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2018 DIGILAW 346 (JHR)

Tata Engineering And Locomotive Company Limited v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court

2018-02-08

ANIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY

body2018
ORDER Anil Kumar Choudhary, J. - This writ petition has been filed invoking the jurisdiction of this court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging the award passed by the Labour Court, Jamshedpur in Reference Case No. 35 of 1989 dated 15th July, 2000. The Labour Court, Jamshedpur by the award has set aside the termination/dismissal of the respondent No. 2 from the service and ordered him to be reinstated with full back wages with continuity in service and other consequential benefits. 2. The facts of this case are that the respondent No. 2 was an employee of the petitioner and at the relevant time, he was working as Inspector of Audit Inspection Department. The allegation against him was that he absented from duty without leave or permission from 30.04.1986 to 16.06.1986. Subsequently, the petitioner found that the respondent No. 2 submitted a leave application dated 29.04.1986 for the period from 30.04.1986 to 03.05.1986 to the Finance Department (Wage section) and had drawn advance money against salary on submission of the said leave application. It is also alleged that the signatures of both the recommending and sanctioning authorities, in respect of the said leave application, were false. It is alleged that respondent No. 2 indulged in deceptive and corrupt practise by submitting a false application and subsequently drawing advance money against his salary based on the said false recommendation and sanction. 3. For the said misconduct of the respondent no. 2, a charge-sheet was issued against him under Order No. 24 of the Company''s Works Standing Order, which reads as:- Order No. 24 Sub-Clause (xi) ".......... absence without permission, absence without leave....." and Sub-Clause (xv) "Deceptive or corrupt practices" "You absented from duty without leave or permission from 30-4-83 to 16-6-86. Subsequently, it was found that you had submitted a leave application dated 29-4-86 for the period 30.4.86 to 3.5.86 to the Finance Department (Wage Section) and drawn advance money against salary on submitting of the said leave application. Subsequently, it was found that the signature of both recommending and sanctioning authorities were false. You have thus indulged in deceptive and corrupt practise by submitting false leave application and subsequently drawing advance against salary from the Company based on the said false application." 4. Subsequently, it was found that the signature of both recommending and sanctioning authorities were false. You have thus indulged in deceptive and corrupt practise by submitting false leave application and subsequently drawing advance against salary from the Company based on the said false application." 4. In response to the said charge-sheet, the respondent No. 2 submitted his explanation, in which he took the plea that he submitted the leave application to his Foreman after getting the urgent information to proceed to his native place. Since, he wanted permission from the Finance Department; he was told by the Foreman that he (respondent No. 2) is in the habit of absenting. Hence, he cannot be permitted to meet with the higher boss. Hence, the Foreman took his leave application himself and brought and handed over the leave advance voucher to the respondent No. 2. The respondent No. 2 did not get the opportunity to see the leave application as to who has also signed the application and he thus denied the charges. 5. As the explanation submitted by the respondent No. 2 was found not satisfactory, a domestic enquiry was conducted and after the enquiry report was submitted by the Enquiry Officers holding the respondent No. 2 guilty of the charges levelled against him, the competent disciplinary authority on the consideration of the enquiry proceedings and findings of the Enquiry Officers ordered dismissal of the respondent No. 2 from the services of the petitioner company. 6. The respondent No. 2 raised an industrial dispute and consequent upon the failure of the conciliation, Government of Bihar referred the matter for adjudication to the Labour Court, Jamshedpur which reads as follows:- "Whether termination of service of Sri R. A. Pandey, Ticket no. 6408/09873/ 1, Workman of M/S Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company, Limited, Jamshedpur is proper and justified? If not, whether he is entitled to reinstatement and/or any other relief" 7. During course of hearing before the Labour Court, Jamshedpur, preliminary objection was raised by the workman about the legality and uniformity of the enquiry. 6408/09873/ 1, Workman of M/S Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company, Limited, Jamshedpur is proper and justified? If not, whether he is entitled to reinstatement and/or any other relief" 7. During course of hearing before the Labour Court, Jamshedpur, preliminary objection was raised by the workman about the legality and uniformity of the enquiry. Separate order was passed by the Labour Court, Jamshedpur, wherein it was held that domestic enquiry was conducted following the principles of natural justice and the entire proceeding was done in the presence of the respondent No. 2 and that the competency of the disciplinary authority who has taken the disciplinary action, was to be decided at the time of hearing on merit of the reference. 