ORDER : 1. The petitioners in Criminal Petition No.5575 of 2018 are Accused Nos.5 and 8; the petitioners in Criminal Petition No.5576 of 2018 are Accused Nos.6, 9 and 12 and the petitioner in Criminal Petition No.5596 of 2018 is Accused No.10 in Crime No.31 of 2015 of Chinna Chowk Police Station, Y.S.R. Kadapa District, registered for the offences under Sections 420, 409, 508, 197 and 120-B R/w.34 of IPC and Section 5 of A.P. Protection of Depositors of Financial Establishments Act, 1999. 2. The petitioners/A-5 and A-8 are undisputedly in judicial custody since 09.01.2018 and 09.10.2017 respectively either by arrest on production or by production by P.T. warrants, as the case may be. The petitioners/A-6, A-9 and A-12 are in judicial custody since 09.01.2018, having produced on P.T. warrants, and the petitioner/A-10 is in judicial custody since 09.01.2018. 3. The petitioners/A-5 and A-8 and A-10 moved default bail applications before the learned Special Judge-cum-Principal District Judge, Kadapa by filing Crl.P. M.P. No.984 of 2018, 1035 of 2018 and 1064 of 2018, which ended in dismissal on 15.05.2018 and the petitioners/A-6, A-9 and A-12 moved default bail applications before the learned Special Judge-cum-Principal District Judge, Kadapa by filing Crl. P.M.P. Nos.1001 of 2018, 1000 of 2018 and 1002 of 2018, which ended in dismissal on 07.05.2018, respectively. 4. It is impugning the said dismissal orders with the contention of they got indefeasible right to bail, statutorily provided under Section 167 of Cr.P.C, that was not properly considered by the learned Special Judge-cum-Principal District Judge supra, in passing the respective orders, these Petitions are filed. They reiterated the contentions only in relation to the law on the aspect covered by the ‘default bail’ and in saying there is no necessity to go into the merits of the matters as per the settled expressions but for to consider the indefeasible right, and the learned Special Judge-cum-Principal District Judge in passing the dismissal orders went wrong in saying the default bail is not entitled as if without even basis and thereby they are entitled to the default bail to be considered by setting-aside the respective dismissal orders supra. 5. Learned Public Prosecutor opposed the petitions and supported the impugned orders of the learned Special Judge-cum-Principal District Judge, Kadapa. 6. Heard both sides at length and perused the entire material on record including observations in the impugned dismissal orders. 7. 5. Learned Public Prosecutor opposed the petitions and supported the impugned orders of the learned Special Judge-cum-Principal District Judge, Kadapa. 6. Heard both sides at length and perused the entire material on record including observations in the impugned dismissal orders. 7. The law is fairly settled at least from the Constitution Bench expression of the Apex Court in Sanjay Dutt Vs. State through C.B.I., Bombay. Undisputedly, in these cases, the punishment provided for any of the offences is only up to 10 years and for one of the offences upto life and thus the charge sheet must be filed from the very wording of Section 167 of Cr.P.C. within 90 days from the date of respective remand and, if not filed, for that default, in non-compliance with the statutory period to file the final report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. read with 167(2) Cr.P.C.., the accused are entitled to the ‘default bail’, which is an indefeasible right to avail. Even there is no any controversy as to the default bail is to be granted is not from the date of default till filing of charge sheet as a default bail once granted will enure till end of trial, that cloud is also cleared by the Apex Court. It was way back in 1996 in the expression covered by Mohamed Iqbal Madar Sheikh Vs. State of Maharashtra the Apex Court deprecated the practice of some Courts keep the application for ‘default bail’ pending for some days so to file charge sheet in the meantime for such a course must be very strongly and vehemently discouraged, and it is reiterated that no subterfuge should be resorted to, to defeat the indefeasible right of the accused for ‘default bail’ when the statutory period for filing the charge sheet or Challan expires and for timely non-submission of the charge sheet or Challan in Court. 8. In fact, in Uday Mohanlal Acharya Vs. State of Maharashtra, the Apex Court also referring to the Constitution Bench judgment in Sanjay Dutt (1 supra), scanned the law, and laid down 6 guidelines which read as follows: “1. Under Sub-section (2) of Section 167, a Magistrate before whom an Accused is produced while the police is investigating into the offence can authorize detention of the Accused in such custody as the Magistrate thinks fit for a term not exceeding 15 days on the whole. 2. Under Sub-section (2) of Section 167, a Magistrate before whom an Accused is produced while the police is investigating into the offence can authorize detention of the Accused in such custody as the Magistrate thinks fit for a term not exceeding 15 days on the whole. 2. Under the proviso to the aforesaid Sub-section (2) of Section 167, the Magistrate may authorize detention of the Accused otherwise than in the custody of police for a total period not exceeding 90 days where the investigation relates to offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years, and 60 days where the investigation relates to any other offence. 