JUDGMENT : Manindra Mohan Shrivastava, J. This appeal is directed against the impugned judgment and decree dated 30th January 2010 passed by the First Additional District Judge, Raipur in Civil Suit No.11A/2006 by which, the appellant/plaintiffs' suit has been dismissed. 2. Appellants/plaintiffs filed suit for recovery of possession of the disputed house as also for accounts and mesne profit on the pleadings inter alia that the father of the plaintiffs, Late Ghulam Abbas and father of the defendants, Late Mohammed Hussain, Nisar Ali and Adam Ali were sons of one Hussain Ali who held joint family property as also property acquired from their own income. It was further pleaded that a partition of family property had taken place amongst late Hussain Ali and his four sons as per panch decision on 03/09/1956 and later on, a deed of partition was also prepared on 10/02/1969, in which, the disputed house and certain lands situated at village Nakti fell to the share of late Ghulam Abbas. After the death of Ghulam Abbas, plaintiffs started living at Javra and the house in dispute remained in possession of defendants at Raipur which they were holding as constructive trustee on behalf of the plaintiffs. When the plaintiffs asked defendants to handover the possession of the house and other earnings, by registered notice, the defendants did not accede to their claim which gave rise to cause of action for filing the suit and praying for relief’s. 3. In the written statement, the defendants admitted partition under partition deed dated 10.02.1968 and also admitted that the house in dispute was given to the share of late Ghulam Abbas. Defendants came out with the case that the land situated at vilage Nakti was already sold out during the lifetime of Ghulam Abbas. According to the defendants, the house in dispute though, was allotted to the share of Ghulam Abbas in partition, later on, vide sale deed dated 19.8.1976, it was sold to Mohammed Hussain, father of the defendants, vide a deed of sale for a consideration of Rs.10,000/- and since then, Mohammed Hussain remained in possession and after his death, his sons are in continuous possession and their possession is in their own right and title not as constructive trustee on behalf of the plaintiffs. 4. 4. During the pendency of the suit, an extensive amendment was brought by defendants that Ghulam Abbas, during his life time, had executed on 12.07.1981, a deed of relinquishment in favour of their father Mohammed Hussain and it was duly registered. It was further pleaded that as the sale deed dated 19.08.1976 was unregistered, therefore, a deed of relinquishment was executed on 7.12.1981 which was registered. The consideration having already been paid, the deed of relinquishment was without any further consideration and ever since 1976, Mohammed Hussain had remained in possession and paying property tax to the Corporation. After the death of Mohammed Hussain on 13.10.1985, his sons/defendants and their mother have been duly recorded as occupant in the records of the Corporation. 5. A consequential amendment was also carried out by the plaintiffs in their pleading that the so called relinquishment deed dated 7.12.1981 is a forged, bogus and fictitious document and the father of the plaintiff, namely Abbas Khan never executed any such relinquishment deed in respect of the property in dispute in favour of Mohammed Hussain. 6. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, learned Trial Court initially framed four issues and thereafter two additional issues were framed. Apart from the issues relating to partition, learned Trial Court also framed issue whether the suit was within limitation and whether defendants acquired title in the year 1976 and also whether Ghulam Abbas had executed relinquishment deed on 7.12.1981 in favour of defendant's father Mohammed Hussain. 7. Learned Trial Court held that even prior to the death of Ghulam Abbas, plaintiffs were residing at Javra and there had already been a partition of the joint family property amongst the family members i.e. Ghulam Abbas, Mohammed Hussain and their two other brothers and their father. Though sale deed dated 19.8.1976 does not confer any title, a relinquishment deed was executed in favour of Mohammed Hussain by Ghulam Abbas on 7.12.1981, which was registered, thereby transferring title in favour of Mohammed Hussain. Learned Trial Court also held that the plaintiffs having filed the suit long time after the defendants had taken possession of the property, for claim of title and recovery of possession, the suit was barred by limitation. Learned Trial Court also held that Mohammed Hussain and the defendants have otherwise perfected their title by adverse possession. 8. Learned Trial Court also held that the plaintiffs having filed the suit long time after the defendants had taken possession of the property, for claim of title and recovery of possession, the suit was barred by limitation. Learned Trial Court also held that Mohammed Hussain and the defendants have otherwise perfected their title by adverse possession. 8. Assailing correctness and validity of impugned judgment and decree, learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs argued that the Court below has grossly erred, both on facts and in law, in holding that the suit was barred by limitation. He submits that the possession of Mohammed Hussain and his sons were not hostile to the title of Ghulam Abbas and his sons but they were only permitted to keep possession being the next kin because, after the death of Ghulam Abbas, the plaintiffs were residing at Javra with other relatives. He further submits that when the parties are co-owners, it cannot be said to be a case of exclusive possession over the property in denial of title of the other co-owners of the property. 9. Next submission of counsel for the appellants is that the learned Trial Court erred in law in holding that relinquishment deed had the effect of creating title in favour of Mohammed Hussain as the said document is highly doubtful and from the evidence, it is proved to be a bogus document. In this regard, his argument is that defendants came out with a belated plea of relinquishment deed and initially when the written statement was filed, neither the document was disclosed nor any plea was made regarding the relinquishment deed. However, the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate that the relinquishment deed Ex.D-1A contained signature which itself was not tallying with each other, made in different inks, carrying different impressions. He would submit that no other signature of Ghulam Abbas in Urdu was placed before the Court and it has come in evidence that Ghulam Abbas used to put his signature only in Hindi or Gujarati. For this reason also, the document is highly doubtful. Reliance placed on the evidence of defendants is in ignorance of legal position in this regard. Learned Trial Court has wrongly disbelieved the evidence of plaintiffs' witness PW-12 and wrongly believed the testimony of DW-1 in so far as the proof of relinquishment deed is concerned. For this reason also, the document is highly doubtful. Reliance placed on the evidence of defendants is in ignorance of legal position in this regard. Learned Trial Court has wrongly disbelieved the evidence of plaintiffs' witness PW-12 and wrongly believed the testimony of DW-1 in so far as the proof of relinquishment deed is concerned. According to him, the principles applicable in the matter of will are required to be applied as the signatory to the document is no more available to prove the document. In this regard reliance is placed on Mahesh Kumar (dead) by LRs v. Vinod Kumar and ors., 2012 Vol.3 MPLJ 367 (SC). 10. Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that in the circumstances of the case, when the document was surrounded by all suspicious circumstances, learned Trial Court ought to have obtained the report of the handwriting expert. He would submit that the plaintiffs have prayed for calling of the report of the handwriting expert before this Court also and therefore, this application may also be considered and thereafter, report of the handwriting expert may be obtained before deciding the issue. Reliance has been placed on Jageshwar Prasad v. Lappa, 1969 JLJ Note 11. Lastly, it has been submitted that the plea taken by the defendants were mutually destructive and inconsistent in so far as the plea of acquisition of title by the relinquishment deed and plea of prescription of title by adverse possession is concerned. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Mohan Lal (deceased) Through his LRs. Kachru & Ors. v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar & Anr. reported in (1996) 1 SCC 639 and in the matter of Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India & Others reported in 2004 Vol. 10 SCC 779. Thus, it is submitted that the partition having been proved, the house having been allotted to the share of plaintiffs' father Ghulam Abbas and no title having passed in favour of Mohammed Hussain either under sale deed dated 19.08.1976 or relinquishment deed dated 7.12.1981, plaintiffs were entitled to the decree of possession in respect of the property in dispute along with the relevant accounts and also mesne profits arising from the use of that property. 12. 12. Counsel for the respondents supported the judgment/decree, by submitting that the scope of interference even in appeal on facts is circumscribed by well settled principles laid down in the matter of Jagdish Singh v. Madhuri Devi reported in (2008) 10 SCC 497 . He would next submit that the appeal can be heard only on those grounds which have been specifically mentioned and taken in the memo of appeal. He submits that the suit of the plaintiffs must fail both on the grounds of limitation as also on the ground that the defendants having come out with the case of having acquired title by virtue of relinquishment deed dated 7.12.1981, the plaintiffs did not seek any relief against the relinquishment deed dated 7.12.1981 and unless appropriate relief is sought to avoid the said instrument in the form of specific relief, plaintiffs' claim for recovery of possession is not tenable and therefore the trial court has rightly dismissed the suit. In support of this submission counsel for the respondents referred to the provisions of Order 2 Rule 1, 2 CPC and Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act as also the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of J.P. Builders and anr. v. A. Ramadas Rao and anr., (2011) 1 SCC 429 . He would further submit that as far as the plea of acquisition of title by sale deed or relinquishment deed on one hand and plea of prescription of title by adverse possession on the other, are concerned, the defendant is entitled to raise such defences which may be even inconsistent. According to him, the two pleas may be said to be inconsistent but cannot be said to be mutually destructive. 13. Counsel for the respondents further argue that the document dated 19.08.1976 (Ex. D-1) has been duly proved and this is in essence, recitation of preparatory and panch decision as a prelude to execution of relinquishment deed (Ex.D-1A). Counsel for the respondents submits that the parties always intended that Ghulam Abbas would be relinquishing his interest in the property and later on the deed was not only executed but registered. Thus relinquishment deed (Ex.D-1A) is supported from what has been stated in Ex.D-1 as also from Ex.D-2, Qabooliyatnama. Counsel for the respondents submits that the parties always intended that Ghulam Abbas would be relinquishing his interest in the property and later on the deed was not only executed but registered. Thus relinquishment deed (Ex.D-1A) is supported from what has been stated in Ex.D-1 as also from Ex.D-2, Qabooliyatnama. These three documents have been duly proved in the trial and therefore, it is clear that the title had passed in favour of Late Mohammed Hussain who was in possession of the property in dispute not on behalf of any body including his brother Ghulam Abbas but in his own title and ownership which was completely adverse to title of Ghulam Abbas and his sons title in respect of the property in dispute. As there is no challenge laid to the relinquishment deed (Ex.D-1A), the presumption in favour of the defendant that the said document was so executed by the parties is liable to be drawn and onus would be on the plaintiffs to prove against the same. For this purpose, reliance has been placed on the judgment in Vishwanath Bapurao Sabale v. Shalinibai Nagappa Sabale and ors., (2009) 12 SCC 101 . 14. Counsel for the respondents would further submit that even though ordinarily, plea of adverse possession may not be set up against a co-owner, in appropriate case, such a plea may be raised and established to prove prescription of title by adverse possession even against a co-owner as has been held by the Apex Court in the matter of P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy reported in AIR 1957 SC 314 . When it was advanced by counsel for the respondents that for want of the relief seeking cancellation or declaration that the relinquishment deed dated 7.12.1981 was void and inoperative, suit is liable to be dismissed, an application has been filed today by the appellant/plaintiff seeking amendment of relief in the plaint. 15. Counsel for the appellant argues that the plaintiffs have clearly stated in their pleadings that the deed dated 7.12.1981 was bogus, false and fictitious document and incapable of taking effect under the law. This document came to the notice only when amendment was lately carried out in the written statement by the defendants. 15. Counsel for the appellant argues that the plaintiffs have clearly stated in their pleadings that the deed dated 7.12.1981 was bogus, false and fictitious document and incapable of taking effect under the law. This document came to the notice only when amendment was lately carried out in the written statement by the defendants. He would submit that the Trial Court had also framed an issue in this regard and recorded a finding, therefore, if he is not allowed to challenge these findings on the ground that no relief of declaration is sought that the relinquishment deed dated 7.12.1981 is void and inoperative or no cancellation was sought against relinquishment deed dated 7.12.1981, it would cause injustice to the appellants/plaintiffs. 16. Counsel for the respondents orally opposing the prayer for amendment at this stage of hearing, submits that the defendants came out with a specific plea by way of amendment that a relinquishment deed was executed in favour of Mohammed Hussain by Ghulam Abbas way back in the year 1981 and it was registered also. This plea was made long back in the year 2008 and therefore at that stage when such a plea was taken, though by way of amendment in the year 2008, it had come to the notice of the plaintiffs that there exists a document dated 7.12.1981, the plaintiffs did amend their pleadings as a consequence of the amendment carried out by the defendants but they did not choose to seek any relief of cancellation or declaring void and inoperative, registered deed dated 7.12.1981 within limitation as provided under Article 59 of the Limitation Act, therefore, by way of amendment, the appellant may not be permitted to seek relief which is otherwise barred by the law of limitation. 17. We have heard counsel for the parties and perused the records. 18. Before adverting ourselves to the grounds raised in the appeal to find out whether judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court is in accordance with law, the scope of interference in appeal under Section 96 by the appellate court as delineated by their Lordships in the Supreme Court in the case of Jagdish Singh v. Madhuri Devi, 2008 (10) SCC 497 needs to be reiterated. In the aforesaid case, it was held - “27. In the aforesaid case, it was held - “27. It is no doubt true that the High Court was exercising power as first appellate court and hence it was open to the Court to enter into not only questions of law but questions of fact as well. It is settled law that an appeal is a continuation of suit. An appeal thus is a re-hearing of the main matter and the appellate court can re-appraise, re- appreciate and review the entire evidence -oral as well as documentary -and can come to its own conclusion. 