8. The Labour Court, Jamshedpur formulated the following points for consideration and adjudication:- a. (i) Whether the disciplinary authority who has initiated disciplinary action and the authority who has passed dismissal order against the workman are competent to do so? (ii) Whether the charges levelled against the workman stands established? (iii) Whether the dismissal of the workman is justified? (iv) Whether the workman is entitled to relief for his reinstatement or any other relief or reliefs? 9. In para-15 of the impugned award, the Labour Court came to the conclusion that the Assistant Manager who issued the charges and the General Manager who passed the dismissal order are fully competent to pass the order. 10. So far as the point of consideration and adjudication as to whether the charges levelled against the workman stands established, the Labour Court observed that the petitioner did not examine T. S. Nagi who was the relevant foreman and two other employees namely Sri Neelkanthan and Sudershan Singh, whose examination according to the Labour Court was essential during the departmental enquiry. The Labour Court came to the following conclusions in respect of the second point of consideration and adjudication in para-25 of impugned award:- "Thus in view of the above discussed facts and circumstances and particularly this fact that original leave application and photo copy of leave application had been produced by the management. I strongly presume that workman has submitted his leave application on 29.04.86 which has been duly recommended and sanctioned by the proper authorities." 11. I strongly presume that workman has submitted his leave application on 29.04.86 which has been duly recommended and sanctioned by the proper authorities." 11. While coming to such a conclusion, the Labour Court also observed that the explanation of the management that the said T. S. Nagi has retired from service on 01.07.1986 was not sufficient as the Presiding Officer has mentioned in his report that he has seen in several cases that the management has also produced so many retired employees. 12. The Labour Court, Jamshedpur took up the points ((iii) and (iv)) for consideration and adjudication together and held and observed that as it is not disputed that the respondent No. 2 was involved in trade union activities and no wrongful loss has been caused to the management nor any wrongful gain has accrued to the delinquent employee and he reported for duty within the stipulated time of seven days mentioned in the notice asking him to join the duty and ultimately held that the punishment of dismissal was not just and proper and hence, the dismissal of the respondent No. 2 from his service by management is fit to be set aside and the respondent No. 2 is entitled to be reinstated with full back wages and other benefits. Being aggrieved and feeling dissatisfied by the said award passed by the Labour Court, Jamshedpur, the petitioner management preferred this writ petition. 13. Arguments canvassed by the counsel for the petitioner: Mr. Vijay Pratap Singh, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner, submitted that once a departmental enquiry is held as legal and valid by the Labour Court and also that adequate opportunity of being heard was given to the respondent No. 2 during the domestic enquiry and when evidences were led in presence of the respondent No. 2 and when there was no perversity in the findings of the departmental enquiry, no power, jurisdiction or authority is vested with the Labour Court under Section 11 -A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to interfere with the findings of the inquiry officer. It is further submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the Labour Court, Jamshedpur is not supposed to sit in appeal against the findings of the departmental enquiry officer and re-appreciation of the evidence could not have been dope by the Labour Court, Jamshedpur. It is further submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the Labour Court, Jamshedpur is not supposed to sit in appeal against the findings of the departmental enquiry officer and re-appreciation of the evidence could not have been dope by the Labour Court, Jamshedpur. It is also submitted that the Labour Court, Jamshedpur erred by coming to a finding different from the enquiry committee on mere strong presumption of existence of a fact without any proof of the fact concerned, which is not sustainable in law. It is also submitted that the Labour Court, Jamshedpur was not entitled in law to rely upon his personal experience of what he observed in some other proceeding, when no such material was on the record, to disbelieve the evidence put forth by the petitioner by observing that he has seen in many cases, without mentioning the number of any particular case, that retired employees have been examined, as such observation is vague and is not a valid reason for throwing away the otherwise well proved case of the petitioner to woods, for the sole reason of non-examination of two particular persons as witnesses. It is also submitted by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the Labour Court, Jamshedpur failed to appreciate that the allegation of victimisation must be duly proved by cogent evidence and in this case, there was no evidence in support of such allegations. It is further submitted that the Labour Court failed to consider the evidences put forth by the petitioner in the domestic enquiry through five witnesses and the documents produced by the petitioner in establishing the charges against the respondent No. 2. