ORDER : M.K. HANJURA, J. 1. The State of J&K, through Commissioner Secretary to the Government, Education Department, Civil Secretariat, has filed an application seeking the indulgence of this Court in condoning the delay of 505 days in filing the Appeal, against the judgment and order dated 27-05-2017 of this Court passed in SWP 978/2002, primarily on the grounds that immediately after attaining the knowledge of the passing of the judgment and order, the applicant – appellant No.1, vide letter dated 13-06-2016, requested the appellant No.2 to furnish a detailed report as also a copy of the writ petition so that further action in the matter is taken up. The appellant No.2, vide his letter dated 20-06-2016, sought necessary details including the relevant record from the appellant No.4, and the appellant No.4, by his letter dated 18-06-2016, asked for a report from the appellant No.5, who submitted the details vide communication dated 30-11-2016. It is further stated that the appellant No.4, furnished a detailed report to the appellant No.2 on 23-02-2017 and the process to implement the orders was undertaken thereafter. It is stated further that the mater had to be examined and perused at various levels in the appellants’ Department. However, after examining the matter finally, it was decided that the remedy of appeal be availed of and, accordingly, after collecting the record, the matter was forwarded to the Administrative Department (School Education), wherefrom, it was sent to the Department of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs for seeking necessary opinion/sanction to file the LPA. The applicants – appellants have stated that in this process a lot of time was consumed. 2. It is further stated that after analyzing and perusing the record in its entirety, the Department of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, vide its letter dated 13-11-2017, accorded sanction to the filing of the LPA with the request to the ld. Deputy Advocate General concerned to file the LPA against the impugned judgment. Learned counsel for the applicants – appellants has further pleaded that since the Appeal is strong on merits, therefore, the appellants are sure to succeed in it. Deputy Advocate General concerned to file the LPA against the impugned judgment. Learned counsel for the applicants – appellants has further pleaded that since the Appeal is strong on merits, therefore, the appellants are sure to succeed in it. It is further stated that the appeal has an important bearing as far as the interests of the Appellants are concerned and in case the delay in filing of Appeal is not condoned, they will be thrown out of the Court, which will cause serious prejudice to the interests of the State. 3. The respondent has resisted and controverted the application of the Appellants, chiefly on the grounds that the delay in filing the appeal is reckoned at one and a half years and no reasonable ground has been urged in the application and, therefore, on the face of it, non application of mind and mismanagement is apparent, as a sequel to which, the application deserves to be dismissed. The respondent further has stated that the applicant – State, at every point of time, when the order/judgment is passed by the Hon’ble Court, first sits over the judgment for months together and when the aggrieved person/s decide to initiate the contempt proceedings, the State wakes up from the deep slumber and instead of complying with the orders of the Hon’ble Court, it comes up with the applications seeking condonation of delay and such move is adopted only to delay the justice to the aggrieved person/s. 4. It is further stated by the respondent that the applicants-appellants have, intentionally mentioned the date of judgment, sought to be appealed against, as 27-05-2017, when as a matter of fact, it is 27-05-2016, which tantamounts to suppression of actual facts. It is further stated by the learned counsel for the respondent that the applicants – appellants have taken more than one and half years to form an opinion for filing of the appeal and sitting on the judgment for so long a time, is unconstitutional, unjustified and unreasonable. It provides a sufficient cause to raise the finger against the appellants – applicants. The time so taken is only to mislead the Hon’ble Court and delay the justice supposed to be meted out to the aggrieved. It provides a sufficient cause to raise the finger against the appellants – applicants. The time so taken is only to mislead the Hon’ble Court and delay the justice supposed to be meted out to the aggrieved. It is further stated that it is the settled position of law that the applicant has to show sufficient reason and has to explain each and every day’s delay in filing the appeal within the period stipulated by the law and the attempt of filing of the application for condonation of delay with the mere intention of saving itself from contempt proceedings is bound to fail. The respondent has finally prayed that the application seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal deserves to be dismissed with heavy costs. 5. Heard and considered. 6. It cannot be disputed that the Law of Limitation has to be applied with all its vigor and rigor as prescribed by the Statute. One cannot escape the consequences of section 5 of the J&K Limitation Act Samvat 1995, which provides that for the extension of the period of limitation in a given case, the condition precedent is that the applicant or the appellant has to satisfy the Court that he/she has carved out a sufficient cause in seeking the assistance of the Court for not preferring the Appeal or Application within the stipulated time. The State cannot, as a matter of rule, take umbrage under the plea that it has to be treated on a different pedestal in the matter of the extension of time for filing the Appeal/Application. No doubt, some latitude may be warranted to be given to the State promoting social justice but it cannot escape the liability of satisfying the Court that the Appeal was filed with due diligence. The Courts cannot come to the aid and rescue of the State where the application for condonation of delay does not spell out sufficient cause and the approach of the State, in making such application, is casual and cryptic. 7. Testing the application of the Applicants on the touch stone of the law, governing the subject, it will be profitable to quote paragraphs 7&8 of the law laid down in 2010(4) JKJ 638 (HC), herein below, in verbatim : “7. 7. Testing the application of the Applicants on the touch stone of the law, governing the subject, it will be profitable to quote paragraphs 7&8 of the law laid down in 2010(4) JKJ 638 (HC), herein below, in verbatim : “7. In the case P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, reported in AIR 1998 SC 2276 , the Apex Court, at paragraph 6 ruled as under: “Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigor when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay filed in the High Court would stand rejected and the Miscellaneous First Appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time. No costs.” 