JUDGMENT : KH. NOBIN SINGH, J. 1. Heard Shri H.S. Paonam, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri A. Arunkumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and Shri N. Kumarjit, learned Advocate General, Manipur assisted by Shri P. Tamphamani, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 2. Since both the writ petitions have arisen out of a similar set of facts, the same are being disposed of by this common judgment and order. W.P. (C) No. 908 of 2017: 3. By the instant writ petition, the petitioners have prayed for issuing a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or order or direction to direct the respondents to allow the petitioners to join the Department of Rural Development and Panchayati Raj, Government of Manipur as Village Level Workers (VLWs) pursuant to the appointment order dated 31-12-2016 issued by the Director (RD & PR), Manipur. 4.1 The facts of the case as narrated in the writ petition are that the Director (RD & PR), Government of Manipur issued an advertisement dated 04-08-2016 inviting applications from amongst the eligible candidates for appointment to the posts of Progress Assistant (PA), Village Level Worker (VLW), LDC, Road Muhorrir, Driver, Peon, etc. The petitioners being eligible for appointment to the posts of VLW applied for it and they were informed vide Notification dated 20-09-2016 that a written examination would be held on 25-09-2016 and the result thereof was declared vide Notification dated 14-10-2016. The petitioners being qualified for the personality test, were allowed to face the Interview which was held from 17-10-2016 to 21-10-2016. On the recommendation of the DPC/ Selection Committee which was approved by the State Government vide its letter dated 31-12-2016, the petitioners were appointed as VLWs vide order dated 31-12-2016 issued by the Director (RD & PR), Manipur. 4.2 Before the petitioners were allowed to join the posts against which they were appointed, the Election Model Code of Conduct was imposed w.e.f. 04-01-2017 and the respondents were directed to submit all the relevant files to the office of the Chief Electoral Officer for perusal vide its letter dated 27-02-2017 and after having perused the said files, the Chief Electoral Officer did not issue any restraint order nor did it pass any adverse remark against the appointment order in question. Although the persons who were appointed as Progress Assistant, Road Muhorrir, Driver and Peon, pursuant to the said Notification dated 04-08-2016, were allowed to join their respective posts in the month of November, 2016, the petitioners were denied to join the post of VLWs infringing their valuable rights. Being aggrieved by the inaction on the part of the respondents, the instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioners. 5. In the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, the averments made in the writ petition have not been denied to the extent that the process of selection was initiated and conducted by the State Government pursuant to the Notification dated 04-08-2016. But it has been stated therein that the total number of posts for which the advertisement was issued in respect of the post of VLWs, was only 56 but in addition thereto, 60 posts were created vide orders dated 02-12-2016 and 23-12-2016 issued by the Secretary (RD & PR), Government of Manipur. On the recommendation of the Class-III DPC/ Selection Committee, the State Government vide its order dated 31-12-2016 appointed as many as 116 candidates and 12 candidates were kept in the waiting list. It has further been stated that from the minutes of the proceedings of the DPC/ Selection Committed held from 17-10-2016 to 21-10-2016, it is clear that the proceedings were drawn on 31-12-2016 or after the enforcement of the Election Code of Conduct which took place on 04-01-2017. It is not known as to how the Government orders dated 02-12-2016 and 23-12-2016 were placed before the DPC/ Selection Committee during its meeting held from 17-10-2016 to 21-10-2016. In order to enquire into the irregularities or illegalities as alleged by the public with respect to the recruitment process, during the period of Model Code of Conduct of Election, in respect of various Departments including the RD & PR, a SIT was constituted and after due verification and examination of all records, the SIT submitted its report and based on such report, the Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms, Government of Manipur vide its letter dated 05-12-2017 communicated to the Principal Secretary (RD & PR), Government of Manipur that the Administrative Department may retain/allow only 46 Progress Assistant while that of the rest of the recruitment be cancelled. W.P. (C) No. 912 of 2017: 6. W.P. (C) No. 912 of 2017: 6. By the instant writ petition, the petitioners have prayed for issuing a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or direction or order to direct the respondents to allow the petitioners to join the Department of Rural Development and Panchayati Raj as LDCs (re-designated as Office assistant cum Computer Operator) pursuant to the order dated 31-12-2016 issued by the Director (RD & PR), Manipur. 