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner also submitted that the Labour Court failed to appreciate that under Industrial Dispute, Bihar Rules 1951, the written statement of the parties are to be exchanged and there is no provision for filing reply to the pleadings by which one side can deny the allegation made by the other side. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner also submitted that the Labour Court failed to appreciate that under Industrial Dispute, Bihar Rules 1951, the written statement of the parties are to be exchanged and there is no provision for filing reply to the pleadings by which one side can deny the allegation made by the other side. It is further submitted that the Labour Court failed to appreciate that the respondent No. 2 had drawn advance money against salary on the basis of false and forged signature of the recommending and sanctioning authority and thereby resorted to corrupt practise which is a serious offence and as such, the respondent No. 2 is bound to lose the confidence of the petitioner-management and that it is a settled principle of law that when a delinquent employee indulges in corrupt practise the only punishment is dismissal from service. Learned " Senior Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this court passed in L.P.A. No. 454 of 2010 vide order dated 09.08.2017 in the case of The Management of Telco v. K.C. Bandhopadhyay , wherein this Court has observed as under in the different paragraphs:- "(iii) It appears that whenever any theft is found out, clever persons have several defences. Respondent has no exception to that. After issuance of charge-sheet dated 01.06.1992 (Annexure-1) to the memo of this Letters Patent Appeal), defences were adjusted by the respondent that 30 tablets of Voveran were prescribed by the Doctor for his own wife. To that effect, nothing has been brought on record during course of domestic enquiry by the respondent-delinquent. No prescription was ever found out during his search in the name of his wife. This defence is nothing, but, an afterthought. Similarly, there is also a defence about 80 tablets of Norflox. Second defence is that appellant has not filed any complaint of theft of 80 tablets of Norflox. No such complaint of theft is required to be filed by the management. Even in absence of complaint of theft by the management, it was a duty of the respondent to explain that how he was in custody of 80 tablets of Norflox. However, defences have been accepted unnecessarily by the Labour Court as well as by the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition preferred by this appellant. Even in absence of complaint of theft by the management, it was a duty of the respondent to explain that how he was in custody of 80 tablets of Norflox. However, defences have been accepted unnecessarily by the Labour Court as well as by the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition preferred by this appellant. This is an apparent error on the face of the record. This is misuse of jurisdiction on the part of the Labour Court, Jamshedpur especially under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. (v) Looking to the enquiry officer''s report, it cannot be said that the said report is based upon "no evidence". On the contrary, enquiry officer''s report is absolutely based upon the evidences on record, both oral as well as documentary. Every absurd defence of the respondent ought not to have been appreciated by the Labour Court. In fact, Labour Court. Jamshedpur is not supposed to sit in appeal against the report of the enquiry officer. (vi) Preliminary objection was already raised by the respondent before the Labour Court in Reference Case No. 23 of 1997 that enquiry is not legal and is not valid. On this application. finding has also been given by the Labour Cour. Jamshedpur vide order dated 23.06.2004 (Annexure-5) to the memo of this Letters Patent Appeal) that domestic enquiry is legal, valid and proper. (vii) Thus, once domestic enquiry is held as legal, valid and proper, thereafter. Labour Court. Jamshedpur ought not to have entered into the re-appreciation of the evidence of each and every management witnesses like first appeal. (viii) It ought to be kept in mind that for establishing any fact there are three words- "Proved". "Not Proved and "Unproved". To arrive at the conclusion of "Proved", "Not Proved and "Unproved", subjective satisfaction has to be arrived at by the inouirv officer based upon the evidences on record. How much degree of satisfaction is required for treating the fact as "Proved" that all depend upon the subjective satisfaction of the concerned officer whether he is a judicial officer or enquiry officer in a domestic enquiry. There is no red light or green light for "Proved", "Not Proved" and "Unproved". It all depends upon the subjective satisfaction of Judge or subjective satisfaction of