JUDGMENT Hon’ble Yashwant Varma, J.—Heard Shri Pankaj Srivastava, learned counsel for the applicant and Shri K.R. Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the opposite party. 2. This petition has been preferred alleging non compliance with the directions issued by a Division Bench of the Court on 24 September 2015 in Special Appeal. The issue itself relates to the claim of the applicant for regularisation in the Forest Department and formed subject-matter of Writ Petition No. 48322 of 2000. This petition was partly allowed by a learned Single Judge on 17 October 2005 with the following observations : “22. For the aforesaid reasons all the writ petitions are partly allowed. It is held that the petitioners have not succeeded in establishing mala fides in selections for the regularization and diversion of vacancies. The selection Committees were constituted in accordance with the Rules. The petitioners, however, are held entitled to be considered for regularization afresh after ignoring the artificial breaks in their services in accordance with the judgments of this Court in Jaglal and others v. Director of Horticulture, U.P. Government, Lucknow and others (supra) and Visheshwar v. Principal Secretary, Forest Anubhag-3 and others (supra) and further they are also held entitled for exemption from minimum educational qualifications and physical endurance test, for regularisation as Group ‘D’ and Group ‘C’ employees in the forest department. All the petitioners shall be considered for regularisation afresh by the selection committees. 23. The State Government is directed to reconsider all the petitioners for regularisation ignoring the artificial breaks, and the minimum educational qualifications and the physical endurance prescribed by the service rules. The selection committees shall meet again and shall reconsider the candidature of all the petitioners for regularisation. Those petitioners who are found eligible shall be included in the merit list to be regularized on the vacancies or the vacancies which may arise in future in their respective divisions, and until then all the petitioners who are still working shall be allowed to continue on the daily wages, and shall be entitled for minimum pay scale which was so allowed by the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Puti Lal, 2002 1 UPLBEC 1595. The directions shall be carried out in three months. The petitioners are also held entitled to the costs.” 3. The directions shall be carried out in three months. The petitioners are also held entitled to the costs.” 3. It is not disputed that the State carried the matter in a Special Appeal which was also partly allowed by a Division Bench by its judgment dated 24 September 2015. While partly allowing the appeal, the Division Bench held as under : “Thus, for all the reasons stated above, the directions issued by the learned Judge on 17 October 2005 to the State Government, while partly allowing the writ petitions, to reconsider the cases of the writ petitioners for regularisation of their services by ignoring the minimum educational qualifications or the physical endurance requirement prescribed in the service rules with a further direction that until then all the petitioners who were still working should be allowed to continue on a daily wage basis and be paid the minimum of the pay-scale, cannot be sustained and are, accordingly, set aside. The State Government shall consider the cases of the daily wagers in the light of the observations made above and by ignoring the artificial breaks in their engagement as daily wagers. The Special Appeal is, accordingly, partly allowed. The writ petition shall also stand partly allowed to the extent indicated above.” 4. As would be evident from a reading of the extracts of the decisions referred to above, while the learned Single Judge has proceeded to hold that the claim of the applicants for regularisation could not be negatived on the ground of they lacking the minimum educational qualification or not meeting the parameters of physical endurance, this part of the decision of the learned Single Judge was faulted with and set aside by the Court in Special Appeal. It is further pertinent to note the following observations as they appear in paragraph 21 of the decision of the learned Single Judge which reads thus : “21. It is further pertinent to note the following observations as they appear in paragraph 21 of the decision of the learned Single Judge which reads thus : “21. So far as the break in service between the two cut of dates, on account of non-availability of vouchers/must rolls for payment is concerned, I find on the ratio of the decisions in Jaglal (supra) and Visheshwar (supra) that where such persons were taken in daily waged employment before the date on which the Rules of 2001 and Rules of 1998 came into force, the breaks unless it is shown that such persons had left the employment on their own and had taken up some other job or vocation, shall also be ignored. The prayers to treat the petitioners (those who have been regularised), to be regularised with effect from the dates of their initial appointment on daily wages or from the dates the vacancies became available or alternatively the date they were considered by the selection committee, are rejected. The Rules of 2001 and the Rules of 1998, do not provide for any such retrospective operation of the date of appointment. All those petitioners, who have either been regularised or may be found eligible and regularised on available vacancies, shall be treated to be appointed and born on the cadres in the department, only from the dates on which they are appointed, on the posts.” 