence to make a meticulous scrutiny, whether all the ingredients have been precisely spelled out in the complaint, is not the need at this stage. If factual foundation for the offence has been laid in the complaint, the Court should not hasten to quash criminal proceedings during investigation stage merely on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated with details. For quashing an FIR (a step which is permitted only in extremely rare cases) the information in the complaint must be so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal... this Court laid down the premise on which the FIR can be quashed in rare cases... “ 47. State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa, 2002 3 SCC 89 : In that case, a charge sheet was submitted by the Police against the respondents alleging commission of offences under Sections 465, 468, 471 and 420 read with Section 120-B IPC. A learned Single Judge of the High Court in 482 Cr.P.C. petition, on analysis of the background facts, held that involvement of the excise officials could not be ruled out. It was also noted that there was no definite evidence to show that accused nos. 1 and 2 were directly involved, and that there was no material to hold that the accused had committed theft of letter heads from the Bank and/or that they had committed forgery for the purpose of cheating or had used as genuine the forged documents or had cheated the Government, etc. The Supreme Court in para 6 of the judgment laid down as under: “6... Inherent jurisdiction under the section, though wide, has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the rests specially laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the Court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court has power to prevent abuse. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the Court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of Court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers Court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of process of Court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the Court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto. “ The Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision, reiterated and quoted the illustrative categories indicated in State of Haryana v Bhajan Lal. And in para 9 of the judgment, the Supreme Court laid down that “... the High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, moreso when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material... “ 48. State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi, 2006 1 SCC 667 That was a service matter, concerning appointments made in excess of the available posts 5600 appointments against 3395 posts and termination of about 1021 employees. Obviously, the judgment is irrelevant. 49. Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Incorporated, 2011 AIR(SC) 20 In that case, the complaint against the respondent before the Supreme Court, pertaining to allegations of cheating under Section 420 read with Section 120-B IPC, had been quashed by the Bombay High Court. The Supreme Court held that inherent powers cannot be exercised to stifle prosecution. The Court in para 44, inter alia, observed and laid down as under: “... The Supreme Court held that inherent powers cannot be exercised to stifle prosecution. The Court in para 44, inter alia, observed and laid down as under: “... As noticed earlier, both the appellants and the respondents have much to say in support of their respective view points. Which of the views is ultimately to be accepted, could only be decided when the parties have had the opportunities to place the entire materials before the Court. This Court has repeatedly held that power to quash proceedings at the initial stage have to be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae. Such power can be exercised where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and have been instituted maliciously with ulterior motive. This inherent power ought not to be exercised to stile a legitimate prosecution... “ 50. Taramani Parakh v. State of M.P., 2015 CrLJ 2031 with specific reference to paras 11 and 14: In that case, the wife lodged a complaint alleging that her husband and his parents harassed her with demand of dowry amounting to cruelty. This led o registration of FIR which culminated into filing of charge sheet against the accused. The accused moved the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The wife contested that petition. The High Court, relying upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in Neelu Chopa v. Bharti, 2009 AIR(SC) 2950; Manjoj Mahavir Prasad Khaitan v. Ram Gopal Moddar, 2010 10 SCC 673 ; and Geeta Mehrotra v Stae of U P., 2012 10 SCC 741 , held that since there were no specific allegations, the criminal proceedings against the accused amounted to abuse of the court's process. Accordingly, the High Court quashed the criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court, on appeal by the wife, in para 11, referred to and relied upon by the learned counsel, said that in matrimonial cases, the Courts have to be cautious when omnibus allegations are made, particularly against relatives who are not generally concerned with the affairs of the couple. The Supreme Court in this para of the judgment relied upon 20 of its earlier judgments. Then in para 14, again referred to and relied upon by the learned counsel for the contesting respondent, the Supreme Court laid down: “14. The Supreme Court in this para of the judgment relied upon 20 of its earlier judgments. Then in para 14, again referred to and