officer, who is holding the enquiry. The standard of subjective satisfaction varies from head to head. There is no red light or green light for "Proved", "Not Proved" and "Unproved". It all depends upon the subjective satisfaction of Judge or subjective satisfaction of officer, who is holding the enquiry. The standard of subjective satisfaction varies from head to head. Only fact, which has to be seen by the Labour Court, is. whether the subjective satisfaction of the enquiry officer is based upon "no evidence". In fact, the Labour Court. Jamshedpur has gone into the question of sufficiency of the evidence before the enquiry officer. This is not permissible in the eves of law. Sufficiency of the evidence depends upon the subjective satisfaction of the enquiry officer. If on the basis of the evidences on record, the enquiry officer is subjectively satisfied that fact is proved, it cannot be altered by the Labour Court, Jamshedpur on the ground that there is still need of further evidence, there could have been something more to prove these facts and on the ground that had there been more evidence, the charge could have been proved more effectively. Such type of interference by the Labour Court. Jamshedpur is known as perversity in the finding, while passing the award. Such type of intervention by the Labour Court, Jamshedpur is in violation of Section 11 -A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Such type of intervention in known as "sitting in appeal" against the evidences on record. This is also not permissible by the Labour Court and hence, it is known as usage of "excess of jurisdiction" by the Labour Court under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and hence, the award passed by the Labour Court, Jamshedpur in Reference Case No. 23 of 1997 dated 19.12.2009 (Annexure-6 to the memo of this Letters Patent Appeal) deserves to be quashed and set aside. These aspects of the matter have also not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while deciding W.P.(L) No. 2185 of 2010 vide judgment and order dated 23.06.2010 and hence, the same also deserves to be quashed and set aside. (ix) It has been held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of " The East India Hotels v. Their workmen and Others", reported in AIR 1974 Supreme Court 696 = (1974) 3 Supreme Court Cases 712 , as under:- "5.This appeal is by special leave against the award of the tribunal. (ix) It has been held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of " The East India Hotels v. Their workmen and Others", reported in AIR 1974 Supreme Court 696 = (1974) 3 Supreme Court Cases 712 , as under:- "5.This appeal is by special leave against the award of the tribunal. It is not denied that the Tribunal was in error in applying Section 11A of the Act to this case, because the complaint, the enquiry, the report and the reference were ail prior to the coming into operation of this Section on December 15, 1971. This Court held in Work men of M/s. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (Pvt.). Ltd. v. The Management (1973) 1 Lab LJ 278 : ( AIR 1973 SC 1227 ) that Section 11A has no retrospective operation as it not only deals with procedural matters, but also has the effect of altering the law laid down by this Court in this respect by abridging the rights of the employer inasmuch as it gives power to the Tribunal for the first time to differ both on a finding of misconduct arrived at by an employer as well as with the punishment imposed by it. In the undoubted exercise of the right of the employer to take disciplinary* action, and to decide upon the quantum of punishment, both of which are part of the managerial functions, what has to be seen is whether the employer before imposing the punishment had conducted a proper enquiry in accordance with the provisions of the Standing Orders, if applicable, and principles of natural justice. When a proper enquiry has been held by an employer and the finding of misconduct has support from the evidence adduced at the said enquiry, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to sit in judgment over the decision of the employer as an appellate body. The interference with the decision of the employer will be justified when the enquiry is unfair or the findings arrived at in the enquiry are perverse or have no basis in evidence or the management is guilty of victimisation, unfair labour practise or mala fide or the punishment is harsh and oppressive. The Tribunal cannot, therefore, re-appraise the evidence and arrive at a conclusion different from that arrived at by the domestic Tribunal. The Tribunal cannot, therefore, re-appraise the evidence and arrive at a conclusion different from that arrived at by the domestic Tribunal. Even if no enquiry has been held by an employer or if the enquiry held by him is found to be defective, the Tribunal in order to satisfy itself about the legality and validity of the order, has to give an opportunity to the employer and employee to adduce evidence before it. It is open to the employer to adduce evidence for the first time justifying his action; and it is open to the employee to adduced evidence contra. Once misconduct is proved, either in the enquiry conducted by the employer or by the evidence placed before the Tribunal for the first time, the punishment imposed cannot be interfered