3. On the expiry of the said period of 90 days or 60 days, as the case may be, an indefeasible right accrues in favour of the Accused for being released on bail on account of default by the investigating agency in the completion of the investigation within the period prescribed and the Accused is entitled to be released on bail, if he is prepared to and furnishes the bail as directed by the Magistrate. 4. When an application for bail is filed by an Accused for enforcement of his indefeasible right alleged to have been accrued in his favour on account of default on the part of the investigating agency in completion of the investigation within the specified period, the Magistrate/court must dispose of it forthwith, on being satisfied that in fact the Accused has been in custody for the period of 90 days or 60 days, as specified and no charge-sheet has been filed by the investigating agency. Such prompt action on the part of the Magistrate/court will not enable the prosecution to frustrate the object of the Act and the legislative mandate of an Accused being released on bail on account of the default on the part of the investigating agency in completing the investigation within the period stipulated. 5. Such prompt action on the part of the Magistrate/court will not enable the prosecution to frustrate the object of the Act and the legislative mandate of an Accused being released on bail on account of the default on the part of the investigating agency in completing the investigation within the period stipulated. 5. If the Accused is unable to furnish the bail as directed by the Magistrate, then on a conjoint reading of Explanation I and the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 167, the continued custody of the Accused even beyond the specified period in Para (a) will not be unauthorized, and therefore, if during that period the investigation is complete and the charge-sheet is filed then the so-called indefeasible right of the Accused would stand extinguished. 6. The expression "if not already availed of" used by this Court in Sanjay Dutt v. State through CBI, (1994) 5 SCC 410 , must be understood to mean when the Accused files an application and is prepared to offer bail on being directed. In other words, on expiry of the period specified in Para (a) of the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 167 if the Accused files an application for bail and offers also to furnish the bail on being directed, then it has to be held that the Accused has availed of his indefeasible right even though the court has not considered the said application and has not indicated the terms and conditions of bail, and the Accused has not furnished the same.” 9. Of which, guideline No.3 is very clear that on the expiry of the said period of 90 days or 60 days, as the case may be, an indefeasible right accrues in favour of the accused for being released on bail on account of default by the investigating agency in completion of the investigation within the period prescribed and the accused is entitled to be released on bail, if he is prepared to, and furnishes the bail, as directed by the Magistrate. From guideline No.4, when an application for bail is furnished by an accused for enforcement of his indefeasible right, alleged to have been accrued in his favour, on account of default on the part of the investigating agency in completion of the investigation within the specified period, the Magistrate Court must dispose of it forthwith, on being satisfied that in fact the accused has been in custody for the period of 90 days or 60 days, as specified, and no charge sheet has been filed by the investigating agency. Such prompt action on the part of the Magistrate Court will not enable the prosecution to frustrate the object of the Act and the legislative mandate of an accused being released on bail on account of the default on the part of the investigating agency in completing the investigation within the period stipulated. After that expression, the Apex Court again in Union of India Vs. Nirala Yadav reviewed the entire case law and reiterated the law laid down in Uday Mohanlal Acharya (3 supra) by referring to the Condition No.3 supra. 10. From the above, it is the duty of the Court if charge sheet not filed within the statutory period, to release the detenu on bail. For that even an oral application is enough if at all accused wants to apply. There are some expressions saying even default bail granted when there is a subsequent filing of charge sheet, the procedure contemplated if at all to cancel the bail and to take custody is as per Cr.P.C.. It is crystal clear there from of only the bail sought to be cancelled as contemplated by Section 439(2) and 437(4) Cr.P.C., once the default bail is availed by the accused for non submission of the charge sheet. So far as the application for default bail is filed during pendency of filing of the charge sheet concerned that practice is already deprecated way back by the Apex Court in Mohamed Iqbal (2 supra). So far as the application for default bail is filed during pendency of filing of the charge sheet concerned that practice is already deprecated way back by the Apex Court in Mohamed Iqbal (2 supra). So far as the recourse if at all to take for cancellation of the bail concerned, the expression of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sanjay Dutt (1 supra) reads as follows: “(2)(b) The "indefeasible right" of the Accused to be released on bail in accordance with Section 20(4)(bb) of the TADA Act read with Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in default of completion of the investigation and filing of the Challan within the time allowed, as held in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur is a right which enures to, and is enforceable by the Accused only from the time of default till the filing of the challan and it does not survive or remain enforceable on the challan being filed. If the Accused applies for bail under this provision on expiry of the statutory period (of 180 days) or the extended period, as the case may be, then he has to be released on bail forthwith. The accused, so released on bail may be arrested and committed to custody according to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The right of the Accused to be released on bail after filing of the challan, notwithstanding the default in filing it within the time allowed, is governed from the time of filing of the challan only by the provisions relating to the grant of bail applicable at that stage.” 