JUDGMENT : Arup Kumar Goswami, J. 1. Heard Mr. D. Baruah, learned counsel appearing for the defendant No. 1/appellant. Also heard Mr. R.L. Yadav, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff/respondent. 2. On the request of the learned counsel for the parties, the appeal is taken up for disposal at the admission stage. 3. The appeal is filed under Order XLIII Rule 1(d) CPC read with Order XLIII Rule 2 CPC and Order XLI of the CPC against the judgment and order dated 20.07.2015 passed by the learned Civil Judge No. 1, Kamrup (Metro), Guwahati, in Misc. (J) Case No. 308/2013 in Money Suit No. 117/2004, whereby the learned Civil Judge had rejected the application filed by the defendant No. 1/appellant under Order IX Rule 13 CPC for setting aside the ex-parte decree dated 17.09.2009. 4. I.A. 2248/2015 is an application under Order XLI Rule 5 CPC read with Order XLIII Rule 2 and Section 151 CPC for stay of the judgment and decree dated 17.09.2009, passed in Money Suit No. 117/2004 as well as for stay of the Money Execution Case No. 7/2012, which was instituted by the plaintiff/respondent. 5. The respondent filed the aforesaid money suit against the appellant and two others, namely, Bhaskar A. Patel, Director of the appellant company as defendant No. 2, as well as M/s. Shreya Life Science Pvt. Ltd. as defendant No. 3. The appellant was shown to be represented by its Regional Manager, Shri Sishir Kumar Dutta. The appellant, according to the plaint version, had appointed the plaintiff company as a Consignment Agent in the year 1999 but there was sudden discontinuation of supply of its products to the plaintiff company as a result of which, besides financial loss, plaintiff company suffered loss of reputation and goodwill. In the suit, the plaintiff prayed for the following reliefs: "(i) Realization of Rs. 50,63,844.97 (Rupees Fifty lakhs Sixty-Three thousand Eight hundred Forty-Four and paise Ninety-Seven) only. (ii) Realization of Rs. 15,00,000/- towards damage and compensation for loss of reputation and good will of the plaintiff due to sudden stop of supply of goods by the defendants. (iii) Future interest @18% per annum on Rs. 50,63,844.97 from the date of filing of the suit till the date of recovery of the same. (iv) Cost of the suit. (v) Any other relief or reliefs to which plaintiff is entitled under the law and equity." 6. (iii) Future interest @18% per annum on Rs. 50,63,844.97 from the date of filing of the suit till the date of recovery of the same. (iv) Cost of the suit. (v) Any other relief or reliefs to which plaintiff is entitled under the law and equity." 6. From the judgment and decree passed in the said suit, it appears that the learned trial court had decreed the suit ex-parte with cost for recovery of Rs. 41,33,751.00 with interest @ 6% per annum from the date of the passing of the decree till realization. 7. The appellant had filed an application on 18.05.2013, registered as Misc. (J) Case No. 308/2013, under Order IX Rule 13 read with Section 151 CPC for setting aside the judgment and decree dated 17.09.2009 stating that summons was not duly served upon the appellant. On 22.04.2013, the Vice-President (Commercial) of the appellant company, namely, P.L. Rapheal was informed by the legal heirs of defendant No. 2 that they had received a notice in Money Execution Case No. 7/12 fixing 02.05.2013 as the date for appearance. In the said application, a plea was taken that Shri Sishir Kumar Dutta had resigned from service of the appellant company way back on 15.06.2003 and that defendant No. 2 had also resigned from the Directorship of the company on 30.06.2005. Taking a cue from the address given for defendant No. 1, i.e. the appellant, which is same as that of the address of the plaintiff, it was asserted that the suit was a collusive suit in between the plaintiff and the said Sishir Kumar Dutta. It is pleaded that summons was not sent to the registered office of the appellant and, that apart, though the plaintiff was directed vide orders dated 11.02.2005 and 28.06.2005 to take fresh steps for issuing summons on, amongst others, the appellant, no such steps were taken by the plaintiff and, yet, on 04.08.2005, a presumption was drawn regarding service of summons on the appellant on the basis of the summons issued earlier on 01.10.2004. 8. 8. An objection was filed by the plaintiff asserting that the appellant had taken recourse to falsehood as the fact regarding pendency of the money suit in question was very much to the knowledge of the appellant as, in a suit filed by the appellant, namely, Money Suit No. 56B/03, in the court of 21 No. District Court, Indore, the present respondent, in the evidence of DW-1 had succinctly disclosed that a suit, being Money Suit No. 117/04 for recovery of Rs. 55,68,844.97 was pending disposal before the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division No. 1, Guwahati, and a copy of the plaint was also exhibited as Ext.D1. It is further stated that the said affidavit of DW-1 was filed long back on 06.05.2006 and, therefore, the approach to the court belatedly after a lapse of seven years is an abuse of the process of court. In the said objection, the statement made by the appellant that Sishir Kumdar Dutta had resigned from service and that the defendant No. 2 had resigned from the Directorship of the company were denied. 