7. Since the facts of the present writ petition are similar to that of the writ petition being WP(C) No. 908 of 2017, the detailed facts are not repeated here for the sake of brevity and the only difference is in respect of the name of the posts for which the petitioners have been appointed ie., the LDCs. It has also been stated in the petition that it is learned by the petitioners from the reliable sources that a Special Investigation Team (SIT) was constituted by the State Government to investigate into the irregularity in respect of the recruitment process and that the said SIT submitted its report to the effect that there was no irregularity in the recruitment process but for the reasons best known to the State Government, the petitioners were not allowed to join their services. The stand of the respondents as indicated in their affidavit-in-opposition, is almost identical to that of the stand taken in the writ petition being WP(C) No.908 of 2017 and therefore, the same is not repeated herein for the sake of brevity. 8.1 It has been submitted by Shri H.S Paonam, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the recruitment process is common for all the posts namely Progress Assistant, Village Level Workers, Lower Division Clerk, Road Muhorrir, Driver, Peon etc. and persons/candidates appointed against the posts other than the posts of VLW and LDC, have been allowed to join their posts, while the petitioners have been denied to join their posts arbitrarily. There is no irregularity in the recruitment process and no one has challenged the appointment orders dated 31-12-2016 issued by the Director (RD & PR), Manipur appointing the petitioners as the VLW and LDC. The office of the Chief Electoral Officer, after having perused the relevant files relating to the recruitment process, has not interfered with the appointment orders. There is no irregularity in the recruitment process and no one has challenged the appointment orders dated 31-12-2016 issued by the Director (RD & PR), Manipur appointing the petitioners as the VLW and LDC. The office of the Chief Electoral Officer, after having perused the relevant files relating to the recruitment process, has not interfered with the appointment orders. The respondents cannot be permitted to witch hunting, in the absence of any complaint of irregularity, for finding fault in the recruitment process only for the reason that the appointment orders have been issued by the previous government belonging to another political party. The State Government ought to act fairly and reasonably and for no fault of the petitioners, they shall not be penalised by the State Government by not allowing them to join the service. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance in many decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court which can be classified into three. Firstly, in State of Haryana v. state of Punjab, (2002) 2 SCC 507 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed: "In the matter of governance of a State or in the matter of execution of a decision taken by a previous Government, on the basis of a consensus arrived, which does not involve any political philosophy, the succeeding government must be held duty-bound to continue and carry on the unfinished job rather than putting a stop to the same." The law laid down in the said case, has been followed in State of Karnataka & anr. v. All India Manufactures Organisation & ors., (2006) 4 SCC 683 and State of UP v. Johri Mal, (2004) 4 SCC 714 . Secondly, in Mrs. Asha Kaul & anr. v. State of Jammu & Kashmir & ors., (1993) 2 SCC 573 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "8. It is true that mere inclusion in the select list does not confer upon the candidates included therein an indefeasible right to appointment (State of Haryana v. Subhash Chandra Marwaha; Mani Subrat Jain v. State of Haryana; State of Kerala v. A. Lakshmikutty) but that is only one aspect of the matter. The other aspect is the obligation of the government to act fairly. The whole exercise cannot be reduced to a farce. The other aspect is the obligation of the government to act fairly. The whole exercise cannot be reduced to a farce. Having sent a requisition/request to the commission to select a particular number of candidates for a particular category, -in pursuance of which the commission issues a notification, holds a written test, conducts a notification, holds a written test, conducts interviews, prepares a select list and then communicates to the government-the government cannot quietly and without good and valid reasons nullify the whole exercise and tell the candidates when they complain that they have no legal right to appointment. We do not think that any government can adopt such a stand with any justification today. This aspect has been dealt with by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India where the earlier decisions of this court are also noted. The following observations of the court are apposite: (SCC pp. 50-51, para 7) "It is not correct to say that if a number of vacancies are notified for appointment and adequate number of candidates are found fit, the successful candidates acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed which cannot be legitimately denied. Ordinarily the notification merely amounts to an invitation to qualified candidates to apply for recruitment and on their selection they do not acquire any right to the post. Unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies. However, it does not mean that the State has the licence of acting in an arbitrary manner. The decision not to fill up the vacancies has to he taken bona fide for appropriate reasons. And if the vacancies or any of them are filled up, the State is bound to respect the comparative merit of the candidates, as reflected at the recruitment