8. In another case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while deliberating upon the question of condonation of an inordinate delay of 264 days on an application preferred by the Government, has observed as under: “2. This special leave petition filed on November 16, 1993 is delayed by 264 days. For quite some time in the past this Court has been making observations as to the grave prejudice caused to public interest by appeals brought on behalf of the Government being lost on the point of limitation. Such observations have been made for over a few years in the past. But there seems to be no conspicuous improvement as is apparent in the present petition which is filed in November 1993. The explanation for the delay, had better bet set out in petitioner’s own words: …………………………………… …………………………………… 3. This explanation is incapable of furnishing a judicially acceptable ground for condonation of delay. After the earlier observations of this Court made in several cases in the past, we hoped that the matters might improve. There seems to be no visible support of this optimism. There is a point beyond which even the courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant is Government which is itself under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference. Having regard to the law of limitation which binds everybody, we cannot find any way of granting relief. There seems to be no visible support of this optimism. There is a point beyond which even the courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant is Government which is itself under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference. Having regard to the law of limitation which binds everybody, we cannot find any way of granting relief. It is true that Government should not be treated as any other private litigant, as indeed, in the case of the former the decisions to present and prosecute appeals are not individual but are institutional decisions necessarily bogged down by the proverbial red-tape. But there are limits to this also. Even with all this latitude, the explanation offered for the delay in this case merely serves to aggravate the attitude of indifference of the Revenue in protecting its common Interests. The affidavit is again one of the stereotyped affidavits making it susceptible to the criticism that the Revenue does not seem to attach any importance to the need for promptitude even where it affects its own interest.” 8. Applying the ratio of the law laid down above to the instant case, there has been a reckless delay of 505 days in filing the LPA and no satisfactory explanation has come forward on that count except for routine words and phrases. No doubt, a liberal approach has to be adopted in the matter of condonation of delay when there is no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides on the part of the State but in the instant case the appellant took his own time to file the LPA. The law laid down in AIR 2011 SC 1237 enunciates this principle and it lays down as follows : “……..3. This appeal emanates from the judgment of the Division Bench of the Guahati High Court (High Court of Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur, Tripura, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh) in Misc. Case No. 1569 of 2007 in W.A.No. 72020 of 2006. The appeal filed by the Union of India was dismissed by the High Court because of inordinate delay of 239 days. The Division Bench of the High Court, while dismissing the appeal, has observed as under : “We have gone through the contents of the petition. The delay occurred because of the respondents took their own sweet time to reach the conclusion whether the judgment should be appealed or not. The Division Bench of the High Court, while dismissing the appeal, has observed as under : “We have gone through the contents of the petition. The delay occurred because of the respondents took their own sweet time to reach the conclusion whether the judgment should be appealed or not. It is not that they were prevented by any reason which is beyond their control to take such a decision in time. Even otherwise, on merits of the case also it does not appear to have any tenable ground of appeal. In the circumstances, we do not see any merits in this petition.” 4. We have also gone through the condonation of delay application which was filed in the High Court. In our considered view, the High Court was fully justified in dismissing the appeal on the ground of delay because no sufficient cause was shown for condoning the delay. ……………….. 6. The Union of India ought to have been careful particularly in filing this Civil Appeal because the Division Bench, by the impugned order, has dismissed the appeal before it on the ground of delay. It is a matter of deep anguish and distress that majority of the matters filed by the Union of India are hopelessly barred by limitation and no satisfactory explanations exist for condoning inordinate delay in filing those cases.” 9. Resort can also be had to an elaborate and a lucid judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court, reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649 , the relevant excerpts of which are as under : “………..21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. 21.9. (ix) The conduct, behavior and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. ……………… 21.12. 21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. ……………… 21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 22.1 (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harboring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. ……………….. 31. Neither leisure nor pleasure has any room while one moves an application seeking condonation of delay of almost seven years on the ground of lack of knowledge or failure of justice.” 10. Risking repetition, what is stated here is that the State has been negligent in prosecuting its claim within time and the application appears to have been drafted recklessly without giving a proper account as to why such a delay was allowed to happen. The sequence of the events followed by the dates that prompted the State to file the appeal after a long delay had to be accounted for to satisfy the Court that the delay in lodging of appeal was neither willful nor deliberate. 11. Viewed in the context of what has been said and done above, we are of the considered opinion that the State has failed to explain the delay of 505 days in filing the Appeal. Consequently, the application for Condonation of Delay, in filing the Appeal, is rejected and the Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) shall stand dismissed as barred by time.