9. By the impugned order dated 20.07.2015, passed in Misc. (J) Case No. 308/2013 in Money Suit No. 117/2004, the learned court below rejected the application filed by the appellant as being without any merit. While holding so, learned trial court relied heavily on the assertion of the plaintiff by way of the evidence of DW1 in Money Suit No. 56B/03, in the court of 21 No. District Court, Indore, that the appellant was aware of the pendency of the suit. The learned trial court held as follows: "In the case at hand, it is found that between the same parties there was litigation at Indore, where the opposite party in the said suit as defendant filed written statements and affidavit evidence and the witness was duly cross examined by the applicant's side wherein the pendency of the M.S. No. 117/04 was specifically stated. The very object of serving summons is to bring the matter in to the notice of the other side and in the present case the applicant had that knowledge through the case fighting by them in Indore. The very object of serving summons is to bring the matter in to the notice of the other side and in the present case the applicant had that knowledge through the case fighting by them in Indore. Now applicant pleading ignorance of knowledge that fact no longer save him at this stage as the petitioner having full knowledge of the case and having allowed the case to proceed ex-parte now after a lapse of 7 years cannot be allowed to take advantage of the fact that notice was not served upon the applicant as required by law. When in another pending case between the same parties it is brought to the notice of the other party that another cases pending in another Court and having acquired such knowledge later on that party cannot be subsequently allowed to take advantage that the party had no such knowledge. Only the knowledge matters in which manner that knowledge was obtained in not material. In view of the above discussions and reasons, the petition number 2105/13 filed under order 9 rule 13 read with section 151 CPC stands rejected as of no merit. Accordingly the miscellaneous application stands finally disposed of on contest." 10. Mr. D. Baruah, learned counsel for the appellant has urged in tune with the assertions made in the application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC read with Section 151 CPC that no summons was served on the appellant/defendant No. 1 and, therefore, the learned trial court committed manifest error of law in not setting aside the ex-parte decree. It is submitted by him with reference to the order-sheet annexed with the Interlocutory Application that on 11.02.2005, the plaintiff was directed to take fresh steps on other defendants save and except defendant No. 3, who had filed written statement. In order to bring home the point that summons was not served, Mr. Baruah has also drawn attention of the court to the order dated 28.06.2005 and the intervening orders dated 04.03.2005, 27.04.2005 and 13.06.2005 to show that it was not recorded in the said orders that summons had been served on defendant Nos. 1 and 2, rather, by the order dated 28.06.2005 the plaintiff was directed to again take steps fixing 04.08.2005. Baruah has also drawn attention of the court to the order dated 28.06.2005 and the intervening orders dated 04.03.2005, 27.04.2005 and 13.06.2005 to show that it was not recorded in the said orders that summons had been served on defendant Nos. 1 and 2, rather, by the order dated 28.06.2005 the plaintiff was directed to again take steps fixing 04.08.2005. On 04.08.2005, though no fresh step was taken, on the basis of the previous steps taken by the plaintiff on 01.10.2004, service of summons was presumed and the case was directed to be proceeded ex-parte against defendant Nos. 1 and 2. He submits that the very order drawing presumption of service is fallacious. It is also contended by him that apart from the issue as to whether summons had been sent to the registered office of the appellant by registered post with A/D or not, even the address given in the copy of the plaint is not correct as the address given was that of the address of the plaintiff itself and, therefore, it cannot be said that summons was duly and properly sent to the correct address of the defendant No. 1. Drawing attention of the court to the provisions of Order V Rule 9(5) with particular emphasis on the proviso thereto, Order IX Rule 6, Order IX Rule 13 and Order XXIX Rule 2 CPC, he assiduously urges that knowledge about the pendency of the suit is not a relevant consideration and what is relevant is the knowledge of the defendant about the date of hearing which, admittedly, appellant had no notice of in absence of service of summons. In order to buttress his arguments, Mr. Baruah has placed reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Sushil Kumar Sabharwal vs. Gurpreet Singh and Others, (2002) 5 SCC 377 , Nahar Enterprises vs. Hyderabad Allwyn Ltd. and Another, (2007) 9 SCC 466 as well as in the case of M/s. Shalimar Rope Works Ltd. vs. M/s. Abdul Hussain H.M. Hasanbhai Rassiwala and Others, (1980) 3 SCC 595 . 