JUDGMENT : 1. The short question raised by the Revenue is as to whether payments in excess of Rs. 1 crore made in a financial year on account of truck loading wages could have all been made in cash and without deducting tax at source. 2. In the assessment order for assessment year 2009-10 passed on December 29, 2011, the Assessing Officer noticed that the assessee had incurred expenses of Rs. 1,08,24,239/- as truck loading wages from the ledger submitted and the bills and vouchers produced. There does not appear to have been any doubt expressed as to the genuineness of the payment, but it was observed that cash payments had been made to single person in violation of Section 40A(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 which, during the relevant year, had a cap of Rs. 20,000/- under such provision. 3. The assessee refers to Rule 6DD of the Income Tax Rules, 1962 and particularly to Clause (g) thereof. Clause (g) of the said Rule covers a situation where the payment is made in a village or town, which on the date of such payment, is not served by any bank. 4. Thus, even if the ground urged by the assessee were to be accepted, it is a matter of evidence as to whether the benefit under Rule 6DD(g) could have been availed of by the assessee. It does not appear that such evidence was produced before the Assessing Officer or before the Commissioner (Appeals). The order impugned dated March 16, 2016 passed by the appellate Tribunal erred in law in presuming that all of the truck loading was made in a village which is not served by a bank or that the payments in respect thereof were made in such a village. 5. The appellate Tribunal fell into error in interfering with the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals), without it being evident to the appellate Tribunal that adequate evidence to invoke the benefit under Rule 6DD(g) of the Act had been presented by the assessee at least before the Commissioner (Appeals). 6. On the legal issue as above, the order impugned dated March 16, 2016 passed by the appellate Tribunal cannot be sustained. 7. 6. On the legal issue as above, the order impugned dated March 16, 2016 passed by the appellate Tribunal cannot be sustained. 7. ITA No. 45 of 2018 and GA No. 2779 of 2016 are allowed by setting aside the order dated March 16, 2016 passed by the appellate Tribunal and by remanding the matter before the relevant Commissioner (Appeals) who had passed the order dated December 24, 2012 for a fresh consideration of the matter in accordance with law. 8. There will be no order as to costs.