5. From the above, it is evident that the learned Single Judge has held that the artificial breaks in service would not be liable to be countenanced unless it is shown that such person/s had left employment of their own or had taken some other job or vocation. According to the learned Judge in the absence of any of the aforementioned two factors being applicable, all other breaks were liable to be ignored. The Court notes that the Division Bench while partly allowing Special Appeal No. 1530 of 2007 has not interfered with this part of the judgment of the learned Judge either. In fact and to the contrary, peremptory directions were framed including a direction to the State Government to consider the case of daily wagers by ignoring artificial breaks in their engagement. 6. In fact and to the contrary, peremptory directions were framed including a direction to the State Government to consider the case of daily wagers by ignoring artificial breaks in their engagement. 6. In order to complete the narration of facts in the backdrop of which the present contempt petition would merit disposal, it is also relevant to note that in another appeal being Special Appeal No. 325 of 2005, the State had candidly admitted and conceded before the Division Bench that the directions of the learned Single Judge for ignoring artificial breaks in service was not being assailed. The observation as they appear in the decision of the Division Bench reads thus: “Learned Additional Advocate General for the appellants has stated that the appellants are not aggrieved by the direction issued for ignoring the artificial breaks in the service but the direction by the learned Judge to pay the minimum of the pay scale to the writ petitioner should be set aside.” 7. At the time when this contempt petition came to be preferred, no decision had been taken by the respondent. It is only thereafter and in terms of an affidavit dated 15 November 2016 that an order dated 24 October 2016 was brought on record of these proceedings in purported compliance of the directions of the Court. At the time when this contempt petition came to be preferred, no decision had been taken by the respondent. It is only thereafter and in terms of an affidavit dated 15 November 2016 that an order dated 24 October 2016 was brought on record of these proceedings in purported compliance of the directions of the Court. The relevant part of the said decision and upon which would turn the disposal of this contempt application reads thus: ^^p;u lfefr }kjk mRrj izns'k lewg ^?k^ ds inks ij fofu;ferhdj.k gsrq cukbZ x;hA fofu;ferhdj.k fu;ekoyh&2001 dk Hkh voyksdu fd;k x;kA fofu;ferhdj.k fu;ekoyh ds fu;e&4¼1½ ds vuqlkj fdlh O;fDr dks%& ^^¼d½ tks jkT;k/khu lsok esa 29 twu 1991 ds iwoZ lewg ^?k^ ds in ij nSfud osru ds vk/kkj ij lh/ks fu;qDr fd;k x;k gks vkSj bl fu;ekoyh ds izkjEHk ds fnukad dks ml :i esa fujUrj lsokjr gks* o"kZokj dk;Z fooj.k o"kZ o"kZ o"kZ o"kZ o"kZ o"kZ o"kZ o"kZ o"kZ o"kZ o"kZ o"kZ o"kZ o"kZ 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 16 90 0 141 259 182 145 312 234 255 208 286 312 78 mDr us o"kZ 1991 esa dk;Z ugha fd;k gSA o"kZ 1992 esa 141 fnu] o"kZ 1994 esa 182 fnu] o"kZ 1995 es 145 fnu] o"kZ 1997 esa 234 fnu] o"kZ 1999 esa 208 fnu dk;Z fd;k gSA mDr us mDr o"kksZ esa fujUrj dk;Z ugha fd;k gSA p;u lfefr }kjk lE;d fopkjksjkUr bl dk;kZy; dks miyC/k djkbZ x;h fjiksVZ@laLrqfr ds vuqlkj ;kph Jh jkedqekj frokjh iq= Jh ijes'ojh n;ky frokjh xzke o iksLV ddjcbZ rglhy xjkSBk ftyk >kalh dks mŒizŒ lewg ^^?k^^ ds inks ij nSfud osru fu;qfDr;ksa dk fofu;ferhdj.k fu;ekoyh&2001 esa of.kZr vgZrkvksa dks iw.kZ ugha dj ikus ds dkj.k fofu;erhdj.k gsrq ik= ugha ik;s x;s gSA ,rn }kjk rn~uqlkj mDr ds izkFkkZuk i=ksa dk fuLrkj.k fd;k tkrk gSA^^ 8. As is event from the above extract, the sole ground on which the opposite parties have proceeded to negative the claim of the applicant is that he had not been in continuous service between the two dates which find mention in Rule 4 of the 2001 Rules. As is event from the above extract, the sole ground on which the opposite parties have proceeded to negative the claim of the applicant is that he had not been in continuous service between the two dates which find mention in Rule 4 of the 2001 Rules. Rule 4 itself, it may be noted, prescribes that for the purposes of being eligible for regularisation, a daily wager would be one who had entered service prior to 29 June 1991 and had rendered uninterrupted service thereafter till the promulgation of the 2001 Rules. The 2001 Rules, it is pertinent to note, had come into force on 20 December 2001. The order dated 24 October 2016 passed in purported compliance of the directions issued by the writ Court details the number of days on which the applicant had worked during the year 1989 to 2002 as evident from the chart extracted herein above. 9. Sri Srivastava, learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that the exercise undertaken by the respondents is in clear breach of the directions issued by the Court and is an apparent attempt to overreach and deny to the applicant the fruits of the judgment which has attained finality inter partes. He submitted that despite the issue of artificial breaks in service having been settled against the State, the claim of the applicant has been negatived yet again on the same score. He has also submitted that the absence of a seniority list having been prepared and a committee having been constituted as contemplated under the 2001 Rules would clearly warrant this Court taking the view that the respondents are in contempt. 10. On the other hand, Shri K.R. Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel has submitted that as is evident from the facts captured in the order dated 24 October 2016, the applicant had not worked for a single day in 1991. Referring to the number of days on which the applicant worked during the period 1989-2002, it was submitted that it would be ex facie evident that the working of the applicant was clearly intermittent and cannot possibly be prescribed as suffering from artificial breaks. Referring to the number of days on which the applicant worked during the period 1989-2002, it was submitted that it would be ex facie evident that the working of the applicant was clearly intermittent and cannot possibly be prescribed as suffering from artificial breaks. A further submission of Shri Singh was that what would constitute artificial break in the facts of a present case would itself be a debatable question and this and other aspects would clearly fall beyond the authority and the scope of power of the Court while exercising its jurisdiction of contempt. It is these rival submissions which fall for determination. 11. The fundamental precept on which an action in contempt is liable to be assessed is a wilful and deliberate disobedience of an order of the Court. In order to hold that there is a wilful and deliberate disobedience, the Court must be able to arrive at a conclusion that the disobedience is a deliberate attempt on the part of the opposite party to either not comply or attempt to circumvent the directions issued by the Court. The deliberate or wilful disobedience must by its very inherent and intrinsic character be stark and evident. Any exercise which the Court proceeds to undertake in order to evaluate the allegation of contempt which would involve the consideration of rival submissions touching upon the merits of the dispute or to consider an issue which is substantive and contentious would clearly be beyond the contours of the contempt jurisdiction itself. The Court must not be understood to mean to hold that an allegation of contempt is liable to be brushed aside merely because the respondents take an objection or refuse to recognise the claim of the applicant. Ultimately the invocation of the power would have to be guided by a consideration of the merits and the substantive character of the objection which is raised or the decision taken. An objection in order to qualify as being contentious must be one which raises a serious issue of dispute and which may prima facie appear to be a valid negation of the claim. This simply because in such a situation and where an objection of such a character is taken, the opposite parties cannot be said to have conducted themselves in a manner which constrains the Court to hold that there has been a wilful and deliberate disobedience. 12. This simply because in such a situation and where an objection of such a character is taken, the opposite parties cannot be said to have conducted themselves in a manner which constrains the Court to hold that there has been a wilful and deliberate disobedience. 12. In the facts of the present case, the Court notes that although the learned Single Judge while proceeding to deal with the issue on merits had clearly held that artificial breaks would not be liable to be viewed as being relevant for the purposes of considering whether a claim for regularisation was liable to be granted under the 2001Rules, the issue which itself falls for consideration would be whether the working of the applicant could be said to suffer from “artificial breaks”. 13. As this Court goes through the order dated 24 October 2016, it is evident that the period of working of the applicant is not continual throughout the year. The number of days on which the applicant has worked during the period 1989-2002 has been duly set out in the said order. As pointed out by Shri Singh, the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel, in 1991 the applicant is stated to have not worked for a single day. Insofar as the period between 1999-2002 is concerned here also the Court notes that the working of the applicant is not uninterrupted. Whether the breaks in service would qualify as “artificial” is one which is not free from either doubt or debate. Eietherways it appears to be an issue which would clearly involve and require the Court to evaluate the rival submissions of parties and enter the arena of the merits of the dispute. The mere fact that the opposite party has taken the position that the applicant does not fulfil the requirements of Rule 4 does not, therefore, in the facts of the present case appear to this Court to be in wilful or deliberate disobedience. 14. It is pertinent to note that the directions of the writ Court as modified to a certain extent by the Court in Special Appeal was for the consideration of the claim of the applicant in light of the principles enunciated therein. There was no positive direction to compulsorily regularise the services of the applicant. 14. It is pertinent to note that the directions of the writ Court as modified to a certain extent by the Court in Special Appeal was for the consideration of the claim of the applicant in light of the principles enunciated therein. There was no positive direction to compulsorily regularise the services of the applicant. Whether the breaks in service as evidenced in the order dated 24 October 2016 would in fact qualify as artificial breaks are all aspects which touch upon the rival claims of parties and the merits of the dispute. The validity of this order, therefore, cannot form the subject-matter of adjudication by this Court in contempt. 15. Accordingly and in view of the above, this petition is dismissed with liberty to the applicant to initiate appropriate proceedings in respect of the order dated 24 October 2016.