11. Mr. R.L. Yadav, learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent has submitted that the appellant has not stated that it had no knowledge about the pendency of the suit in which the decree was passed. 11. Mr. R.L. Yadav, learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent has submitted that the appellant has not stated that it had no knowledge about the pendency of the suit in which the decree was passed. He asserts that the appellant had such knowledge about seven years prior to filing of the application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC read with Section 151 CPC though the decree came to be passed in the year 2009. This fact of its knowledge of the pendency of the suit was suppressed by them in the application filed under Order IX Rule 13 CPC read with Section 151 CPC and, therefore, the appellant is not entitled to any relief at the hands of the court. He has submitted that there can be no justification for setting aside the ex-parte decree when such knowledge about the pendency of the suit is not denied and, if it is set aside, it will cause miscarriage of justice. He has further submitted that it is undisputed that summons was sent to the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 on 01.10.2004 by registered post with A/D and, a period of 30 days having elapsed from the date of dispatch of notice to the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 in their correct addresses, no fault can be attributed to the learned trial court in presuming service under proviso to Order V Rule 9(5). He has also laid emphasis on the proviso to Order IX Rule 13 CPC to contend that any irregularity in service of summons shall not be a ground to set aside the ex-parte decree in the context of the factual matrix where the defendant No. 1/appellant had knowledge of the pendency of the suit. He has placed reliance upon the case of V. Chandrashekharan and Another vs. Administrative Officer and Others, (2012) 12 SCC 133 . 12. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the materials on record. 13. The pleadings and the submission of the learned counsel for the parties leave no manner of doubt that the defendant No. 1/appellant was aware of the pendency of the proceeding in Money Suit No. 117/2004, in which the decree was passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division) No. 1, Kamrup, Guwahati, on 17.09.2009. 13. The pleadings and the submission of the learned counsel for the parties leave no manner of doubt that the defendant No. 1/appellant was aware of the pendency of the proceeding in Money Suit No. 117/2004, in which the decree was passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division) No. 1, Kamrup, Guwahati, on 17.09.2009. How far this knowledge of the appellant about the pendency of the suit will impact the application under Order IX Rule 13 read with Section 151 CPC will be considered at an appropriate point of time. However, at the outset it will be necessary to extract Order IX Rule 13 CPC for better appreciation and the same reads as follows: "13. Setting aside decree ex-parte against defendants - In any case in which a decree is passed ex-parte against a defendant, he may apply to the Court by which the decree was passed for an order to set it aside and if he satisfies the Court that the summons was not duly served, or that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing, the Court shall make an order setting aside the decree as against him upon such terms as to costs, payment into Court or otherwise as it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit: Provided that where the decree is of such a nature that it cannot be set aside as against such defendant only it may be set aside as against all or any of the other defendants also: Provided further that no Court shall set aside a decree passed ex-parte merely on the ground that there has been an irregularity in the service of summons, if it is satisfied that the defendant had notice of the date of hearing and had sufficient time to appear and answer the plaintiff's claim. Explanation - Where there has been an appeal against a decree passed ex-parte under this rule and the appeal has been disposed of on any ground other than the ground that the appellant has withdrawn the appeal, no application shall lie under this rule for setting aside the ex-parte decree." 14. Explanation - Where there has been an appeal against a decree passed ex-parte under this rule and the appeal has been disposed of on any ground other than the ground that the appellant has withdrawn the appeal, no application shall lie under this rule for setting aside the ex-parte decree." 