relied upon by the learned counsel for the contesting respondent, the Supreme Court laid down: “14. From reading of the complaint it cannot be held that even if the allegations are taken as proved no case is made out”. I do not see any resemblance in the facts of that case and the present case. 51. Rakhi Mishra v State of Bihar, 2017 AIR(SC) 4019: Again, this case related to the complaint filed by wife against her husband and other members of his family alleging ill treatment by them. The FIR, which was registered on the wife's complaint, and the proceedings initiated on the charge sheet filed before the trial court taking cognizance, were quashed by the High Court. On appeal, the Supreme Court observed that a perusal of the complaint would disclose a prima facie case against respondents 2, 4 to 10, and that the order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate by which cognizance was taken ought not to have been interfered with by the High Court. In para 5 of the judgment, the Supreme Court laid down as under: “5.... It is settled law that the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is exercised by the High Court only in exceptional circumstances only when a prima facie case is not made out against the accused. The test applied by this Court for interference at the initial stage of a prosecution is whether the uncontroverted allegations prima facie establish a case.” 52. Looking at the above decisions, it transpires that it has been conclusively settled that the High Court, with a view to preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, not only can, but has to, exercise its inherent powers, where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima-facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused or where the allegations made in the F. I. R. or the complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable as no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. However, if the Court finds that a criminal prosecution is otherwise justifiable and based upon evidence, it will not be vitiated even on account of mala fides or vendetta of the first informant or the complainant. For purposes of finding whether a prosecution is justifiable it has been held to be impermissible for the High Court to look into materials, for, the acceptability of it is essentially a matter for trial. It is also held that at the stage where charge is framed, the court has to only prima facie be satisfied about the existence of sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and for that limited purpose it can evaluate material and documents on record, but it cannot appreciate the evidence, and that at this stage, the court cannot judge the sufficiency or otherwise of the ground for proceeding as the same is beyond the power of the High Court. The Supreme Court further held that the High Court should not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry as to reliability of evidence to sustain the allegations which is the function of the trial Judge. It is also laid down that High Court cannot substitute its own view for the prima facie satisfaction arrived at by a trial Magistrate. It has repeatedly been held that power to quash proceedings at the initial stage has to be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases, solely ex debito justitiae, and that it is not necessary that a complainant should verbatim reproduce in the body of his complaint all the ingredients of the offence he is alleging. Nor is it necessary that the complainant should state in so many words that the intention of the accused was dishonest or fraudulent. Splitting up of the definition into different components of the offence to make a meticulous scrutiny, whether all the ingredients have been precisely spelled out in the complaint, is not the need at this stage. If factual foundation for the offence has been laid in the complaint, the Court should not hasten to quash criminal proceedings. 53. The judgments cited at the Bar and relied upon by the learned counsel, as mentioned and quoted above, make things crystal clear, leaving no score for this Court to elaborate on any point. If factual foundation for the offence has been laid in the complaint, the Court should not hasten to quash criminal proceedings. 53. The judgments cited at the Bar and relied upon by the learned counsel, as mentioned and quoted above, make things crystal clear, leaving no score for this Court to elaborate on any point. The submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners to persuade the Court that this case falls within the first and the last (7th) categories of cases mentioned by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, also stands adequately dealt with and is, therefore, answered in negative. I may also say that having gone through the trial court record, I am convinced that this is a case where the allegations made in the complaint do prima-facie constitute the offences and make out a case against the accused, and that the allegations made in the complaint are not absurd and/or inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It may be mentioned here that from the record it transpires that in support of the complainant, apart from the statement of the complainant, Ghulam Nabi Kaboo, the person from whom the medical records were obtained by the accused, has also tendered his statement as a witness and he has supported the allegations contained in the complaint. 