ORDER : M.K. HANJURA, J. 1. The State of J&K, through Financial Secretary, Home Department, Civil Secretariat, Srinagar, has filed this application seeking the indulgence of the Court in condoning the delay of 640 days in filing the Appeal, against the judgment dated 31-12-2014 of this Court, inter alia, on the grounds that immediately on the receipt of the copy of the said judgment on 06-01-2015, the Armed Police Head Quarters (APHQ) took up the matter with the PHQ on 19-01-2015 and on the same day, after ascertaining the factual position of the matter, a report was submitted. However, the PHQ, vide its letter dated 23-02-2015, sought certain information, as a consequence of which, the matter was taken up with the DIG, CKR, Srinagar, in terms of letter dated 20-03-2015 and the information, sought for, was directly sent to the PHQ with an intimation to the APHQ. It is further stated that, subsequently, the PHQ, vide its letter dated 01-09-2015, sought some clarification, as a result of which, the DIG, CKR, Srinagar, being the Chairman, Range Level Recruitment Board, was yet again requested by the APHQ to provide the requisite clarification, who filed the same along with the statement of facts of DIG, Traffic, Srinagar, (the then DIG, CKR, Srinagar). 2. It is further stated that vide letter dated 16-09-2015, the applicants-appellants took up the mater with the PHQ again, who sought further clarification on the ground that the report submitted by APHQ does not serve any purpose. It is further stated by the applicants – appellants that the relevant record from the DIG, CKR was called for and after discussing the matter in the light of the said record, a factual report along with clarification was prepared and submitted to the PHQ. It is also stated that on 24-03-2016, the matter was deliberated upon before the designated Committee of PHQ, where the remedy of appeal against the judgment dated 31-12-2014 of this Court was recommended. 3. It is also stated by the applicants – appellants that vide letter dated 28-04-2016, the PHQ requested the Administrative Department (Home Department), to accord sanction for filing the LPA against the judgment. Upon consideration, the Home Department sought fresh details for filing the LPA. Finally the matter was referred to the Department of Law, Justice & Parliamentary Affairs, who accorded sanction to the filing of the LPA vide its communication dated 24-08-2016. Upon consideration, the Home Department sought fresh details for filing the LPA. Finally the matter was referred to the Department of Law, Justice & Parliamentary Affairs, who accorded sanction to the filing of the LPA vide its communication dated 24-08-2016. Thereafter the matter was referred to the learned AAG for preparation of the LPA and the information/material, required to do the needful, was provided to him vide letter dated 01-12-2016. It is further stated that the delay, caused due to the procedure enumerated above, is neither intentional nor deliberate and the same was beyond the control of the applicants –appellants. It is further stated that the appeal is strong on merits and the applicants are sure to succeed in it. In the end it has been prayed that in order to safeguard the interests of the applicant - department, the Court, in exercise of its discretionary powers, be pleased to condone the delay in filing the appeal, so that the same is considered on merits. 4. In their objections, the respondents have resisted and controverted the application of the Appellants, chiefly on the grounds that the delay of about 02 years in filing the LPA, is on the face of it, completely sub-silentio with regard to the requisite details and particulars to support the cause of delay. As per the own version of the applicants – appellants, the copy of the judgment dated 31-12-2014, which is sought to be appealed against, was received by the Department on 06-01-2015 and the appeal is filed in the month of November, 2016. However, there are no particulars/details available, which are sine quo non for maintaining the application for condonation of delay. Apart from red tape, no sufficient cause is disclosed to invite the attention of the Court to condone the delay. The application being cryptic and there being no ground, much less a sufficient one, for the condonation of delay, the application is liable to be dismissed. Apart from red tape, no sufficient cause is disclosed to invite the attention of the Court to condone the delay. The application being cryptic and there being no ground, much less a sufficient one, for the condonation of delay, the application is liable to be dismissed. In the objections, it is further stated that the plea of the applicants-appellants that they have a strong case on merits is falsified and belied by the fact that there has been no contest on the part of the answering respondents in the writ petition itself as is evident from the paragraphs 8 & 10 thereof that the entire selection process undertaken by the applicants – appellants was afflicted by large scale bungling, thereby the entire selection was vitiated. Learned counsel has further stated that although the applicants - appellants have stated that the judgment was perused at different levels and the same was referred to the Law Department that directed the filing of appeal, yet there is nothing to state as to when the applicants - appellants were advised to file the Appeal. In the face of what has been stated above, it is prayed that the application for condonation of delay deserves to be dismissed with costs as the same is bereft of any merit or substance and the applicants – appellants have miserably failed to disclose any cause let alone a sufficient one, which can warrant indulgence of the Court to exercise the powers vested in it under section 5 of the Limitation Act, to allow the same. 5. Heard and considered. 6. It cannot be disputed that the Law of Limitation has to be applied with all its vigor and rigor as prescribed by the Statute. One cannot escape the consequences of section 5 of the J&K Limitation Act Samvat 1995, which provides that for the extension of the period of limitation in a given case, the condition precedent is that the applicant or the appellant has to satisfy the Court that he/she has carved out a sufficient cause in seeking the indulgence of the Court for not preferring the Appeal or Application within the stipulated time. No doubt, some latitude may be warranted to be given to the State promoting social justice but it cannot escape the liability of satisfying the Court that the Appeal was filed with due diligence. No doubt, some latitude may be warranted to be given to the State promoting social justice but it cannot escape the liability of satisfying the Court that the Appeal was filed with due diligence. The Courts cannot come to the aid and rescue of the State where the application for condonation of delay does not spell out sufficient cause and the approach of the State, in making such application, is casual and cryptic. 7. In order to find out whether or not the appellants – State has been remiss and callous in seeking the condonation of delay in filing the LPA, it is reiterated here that the appellants have stated in the Application that the copy of the order/judgment was perused at various levels to derive satisfaction on the count whether the Appeal has or has not to be filed. It has also been stated that the entire record was sent to the Department of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, and the said Department accorded sanction to the filing of such Appeal. 