14. A perusal of the aforesaid provision goes to show that in any case in which a decree is passed ex-parte against a defendant, he may apply to the very same court which passed the decree for an order to set aside the decree and if the court is satisfied that summons was not duly served or that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing, the court shall make an order setting aside the decree with such conditions as the court thinks fit. Thus, only in the event of aforesaid two eventualities, namely, (i) summons was not duly served on the defendant or (ii) the defendant was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing, an ex-parte decree can be set aside. 15. In I.A. 2248/2015 the appellant has brought on record a resignation letter dated 15.06.2003 of Shri Sishir Kumar Dutta and an Advance Voucher dated 15.06.2003 evidencing full and final payment of the dues received by Sishir Kumar Dutta. It may be noticed, at this juncture, that the suit was filed on 30.08.2004. Form No. 32, issued under the Companies Act, 1956, goes to show that the defendant No. 2 had resigned from the directorship of the Board of Directors of the appellant company in its Board meeting held on 30.06.2005. 16. It appears that summons was issued on 01.10.2004 to the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 as per the addresses given in the plaint. Thereafter, on 11.02.2005, 04.03.2005 and 27.04.2005, the plaintiff was again directed to take steps. It appears that pursuant to the order dated 27.04.2005, steps were taken on 13.06.2005. The court then fixed the next date on 28.06.2005 for service report and written statement. The order dated 28.06.2005 goes to show that the plaintiff was directed to take steps fixing 04.08.2005. Apparently, in terms of the order dated 28.06.2005, no fresh steps were taken by the plaintiff. 17. The court then fixed the next date on 28.06.2005 for service report and written statement. The order dated 28.06.2005 goes to show that the plaintiff was directed to take steps fixing 04.08.2005. Apparently, in terms of the order dated 28.06.2005, no fresh steps were taken by the plaintiff. 17. Proviso to Order V Rule 9(5) provides that where summons was properly addressed, pre-paid and duly sent by registered post acknowledgement due, the court may declare that the summons had been duly served on the defendant notwithstanding the fact that the acknowledgement having been lost or mislaid, or for any other reason, has not been received by the court within 30 days from the date of issue of summons. 18. Order XXIX Rule 2 CPC provides that subject to any statutory provision regulating service of process, where the suit is against a corporation, the summons may be served (a) on the secretary, or on any director, or other principal officer of the corporation, or (b) by leaving it or sending it by post addressed to the corporation at the registered office, or if there is no registered office then at the place where the corporation carries on business. 19. The meaning of Clause (b) has got to be understood in the background of the provisions of Order V Rule 17 CPC, which is meant for issue and service of summons on natural persons. Sending summons to a corporation by post addressed to it at its registered office may be a good mode of service either by itself, or preferably, by way of an additional mode of service. It has to be understood that if the serving peon or bailiff is not able to serve summons on the Secretary or Director or any other principal officer of the corporation because either he refuses to sign the summons or is not to be found by the serving person even after due diligence then he can leave the summons at the registered office of the company and make a report to that effect. (See M/s. Shalimar Rope Works Ltd.) 20. At this stage, it will be relevant to take note of the provisions contained in Order IX Rule 6 CPC and the same is quoted herein below: "6. (See M/s. Shalimar Rope Works Ltd.) 20. At this stage, it will be relevant to take note of the provisions contained in Order IX Rule 6 CPC and the same is quoted herein below: "6. Procedure when only plaintiff appears:- (1) Where the plaintiff appears and the defendant does not appear when the suit is called on for hearing, then:- (a) When summons duly served-if it is proved that the summons was duly served, the Court may make an order that the suit shall be heard ex-parte. (b) When summons not duly served - if it is not proved that the summons was duly served, the Court shall direct a second summons to be issued and served on the defendant. (c) When summons served but not in due time - if it is proved that the summons was served on the defendant, but not in sufficient time to enable him to appear and answer on the day fixed in the summons, the Court shall postpone the hearing of the suit to future day to be fixed by the Court, and shall direct notice of such day to be given to the defendant. (2) Where it is owing to the plaintiffs' default that the summons was not duly served or was not served in sufficient time, the Court shall order the plaintiff to pay the costs occasioned by the postponement." 