JUDGMENT : Vijay Bishnoi, J. 1. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner for granting the following reliefs:- "It is, therefore, most humbly and respectfully prayed that this writ petition may kindly be allowed and i. By an appropriate writ order or direction, the order impugned dated 17.01.2017 (Annx.7) and issuance of auction notice dated 05.01.2018 (Annx.9) followed all further proceedings subsequent thereto may kindly be declared illegal and the same may kindly be quashed and set aside. ii. Any other appropriate, writ, direction or order which this Hon'ble Court may deem it just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, may kindly be issued. iii. Cost of this writ petition may kindly be awarded to the humble Petitioner." 2. It is the case of the petitioner that way back in the year 1959, Bhimraj Bhandari, father of the petitioner, Inder Raj Bhandari and Ganpat Raj Bhandari purchased a plot bearing Plot No. 260 measuring 50 X 98 feet situated in Laxmi Nagar through a registered sale-deed, executed through power of attorney holder of the land holders. It is averred that the right, title and interest over the above mentioned plot always vested with three brothers, who had purchased the same, and after their death the same vested into their legal heirs. It is further averred that the above mentioned plot was never sold, mortgaged and transacted to any other person by any party till date. 3. It is also averred by the petitioner that due to non-availability of the owners of the above mentioned plot, the same was resold by Virendra Singh (son of the original landholders) through his power of attorney holders to two persons in two parts by registered sale-deeds dated 18.08.2005 and 23.09.2005 respectively. Subsequent purchasers sold one plot out of two plots to Ashok Golia, Anil Golia and Meena Golia by registered sale-deed dated 30.10.2007. It is also averred that Ashok Golia and others further sold their shares in the said plot to Ramesh Agarwal through registered sale-deed dated 30.10.2007 and so on. It is further averred in the writ petition that when Ramesh Agarwal tried to encroach over the above mentioned plot, one FIR was lodged by the petitioner to the concerned police station. Averments regarding a civil suit filed by Ramesh Agarwal against one Ramras Yadav have also been made in this writ petition. 4. It is further averred in the writ petition that when Ramesh Agarwal tried to encroach over the above mentioned plot, one FIR was lodged by the petitioner to the concerned police station. Averments regarding a civil suit filed by Ramesh Agarwal against one Ramras Yadav have also been made in this writ petition. 4. It is further averred in the writ petition that the officers of the ICICI Bank pasted a notice dated 17.01.2017 issued under Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter to be referred as 'the SARFAESI Act') on the above mentioned plot claiming that the possession of the plot has been taken by the ICICI Bank. 5. At this stage, the petitioner came to know that Ashok Golia has either fraudulently mortgaged the above mentioned plot purchased by him from Dwarka Prasad Taparia in favour of the ICICI Bank and sold it to any other third party, who has further mortgaged the disputed plot to the bank. 6. It is further contended that though the petitioner immediately sent a legal notice dated 12.03.2017 to the respondent-bank, disputing the authority of the bank to take possession of the above mentioned plot, but the bank did reply to the said legal notice, however, vide public notice dated 05.01.2018 put the above mentioned plot for auction. 7. After hearing learned counsel for the petitioner at length, this Court has expressed its opinion that the writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is liable to be entertained in view of the alternate remedy available to the petitioner of filing appeal under Section 17 of SARFAESI Act. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner cannot file an appeal before the Debt Recovery Tribunal as provided under Section 17 of SARFAESI Act as he is neither borrower nor guarantor and, therefore, the appeal filed by the petitioner would be maintainable. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further argued that the registered sale-deed, executed in favour of the predecessor of the petitioner, was prior in time and will prevail over the subsequent registered sale-deeds in relation to the above mentioned plot. It is also contended that the subsequent purchasers acquire no right or title on the basis of subsequent registered sale-deed. 10. It is also contended that the subsequent purchasers acquire no right or title on the basis of subsequent registered sale-deed. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in Atla Sidda Reddy v. Busi Subba Reddy & Ors. reported in 2010 DNJ (SC) 527. 11. The contention of the petitioner to the effect that the remedy of filing of an appeal under Section 17 of Sarfaesi Act is available to him, is tenable as a plain reading of Section 17(1) of Sarfaesi Act makes it clear that any person (including borrower), aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor may make an application before the Debts Recovery Tribunal and it can be safely said that only borrower but also guarantor or any person, who may be effected by the action of the bank taken under section 13 or section 14 of Sarfaesi Act, can approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal. 12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon & Ors. reported in (2010) 8 SCC 110 has held as under :- "42. ... ... ... The expression "any person" used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, only the borrower but also the guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective." 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon & Ors. (supra) has further held as under :- "43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. 44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. 45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance. 46. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which (sic will) ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which (sic will) ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. Of course, if the petitioner is able to show that its case falls within any of the exceptions carved out in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad, Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks and Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and some other judgments, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public interest, pass appropriate interim order. 