11. Once the law is clear also reiterating the Constitution Bench expression in Sanjay Dutt (1 supra) and another expression in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and others Vs. State of Maharashtra and others ( 1994 (4) SCC 602 ) that were referred in Uday Mohanlal Acharya (3 supra) and again in Nirala Yadav (4 supra). The accused, the movement entitled to default bail as a part of duty of the Court to grant even otherwise once applied the Court must grant. Law is also very clear from the expressions that so far as the default bail concerned, Court has no right to go into the merits of the meritorious entitlement or not of the bail, but for the concession to be availed, once opted of the statutory right. Law is also very clear from the expressions that so far as the default bail concerned, Court has no right to go into the merits of the meritorious entitlement or not of the bail, but for the concession to be availed, once opted of the statutory right. The issue again came in the recent past for consideration before another three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Rakesh Kumar Paul Vs. State of Assam (2017 (3) ALT (Crl.) 141 (SC). A perusal of the lengthy judgment reiterating the law shows the Hon’ble 3 Justices Madan B. Lokur, Prafulla C. Pant and Deepak Gupta written the different judgments, particularly in relation to the offence punishable with imprisonment to the maximum of ten years, the period to be reckoned is 60 days or 90 days. Two of the Hon’ble Justices Madan B. Lokur and Deepak Gupta held in majority the period to be reckoned is 60 days and not 90 days. 12. In the judgment of Hon’ble Justice Madan B. Lokur, it was observed in the very 1st and 2nd Paragraphs of the beginning of the Judgment as follows: “1. In Measure for Measure the Duke complains (in the given situation): "And liberty plucks justice by the nose".1 The truth is that personal liberty cannot be compromised at the altar of what the State might perceive as justice-justice for one might be perceived as injustice for another. We are therefore unable to agree with learned Counsel for the State that the Petitioner is not entitled to his liberty through what is commonly referred to as 'default bail' or that the justice of the case should persuade us to decide otherwise. 2. The facts in these petitions are not in dispute and we need not go into them in any great detail since we are really concerned with the interpretation of the words "imprisonment for a term not less than ten years" appearing in Clause (i) of proviso (a) to Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 as amended in 1978.” Further, in Paragraphs 33 to 43 and 49, it is observed by the learned Judge in dealing with the default bail as an indefeasible right what is referred supra and, particularly, at Paragraphs 41 and 43 in the beginning words it reads as follows: “41. We take this view keeping in mind that in matters of personal liberty and Article 21 of the Constitution, it is not always advisable to be formalistic or technical. The history of the personal liberty jurisprudence of this Court and other constitutional courts includes petitions for a writ of habeas corpus and for other writs being entertained even on the basis of a letter addressed to the Chief Justice or the Court. 43. This Court and other constitutional courts have also taken the view that in the matters concerning personal liberty and penal statutes, it is the obligation of the Court to inform the accused that he or she is entitled to free legal assistance as a matter of right. ……………………” In the conclusion Para at 49, it is observed as follows: “49. The petitioner is held entitled to the grant of ‘default bail’ on the facts and in the circumstances of this case. The trial Judge should release the petitioner on ‘default bail’ on such terms and conditions as may be reasonable. However, we make it clear that this does not prohibit or otherwise prevent the arrest or re-arrest of the petitioner on cogent grounds in respect of the subject charge and upon arrest or re-arrest, the petitioner is entitled to petition for grant of regular bail which application should be considered on its own merit. We also make it clear that this will not impact on the arrest of the petitioner in any other case.” 13. Coming to the separate judgment written by another Judge, Hon’ble Justice Prafulla C. Pant, referring to the expressions supra, particularly, from Paragraphs 21 to 31, on the issue of entitlement of the default bail, it is observed referring to the provisions and at Para 22 of the legal position regarding bail under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C.. Coming to the separate judgment written by another Judge, Hon’ble Justice Prafulla C. Pant, referring to the expressions supra, particularly, from Paragraphs 21 to 31, on the issue of entitlement of the default bail, it is observed referring to the provisions and at Para 22 of the legal position