test, and no discrimination can be permitted. This correct position has been consistently followed by this Court, and we do not find any discordant note in the decisions in State of Haryana v. Subhash Chander Marwaha, Neelima Shangla v. State of Haryana or Jatendra Kumar v. State of Punjab." In East Cost Railway & anr. v. Mahadev Appa Rao & ors., (2010) 7 SCC 678 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "14. v. Mahadev Appa Rao & ors., (2010) 7 SCC 678 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "14. It is evident from the above that while no candidate acquires State does not enjoy an unqualified prerogative to refuse an appointment in an arbitrary fashion or to disregard the merit of the candidates as reflected by the merit list prepared at the end of the selection process. an indefeasible right to a post merely because he has appeared in the examination or even found a place in the select list, yet the The validity of the State's decision not to make an appointment is thus a matter which is not beyond judicial review before a competent writ court. If any such decision is indeed found to be arbitrary, appropriate directions can be issued in the matter. 17. It is trite that Article 14 of the Constitution strikes at arbitrariness which is an anti thesis of the guarantee contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Whether or not the cancellation of the typing test was arbitrary is a question which the Court shall have to examine once a challenge is mounted to any such action, no matter the candidates do not have an indefeasible right to claim an appointment against the advertised posts." Thirdly, in Kranti Associates Private Limited & anr. v. Masood Ahmed Khan & ors., (2010) 9 SCC 496, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "12. The necessity of giving reason by a body or authority in support of its decision came up for consideration before this Court in several cases. Initially this Court recognized a sort of demarcation between administrative orders and quasi-judicial orders but with the passage of time the distinction between the two got blurred and thinned out and virtually reached a vanishing point in the judgment of this Court in A.K. Kraipak and others v. Union of India." 8.2 Per contra: The learned Advocate General, Manipur has submitted that the Government orders dated 02-12-2016 and 23-12-2016 could not have been placed before the DPC/ Selection Committee in its meeting held from 17-10-2016 to 21-10-2016 and therefore, the proceedings of the DPC/ Selection Committee must have been drawn on 31-12-2016 or after the model code of conduct being imposed with effect from 04-01-2017 and that too, without the date of signature being shown therein. Since the illegality cannot be regularised, a SIT was constituted to inquire into the irregularity or illegality in the recruitment process and on the basis of its report, the Department of personnel & Administrative Reforms informed the Administrative Department for cancellation of the recruitments except in respect of the post of Progress Assistants where the number of posts recommended is less than the number of sanctioned posts. In order to support his contention, he has relied upon the decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court which can also be classified into three. Firstly, in Yogesh Kumar & ors. v. Government of NCT, Delhi & ors., (2003) 3 SCC 548 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "8. This last argument advanced also does not impress us at all. Recruitment to public services should be held strictly in accordance with the terms of advertisement and the recruitment rules, if any. Deviation from the rules allows entry to ineligible persons and deprives many others who could have competed for the post. Merely because in the past some deviation and departure was made in considering the B.Ed. candidates and we are told that was so done because of the paucity of TTC candidates, we cannot allow a patent illegality to continue. The recruitment authorities were well aware that candidates with qualification of TTC and B.Ed. are available yet they chose to restrict entry for appointment only to TTC-pass candidates. It is open to the recruiting authorities to evolve a policy of recruitment and to decide the source from which the recruitment is to be made. So far as B.Ed. qualification is concerned, in the connected appeals [CA No. 1726-28 of 2001] arising from Kerala which are heard with this appeal, we have already taken the view that B.Ed. qualification cannot be treated as a qualification higher than TTC because the nature of training imparted for grant of certificate and degree is totally different and between them there is no parity whatsoever. It is projected before us that presently more candidates available for recruitment to primary school are from B.Ed. category and very few from TTC category. Whether for the aforesaid reasons, B.Ed. qualification can also be prescribed for primary teachers is a question to be considered by the authorities concerned but we cannot consider B.Ed. candidates for the present vacancies advertised as eligible. category and very few from TTC category. Whether for the aforesaid reasons, B.Ed. qualification can also be prescribed for primary teachers is a question to be considered by the authorities concerned but we cannot consider B.Ed. candidates for the present vacancies advertised as eligible. In our view, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court was fully