28. At the same time, however, the appellate court is expected, nay bound, to bear in mind a finding recorded by the trial court on oral evidence. It should not forget that the trial court had an advantage and opportunity of seeing the demeanour of witnesses and, hence, the trial court's conclusions should not normally be disturbed. No doubt, the appellate court possesses the same powers as that of the original court, but they have to be exercised with proper care, caution and circumspection. When a finding of fact has been recorded by the trial court mainly on appreciation of oral evidence, it should not be lightly disturbed unless the approach of the trial court in appraisal of evidence is erroneous, contrary to well- established principles of law or unreasonable. 29. Before more than a century, in Coghlan v. Cumberland, (1898) 1 Ch 704, Lindley, M.R. pronounced the principle thus; "Even where the appeal turns on a question of fact, the Court of appeal has to bear in mind that its duty is to rehear the case, and the Court must reconsider the materials before the Judge with such other materials as it may have decided to admit. The Court must then make up its own mind, not disregarding the judgment appealed from, but carefully weighing and considering it; and not shrinking from overruling it if on full consideration the Court comes to the conclusion that the judgment is wrong. When, as often happens, much turns on the relative credibility of witnesses who have been examined and cross-examined before the Judge, the Court is sensible of the great advantage he has had in seeing and hearing them. When, as often happens, much turns on the relative credibility of witnesses who have been examined and cross-examined before the Judge, the Court is sensible of the great advantage he has had in seeing and hearing them. It is often very difficult to estimate correctly the relative credibility of witnesses from written depositions and when the question arises which witness is to be believed rather than another; and that question turns on manner and demeanour, the Court of Appeal always is, and must be, guided by the impression made on the Judge who saw the witnesses. But there may obviously be other circumstances, quite apart from manner and demeanour, which may shew whether a statement is credible or not; and these circumstances may warrant the Court in differing from the Judge, even on a question of fact turning on the credibility of witnesses whom the Court has not seen." [see also observations of Lord Thankerton in Watt v. Thomas, (1947) 1 All ER 582] 30. In Sara Veeraswami v. Talluri Narayya, AIR 1949 PC 32 : 75 IA 252, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, after referring to relevant decisions on the point, stated; "…..but if the evidence as a whole can reasonably be regarded as justifying the conclusion arrived at the trial, and especially if that conclusion has been arrived at on conflicting testimony by a tribunal which saw and heard the witnesses, the appellate court will bear in mind that it has not enjoyed this opportunity and that the view of the trial Judge as to where credibility lies is entitled to great weight. This is not to say that the Judge of first instance can be treated as infallible in determining which side is telling the truth or is refraining from exaggeration. Like other tribunals, he may go wrong on a question of fact, but it is a cogent circumstance that a Judge of first instance, when estimating the value of verbal testimony, has the advantage (which is denied to Courts of appeal) of having the witnesses before him and observing the manner in which their evidence is given." 31. This Court also, before more than half a century in Sarju Ramdeo Sahu Pershad v. Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh Pratap Narain Singh, 1950 SCR 781 , stated; "7. This Court also, before more than half a century in Sarju Ramdeo Sahu Pershad v. Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh Pratap Narain Singh, 1950 SCR 781 , stated; "7. The question for our consideration is undoubtedly one of fact, the decision of which depends upon the appreciation of oral evidence adduced in the case. In such cases, the appellate court has got to bear in mind that it has not the advantage which the trial Judge had in having the witnesses before him and of observing the manner in which they deposed in court. This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies on facts, the appellate court is not competent to reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the trial Judge. The rule is -and it is nothing more than a rule of practice -that when there is conflict of oral evidence of the parties on any matter in issue and the decision hinges upon the credibility of the witnesses, then unless there is some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness which has escaped the trial Judge's notice or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lies, the appellate court should not interfere with the finding of the trial Judge on a question of fact. 32. Referring to several cases on the point, the Court concluded; "15. …....The duty of the appellate court in such cases is to see whether the evidence taken as a whole can reasonably justify the conclusion which the trial court arrived at or whether there is an element of improbability arising from proved circumstances which, in the opinion of the court, outweighs such finding." (emphasis supplied) 33. After about a decade, in Radha Prasad Singh v. Gajadhar Singh, (1960) 1 SCR 663 , this Court reiterated; "14. After about a decade, in Radha Prasad Singh v. Gajadhar Singh, (1960) 1 SCR 663 , this Court reiterated; "14. The position in law, in our opinion, is that when an appeal lies on facts it is the right and the duty of the Appeal Court to consider what its decision on the question of facts should be; but in coming to its own decision it should bear in mind that it is looking at the printed record and has not the opportunity of seeing the witnesses and that it should not lightly reject the Trial Judge's conclusion that the evidence of a particular witness should be believed or should not be believed particularly when such conclusion is based on the observation of the demeanour of the witness in Court. But, this does not mean that merely because an appeal court has not heard or seen the witness it will in no case reverse the findings of a Trial Judge even on the question of credibility, if such question depends on a fair consideration of matters on record. When it appears to the Appeal Court that important considerations bearing on the question of credibility have not been taken into account or properly weighed by the Trial Judge and such considerations including the question of probability of the story given by the witnesses clearly indicate that the view taken by the Trial Judge is wrong, the Appeal Court should have no hesitation in reversing the findings of the Trial Judge on such questions. Where the question is not of credibility based entirely on the demeanour of witnesses observed in Court but a question of inference of one fact from proved primary facts the Court of Appeal is in as good a position as the Trial Judge and is free to reverse the findings if it thinks that the inference made by the Trial Judge is not justified". 34. In T.D. Gopalan v. Commissioner of Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments, Madras, (1973) 1 SCR 584 , this Court said; "9. The High Court next proceeded to reproduce a summary of the statement of each of the witnesses produced by the defendants. 34. In T.D. Gopalan v. Commissioner of Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments, Madras, (1973) 1 SCR 584 , this Court said; "9. The High Court next proceeded to reproduce a summary of the statement of each of the witnesses produced by the defendants. No attempt whatsoever was made to discuss the reasons which the learned District Judge had given for not accepting their evidence except for a general observation here and there that nothing had been suggested in the cross-examination of a particular witness as to why he should have made a false statement. We apprehend that the uniform practice in the matter of appreciation of evidence has been that if the trial court has given cogent and detailed reasons for not accepting the testimony of a witness the appellate court in all fairness to it ought to deal with those reasons before proceeding to form a contrary opinion about accepting the testimony which has been rejected by the trial court. We are, therefore, not in a position to know on what grounds the High Court disagreed with the reasons which prevailed with the learned District Judge for not relying on the evidence of the witnesses produced by the defendants". 