regarding bail under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C.. was cemented by the Constitution Bench of this Court which has inter-alia held in the case of Sanjay Dutt (1 supra) of the same is indefeasible right of the accused to be released on bail in accordance with the provisions, in default of completion of investigation and filing of the challan within the time allowed, as held in Hintendra Vishnu Thakur (5 supra) and it is a right which enures to and is enforceable by the accused only from the time of default till filing of the challan and it does not survive or remain enforceable on the challan being filed. If he applies for bail under the provision after expiry of the period, he has to be released on bail forthwith. The accused, so released on bail, may be arrested and committed to custody according to the provisions of the Cr.P.C.. The right of the accused to be released on bail, after filing of the challan, notwithstanding the default in filing it within the time allowed, is governed from time to time of filing of the challan only by the provisions relating to the grant of bail, applicable at this stage. Also referred the expression of the Apex Court in Uday Mohanlal Acharya (3 supra) that referred the 3 Judge Bench expression of the Apex Court of 1996 in Dr. Bipin Shanthilal Panchal Vs. State of Gujarat ( 1996 (1) SCC 718 ), where it is observed that the accused has not made application for enforcement of his right of default bail but raised the contention only in the Apex Court thereby formulated the question thus whether accused was entitled to be released on bail under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C.., not having made an application when such right has accrued, can exercise that right at a later stage of the proceeding and answered in the negative. It also referred another expression of the Apex Court in Mohamed Iqbal (2 supra) of where default bail application filed for the indefeasible right must be disposed of immediately by the Courts to grant with no lapse of time and also referred Hintendra Vishnu Thakur (5 supra) the case under TADA Act, and concluded that at Para No.26 that requirement of application claiming a statutory right under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C.. is a pre-requisite for grant of default bail. Such application has to be made before the Magistrate for enforcement of the statutory right and in the cases under Prevention of Corruption Act or whether there are special Courts to deal with before those Courts and in the facts of the case as petitioner never sought for default bail before the Court concerned, he is not entitled to the same by saying the issue raised for the first time before the Apex Court. 14. Coming to the 3rd separate judgment of the Apex Court in Rakesh Kumar (6 supra), written by Hon’ble Justice Deepak Gupta, it is mentioned that having the privilege to go through the independent judgments authored by the other 2 learned Judges supra and in formulating 2 issues for answer as to what is the statutory period for the offences punishable up to 10 years is 60 days and without even making application he entitled to the default bail, leave about any oral request is enough, and answered the same from Paragraph Nos.1 to 30, in particular, at Para No.27 by referring to the expressions referred supra that a reading of the aforesaid judgments leaves no manner of doubt that if the accused files an application for grant of default bail and is willing to furnish bail, then he is deemed to have exercised his right to avail the bail and his right cannot be defeated by filing the charge sheet thereafter. 15. Thus, the law is clear from the said expression that once an application is made by the accused, after expiry of the statutory period of remand from non-filing of the charge sheet, he is entitled to the default bail and such a right cannot even be defeated by filing of charge sheet thereafter. 15. Thus, the law is clear from the said expression that once an application is made by the accused, after expiry of the statutory period of remand from non-filing of the charge sheet, he is entitled to the default bail and such a right cannot even be defeated by filing of charge sheet thereafter. So, the filing of the application either orally or in writing is a prerequisite, if not the Court chosen to grant the default bail, and once such an application is there, in recognition of his indefeasible right, he is entitled to the default bail and that can no way be delayed even in its disposal, as referred supra. 16. This Court in Singamala Shankarnar Vs. State of A.P (2007 (1) ALT (Crl.) 226) categorically observed that where the imprisonment is ten years and below the period of filing charge sheet from the date of remand is 60 days, from which there is indefeasible right to claim default bail accrues and for that conclusion referred several earlier expressions of the Apex Court even. 17. In the latest expression of the Apex Court, three Judge Bench in Rambeer Shokeen Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) ( 2018 (4) SCC 405 ), again it came for consideration the scope of law for the default bail and it is observed by the Apex Court that the accused is entitled after expiry of the period for filing the charge sheet statutorily provided to the default bail. However, under any provision once there is provided for extension of time to file charge sheet and such application is filed pending, the Court must dispose of that application first before considering the entitlement of default bail and it is only there from to consider the entitlement as that entitlement depends upon