justified in coming to the conclusion that B.Ed. candidates were rightly excluded by the authorities from selection and appointment as primary teachers. We make it clear that we are not called upon to express any opinion on any B.Ed. candidates appointed as primary teachers pursuant to advertisements in the past and our decision is confined only to the advertisement which was under challenge before the High Court and in this appeal." The law laid down in the said case has been followed in Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation v. Subash Sindhi Cooperative Housing, (2013) 5 SCC 427 . A similar view has also been taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India & anr. v. International Trading Co. & anr., (2003) 5 SCC 437 which reads as under: "13. What remains now to be considered, is the effect of permission granted to the thirty two vessels. As highlighted by learned counsel for the appellants, even if it is accepted that there was any improper permission, that may render such permissions vulnerable so far as thirty two vessels are concerned, but it cannot come to the aid of the respondents. It is not necessary to deal with that aspect because two wrongs do not make one right. A party cannot claim that since something wrong has been done in another case direction should be given for doing another wrong. It would not be setting a wrong right, but would be perpetuating another wrong. In such matters there is no discrimination involved. The concept of equal treatment on the logic of Article 14 of the Constitution of India (in short 'the Constitution') cannot be pressed into service in such cases. What the concept of equal treatment presupposes is existence of similar legal foothold. It does not countenance repetition of a wrong action to bring both wrongs on a par. Even if hypothetically it is accepted that a wrong has been committed in some other cases by introducing a concept of negative equality the respondents cannot strengthen their case. What the concept of equal treatment presupposes is existence of similar legal foothold. It does not countenance repetition of a wrong action to bring both wrongs on a par. Even if hypothetically it is accepted that a wrong has been committed in some other cases by introducing a concept of negative equality the respondents cannot strengthen their case. They have to establish strength of their case on some other basis and not by claiming negative equality." Secondly, in State of Bihar & ors. v. Kameshwar Prasad & anr., (2000) 9 SCC 94 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "30. The concept of equality as envisaged under Article 14 of the Constitution is a positive concept which cannot be enforced in a negative manner. When any authority is shown to have committed any illegality or irregularity in favour of any individual or group of individuals, others cannot claim the same illegality or irregularity on the ground of denial thereof to them. Similarly wrong judgment passed in favour of one individual does not entitle others to claim similar benefits. In this regard this Court in Gursharan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee held that citizens have assumed wrong notions regarding the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution which guarantees equality before law to all citizens. Benefits extended to some persons in an irregular or illegal manner cannot be claimed by a citizen on the plea of equality as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution by way of writ petition filed in the High Court. The Court observed: (SCC p. 465, para 9) "Neither Article 14 of the Constitution conceives within the equality clause this concept nor Article 226 empowers the High Court to enforce such claim of equality before law. If such claims are enforced, it shall amount to directing to continue and perpetuate an illegal procedure or an illegal order for extending similar benefits to others. Before a claim based on equality clause is upheld, it must be established by the petitioner that his claim being just and legal, has been denied to him, while it has been extended to others and in this process there has been a discrimination." Again in Secy., Jaipur Development Authority v. Daulat Mal Jain this Court considered the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution and reiterated its earlier position regarding the concept of equality holding:(SCC pp. 51-52, para 28) "Suffice it to hold that the illegal allotment founded upon ultra vires and illegal policy of allotment made to some other persons wrongly, would not form a legal premise to ensure it to the respondent or to repeat or perpetuate such illegal order, nor could it be legalised. In other words, judicial process cannot be abused to perpetuate the illegalities. Thus considered, we hold that the High Court was clearly in error in directing the appellants to allot the land to the respondents." A similar view has been taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Fuljit Kaur v. State of Punjab & ors., (2010) 11 SCC 455 , the para 11 of which is as under: "11. The respondent cannot claim parity with D.S. Laungia in view of the settled legal proposition that Article 14 of the Constitution of India does not envisage for negative equality. Article 14 is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud. Article 14 of the Constitution has a positive concept. Equality is a trite, which cannot be claimed in illegality and therefore, cannot be enforced by a citizen