35. Yet in another decision in Madhusudan Das v. Narayanibai, (1983) 1 SCR 851 , this Court said; "8. ….At this stage, it would be right to refer to the general principle that in an appeal against a trial court decree, when the appellate court considers an issue turning on oral evidence it must bear in mind that it does not enjoy the advantage which the trial court had in having the witnesses before it and of observing the manner in which they gave their testimony. When there is a conflict of oral evidence on any matter in issue and its resolution turns upon the credibility of the witnesses, the general rule is that the appellate court should permit the findings of fact rendered by the trial court to prevail unless it clearly appears that some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness has escaped the notice of the trial court or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace its opinion as to where the credibility lies. . . The principle is one of practice and governs the weight to be given to a finding of fact by the trial court. . . The principle is one of practice and governs the weight to be given to a finding of fact by the trial court. There is, of course, no doubt that as a matter of law if the appraisal of the evidence by the trial court suffers from a material irregularity or is based on inadmissible evidence or on a misreading of the evidence or on conjectures and surmises the appellate court is entitled to interfere with the finding of fact.” (emphasis supplied) 36. Three requisites should normally be present before an appellate court reverses a finding of the trial court; (i) it applies its mind to reasons given by the trial court; (ii) it has no advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses; and (iii) it records cogent and convincing reasons for disagreeing with the trial court.” Keeping in view the aforesaid principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we shall deal with the matter in our hand. 19. Learned counsel for the respondent has also raised an issue that the plaintiff cannot be permitted to assail the legality and validity of the impugned judgment and decree on grounds other than those, which have specifically been taken in the memo of appeal. In this regard, it has to be stated as a matter of law that in view of the provisions contained in Order XLI Rule 2 CPC, the appellant shall not, except by leave of the Court, urge or be heard in support of any ground not set forth in the memo of appeal but the Appellate Court, in deciding the appeal, shall not confine to the grounds of objection set forth in the memo of appeal or taken by leave of the Court. Further, the Court shall not rest its decision on any ground, unless the party who may be affected thereby had a sufficient opportunity to contest the case on that ground. In the present case, learned counsel for the appellant has confined his arguments to the grounds raised by him in the appeal and we do not find that during the course of arguments, any ground, which had not been included or implicit in the grounds of appeal taken in the memo of appeal, was raised during the arguments. 20. In the present case, learned counsel for the appellant has confined his arguments to the grounds raised by him in the appeal and we do not find that during the course of arguments, any ground, which had not been included or implicit in the grounds of appeal taken in the memo of appeal, was raised during the arguments. 20. Before examining various issues arising out of the impugned judgment, it would be proper to first decide the application for amendment filed by the appellants today. When the written statement was filed by the defendant, initially the defendants did not come out with any plea that there was a relinquishment deed executed by Ghulam Abbas in favour of Mohammed Hussain but, later on, an amendment application was moved by the defendant in the month of January, 2008 in which it was pleaded and disclosed that there was a relinquishment deed executed in favour of Mohammed Hussain by Ghulam Abbas on 7.12.1981. Not only the document was filed by the defendants in support of their case but it was pleaded that Ghulam Abbas divested his title in respect of the property in dispute. The amendment application was allowed and thereafter, the plaintiffs carried out consequential amendment which was quite an extensive one. They were fully aware of the said document which is manifest from their pleadings that the the deed was fictitious, bogus etc., however, even at that stage of carrying out the amendment in the pleadings, the plaintiffs did not choose to seek relief by amending the relief clause against the relinquishment deed dated 7.12.1981. The period of limitation prescribed for seeking cancellation of document or getting the document/instrument set aside, is provided in Article 59 of the Limitation Act as below : “59. Article 59: (Arts. 91 and 114 of the Act of 1908): The period of limitation for a suit to cancel or set aside an instrument or decree or for the rescission of a contract is three years and the time of limitation starts to run when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded first become known to him.” Article 59 applies to all suits— (i) to cancel or set aside all instruments; (ii) to cancel or set aside any decree; and (iii) for rescission of contract. Article 59 is the general Article. Article 59 is the general Article. Article 59 envisages any suit to cancel or set aside an instrument or document. An instrument is a formal legal writing such as, a record, charter, deed or agreement. An instrument is a deed, writ or other legal proceeding or matter reduced to writing. It includes every document by which any right or liability is, or purports to be, created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded. The word ‘document’ denotes any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks, or by more than one of those means, intended to be used, or which may be used, as evidence of that matter. Thus document is an instrument on which is recorded matter which may be used as evidence. The words ‘document’ and ‘instrument’ are sometimes interchangeably used. An instrument or document may be valid, voidable or void. When the document or instrument is valid no question arises for its cancellation. Similar is the case when the document is void ab initio. When the instrument is void there is nothing to set aside or cancel it when it is a nullity. 21. The time from which the period begins to run would be when the fact that plaintiff is entitled to have the instrument cancelled, become known to him. The pleadings of the plaintiffs, as carried out by way of amendment, clearly show that the plaintiffs came out with the plea that the relinquishment deed was a fictitious, bogus document and it was not signed by their father. If that was their case, certainly, the facts entitling them to have the instrument set aside, were known to them at least from the date of pleadings made by them. Therefore from that date, the limitation would begin to run and expire after three years i.e. sometime in the year 2011. The argument raised by other party is that for want of appropriate relief against the relinquishment deed dated 7.12.1981, the plaintiff is not entitled to claim relief of recovery possession. Irrespective of the result, such relief not prayed for in the present case, we are of the opinion that the relief for cancellation or for setting aside or for declaring illegal the sale deed dated 7.12.1981 could be taken up only within three years as discussed above. Irrespective of the result, such relief not prayed for in the present case, we are of the opinion that the relief for cancellation or for setting aside or for declaring illegal the sale deed dated 7.12.1981 could be taken up only within three years as discussed above. The relief could be amended within a period of three years which has not been done and, therefore, at this stage, allowing the plaintiffs to add new relief would amount to allowing them to claim the relief which is otherwise barred by limitation. 