with by the Tribunal except in cases where the punishment is harsh and oppressive. This is not a case where no enquiry has been held, nor is it a case where either side had not adduced evidence before the tribunal. What the Tribunal had to see is whether the enquiry is vitiated by any of the grounds referred to by us. Admittedly, no such grounds exist in this case. Nothing was stated as to in what respects the enquiry was defective. On the other hand, the Tribunal proceeded on the basis that the enquiry was not vitiated but it had power under Section 11A to arrive at a different conclusion and award a different punishment. That apart, even the evidence justified the conclusion arrived at by the enquiry Officer." (Emphasis supplied) Hence it is submitted by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the impugned award being not sustainable in law be quashed. 14. Arguments canvassed by the counsel for the respondents: Mr. Ashim Kumar Sahni, the learned counsel for the respondent no 2. On the other hand submitted that in this case, the respondent has filed a caveat but he has not filed any counter affidavit. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 submitted that the findings arrived at by the enquiry officer, was not based upon the evidence on record and the same is perverse. It was also submitted that the respondent No. 2 was victimised due to his trade union activities and the punishment order against him is malafide. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 submitted that the findings arrived at by the enquiry officer, was not based upon the evidence on record and the same is perverse. It was also submitted that the respondent No. 2 was victimised due to his trade union activities and the punishment order against him is malafide. Learned counsel for the respondent defended the impugned award and submitted that the Labour Court, Jamshedpur has rightly held that the examination of three witnesses was essential and they having not been examined rightly set aside the dismissal of the respondent No. 2. Learned counsel for the respondent relied upon the decision rendered by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Mavji C. Lakum v. Central Bank of India reported in (2008) 12 SCC 726 , wherein the Hon''ble Supreme Court held in paragraph -23 as under:- "23. In this backdrop when we see unusually long judgment of the learned Single Judge, it comes out that the learned Single Judge held firstly that the Tribunal had exceeded its powers vested in it under the provisions of Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. The learned Judge, as regards Section 11 -A, after quoting the same observed: "Though the Tribunal was equipped with the power to come to its own conclusion whether in a given case the imposition of punishment of discharge or dismissal from the service is justified. It is for that purpose that the Tribunal is authorised to go into the evidence that has been adduced before the enquiry officer in detail and find out whether the punishment of discharge or dismissal is commensurate with the nature of charges proved against the delinquent." So far the findings of the learned Single Judge appears to be correct. However, the whole thrust of the judgment has changed merely because the Industrial Tribunal had found the inquiry to be fair and proper. The learned Judge seems to be of the opinion that if the inquiry is held to be fair and proper, then the Industrial Tribunal cannot go into the question of evidence or the quantum of punishment. We are afraid that this is not the correct law. Even if the enquiry is found to be fair, that would be only a finding certifying that all possible opportunities were given to the delinquent and the principles of natural justice and fair play were observed. We are afraid that this is not the correct law. Even if the enquiry is found to be fair, that would be only a finding certifying that all possible opportunities were given to the delinquent and the principles of natural justice and fair play were observed. That does not mean that the findings arrived at were essentially the correct findings. If the Industrial Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the findings could not be supported on the basis of the evidence given or further comes to the conclusion that the punishment given is shockingly disproportionate, the Industrial Tribunal would still be justified in re appreciate in the evidence and/or interfering with the quantum of punishment. There can be no dispute that power under Section 11-A has to be exercised judiciously and the interference is possible only when the Tribunal is not satisfied with the findings and further concludes that punishment imposed by the management is highly disproportionate to the degree of guilt of the workman concerned. Besides, the 15. FINDINGS tribunal has to give reasons as to why it is satisfied either with the findings or with the quantum of punishment and that such reason should not be fanciful or whimsical but there should be good reasons." (Emphasis Supplied) Learned counsel for the respondents further relied upon the judgment of Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Others v. Gyan Chand Chattar reported in (2009) 12 SCC 78 , wherein the Hon''ble Supreme Court has reiterated the procedure and principles of a Departmental enquiry in