or court in a negative manner. If an illegality and irregularity has been committed in favour of an individual or a group of individuals or a wrong order has been passed by a judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher or superior court for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing wrong order. A wrong order/decision in favour of any particular party does not entitle any other party to claim the benefits on the basis of the wrong decision. Even otherwise Article 14 cannot be stretched too far otherwise it would make function of the administration impossible. [vide Coromandel Fertilizers Ltd. v. Union of India; Panchi Devi v. State of Rajasthan; and Shanti Sports Club v. Union of India)." The law laid down in the above case has been reiterated and followed in Sarup Singh v. Union of India & ors., (2011) 11 SCC 198 and Basawaraj & anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81 . Thirdly, in Secretary, A.P. Public Service Commission v. B. Swapna & ors., (2005) 4 SCC 154 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "10. There are two principles in service laws which are indisputable. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81 . Thirdly, in Secretary, A.P. Public Service Commission v. B. Swapna & ors., (2005) 4 SCC 154 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "10. There are two principles in service laws which are indisputable. Firstly, there cannot be appointment beyond the advertised number and secondly norms of selection cannot be altered after the selection process has started. In the instant case 15 posts were to be filled up. The vacancies in the different zones were as follows: Zone IV ST 1 Zone III BC-A 1 Zone V BC-C 1 11. Fourteen vacancies were indented on 14.4.1997. Obviously, they were not existing vacancies on the date of advertisement i.e. 8.1.1995. The selection list was operative till 1.7.1997. The 14 vacancies which were indented on 14.4.1997 were as follows: Zone III BC'A' 1, OC - 1 Zone IV ST 1, OC - 2 Zone V BC 'C' 1, SC -1, BC 'D' - 1, OC - 3 Zone VI SC 1, OC - 1, BC 'D' 1." A similar view has been taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mukul Saikia & ors. v. State of Assam & ors., (2009) 1 SCC 386 , the para 33 of which is as under: "33. At the outset it should be noticed that the select list prepared by APSC could be used to fill the notified vacancies and not future vacancies. If the requisition and advertisement was only for 27 posts, the State cannot appoint more than the number of posts advertised, even though APSC had prepared a select list of 64 candidates. The select list got exhausted when all the 27 posts were filled. Thereafter, the candidates below the 27 appointed candidates have no right to claim appointment to any vacancy in regard to which selection was not held. The fact that evidently and admittedly the names of the appellants appeared in the select list dated 17-7.2000 below the persons who have been appointed on merit against the said 27 vacancies, and as such they could not have been appointed in excess of the number of posts advertised as the currency of select list had expired as soon as the number of posts advertised are filled up, therefore, appointments beyond the number of posts advertised would amount to filling up future vacancies meant for direct candidates in violation of quota rules. Therefore, the appellants are not entitled to claim any relief for themselves. The question that remains for consideration is whether there is any ground for challenging the regularisation of the private respondents." In Rakhi Ray & ors. v. High Court of Delhi & ors., (2010) 2 SCC 637 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "7. It is a settled legal proposition that vacancies cannot be filled up over and above the number of vacancies advertised as "the recruitment of the candidates in excess of the notified vacancies is a denial and deprivation of the constitutional right under Article 14 read with Article 16(1) of the Constitution", of those persons who acquired eligibility for the post in question in accordance with the statutory rules subsequent to the date of notification of vacancies. Filling up the vacancies over the notified vacancies is neither permissible nor desirable, for the reason, that it amounts to "improper exercise of power and only in a rare and exceptional circumstance and in emergent situation, such a rule can be deviated from and such a deviation is permissible only after adopting policy decision based on some rationale", otherwise the exercise would be arbitrary. Filling up of vacancies over the notified vacancies amounts to filling up of future vacancies and thus, is not permissible in law. (Vide Union of India v. Ishwar Singh Khatri, Gujarat State Dy. Executive Engineers' Assn. v. State of Gujarat, State of Bihar v. Secretariat Asstt. Successful Examinees Union 1986, Prem Singh v. Haryana SEB and Ashok Kumar. v. Banking Service Recruitment Board)." The above law laid down in Rakhi Ray case, has been followed in State of Orissa v. Rajkishore, (2010) 6 SCC 777 and K. Lakshmi v. state of Kerala & ors., (2012) 4 SCC 115 . In Kulwinder Pal Singh & anr. v. State of Punjab & ors., (2016) 6 SCC 532 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "10. It is fairly well-settled that merely because the name of a candidate finds place in the select list, it would not give him indefeasible right to get an appointment as well. The name of a candidate may appear in the merit list but he has no indefeasible right to an appointment (vide Food Corporation of India v. Bhanu Lodh, All India SC & ST Employees' Assn. v. A. Arthur Jeen and UPSC v. Gaurav Dwivedi. 