54. Before I conclude this judgment, I deem it necessary to refer to and deal with the argument of the learned counsel that medical records do not constitute property and that, even if that be so, it belongs to the patient, not to the Doctor. What constitutes criminal breach of trust for which punishment is prescribed under Section 406 RPC is stipulated in Section 405 RPC. Section 405 RPC does not define property. However, the Supreme Court, long back, more than 55 years back, in R.K. Dalmia v. Delhi Administration, 1962 AIR(SC) 1821, has held as under: “We are of opinion that there is no good reason to restrict the meaning of the word 'property' to movable property only when it is used without any qualification in S.405 or in other sections of the Indian Penal Code. Whether the offence defined in a particular section of the Indian Penal Code can be committed in respect of any particular kind of property will depend not on the interpretation of the word 'property' but on the fact whether that particular kind of property can be subject(ed) to the acts covered by that section. It is in this sense that it may be said that the word property in a particular section covers only that type of property with respect to which the offence contemplated in that section can be committed. Section 22 I.P.C. defines 'movable property'. The definition is not exhaustive. According to the section the words 'movable property' are intended to include corporeal property of every description, except land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything which is attached to the earth. The definition is of the expression 'movable property' and not of 'property' and can apply to all corporeal property except property excluded from the definition. It is thus clear that the word 'property' is used in the Code in a much wider sense than the expression 'movable property'. It is not therefore necessary to consider in detail what type of property will be included in the various sections of the Indian Penal Code. “ Sections 22 and 405 of the IPC are akin to Sections 22 and 405 of the RPC. Therefore, the above judgment squarely covers the point raised whether medical records could be termed as property. Then comes the question of ownership; I am of the view that the entries recorded by a Doctor in the medical records of a patient cannot be said to belong to the patient, for, anything wrong therein mentioned would make the Doctor liable to action, not the patient. Every entry recorded therein is more sacrosanct and valuable to the Doctor than the patient, since it attaches the risk of liability of the Doctor. If any entry therein is altered, the risk is earned by the Doctor, as is the fact as well as allegation in the present case fact to the extent and insofar as a complaint has been filed against the complainant by accused no. 1 on the basis of contents of medical documents/record attributed to the complainant and allegation to the extent the complainant alleges forgery of some entries therein. 1 on the basis of contents of medical documents/record attributed to the complainant and allegation to the extent the complainant alleges forgery of some entries therein. I am of the considered view that the medical documents of a patient, prepared and recorded by a Doctor, insofar as contents thereof are concerned, cannot be said to be the property of the patient. For purposes of day-to-day use, record and reference a set of such medical records have to be available to, and in possession of the patient, and in this age of science, technology and digitalization, the established and organized clinics maintain record and storage of such records of a patient for future and ready reference with them, as is claimed by the claimant in the present case, inasmuch as the he states that he has been keeping the record of medical history/reports of his patients. Then the learned counsel also raised the point of entrustment. Though the Supreme has also held that the complainant is not required to spell out each and every ingredient of an offence in his complaint and the High Court, while exercising its inherent powers at the initial stage of a criminal prosecution, cannot split up of the definition into different components of the offence to make a meticulous scrutiny whether all the ingredients have been precisely spelled out in the complaint, yet it is not only alleged that accused no. 1 had fraudulently and dishonestly obtained the medical records of the witness, Ghulam Nabi Kaboo, from his wife, it is admitted by him in his complaint before Police Station, Parimpora, that he had the dominion over the medical records of his neighbours, which medical records had been written, recorded and prepared by the complainant. The words 'in any manner' used in Section 405 RPC has a wider meaning. The argument raised is, accordingly, answered as rejected. 55. In light of all what has been discussed above, this petition is dismissed together with the connected interim application, if any. The subsisting interim direction(s), if any, shall stand vacated. 56. Any observation made in the judgment shall not form the basis for deciding the complaint by the trial Magistrate and the complaint shall be decided exclusively on merits. 57. The parties are directed to appear before the trial court for further proceedings on 03.02.2018. The subsisting interim direction(s), if any, shall stand vacated. 56. Any observation made in the judgment shall not form the basis for deciding the complaint by the trial Magistrate and the complaint shall be decided exclusively on merits. 57. The parties are directed to appear before the trial court for further proceedings on 03.02.2018. The Registry is directed to sent down the original trial court records forthwith and, in any case, before 03.02.2018.