22. In our view therefore, the application, at this belated stage, is liable to be rejected and is accordingly rejected. 23. The plaintiffs' case is based on the plea of partition and that the house in dispute was allotted to the share of their father Ghulam Abbas. Though, the plaintiffs have themselves come with the plea that the defendants are in possession of the property in dispute, there case has been that the possession is permissive and the defendants are holding possession on their behalf i.e. in trust for and on behalf of the plaintiffs but then, the defendants' case has been that even though, the plaintiffs have taken plea that the house in dispute was in the share of Ghulam Abbas, later on, Ghulam Abbas sold/relinquished in favour of Mohammed Abbas and, therefore, the plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief. 24. As far as the partition amongst the sons of late Hasan Ali and his four sons namely Mohammed Hussain, Nissar Ali, Adam Ali and Ghulam Abbas is concerned, this is admitted position as between the parties. In para 5 of the plaint, the plaintiffs have come out with the plea that the partition had taken place on 3.9.1956 and a partition deed was also prepared on 10.02.1968. In the written statement defendants have admitted that a partition deed was prepared on 10.02.1968. According to the plaintiffs, as pleaded in para 6, the house in dispute and certain lands situated at village Nakti were allotted to the share of Ghulam Abbas. In reply, the defendants have admitted this fact that the house in dispute was received upon partition by Ghulam Abbas. The parties have also led evidence in this regard, therefore, the fact of partition has been admitted between them and also that the house in dispute was allotted to the share of Mohammed Hussain. In reply, the defendants have admitted this fact that the house in dispute was received upon partition by Ghulam Abbas. The parties have also led evidence in this regard, therefore, the fact of partition has been admitted between them and also that the house in dispute was allotted to the share of Mohammed Hussain. It does not require further enquiry on that aspect and therefore, while deciding all other issues, we shall proceed on this admitted position of partition having already taken place and the house in dispute allotted to Ghulam Abbas. 25. The defendants have admitted that the house was allotted to Ghulam Abbas but they come out with the plea that under sale deed dated 19.8.1976, the house was sold by Ghulam Abbas in favour of Mohammed Hussain for a consideration of Rs.10,000/- and thereafter, Mohammed Hussain became the holder of title and also came in possession of the property in dispute. Defendants further came out with the case that as the sale deed was unregistered, relinquishment deed was executed on 7.12.1981 by Ghulam Abbas in favour of Mohammed Hussain and the same was registered also. This has been seriously disputed by the plaintiffs in their consequential pleading and the Trial Court had to therefore frame an issue. The said document, relinquishment deed dated 7.12.1981, as it reads, has been executed on 7.12.1981. It is a registered document. The said relinquishment deed is said to be prepared in the presence of as many as two witnesses one being Shaqir Hussain defendant No.1 and the other being Abdi Ali. The defendant witness Shaqir Hussain has stated in his affidavit that a relinquishment deed was executed by late Ghulam Abbas in favour of his father on 7.12.1981. He has stated that as the sale deed dated 19.8.1976 was unregistered, therefore, the relinquishment deed dated 7.12.1981 was executed without any consideration. In his evidence he has proved his signature. He further deposes that his uncle Ghulam Abbas had also signed the deed. In his detailed cross-examination, this witness, however, states that he cannot read or write Arbi (Urdu) but can read only few letters. In para 16 of his evidence, he further deposes that he had signed the relinquishment deed Ex.D-1A in the office of Registrar in presence of another witness Abdi Ali. In his detailed cross-examination, this witness, however, states that he cannot read or write Arbi (Urdu) but can read only few letters. In para 16 of his evidence, he further deposes that he had signed the relinquishment deed Ex.D-1A in the office of Registrar in presence of another witness Abdi Ali. The evidence of defendants witness Abdi Ali (DW-3) is that he is resident of Sadar Bazar Raipur and he belongs to the same community of Bohra to which the plaintiffs and defendants belong. He further deposes that he knew both the plaintiffs and defendants' father Ghulam Abbas. In para 3 of his affidavit, he has stated that about 27 years before, relinquishment deed was executed and registered and he put his signature in the said relinquishment deed as one of its witnesses and along with him defendant No.1 had also signed the document as witness. He further deposes that the relinquishment deed was signed by late Ghulam Abbas in his presence. This witness has been subjected to cross-examination in which he has denied that he has signed the document in his house and also denied the suggestion that he did not go to the office of the Registrar. 26. Much of suspicion has been raised on this document by the counsel for the appellant by submitting that the document contains signatures in Arbi (Urdu) whereas Ghulam Abbas never used to write or put his signature in Urdu. In this regard, the evidence of PW-1 in para 29 of his cross-examination is that his father never used to sign in Urdu but only used to sign in Hindi or Gujarati. The suggestion that his father also used to sign in Urdu has been denied. A bald statement made to that effect, by itself, without anything more, may not be a suspicion to hold that the document was not executed. In the present case, taking into consideration that the execution of the document has been proved by an independent witness Abdi Ali (DW-3), doubt, if any, stands removed. 27. Moreover, the document is registered one and both DW-1 and DW-2 have stated that they had signed the document in the office of the Registrar. It has also been stated that the said document was signed by Ghulam Abbas in the presence of the witnesses. 27. Moreover, the document is registered one and both DW-1 and DW-2 have stated that they had signed the document in the office of the Registrar. It has also been stated that the said document was signed by Ghulam Abbas in the presence of the witnesses. Therefore, the finding of the Trial Court regarding proof of the document which is a registered one and carries presumption in his favour, unless proved otherwise, cannot be interfered with. The submission that this document was belatedly brought into existence by way of amendment, in our opinion, does not lead to a presumption of it being forged and that by itself, should not be a matter of suspicion, particularly taking into consideration that this is a registered document. 28. An argument has also been raised that the signatures are not tallying with each other or their ink impressions also are different. Slight difference in the ink impression does not mean that the signatures were forged or the person concerned did not sign the document. The words written are in Urdu and it does not show that there was material difference in their style and design and it is not that they apparently look to be completely different and distinct from each other. Again, doubt if any, is cleared because the independent witness has proved the execution of this document by Ghulam Abbas. 29. The prayer made for sending the document for opinion of handwriting expert at this stage is liable to be rejected. The plaintiffs had all the opportunity to make such a prayer before the Trial Court. Moreover, the other practical aspect of difficulty in obtaining the specimen signature of the deceased person also impel us to reject the prayer of sending the document at this stage for opinion of handwriting expert and therefore, we reject the same. 30. Learned Trial Court has dismissed the suit holding it to be barred by limitation. The plaintiffs filed the suit for recovery of possession on 9th May 2006. 