12. The name of a candidate may appear in the merit list but he has no indefeasible right to an appointment (vide Food Corporation of India v. Bhanu Lodh, All India SC & ST Employees' Assn. v. A. Arthur Jeen and UPSC v. Gaurav Dwivedi. 12. In Manoj Manu v. Union of India, it was held that (SCC p. 176, para 10) merely because the name of a candidate finds place in the select list, it would not give the candidate an indefeasible right to get an appointment as well. It is always open to the government not to fill up the vacancies, however such decision should not be arbitrary or unreasonable. Once the decision is found to be based on some valid reason, the court would not issue any mandamus to the government to fill up the vacancies. As noticed earlier, because twenty-two other candidates were declared successful by the Supreme Court pertaining to the selection of the years 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001 as Civil Judges (Junior Division), they were to be accommodated, as rightly resolved by the Administrative Committee in the meeting dated 6-7-2011. The three resultant vacancies of the year 2007-2008 stood consumed with the joining of the said seventeen candidates and the same could not be filled up from the select list of that year. The decision of the Administrative Committee observing that the three resultant vacancies stood consumed is based on factual situation arising there and cannot be said to be arbitrary." In Anurag Kumar Singh & ors. v. State of Uttarkhand & ors., (2016) 9 SCC 426 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "11. It is clear from the pleadings and the various documents filed by the Appellants that no additional posts were created between 1-7-2008 and 30-6-2009. It is significant that the Rules refer to the recruitment year. It is a well-accepted principle of service law that only the number of vacancies that are advertised can be filled up. If the advertisement gives liberty to the Government to vary the number of posts, such power cannot be exercised for filling up future vacancies. If additional posts were created during the recruitment year i.e. between 1-7-2008 and 30-6-2009, the Government could have directed the Second Respondent to include those posts also in the selection list that was made pursuant to the advertisement dated 19-9-2009." 9. If additional posts were created during the recruitment year i.e. between 1-7-2008 and 30-6-2009, the Government could have directed the Second Respondent to include those posts also in the selection list that was made pursuant to the advertisement dated 19-9-2009." 9. Facts of the case which are not disputed between the parties, are that the Director (RD & PR), Government of Manipur issued an advertisement dated 04-08-2016 inviting applications from amongst the eligible candidates for appointment to the posts of Progress Assistant (PA), Village Level Worker (VLW), LDC, Road Muhorrir, Driver, Peon, etc. The petitioners being eligible for appointment to the posts of LDC and VLW applied for them and as per the Notification dated 20-09-2016, a common written examination was held on 25-09-2016 and the result thereof was declared vide Notification dated 14-10-2016. The interview was held from 17-10-2016 to 21-10-2016. The process of recruitment was common for all the posts as mentioned in the advertisement. On the recommendation of the DPC/ Selection Committee which was approved by the State Government vide its letter dated 31-12-2016, the petitioners were appointed as LDCs and VLWs vide order dated 31-12-2016 issued by the Director (RD & PR), Manipur. In the meantime, persons/candidates who were appointed against the other post like Progress Assistants, Road Muhorrir, Driver and Peon, have already been allowed to join their services in the month of November, 2016 itself. So far as the petitioners are concerned, before they were allowed to join the posts against which they were appointed, the Election Model Code of Conduct was imposed w.e.f. 04-01-2017 and the respondents were directed to submit all the relevant files to the office of the Chief Electoral Officer for perusal vide its letter dated 27-02-2017 and after having perused the said files, the Chief Electoral Officer did not issue any restraint order nor did it pass any adverse remark against the appointment orders in question. As regards the irregularities or illegalities as alleged by the public with respect to the process of recruitment in respect of various Departments including the RD & PR, a SIT was constituted and after due verification and examination of all records, the SIT submitted its report and based on such report, the Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms, Government of Manipur vide its letter dated 05-12-2017 communicated to the Principal Secretary (RD & PR), Government of Manipur that the Department may retain/allow only 46 Progress Assistants while that of the rest of the recruitments be cancelled. The contents of the report of the SIT are not made known to the public and moreover, the appointment orders issued in favour of the petitioners have not yet been either cancelled or withdrawn by the State Government. 10. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the short question that arises for consideration by this court, is as to whether the respondents are justified in not allowing the petitioners to join their posts namely LDC and VLW, when persons/candidates who were appointed against the other posts have been allowed to join their posts. The answer is in the negative for the following reasons: (a) The process of recruitment was common for all the posts as mentioned in the advertisement and was duly completed and the only difference is that the proceedings of the DPC/ Selection Committee were drawn separately for each posts; (b) On the basis of the recommendation of the DPC / Selection Committee, appointment orders were issued in respect of all the posts but only persons/candidates who were appointed against the posts like Progress Assistant, Road Muhorrir, Driver, Peon etc., have been allowed to join their services in the month of November, 2016 itself, while denying the same to the petitioners. The justification for it as contended by the respondents relying upon the letter dated 05-12-2017 of the Department of Personnel & Administrative Reforms, is that the number of posts recommended, is less than the number of approved posts. As regards the Progress Assistant, the number of posts as per the advertisement, is 28 posts against which 46 persons have been appointed vide order dated 16-11-2016. As regards the Progress Assistant, the number of posts as per the advertisement, is 28 posts against which 46 persons have been appointed vide order dated 16-11-2016. Similar is the case with the other posts namely Road Muhorrir-34 persons recommended as against 28 posts advertised; Driver-35 persons recommended as against 28 posts advertised and Peon-98 persons recommended as against 56 posts advertised. The appointment orders issued in respect of the posts of Road Muhorrir, Driver and Peon are not placed on record. The justification appears to be incorrect and the denial of joining the services by the petitioners, is unreasonable, arbitrary being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution; (c) It appears that the process of recruitment has not yet been cancelled nor has the appointment orders issued in favour of the petitioners been cancelled by the State Government. There is no material on record to show to the contrary. The only instruction given by the Department of Personnel & Administrative Reforms vide its letter dated 05-12-2017 as reproduced in the affidavit-in-opposition, is that the rest of the recruitments may be cancelled. The term "recruitments" used in the said letter of the Department of Personnel & Administrative Reforms is vague and is not clear to this Court. Does it mean the process of recruitment or the appointment orders issued in favour of the petitioners. It is nowhere stated in the affidavit-in-opposition that either the process of recruitment or the appointment orders issued in favour of the petitioners, has been cancelled by the State Government; (d) No reason has been assigned by the State Government for not allowing the petitioners to join their services except stating that it has been instructed by the Department of Personnel & Administrative Reforms that the rest of the recruitments may be cancelled. The Department of Personnel & Administrative Reforms has not assigned any reason as to why it has given the said instruction to the Administrative Department except stating in its letter that the matter has been examined by the Government and the SIT which has investigated into the matter. The contents of the SIT report are not known nor has a copy of the report been placed on record for perusal by this court. The contents of the SIT report are not known nor has a copy of the report been placed on record for perusal by this court. The necessity of giving reasons by the authorities in support of their decisions has been emphasised by the Hon'ble Supreme Court time and again in various decisions commencing from A.K. Kraipak case; (e) Relying upon the decisions as referred to in para 9 above and rendered in Yogesh Kumar case, Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation case and Union of India v. International Trading Co. case (supra), it has also been submitted by the learned Advocate General that the illegality cannot be allowed to perpetuate and that no direction be given for doing another wrong, when wrong has been done in a case. Article 14 is not meant to perpetuate illegality. There is no and can be no dispute as regards the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decisions relied upon by the learned Advocate General. But the said decisions will have no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case for the reason that there is no material on record to show that the appointment orders issued in respect of the posts of Progress Assistant, Road Muhorrir, driver and Peon have been declared illegal by the State Government or any appropriate and competent court. Therefore, the question of perpetuating illegality will not arise when the petitioners are allowed to join their services; (g) As has been held in Mrs. Asha Kaul case (supra) that it is well settled that mere inclusion in the select list does not confer upon the candidates an indefeasible right to appointment. It has further been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the other aspect is the obligation of the government to act fairly. The whole exercise cannot be reduced to a farce. Having sent a requisition/request to the commission to select a particular number of candidates for a particular category,- in pursuance of which the commission issues a notification, holds a