JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ajit Kumar, J.—Heard learned counsel for the revision-applicant, learned Additional Government Advocate and perused the records. 2. This revision is directed against the judgment of acquittal dated 14.11.2003 passed by Special Judge (SC/ST Act), Kannauj in Sessions Trial No. 51 of 2003, under Sections 323, 504, 506 IPC and Section 3(1)(X) Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 P.S. Chhibramau, District Kannauj. 3. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the revision-application that the Court below wrongly placed reliance on an earlier alleged compromise before the Judicial Magistrate while the case was committed to sessions to be tried by the Special Judge (SC/ST Act). 4. Having gone to the judgment, I find that the Court below has not tried to case as Special Judge E.C. Act only the basis of compromise in question. The Court below has recorded independent finding considering the facts and evidence adduced and concluded that the offence in question was not made out. In order to appreciate the findings returned by the Court below, especially relating to the offence punishable under SC/ST Act, it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions attracted in the present case i.e. 3(1)(X) Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, which reads as under: “(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,— (x) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view." 5. From the bare perusal of the provisions as quoted hereinabove, it is explicit that object behind provision to make it penal is to protect the person of such caste from any humiliation in public as they have already suffered it for centuries in the past. The basic requirement is firstly, not to address in an abusive way indicating the caste and secondly, such person should not be humiliated in public. The basic requirement is firstly, not to address in an abusive way indicating the caste and secondly, such person should not be humiliated in public. Considering the history of the caste structured society in this country, where a person belonging to such caste were humiliated inspite of protection given under the constitution to bring them into the main-stream and to remove untouchability, law got developed and it is in this process in order to remove this social evil from the society, this penal provision (supra) was enacted but such penal provision is required to be understood and interpreted in its letter and spirit and not just because somebody is addressed indicating his caste such an act should be taken as an intentional insult to bring the act within the definition of offence punishable under the Act, 1989. Explaining away the provision, the supreme Court in the case of Swaran Singh and others v. State through Standing Counsel and another, (2008) 8 SCC 435 , vide 23 and 24 has held thus: 23. This is the age of democracy and equality. No people or community should be today insulted or looked down upon, and nobody’s feelings should be hurt. This is also the spirit of our Constitution and is part of its basic features. Hence, in our opinion, the so-called upper castes and OBCs should not use the word ‘Chamar’ when addressing a member of the Scheduled Caste, even if that person in fact belongs to the ‘Chamar’ caste, because use of such a word will hurt his feelings. In such a country like ours with so much diversity - so many religions, castes, ethnic and lingual groups, etc. - all communities and groups must be treated with respect, and no one should be looked down upon as an inferior. That is the only way we can keep our country united. 24. In our opinion, calling a member of the Scheduled Caste ‘Chamar’ with intent to insult or humiliate him in a place within public view is certainly an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act. Whether there was intent to insult or humiliate by using the word ‘Chamar’ will of course depend on the context in which it was used. 6. However, firstly it has to be ensured whether utterances in question have been made in generalized term or purposefully to insult an individual causing humiliation in public view. Whether there was intent to insult or humiliate by using the word ‘Chamar’ will of course depend on the context in which it was used. 6. However, firstly it has to be ensured whether utterances in question have been made in generalized term or purposefully to insult an individual causing humiliation in public view. Thus the use of a particular word of caste to which such person belongs should be with view to cause insult intentionally. Use of the word “chamar” only once by the accused persons in the entire incident of assault caused by several persons cannot be said to have been intentionally used to insult the victim as happened in the present case. Further in the present case two persons came out of the house and physically assaulted the victim and one of whom used the word indicating of the caste. The informant was not sure as to who uttered the word in question. The circumstances as detailed by the prosecution do not lead to draw an inevitable conclusion that the word was uttered with a deliberate intention to insult the victim; and 7. Secondly, humiliation should be in a public view. The public view means at a place which is within the public view the places where ordinarily public movement is a routine. it is not necessary that merely because a place is an open place it is necessarily a place to be treated as within the public view. The intendment of the legislature is that insult is done at a place where victim is humiliated in public eye and by such act of the accused reputation of a person belonging to scheduled caste is lowered down in public esteem. It is an act of this kind which has been made punishable under the SC/ST Act. Thus humiliation and insult should be in public view. The Court in Swarn Singh case (supra) has held that “if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression `place within public view’ with the expression `public place’. A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies.” (emphasis supplied) 8. The trial Court has gone into the facts of the case and has appreciated the evidence and has recorded categorical finding to the effect that the abusive words that constitute offence under the act, were addressed to the applicant not in public, inasmuch as, there was no intention to abuse the applicant with those words knowingly that applicant belonged to that particular caste or that they wanted to humiliate the person concerned in public place which is within public view, meaning thereby intentional humiliation or intimidation with intent to humiliate a person of the caste concerned had not taken place in the instant case and the offence was not made out. 9. I do not find any manifest error of law by the Court below in recording finding that no offence is made out under Section 506 IPC and at the most, the offence would have been under Section 504 IPC. However, I further do not find any jurisdictional error by the Court below in taking notice of the compromise reached between the parties before Judicial Magistrate, which was accepted by Judicial Magistrate. 10. Learned counsel for the revision-applicant could not demonstrate from the judgment as to why findings recorded by the trial Court is perverse. Merely because two views are possible and one view was taken by the Court below, will not warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its power of revision. There is no reason to interfere with the judgment of the Court below. In my considered opinion the judgment of the Court below does not suffer from any factual or legal infirmity or perversity. 11. Accordingly, the criminal revision is dismissed.