Research › Search › Judgment

Madras High Court · body

2018 DIGILAW 3551 (MAD)

Paramasivan v. P. Manokaran

2018-10-05

N.SATHISH KUMAR

body2018
JUDGMENT N. Sathish Kumar, J. This appeal is directed against the judgment of acquittal dated 10.08.2006, made in S.T.C.No.1743 of 2005, on the file of the learned District Munsif -cum- Judicial Magistrate, Sivagiri, Tirunelveli District. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as 'the complainant and the accused'. 3. The prosecution case, in brief, is as follows: 3.1. The accused has borrowed a sum of Rs. 3,00,000/- (Rupees Three Lakhs only) on 24.01.2005 and issued a post-dated (06.06.2005) cheque- Ex.P.1 on 06.05.2005. When the complainant presented the above cheque for encashment through his banker, the same was dishonoured for the reason 'insufficient funds' under Ex.P.2-Memorandum. Thereafter, the complainant issued a legal notice-Ex.P.3 on 01.08.2005. The accused, having received the same, sent a reply notice (Ex.P.5) on 05.08.2005 with false contentions. Hence, the complaint. 3.2. Before the Trial Court, the complainant himself was examined as P.W.1 and Exs.P.1 to P.5 were marked. On completion of the examination of witness on the side of the prosecution, the accused was questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C., as to the incriminating circumstances found in the evidence of the prosecution witness and he denied them as false. On the side of defence, the accused himself was examined as D.W.1, however, no document was marked on his side. 3.3. On consideration of evidence available on record, the learned District Munsif -cum- Judicial Magistrate, Sivagiri, Tirunelveli District found that the complainant has not proved his case beyond reasonable doubt and thereby, acquitted the accused. 4. Challenging the order of acquittal passed by the learned District Munsif -cum- Judicial Magistrate, Sivagiri, Tirunelveli District, the present Criminal Appeal has been filed by the complainant. 5. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the complainant would contend that the accused has not discharged the legal presumption attached to the cheque and it is not in dispute that the dishonoured cheque was that of the accused. The accused has taken two different stands. On earlier occasion, it was his stand that the cheque in question was stolen. Absolutely, there is no evidence to substantiate the same. Whereas, during trial, he has taken a different stand that there was no privity of contract between the complainant and the accused. Similarly, the previous conduct of the accused in some other case clearly shows that he used to set up a defence in such a nature. Absolutely, there is no evidence to substantiate the same. Whereas, during trial, he has taken a different stand that there was no privity of contract between the complainant and the accused. Similarly, the previous conduct of the accused in some other case clearly shows that he used to set up a defence in such a nature. Hence, it is submitted that once the cheque is dishonoured and the ingredients of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, have been established, it is for the accused to discharge the legal presumption attached to the cheque. Mere denial is not sufficient to discharge the legal presumption. In support of his contention, he has also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No.803 of 2018 [Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, decided on 02, July, 2018]. Hence, the learned Senior Counsel prayed for allowing the appeal. 6. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the accused would contend that the evidence adduced on the side of P.W.1 itself clearly indicates that there was no privity of contract between the accused and the complainant. As an accused, he has brought the circumstances to discharge the legal presumption and once legal statutory presumption has been discharged, the burden is again shifted on the complainant to prove the passing of consideration. Absolutely, there is no evidence available on record to show that the complainant has discharged his burden. The Trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence and acquitted the accused. Hence, he prayed for dismissal of the appeal. 7. I have considered the rival submissions and perused the materials available on record. 8. It is the specific case of the complainant that the accused has borrowed a sum of Rs. 3,00,000/- (Rupees Three Lakhs only) on 24.01.2005 and issued Ex.P.1-cheque. Of course, Ex.P.1 cheque, when presented for encashment, was dishonoured and statutory notice was also issued within a time. These aspects are not in dispute. Though, at the initial stage, the accused, in his reply statement, took a defence to the effect that the cheque was stolen, there was no material to substantiate the above defence. But the fact remains that in the cross-examination of P.W.1, certain circumstances were brought in by the accused. 9. It is well settled that the statutory presumptions available under Section 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, can be discharged by the accused. But the fact remains that in the cross-examination of P.W.1, certain circumstances were brought in by the accused. 9. It is well settled that the statutory presumptions available under Section 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, can be discharged by the accused. Such presumption cannot be static. It can be discharged by bringing out probabilities. The probabilities always need not be by way of direct evidence. Even circumstantial evidence or even admission on the side of the complainant is sufficient to discharge the legal presumption. Mere denial by the accused of consideration or issuance of the cheque will not discharge the legal presumption. 10. The evidence of P.W.1, when carefully seen, his entire evidence in cross-examination read together, the same indicates that there is no privity of contract between the accused and himself. In fact, he has shown ignorance about the nature of legal notice issued by the accused and himself. He appears to have totally ignorant of the facts. His entire evidence indicates that only his brother had some dealing with the accused. He has also categorically admitted that he never had any transaction with the accused. When that being the position, advancing huge amount of Rs. 3,00,000/- on 24.01.2005 is highly improbable. Further, advancing such huge amount on 24.01.2005 without any document on the same day is also highly improbable. The very complaint itself clearly indicates that the sum of Rs. 3,00,000/- was paid without any document on 24.01.2005. Thereafter, only, on his insistence, the accused gave a cheque on 06.05.2005. Paying huge amount without any document, at the first instance, is against the normal human conduct. Hence, this Court does not find any material to hold that the complainant has proved his case. 11. Absolutely, there is no dispute with regard to the proposition laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment cited by the complainant's counsel. But, on facts of the case, from the admission of P.W.1 itself, when legal presumption has been discharged, then the burden is on the part of the complainant to establish the passing of consideration. However, the complainant has not discharged his burden in establishing the passing of consideration. Having taken a stand that he has advanced the amount on 24.01.2005, specifically, in cross-examination, he has admitted that there was no privity of contract between himself and the accused. However, the complainant has not discharged his burden in establishing the passing of consideration. Having taken a stand that he has advanced the amount on 24.01.2005, specifically, in cross-examination, he has admitted that there was no privity of contract between himself and the accused. That apart, in the cross-examination, he has admitted that the amount has been paid only on 06.06.2005 and his brother has also contributed which is totally against the very complaint itself. All these facts clearly show the improbability in the case. Hence, the judgment of the Trial Court acquitting the accused does not require any interference at the hands of this Court. 12. In fine, the Criminal Appeal fails and accordingly, the same is dismissed.