JUDGMENT : Lok Pal Singh, J. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. Petitioners have been summoned to face the trial for the offences punishable under section 307, 504 and 506 IPC. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners, and learned counsel for the complainant stated before this Court that parties have entered into compromise. It is further submitted that all the offences except 307 IPC, are compoundable in nature. It is further submitted that from a bare perusal of the FIR, ingredients of the offence punishable under section 307 IPC, are not made out against the applicants. Furthermore, a perusal of the medical report would reveal that the injury sustained by the injured (respondent no. 2) is not on the vital part, which could prove fatal for his life. 4. A compounding application, being CLMA No. 791 of 2018, has been moved on behalf of the applicant. Said application is accompanied with the affidavits of Akshay Sonwal (petitioner no. 1) as well as of the complainant-respondent no. 2 and injured respondent no. 3. 5. Both the petitioners are present in person before the Court, duly identified by their counsel Mr. D.S. Mehta, Advocate. Injured- Jitendra Kanojia (complainant) is also present in person before the Court, duly identified by his counsel Mr. K.K. Harbola, Advocate. 6. The injured-respondent no. 3 stated that he as well as complainant-respondent no. 2 are no more interested in prosecuting the applicant, in as much as the dispute between the parties has been resolved amicably. He further stated that they may be permitted to compound the offences alleged against the petitioners. The statement given by the injured-respondent no. 3 in the open Court has been affirmed on behalf of the petitioners. 7. Whereas offences punishable under Sections 504, 506 IPC are compoundable offences within the scheme of Section 320 of Cr.P.C., Section 307 IPC is not. 8. The only question which is left for consideration of this Court is whether the complainant-respondent no. 2 and injured-respondent no. 3 should be permitted to compound the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC alleged against the accused-applicant or not? 9.
8. The only question which is left for consideration of this Court is whether the complainant-respondent no. 2 and injured-respondent no. 3 should be permitted to compound the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC alleged against the accused-applicant or not? 9. Learned counsel for the applicant drew attention of this Court towards a decision rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Dimpy Gujral vs Union Territory through Administrator U.T. Chandigarh and others, [2013 (123) AIC 119 (S.C.)] and Narendra Singh and others vs State of Punjab and another, (2014) 6 SCC 466 , where the said Court has permitted compounding of such type of offences, which are otherwise non-compoundable, within the scheme of Section 320 of Cr.P.C. 10. It will also be useful to reproduce the law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and another (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 160, wherein it was observed, in the context of such cases, as under : “The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarized thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint of F.I.R. may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society.
Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statues like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceedings or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above questions is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.” 11. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may accept the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. 12.
Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may accept the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. 12. Likewise, those cases, where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start, the High Court can exercise it’s powers, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned therein. This Court is of the opinion that this matter deserves to be given a quietus as continuance of proceedings arising out of the first information report in question would be an exercise in futility. 13. The reply to the question, posed by this Court in para no. 7 of this Judgment, therefore, is in the affirmative. Otherwise also, it will be a futile exercise if proceedings of the criminal case against the applicant are kept pending when the parties have settled their disputes amicably. 14. Compounding application is allowed. As a consequence thereof, application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is also allowed. Charge sheet dated 25.03.2018, as also the entire proceedings of criminal case no. 1105 of 2018 (FIR No. 02 of 2018), under Sections 307, 504, 506 IPC, pending in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nainital are hereby quashed on the basis of compromise arrived at between the parties.