8. Testing the application of the Applicants on the touch stone of the law, governing the subject, it will be profitable to quote paragraphs 7&8 of the law laid down in 2010(4) JKJ 638 (HC), herein below, verbatim : “7. In the case P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, reported in AIR 1998 SC 2276 , the Apex Court, at paragraph 6 ruled as under: “Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigor when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay filed in the High Court would stand rejected and the Miscellaneous First Appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time. No costs.” 8. In another case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while deliberating upon the question of condonation of an inordinate delay of 264 days on an application preferred by the Government, has observed as under: “2. This special leave petition filed on November 16, 1993 is delayed by 264 days. No costs.” 8. In another case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while deliberating upon the question of condonation of an inordinate delay of 264 days on an application preferred by the Government, has observed as under: “2. This special leave petition filed on November 16, 1993 is delayed by 264 days. For quite some time in the past this Court has been making observations as to the grave prejudice caused to public interest by appeals brought on behalf of the Government being lost on the point of limitation. Such observations have been made for over a few years in the past. But there seems to be no conspicuous improvement as is apparent in the present petition which is filed in November 1993. The explanation for the delay, had better bet set out in petitioner’s own words: …………………………………… …………………………………… 3. This explanation is incapable of furnishing a judicially acceptable ground for condonation of delay. After the earlier observations of this Court made in several cases in the past, we hoped that the matters might improve. There seems to be no visible support of this optimism. There is a point beyond which even the courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant is Government which is itself under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference. Having regard to the law of limitation which binds everybody, we cannot find any way of granting relief. It is true that Government should not be treated as any other private litigant, as indeed, in the case of the former the decisions to present and prosecute appeals are not individual but are institutional decisions necessarily bogged down by the proverbial red-tape. But there are limits to this also. Even with all this latitude, the explanation offered for the delay in this case merely serves to aggravate the attitude of indifference of the Revenue in protecting its common Interests. The affidavit is again one of the stereotyped affidavits making it susceptible to the criticism that the Revenue does not seem to attach any importance to the need for promptitude even where it affects its own interest.” 9. Applying the ratio of the law laid down above to the instant case, there has been a reckless delay of 640 days in filing the LPA and no satisfactory explanation has come forward in this regard except for routine words and phrases. Applying the ratio of the law laid down above to the instant case, there has been a reckless delay of 640 days in filing the LPA and no satisfactory explanation has come forward in this regard except for routine words and phrases. No doubt, a liberal approach has to be adopted in the matter of condonation of delay when there is no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides on the part of the State but in the instant case the appellants took their own time to formulate an opinion that the Appeal has to be filed. The law laid down in AIR 2011 SC 1237 enunciates this principle and it lays down as follows : “……..3. This appeal emanates from the judgment of the Division Bench of the Guahati High Court (High Court of Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur, Tripura, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh) in Misc. Case No. 1569 of 2007 in W.A.No. 72020 of 2006. The appeal filed by the Union of India was dismissed by the High Court because of inordinate delay of 239 days. The Division Bench of the High Court, while dismissing the appeal, has observed as under : “We have gone through the contents of the petition. The delay occurred because of the respondents took their own sweet time to reach the conclusion whether the judgment should be appealed or not. It is not that they were prevented by any reason which is beyond their control to take such a decision in time. Even otherwise, on merits of the case also it does not appear to have any tenable ground of appeal. In the circumstances, we do not see any merits in this petition.” 4. We have also gone through the condonation of delay application which was filed in the High Court. In our considered view, the High Court was fully justified in dismissing the appeal on the ground of delay because no sufficient cause was shown for condoning the delay. ……………….. 6. The Union of India ought to have been careful particularly in filing this Civil Appeal because the Division Bench, by the impugned order, has dismissed the appeal before it on the ground of delay. ……………….. 6. The Union of India ought to have been careful particularly in filing this Civil Appeal because the Division Bench, by the impugned order, has dismissed the appeal before it on the ground of delay. It is a matter of deep anguish and distress that majority of the matters filed by the Union of India are hopelessly barred by limitation and no satisfactory explanations exist for condoning inordinate delay in filing those cases.” 10. Resort can also be had to an elaborate and a lucid judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court, reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649 , the relevant excerpts of which are as under : “………..21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. 21.9. (ix) The conduct, behavior and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. ……………… 21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 22.1 (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harboring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. ……………….. 31. Neither leisure nor pleasure has any room while one moves an application seeking condonation of delay of almost seven years on the ground of lack of knowledge or failure of justice.” 11. ……………….. 31. Neither leisure nor pleasure has any room while one moves an application seeking condonation of delay of almost seven years on the ground of lack of knowledge or failure of justice.” 11. Risking repetition, what is stated here is that the State has been negligent in prosecuting its claim within time and the explanation offered for the delay in filing the Appeal is neither plausible nor reasonable. The application appears to have been drafted recklessly without giving proper details of the grounds agitated in it. Recourse has been had to the leisure and pleasure in moving the application. Delay cannot be condoned on a mere asking. The principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to the judicial dispensation system cannot form the base line of condoning delay. If it shall be interpreted in that context then the Limitation Act has to be wiped off from the Statute. 12. Viewed in the context of what has been said and done above, we are of the considered opinion that the State has failed to explain the delay of 640 days in filing the Appeal against the judgment and order dated 31-12-2014 of this Court, passed in SWP 961/2009, as a corollary to which, the application for Condonation of Delay, in filing the Appeal, is rejected and the Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) shall stand dismissed as barred by time.