30. Learned Trial Court has dismissed the suit holding it to be barred by limitation. The plaintiffs filed the suit for recovery of possession on 9th May 2006. In the plaint, it has been admitted in para 7 that after the death of Ghulam Abbas, plaintiffs are residing at Village-Javra, District – Ratlam, MP and the house in dispute is in possession of the defendants but, according to the plaintiffs, the defendants are in possession as constructive trustee whereas, the defendants in their written statement, have come out with the categoric plea that though, the house was allotted to the share of Ghulam Abbas, upon partition in the year 1976, it was sold out to Mohammed Hussain and since 1976, he is in possession and after his death, the defendants who are sons of Mohammed Hussain have remained in continuous possession of the property in dispute. According to the defendants, they were in possession of the property in dispute in their own title and not as constructive trustee of the plaintiffs or their father Ghulam Abbas. It would thus be clear that even according to plaintiffs, they are not in possession of the property in dispute since the death of their father Ghulam Abbas and since then, the defendants are in possession of the property in dispute. Thus, the dispute is only whether Mohammed Hussain and thereafter, the defendants have remained in exclusive possession of the property in dispute till the date of death of Ghulam Abbas. PW-1, who is the son of late Ghulam Abbas has stated in para 6 of his affidavit, under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, that after the death of his father he along with his sister defendant No.2 has started residing in village Javra, district Ratlam and the defendants are in possession of the house in dispute. In para 11 of his cross-examination, he deposes that his father died in the year 1985. He further states that he studied at Raipur till 5th standard and thereafter he studied at village Javra. It is his statement that though, he had gone to Javra but to look after his property, he used to come to Raipur time and again. It is further deposed that after the death of his father, he came to Raipur to look after his property 5-7 times but admits that he has not paid any municipal taxes. It is his statement that though, he had gone to Javra but to look after his property, he used to come to Raipur time and again. It is further deposed that after the death of his father, he came to Raipur to look after his property 5-7 times but admits that he has not paid any municipal taxes. He further deposes that whenever he used to come, defendants used to beat him and compelled to go back. He then also states that as the property was in possession of defendants, there is no question of he paying the taxes. Later on, he admits that after the death of his father they were not allowed to enter the house in dispute. He does not know whether any municipal records record his name or his father's name. In para 22 of the deposition, he has stated that his father died at Raipur and at that time, he was not residing at Raipur but residing at village Javra and even after receiving information regarding death of his father, he did not come to Raipur. He seeks to explain by stating that there was a threat to his life from the defendants and their father and therefore, to avoid the dispute, he had gone to Javra but then he admits that he never lodged any report in the police station though he states that his mother Pizza Bai had lodged the report but no such report has been produced. This witness further admits that no such plea was taken by him in the plaint or in reply to the notice that he was afraid to come to Raipur because of the threat to life given by the defendants and their father. Thus, from the pleadings of the plaintiff and their own evidence it is clearly proved that even according to the plaintiff, they were not residing at Raipur. His case has been that time and again, he used to come to Raipur to look after his property but then he admits that he has no knowledge as to whether his name has been recorded in the municipal records or not. He further admits that he has not paid any municipal taxes. It is also admitted by him that even when his father died at Raipur, he did not come to Raipur. He further admits that he has not paid any municipal taxes. It is also admitted by him that even when his father died at Raipur, he did not come to Raipur. Though, in the plaint it has been stated that the defendants are in possession of the house in dispute as constructive trustee, the evidence is that because of threat and assault, plaintiffs Zahid Hussain was not coming to Raipur and that he was not allowed to enter the house in dispute. According to this witness, his father died in the year 1985 therefore, from plaintiffs own case it is clearly proved that since 1985, the plaintiffs are not in possession of the house in dispute and the house is in exclusive possession of the defendants, in complete hostility and there is no evidence of defendants continuing in permissive possession. Defendant witness No.1 Shaqir Hussain has deposed that ever since 1976, when his father purchased the house in dispute from Ghulam Abbas for a consideration of Rs.10,000/-, he came in possession and after death of his father he and his brother-Fazal are in possession. He has also deposed that even during the life time of Ghulam Abbas, plaintiffs have been residing at village Javra. This statement of his father and thereafter, defendants being in possession of the property in dispute since 1976 has been repeated in his statement. He has stated that after the death of their father, their mother Salma Bai's name was recorded in the municipal records and thereafter, their name has been recorded in the municipal records and they have been paying the municipal taxes since long and that the plaintiffs, even after the death of Ghulam Abbas since 21 years, did not take any remedy and the defendants are openly enjoying possession in complete and open denial of the title of the plaintiffs. The defendants have placed on record the municipal receipts issued by the municipal corporation from Ex.D-16 and D-32 which shows that the property in dispute was recorded in their name and taxes are being paid by them since 1985. 31. It is, thus, proved from the oral and documentary evidence on record that after the death of Ghulam Abbas, plaintiffs did not take any steps for long 21 years until they filed a suit for recovery of possession on the claim of their title in the year 2006. 31. It is, thus, proved from the oral and documentary evidence on record that after the death of Ghulam Abbas, plaintiffs did not take any steps for long 21 years until they filed a suit for recovery of possession on the claim of their title in the year 2006. Therefore, in so far as the finding of the Trial Court that the suit is barred by limitation, does not warrant any interference. 32. A ground of defendants' plea of acquisition of title under registered relinquishment deed and the plea of prescription of title by adverse possession being mutually destructive and therefore, liable to be rejected, has also been taken to assail the correctness and validity of the impugned judgment. 33. Learned Trial Court has recorded a finding that a relinquishment deed was executed and registered in favour of late Mohd. Hussain by plaintiff's father Ghulam Abbas. The Trial Court has also held that otherwise also, the defendants have perfected title by adverse possession. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon two decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohan Lal (deceased) through his LRs Kachru and ors. v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar and anr., (1996) 1 SCC 639 and Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India and ors., 2004 (10) SCC 779 . On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance upon decision in the case of Vimal Chand Ghevarchand Jain and ors. v. Ramakant Eknath Jadoo, 2009 (5) SCC 713 . In the case of Mohan Lal (supra), the facts were that the defendant had taken a plea of he having come into possession of the land lawfully under the agreement and continued to remain in possession. He also took the plea that he having remained in possession from a particular date, has perfected his title by prescription. The plea of having been inducted lawfully in possession and entitled to retain possession was raised by virtue of Section 53 (A) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Hon'ble Supreme Court was of the view that it was not open for the defendants to take both the plea. The issue was examined thus - “3. The only question is whether the appellant is entitled to retain possession of the suit property. Two pleas have been raised by the appellant in defence. Hon'ble Supreme Court was of the view that it was not open for the defendants to take both the plea. The issue was examined thus - “3. The only question is whether the appellant is entitled to retain possession of the suit property. Two pleas have been raised by the appellant in defence. One is that having remained in possession from March 8, 1956, he has perfected his title by prescription. Secondly, he pleaded that he is entitled to retain his possession by operation of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short, 'the Act'). 4. As regards the first plea, it is inconsistent with the second plea. Having come into possession under the agreement, he must disclaim his right there under and plead and prove assertion of his independent hostile adverse possession to the knowledge of the transferor or his successor in title or interest and that the latter had acquiesced to his illegal possession during the entire period of 12 years, i.e., up to completing the period of his title by prescription nec vi, nec clam, nec precario. Since the appellant's claim is founded on Section 53-A, it goes without saying that he admits by implication that he came into possession of the land lawfully under the agreement and continued to remain in possession till date of the suit. Thereby the plea of adverse possession is not available to the appellant.” In another decision in the case of Karnataka Board of Wakf (supra), permissibility of taking inconsistent plea by the plaintiff was examined in the factual backdrop that a declaration was sought that notifications issued by the Wakf Board were illegal and void. An alternative plea was taken to grant declaration that the plaintiff had otherwise perfected their title by adverse possession. It was held that the plaintiff filing a title suit should be very clear about origin of title over the property and pleas on title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and the latter does not begin to operate until former is renounced. It was observed as below - “12. A plaintiff filing a title suit should be very clear about the origin of title over the property. He must specifically plead it. (See: S.M. Karim v. Bibi Sakina, AIR 1964 SC 1254 ). It was observed as below - “12. A plaintiff filing a title suit should be very clear about the origin of title over the property. He must specifically plead it. (See: S.M. Karim v. Bibi Sakina, AIR 1964 SC 1254 ). In P. Periasami v. P. Periathambi (1995) 6 SCC 523 this Court ruled that - "Whenever the plea of adverse possession is projected, inherent in the plea is that someone else was the owner of the property." The pleas on title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and the latter does not begin to operate until the former is renounced. Dealing with Mohan Lal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar, (1996) 1 SCC 639 that is similar to the case in hand, this Court held: "4. As regards the first plea, it is inconsistent with the second plea. Having come into possession under the agreement, he must disclaim his right there under and plead and prove assertion of his independent hostile adverse possession to the knowledge of the transferor or his successor in title or interest and that the latter had acquiesced to his illegal possession during the entire period of 12 years, i.e., up to completing the period his title by prescription nec vi, nec clam, nec precario. Since the appellant's claim is founded on Section 53-A, it goes without saying that he admits by implication that he came into possession of land lawfully under the agreement and continued to remain in possession till date of the suit. Thereby the plea of adverse possession is not available to the appellant." In yet another decision in the case of Vimal Chand Ghevarchand Jain (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court again propounded the principles with regard to the extent to which alternative plea could be taken by the defendant as below - “22. The deed of sale being a registered one and apparently containing stipulations of transfer of right, title and interest by the vendor in favour of the vendee, the onus of proof was upon the defendant to show that the said deed was, in fact, not executed or otherwise does not reflect the true nature of transaction. Evidently, with a view to avoid confrontation in regard to his signature as an attesting witness as also that of his father as vendor in the said sale deed, he did not examine himself. Evidently, with a view to avoid confrontation in regard to his signature as an attesting witness as also that of his father as vendor in the said sale deed, he did not examine himself. An adverse inference, thus, should have been drawn against him by the learned Trial Court. {See Kamakshi Builders v. Ambedkar Educational Society, AIR 2007 SC 2191 }.” 34. The legal position which emerges from the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court is that where plaintiff has to establish its case, it is required to come with a clear plea of title and the defendant, though may take defences which are open to it, including such defences which are inconsistent, mutually destructive plea cannot be taken by him. On application of the aforesaid principle, particularly in a case where a plea of acquisition of title and plea of having perfected title of adverse possession is taken, it has been held that such pleas are not inconsistent but mutually destructive. This is so because whenever the plea of adverse possession is projected, inherent in the plea is that someone else is the owner of the property. (please see S.M. Karim v. Bibi Sakina, AIR 1964 SC 1254 ). 35. In the present case, defendants have come out with a plea that by virtue of sale deed and relinquishment deed, their father Mohd. Hussain acquired title of property in dispute and they have claimed to remain in possession on the basis of the same. Therefore, plea of having perfected by adverse possession was not available to them and the same was liable to be rejected at the threshold. As held in the aforesaid decision, where plea of acquisition of title and plea of having perfected title by adverse possession are taken together, later does not begin to operate until the former is renounced. The defendant having not renounced the plea of acquisition of title by way of sale deed and relinquishment deed, plea of prescription of title by adverse possession was not available to be raised, much less proved by the defendants. 36. We may hasten to add that our finding regarding hostility of possession of the defendants have been recorded only while examining the issue as to whether the possession of the defendants was permissive, in the capacity of constructive trustee, as pleaded by the plaintiff or it was hostile. 36. We may hasten to add that our finding regarding hostility of possession of the defendants have been recorded only while examining the issue as to whether the possession of the defendants was permissive, in the capacity of constructive trustee, as pleaded by the plaintiff or it was hostile. Even on such finding, at the instance of the defendants, their plea of having perfected title by hostile possession, was liable to be rejected. Therefore, the finding of the learned Trial Court that the defendants have perfected their title by adverse possession, is not in accordance with law and is reversed. 37. Even though, the plea taken before this Court by the defendant that in the absence of challenge to legality and validity of the registered relinquishment deed (Ex.D/1) dated 12.07.1981 must fail, has considerable force, we find that the learned Trial Court did enter into this aspect by framing an issue and allowing the parties to lead oral and documentary evidence. 