47. In Thansingh Nathmal v. Superintendent of Taxes the Constitution Bench considered the question whether the High Court of Assam should have entertained the writ petition filed by the appellant under Article 226 of the Constitution questioning the order passed by the Commissioner of Taxes under the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947. While dismissing the appeal, the Court observed as under: (SCC p. 1423, para 7) "7. ... The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is subject to any restrictions except the territorial restrictions which are expressly provided in the Articles. But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary: it is exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain self imposed limitations. Resort that jurisdiction is intended as an alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by statute. Ordinarily the Court will entertain a petition for a writ under Article 226, where the petitioner has an alternative remedy, which without being unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy. Again the High Court does generally enter upon a determination of questions which demand an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce which the writ is claimed. Ordinarily the Court will entertain a petition for a writ under Article 226, where the petitioner has an alternative remedy, which without being unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy. Again the High Court does generally enter upon a determination of questions which demand an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce which the writ is claimed. The High Court does therefore act as a court of appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does by assuming jurisdiction under Article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will permit by entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the machinery created under the statute to be bypassed, and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up." 48. In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa a three-Judge Bench considered the question whether a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution should be entertained in a matter involving challenge to the order of the assessment passed by the competent authority under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 and corresponding law enacted by the State legislature and answered the same in negative by making the following observations: (SCC pp. 440-41, para 11) "11. Under the scheme of the Act, there is a hierarchy of authorities before which the petitioners can get adequate redress against the wrongful acts complained of. The petitioners have the right to prefer an appeal before the Prescribed Authority under sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Act. If the petitioners are dissatisfied with the decision in the appeal, they can prefer a further appeal to the Tribunal under sub-section (3) of Section 23 of the Act, and then ask for a case to be stated upon a question of law for the opinion of the High Court under Section 24 of the Act. The Act provides for a complete machinery to challenge an order of assessment, and the impugned orders of assessment can only be challenged by the mode prescribed by the Act and by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Act provides for a complete machinery to challenge an order of assessment, and the impugned orders of assessment can only be challenged by the mode prescribed by the Act and by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is now well recognised that where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed of. This rule was stated with great clarity by Willes, J. in Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford in the following passage: (ER p. 495) '... There are three classes of cases in which a liability may be established founded upon statute. . . . But there is a third class viz. where a liability existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it. . .the remedy provided by the statute must be followed, and it is competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class. The form given by the statute must be adopted and adhered to.' The rule laid down in this passage was approved by the House of Lords in Neville v. London Express Newspapers Ltd. and has been reaffirmed by the Privy Council in Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Gordon Grant & Co. Ltd. and Secretary of State v. Mask & Co. It has also been held to be equally applicable to enforcement of rights, and has been followed by this Court throughout. The High Court was therefore justified in dismissing the writ petitions in limine." 49. The views expressed in Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa were echoed in CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd. in the following words: (SCC p. 264, para-3) "3. ... Article 226 is meant to short-circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the very vires of the statute is in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be had to Article 226 of the Constitution. But then the Court must have good and sufficient reason to bypass the alternative remedy provided by statute. But then the Court must have good and sufficient reason to bypass the alternative remedy provided by statute. Surely matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are available are such matters. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that the vast majority of the petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution are filed solely for the purpose of obtaining interim orders and thereafter prolong the proceedings by one device or the other. The practice certainly needs to be strongly discouraged." 50. In Punjab National Bank v. O.C. Krishnan this Court considered the question whether a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution was maintainable against an order passed by the Tribunal under Section 19 of the DRT Act and observed: (SCC p. 570, para 5-6) "5. In our opinion, the order which was passed by the Tribunal directing sale of mortgaged property was appealable under Section 20 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (for short 'the Act'). The High Court ought to have exercised its jurisdiction under Article 227 in view of the provision for alternative remedy contained in the Act. We do propose to go into the correctness of the decision of the High Court and whether the order passed by the Tribunal was correct has to be decided before an appropriate forum. 