paragraph - 21 as under:- "21. Such a serious charge of corruption requires to be proved to the hilt as it brings civil and criminal consequences upon the employee concerned. He would be liable to be prosecuted and would also be liable to suffer severest penalty award able in such cases. Therefore, such a grave charge of quasi-criminal nature was required to be proved beyond any shadow of doubt and to the hilt. It cannot be proved on mere probabilities." (Emphasis supplied) On the basis of aforesaid decisions, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that the Labour Court, Jamshedpur has all the power, jurisdiction and authority to appreciate the evidences on record as well as the quantum of punishment and hence, it cannot be said that the Labour Court, Jamshedpur has exceeded its jurisdiction. It is further submitted by the counsel for the respondent-delinquent that the findings of the enquiry officer were perverse and hence, Labour Court, Jamshedpur has rightly passed the impugned award and hence the impugned award having been rightly passed there in no rhyme or reason to interfere with the same and thus the writ petition being without any merit be dismissed. 15. FINDINGS It is pertinent to mention here that before the Hon''ble Division Bench in L.P.A. No. 454 of 2010 (supra), learned counsel for the respondent in that letters patent appeal placed the decisions rendered by the Hon''ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Mavji C. Lakum v. Central Bank of India (supra) and Union of India and Others v. Gyan Chand Chattar (supra) and the Hon''ble Division Bench held that the same is not helpful to the respondents by observing as under:- "(xiii) Counsel for the respondent has referred to and relied upon the two decisions of the Hon''ble Supreme Court, as stated here in above, and none of the decisions are helpful to the respondent-delinquent mainly for the reason that- (f) Once domestic departmental enquiry is held as legal, valid and proper by separate order based on preliminary objection raised by the respondent vide order dated 23.06.2004 (Annexure-5) to the memo of this Letters Paten Appeal), there was no reason for the Labour Court. Jamshedpur to upset the findings of the enquiry officer: (g) moreover, the order of the Labour Court. Jamshedpur dated 23.06.2004 (Annexure-5 to the memo of this Letters Patent Appeal) has never been challenged by the respondent-deliungment: (h) Once the enquiry is held as valid, legal and proper, the only question is left out to decide the quantum of punishment." It is not disputed that the respondent No. 2 was absent from duty. He did not attend his duty from 30.04.1986 to 16.06.1986. In Mavji C. Lakum v. Central Bank of India (supra), the Hon''ble Supreme Court has categorically laid down that the tribunal has to give reasons as to why it is not satisfied either with the findings or with the helped in duplication of the same category of evidence as the other two eyewitnesses. The Public Prosecutor, therefore, cannot be blamed for adopting the course of not examining him. The Public Prosecutor, therefore, cannot be blamed for adopting the course of not examining him. If the accused thought that Randeep Rana''s evidence would help the defence, it was open to the accused to examine him as quantum of punishment and that such reason should not be fanciful or whimsical but there should be good reasons, The only reason for interference assigned by the Labour Court, Jamshedpur with the findings of the enquiry committee is that certain witnesses were not examined which according to the Labour Court were essential to be examined and which according to the Labour Court, Jamshedpur gave rise to a strong presumption that the workman has submitted leave application. This reasoning of the Labour Court is fallacious for the following reasons. Black''s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, defines "presumption" as follows:- "A presumption is a rule of law, statutory or judicial, by which finding of a basic tact gives rise to existence of presumed fact, until presumption is rebutted. ... A legal device which operates in the absence of other proof to require that certain inferences be drawn from the available evidence." It is a settled principle of law as has been held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Suresh Budharmal Kalani v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1998 SC 3258 ) that- "A presumption can be drawn only from facts - and not from other presumptions - by a process of probable and logical reasoning" In the case of Harpal Singh v. Devinder Singh, (1997) 6 SCC 660 when a material witness was not examined the Hon''ble Supreme Court of India in paragraph - 22 observed as under- "22. A Public Prosecutor may give up witnesses during trial to avert proliferation of evidence which could save much time of the court unless examination of such a witness would achieve some material use. Randeep Rana, if examined, would only have a defence witness". (Emphasis supplied) Coming to the facts of the case the witnesses who according to the Labour Court were essential to be examined were undisputedly not in the service of the petitioner. So applying the ratio of the case of Harpal Singh v. Devinder Singh (supra) the delinquent respondent no. Randeep Rana, if examined, would only have a defence witness". (Emphasis