written test, conducts a notification, holds a written test, conducts interviews, prepares a select list and then communicates to the government-the government cannot quietly and without good and valid reasons nullify the whole exercise and tell the candidates when they complain that they have no legal right to appointment. We do not think that any government can adopt such a stand with any justification today. Similarly, in East Cost Railway case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the State does not enjoy an unqualified prerogative to refuse an appointment in an arbitrary fashion or to disregard the merit of the candidates as reflected by the merit list prepared at the end of the selection process. The petitioners, in the present cases, are in a better footing, in the sense that so far as they are concerned, it is not a case of mere inclusion of their names in the merit list but a case of their being appointed as LCDs and VLWs by issuing appropriate orders. 11. The only submission of the learned Advocate General which is quite relevant in the present case and needs to be considered by this court, is that in Rakhi Ray case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that vacancies cannot be filled up over and above the number of vacancies advertised as the recruitment of the candidates in excess of the notified vacancies is a denial and deprivation of the constitutional right under Article 14 read with Article 16(1) of the Constitution, of those persons who acquired eligibility for the post in question in accordance with the statutory rules subsequent to the date of notification of vacancies. Filling up the vacancies over the notified vacancies is neither permissible nor desirable, for the reason that it amounts to improper exercise of power. In the present case, number of posts in respect of LDC and VLW as per the advertisement are 28 and 56 respectively but by the appointment orders dated 31-12-2016 issued by the Director (RD & PR), Manipur, 73 LDCs and 116 VLWs have been appointed. Similar situation may have arisen in respect of other posts as well. In terms of the law laid down in Rakhi Ray case, the said appointment orders dated 31-12-2016 appear to be illegal and contrary thereto but since the validity and correctness thereof is not the subject matter in issue herein, this Court cannot interfere with them. Similar situation may have arisen in respect of other posts as well. In terms of the law laid down in Rakhi Ray case, the said appointment orders dated 31-12-2016 appear to be illegal and contrary thereto but since the validity and correctness thereof is not the subject matter in issue herein, this Court cannot interfere with them. One point which the learned Advocate General has vehemently emphasised, is that from the proceedings of the DPC/ Selection Committee in respect of the posts of LDCs and VLWs, it is seen that it would not have been possible for the DPC to consider government orders dated 02-12-2016 and 23-12-2016 which were issued subsequently creating some more posts, in its meeting held from 17-10-2016 to 21-10- 2016 and that the said proceedings must have been drawn on 31-12-2016 or after the model code of conduct having been imposed with effect from 04-01-2017. His contention appears to have some prima facie force and merit. Be that as it may, since the validity and correctness of the said proceedings is also not the subject matter in issue, it may not be appropriate for this court to make comments on them. Suffice it to say and the fact remains that the process of recruitment, common for all the posts, has not been cancelled nor has the appointment orders dated 31-12-2016 issued in favour of the petitioners been cancelled by the State Government. Persons appointed in respect of the other posts have already been allowed to join their services. The appointment orders dated 31-12-2016 issued in favour of the petitioners have not been challenged by anyone before any appropriate forum. The State Government has not assigned any reason why the petitioners have not been allowed to join their services except the instruction of the Department of Personnel & Administrative Reforms which is also bereft of any reason. Having heard the learned counsels appearing for the parties and keeping in mind the facts and circumstances of the present case, this court is of the view that the appointment in respect of the posts of LDCs and VLWs ought to have been made confining to the number of posts as per the advertisement and that a fresh and appropriate government order ought to have been issued after the cancellation or withdrawal of the earlier orders dated 31-12-2016 issued by the Director (RD & PR), Manipur. 12. 12. In view of and for the reasons stated hereinabove, the above writ petitions are allowed in part with the following directions: (a) The respondents and in particular, the respondent No.2 shall either cancel or withdraw the Government orders dated 31-12-2016 issued by it/the Director (RD & PR), Manipur appointing the petitioners herein and others as the LDCs and VLWs and immediately thereafter, it shall issue orders appointing persons/candidates confining to the number of posts in respect of LDC and VLW as mentioned in the advertisement dated 04-08-2016; (b) The direction (a) above shall be complied with within a month from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment and order and thereafter, the persons/candidates who are so appointed as LDCs and VLWs, shall be allowed to join their posts.