38. True it is that the defendants had initially not taken a plea of their father having acquired title through registered relinquishment deed dated 07.12.1981, later on, as we have observed, such a plea was taken by way of amendment and even the copy of deed was also presented before the Trial Court. Even then, the plaintiff chose not to seek any specific relief of declaration that the said registered relinquishment deed was illegal and inoperative in law. No declaration of title or possession could be granted in favour of the plaintiffs unless the plaintiff successfully avoided the registered relinquishment deed dated 07.12.1981 (Ex.D/1). In our opinion, even though the execution of said deed has been found proved by the learned Trial Court, which finding we have also affirmed, plaintiffs' suit must fail for want of challenge to the registered deed as well. This Court in the case of Smt. Anumati Bai v. Ram Kumar and ors. decided on 26.04.2018 in F.A. No.329/1999, had an occasion to examine the fate of a suit where a registered partition deed was not challenged and no relief was sought for setting aside or declaring the same as null and void by the plaintiff while claiming declaration of title in respect of the property which was subject matter of partition under the registered partition deed. It was held - “10. It was held - “10. xxxxxxxx Thus, it is clear that prior to filing of the suit, the plaintiff had not only come to know about partition deed dated 30-01-1970 but he had also obtained the copy of the same. Even then, he did not sought cancellation of the same despite being a party to the said registered deed of partition. The defendants had clearly stated in the written statement, rather took up as the main shield of defence that the partition was effected long back in the year 1970. Even then, the plaintiff did not seek any relief much less pleadings to state that the deed was null and void or inoperative in law because of any legal defect or that it was voidable at his option by the reason of fraud or misrepresentation etc. It is true that the plaintiff was minor at the time when the partition deed was executed and registered, nevertheless, he was also a party to the partition deed through the guardian Shiv Ratan, who was his uncle as admitted by the plaintiff himself in his defence. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the plaintiff to avoid the said partition deed by seeking cancellation of the same on grounds permissible under the law and without challenge laid to same, no relief could be granted in ignorance of the registered deed of partition. 11. In the case of Nagappan v. Ammasai Gounder and ors., (2004) 13 SCC 480 , though dealing with specific provisions contained in Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, Their Lordships in the Supreme Court held that in the absence of prayer for setting aside the sale deed, the suit filed for recovery of possession was not maintainable. The said verdict was rendered on the facts that the sale of the property in dispute during minority of the plaintiff, was sought to be ignored while filing a suit for declaration after attaining the majority. In that case, without seeking a relief of setting aside the sale deed, declaration of title and recovery of possession was prayed for. The said verdict was rendered on the facts that the sale of the property in dispute during minority of the plaintiff, was sought to be ignored while filing a suit for declaration after attaining the majority. In that case, without seeking a relief of setting aside the sale deed, declaration of title and recovery of possession was prayed for. It was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that in the absence of prayer for setting aside sale deed, suit filed by the plaintiff for recovery of possession was not maintainable, relying upon the earlier decisions, Their Lordships in the Supreme Court held, as below:- “The High Court held that in the absence of a prayer for setting aside of the sale deeds, the suit filed by the appellant for recovery of possession was not maintainable. Placing reliance on the two Division Bench judgments in Sridharan v. Arumugam, (1993) 2 MLJ 428 and in K. Jagannathan v. A.M. Vasudevan Chettiar, (2001) 2 CTC 641 and a Full Bench decision in C.R. Ramaswami Ayyangar v. C. S. Rangachariar, ILR 1940 Mad 259 of his own High Court, the learned Single Judge held that where the minor is an eo nomine party to a sale deed or other documents related to alienation, he must sue for the cancellation of the documents and it is not enough if he applies for possession without getting the sale deed cancelled. Such a suit would not be maintainable. Since the appellant had failed to seek the relief of setting aside of the sale deed and their cancellation, the suit filed by the appellant was not maintainable.” Though, present is not a case under Hindu Minority & Guardianship Act, the principle enunciated therein applies with full force in the present case also. 10. In the case of Chanvirapa v. Dhanava, ILR 1894 19 Bombay 593, it was held that partition made by the mother as guardian of his minor son is valid, that if it is just and legal and it will bind the minor, that when the minor arrives at full age, he can have it set aside if it can be shown to be illegal or fraudulent. Even if it is the plea that the partition was effected during minority, upon attaining majority, the plaintiff is required under the law, before seeking any relief of possession or partition based on title in respect of the property already said to be partitioned in the past under the registered deed of partition to claim relief of cancellation of the registered deed. Though, it is open for the minor, after he attains majority, to challenge the partition effected during his minority on the ground that it is unfair, unjust and detrimental to his interest, nevertheless challenge has to be laid. It is also open for him to have the partition declared inoperative in law on the grounds that no such partition could take place under the law or that his property, in the hands, was not divisable or for any other legal impediment, partition could not take place under the law. Whatever may be the grounds available under the law, challenge has to be laid to the partition and no suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession would be maintainable without avoiding the partition deed in the manner permissible under the law. 11. In the case of Ratnam Chettiar and others v. S. M. Kuppuswami Chettiar and others, (1976) 1 SCC 214 , the partition effected between the members of Hindu Undivided Family was challenged on the ground that it is unfair, unjust and detrimental to the interest of minor coparceners. Their Lordships in the Supreme Court held that the partition was effected between the members of Hindu Undivided Family, which consists of minor coparceners will be binding on the minor. Therefore, this Court is of the considered opinion that unless the partition effected in the past and the registered deed of partition is challenged and cancellation of the same is sought, declaratory relief of title in respect of the same property which was subjected to partition and recovery of possession cannot be granted and suit is liable to be dismissed only on this ground.” 39. Therefore, on this additional ground, plaintiff's suit was also liable to be dismissed as no relief of declaration of title and possession can be granted in favour of the plaintiff unless the relinquishment deed is set aside or declared as null and void and inoperative in law when the plaintiff did not seek relief to state that the suit was null and void, as required under Section 31 read with Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. 40. Since we have held that the plaintiff's suit was not maintainable for want of challenge to the registered relinquishment deed which otherwise has been found to be proved by this Court and further that plaintiff's suit has been found to be barred by limitation, the decree passed by the Court below does not warrant any interference even though plea of adverse possession raised by the defendant is liable to be rejected. In the result, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. Appellants/plaintiffs shall bear the costs throughout. Let appellate decree be drawn accordingly.