6. The Act has been enacted with a view to provide a special procedure for recovery of debts due to the banks and the financial institutions. There is a hierarchy of appeal provided in the Act, namely, filing of an appeal under Section 20 and this fast-track procedure cannot be allowed to be derailed either by taking recourse to proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution or by filing a civil suit, which is expressly barred. Even though a provision under an Act cannot expressly oust the jurisdiction of the court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, nevertheless, when there is an alternative remedy available, judicial prudence demands that the Court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under the said constitutional provisions. This was a case where the High Court should have entertained the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and should have directed the respondent to take recourse to the appeal mechanism provided by the Act." 51. This was a case where the High Court should have entertained the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and should have directed the respondent to take recourse to the appeal mechanism provided by the Act." 51. In CCT v. Indian Explosives Ltd. the Court reversed an order passed by the Division Bench of Orissa High Court quashing the show-cause notice issued to the respondent under the Orissa Sales Tax Act by observing that the High Court had completely ignored the parameters laid down by this Court in a large number of cases relating to exhaustion of alternative remedy. 52. In City and Industrial Development Corporation v. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala the Court highlighted the parameters which are required to be kept in view by the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Paragraphs 29 and 30 of that judgment which contain the views of this Court read as under: (SCC pp. 175-76) "29. In our opinion, the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is duty-bound to take all the relevant facts and circumstances into consideration and decide for itself even in the absence of proper affidavits from the State and its instrumentalities as to whether any case at all is made out requiring its interference on the basis of the material made available on record. There is nothing like issuing an ex parte writ of mandamus, order or direction in a public law remedy. Further, while considering the validity of impugned action or inaction the Court will consider itself restricted to the pleadings of the State but would be free to satisfy itself whether any case as such is made out by a person invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 30. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 is duty-bound to consider whether: (a) adjudication of writ petition involves any complex and disputed questions of facts and whether they can be satisfactorily resolved; (b) the petition reveals all material facts; (c) the petitioner has any alternative or effective remedy for the resolution of the dispute; (d) person invoking the jurisdiction is guilty of unexplained delay and laches; (e) ex facie barred by any laws of limitation; (f) grant of relief is against public policy or barred by any valid law; and host of other factors. The Court in appropriate cases in its discretion may direct the State or its instrumentalities as the case may be to file proper affidavits placing all the relevant facts truly and accurately for the consideration of the Court and particularly in cases where public revenue and public interest are involved. Such directions are always required to be complied with by the State. No relief could be granted in a public law remedy as a matter of course only on the ground that the State did file its counter-affidavit opposing the writ petition. Further, empty and self-defeating affidavits or statements of Government spokesmen by themselves do form basis to grant any relief to a person in a public law remedy to which he is otherwise entitled to in law." 53. In Raj Kumar Shivhare v. Directorate of Enforcement the Court was dealing with the issue whether the alternative statutory remedy available under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 can be bypassed and jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution could be invoked. After examining the scheme of the Act, the Court observed: (SCC pg. 781, paras 31-32) "31. When a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievance and that too in a fiscal statute, a writ petition should be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. In this case the High Court is a statutory forum of appeal on a question of law. That should be abdicated and given a go-by by a litigant for invoking the forum of judicial review of the High Court under writ jurisdiction. The High Court, with great respect, fell into a manifest error by appreciating this aspect of the matter. It has however dismissed the writ petition on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. 32. No reason could be assigned by the appellant's counsel to demonstrate why the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 35 of FEMA does provide an efficacious remedy. In fact there could hardly be any reason since the High Court itself is the appellate forum." 54. In Modern Industries v. SAIL the Court held that where the remedy was available under the Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993, the High Court was justified in entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 55. In Modern Industries v. SAIL the Court held that where the remedy was available under the Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993, the High Court was justified in entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 55. It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection." 14. The Division Bench of this Court at Jaipur Bench in Master Kshitij Goyal (Minor) & Ors. v. State Bank of Patila reported in 2014 (2) DNJ 451 , a Coordinate Bench of this Court in M/s. Kamakshi Indian Oil v. State Bank of India reported in 2016 (1) DNJ 389 and this Court in the judgments dated 21.08.2017 and 19.09.2017 rendered in Rajendra Wadhwa v. Punjab National Bank & Ors. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 9795/2017) and Saroj Devi v. Punjab National Bank & Ors. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1606/2017) respectively took a view that in view of the availability of alternate remedy of appeal under Section 17 of Sarfaesi Act, the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is maintainable. 15. In view of the above proposition of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as by this Court, I am inclined to interfere in this writ petition, however, the petitioner is free to avail statutory remedy available to him under Section 17 of SARFAESI Act. 16. Hence, this writ petition is dismissed in limine. 17. Stay petition also stands dismissed.