supplied) Coming to the facts of the case the witnesses who according to the Labour Court were essential to be examined were undisputedly not in the service of the petitioner. So applying the ratio of the case of Harpal Singh v. Devinder Singh (supra) the delinquent respondent no. 2 was free to examine them as his witnesses but having not done so, it was certainly not available for the Labour Court, Jamshedpur to hold that non examination of certain witnesses establishes the fact that the workman has submitted leave application. Thus this amounts to use of "excess of jurisdiction" by the Labour Court and also amount to an act of perversity. It is pertinent here to mention that a judicial or quasi-judicial authority is not entitled to use his own personal knowledge about any fact involved in any dispute without giving the parties the opportunity of rebuttal of such personal knowledge Hence, the act of Labour Court, Jamshedpur by mentioning that he has personal knowledge that in some cases retired persons were examined as witnesses without mentioning the specific details as to the case number or the name of the witnesses in which such witnesses were examined and using such knowledge to the detriment of the petitioner without giving any opportunity of rebuttal of his personal knowledge about some facts, certainly can be termed perverse. The Labour Court, Jamshedpur has also failed to take into consideration the evidence put forth by the five witnesses examined by the management in the domestic enquiry and mechanically has substituted his own opinion with that of the enquiry committee without any valid or sound reason. So the impugned award of the Labour Court, Jamshedpur in interfering with the findings of the enquiry committee can be termed as fanciful and whimsical. So far as the quantum of punishment is concerned, the Labour Court has just substituted its own view for view of the disciplinary authority by stepping into the shbes of the disciplinary authority, which is not permissible in law. it is a settled principle of law as has also been held in the case of Mavji C. Lakum v. Central Bank of India (supra) that a Labour Court can interfere with the quantum of punishment only if the punishment is shockingly disproportionate. it is a settled principle of law as has also been held in the case of Mavji C. Lakum v. Central Bank of India (supra) that a Labour Court can interfere with the quantum of punishment only if the punishment is shockingly disproportionate. But no such finding having been given by the Labour Court, it was not open for it to interfere with the quantum of punishment either. So on this score also the impugned award is not sustainable in law. Keeping in view the ratio of the judgment of the Division Bench of this court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 454 of 2010 (supra) which is squarely applicable to the facts of this case, the interference by the Labour Court, Jamshedpur with the order of the disciplinary authority by the impugned award can certainly be termed as perversity in the finding while passing the order and the intervention can be termed as sitting in appeal against the evidence on record. In view the principles of law regarding the quantum of punishment referred to in the said Division Bench judgment of Letters Patent Appeal No. 454 of 2010 (supra) particularly the judgment of Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Nirmala J. Jhaia v. State of Gujarat, reported in (2013) 4 SCC 301 , wherein paragraphs no. 25 and 26 it was observed as under:- 25. In Municipal Committee, Bahadurgarh v. Krishnan Behari this Court held as under :(SCC p.715 para 4) "4.... In a case of such nature-indeed. in cases involving corruption-there cannot be any other punishment than dismissal. any sympathy shown in such cases is totally uncalled for an opposed to public interest. The amount misappropriated may be small or large: it is the act of misappropriation that is relevant." 26. In NEKRTC v. H. Amaresh this Court held that the punishment should always be proportionate to the gravity of the misconduct. However, in a case of corruption, the only punishment is dismissal. Similar view has been reiterated in U.P. SRTC v. Vinod Kumar and U.P. SRTC v. Suresh Chand Sharma. In NEKRTC v. H. Amaresh this Court held that the punishment should always be proportionate to the gravity of the misconduct. However, in a case of corruption, the only punishment is dismissal. Similar view has been reiterated in U.P. SRTC v. Vinod Kumar and U.P. SRTC v. Suresh Chand Sharma. " (Emphasis supplied) The serious charge of forging the signature of the authorities by the respondent No. 2 which is a case of corruption as has been mentioned in the relevant clause of the charge itself, is certainly is a valid reason for the petitioner management to lose confidence and faith in such a person and the punishment of dis-reversal under such circumstances cannot be termed shockingly disproportionate. 16. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, I, hereby, quash and set aside the award, passed by the Labour Court in Reference Case No. 35 of 1989, there being perversity in the finding of the Labour Court as the Labour Court has usurped the power of appeal against the finding of the enquiry officer. 17. This writ petition stands allowed but in the circumstances without costs.