consideration or not of the time sought for extension to file final report. It also referred the expressions in Sanjay Dutt (1 supra), Hintendra Vishnu Thakur (5 supra), Nirala Yadav (4 supra) and Uday Mohanlal Acharya (3 supra) in particular, leave about the expressions earlier to the Sanjay Dutt (1 supra) Constitution Bench, in general. Even from this expression, latest in point of time, it is crystal clear of the default bail entitlement concerned, it need not be to go into the merits but to recognize the indefeasible right once the statutory period is lapsed and no application for extension filed much less pending. Even from this expression, latest in point of time, it is crystal clear of the default bail entitlement concerned, it need not be to go into the merits but to recognize the indefeasible right once the statutory period is lapsed and no application for extension filed much less pending. 18. Having regard to the above, the petitioners/accused Nos.5, 6, 8, 9, 10 and 12 respectively are entitled to the default bail. Thereby, the dismissal of the applications by the trial Court despite the petitioners-accused have chosen in filing written applications to avail the default bail is un-sustainable, leave apart the fact that in this case undisputedly from the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners reiterated by ascertainment by the learned Public Prosecutor that, as on date, no charge sheet/s filed. 19. Accordingly and in the result all the three Criminal Petitions are allowed by granting the statutory bail to the petitioners accused supra, subject to the following conditions: 1. Petitioners shall execute a self-bond for Rs.25,000/- [Rupees twenty five thousand only] with two sureties each for the like sum each to the satisfaction of the learned Judge (concerned Court). The bonds to be obtained are not only to appear before the Court for enquiry or trial and even after trial to appear before revisional or appellate Court or other superior Court - vide decision in Pre-Legal Aid Committee, Jamshedpur Vs. State of Delhi (1982 (2) APLJ (43) SC); so that at stage of committal or other proceedings obtaining of fresh bonds from accused and even affidavits of sureties of bonds and solvencies earlier produced are ratifying and in existence and enforceable, without even insisting their further presence, such recourse quickens the proceedings at other stages before that Court or other Court without loss of time and it also to some extent complies with the requirement of Section 437A Cr.P.C.. 2. Petitioners shall report before the investigating officer on every Sunday between 5.00 P.M. to 6.00 P.M. after filing of charge sheet and later once in a month on every first Sunday, for assurance of their availability to safeguard the interest of the prosecution of jumping bail and interference with witnesses, until further orders being passed by the learned trial Judge relaxing the same, empowering him by virtue of this order. 3. 3. Petitioners shall attend before the Court of law regularly in enquiry and trial without fail, if not, their bail shall be cancelled forthwith, without any further order so that, the learned Judge concerned can also issue NBW by canceling the bail from the power under section 439 [2] Cr.P.C.. delegated by this order during pendency of proceedings before the Court. 4. Petitioners shall not leave the State pending enquiry/trial without prior permission of the learned trial Judge. 5. Petitioners shall furnish their full address with property and bank account particulars and submit their passport/s, if any, after enlargement of bail on the next hearing date or at such time granted by trial court and before the Court concerned (for collecting by police as part of their duty to investigate-also the means of accused and to furnish the same in the final report of investigation to enable the trial Court in the event of considering the need of awarding compensation under section 357 Cr.P.C. so to award from such material and evidence, apart from securing presence and obtaining of bonds with sureties under section 437A Cr.P.C.. etc.), failing which, it is open to the learned Judge concerned by virtue of the power conferred by this order to cancel their bail. 6. The bail now granted is since a regular one till end of trial (without prejudice to the right to cancel meanwhile in case of need and/or for non-compliance of conditions supra) any absence of petitioner/s as accused for hearing/enquiry or trial, issuance of non bailable warrant-NBW (unless cancelled before execution) and even its execution and production of accused as per the NBW; that does not tantamount to cancellation of bail including from the wording of Sec. 439(2) Cr.P.C.. and as such in such event no fresh bail application can be entertained. As it tantamount to only cancellation of bail bonds earlier executed, (leave about the power of the Court to issue surety notices by forfeiting bonds and for imposing penalty on the bonds forfeited); the proper course is to direct the accused to work out the remedy to pay penalty on the previous forfeited bonds as per Section 441 to 446 Cr.P.C.. and to submit fresh solvencies with self bonds for enlarging them by release from custody on payment of penalty of the earlier bonds forfeited without need of enforcing against earlier sureties again. 20. and to submit fresh solvencies with self bonds for enlarging them by release from custody on payment of penalty of the earlier bonds forfeited without need of enforcing against earlier sureties again. 20. In consequence, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in these Petitions shall stand closed.