21. A perusal of the same would go to show that where the plaintiff appears and the defendant does not appear when the suit is called on for hearing then there are three courses open to be followed by the court depending on the emerging situation. When it is proved and the court is satisfied that summons was duly served, the court may make an order that the suit be heard ex-parte. The date appended for hearing in the suit, for which summons had been issued, is a significant date and, therefore, the discretion to hold that summons had been duly served has to be exercised with due application of mind. If the summons is not proved to be served, the court is required to direct a second summons to be issued and served on the defendant. If the summons is not proved to be served, the court is required to direct a second summons to be issued and served on the defendant. The third scenario could be that the summons is proved to be served but not in sufficient time to enable the defendant to appear and answer on the day fixed in the summons and in that event, the court has to postpone the hearing of the suit to a future day to be fixed and again direct notice of such day to be given to the defendant. 22. Pausing here for a moment and reverting back to the factual matrix, as unfolded, it appears that when the summons was not served, the learned trial court directed, by order dated 28.06.2005, issuance of fresh summons. It means that the court had, by necessary implication, held that summons had not been proved to have been served on the defendants and, therefore, recourse was taken to the provisions of Order IX Rule 6(b) CPC and fresh steps were directed to be taken for service of summons. But, on the next date, i.e. on 04.08.2005, the court bypassed the order dated 28.06.2005 and proceeded to presume service of summons on the defendants based on the steps taken by the plaintiff on 01.10.2004. This is clearly impermissible in law. When the court was satisfied about summons not having been served and had directed to take steps for service of summons, the court could not have exercised its discretionary powers to draw presumption of service based on the steps earlier taken on 01.10.2004. The net result of the above discussion is that summons was not served on the appellant and the learned trial court had erroneously drawn presumption of service of summons on the appellant. That apart, the appellant is a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 with its registered office at A.B. Road, Manglia, Indore. In view of the mandate of Order XXIX Rule 2 CPC, summons by registered post with A/D was required to be sent to the appellant at the registered office. The same was not done. 23. That apart, the appellant is a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 with its registered office at A.B. Road, Manglia, Indore. In view of the mandate of Order XXIX Rule 2 CPC, summons by registered post with A/D was required to be sent to the appellant at the registered office. The same was not done. 23. The proviso to Order IX Rule 13 CPC, which was introduced in the year 1976, makes it explicitly clear that an irregularity in the service of summons cannot form a ground to set aside an ex-parte decree, if the court is satisfied that the defendant had notice of the date of hearing and had sufficient time to appear and answer the plaintiff's claim. The date of hearing and the date of knowledge about the pendency of the suit is not one and the same thing. As noticed earlier, Order IX Rule 6(c) CPC provides that even when summons had been served upon the defendant, but beyond the date fixed, the court is obliged to again direct the plaintiff to take steps for service of summons. In the case of Nahar Enterprises (supra), the Supreme Court, at paragraphs 4, 8, 10 and 11 observed as follows: "4. The respondent herein filed a suit for recovery of a sum of Rs. 1,87,904.62 with future interest at the rate of 18.5% per annum against the appellant. It appears that in the summons sent to the appellant. 10.10.1988 was fixed for his appearance. However, as the summons had not been served the Court adjourned the matter to 2.12.1988. Summons were served on the appellant on 14.10.1988, but according to him a copy of the plaint was not annexed thereto. He sent a telegram on 17.10.1988 and also a letter to the Court concerned but, admittedly, the same was not responded to. Without issuing any further summons fixing another date for his appearance, the Court fixed a date and having found the appellant absent on that date, fixed another date for ex-parte hearing. On 13.12.1988 the suit was decreed with costs. (8) The Learned Counsel appears to be correct. When a summons is sent calling upon a defendant to appear in the Court and file his written statement, it is obligatory on the part of the court to send a copy of the plaint and other documents appended thereto, in terms of Order 5, Rule 2 CPC. 10. (8) The Learned Counsel appears to be correct. When a summons is sent calling upon a defendant to appear in the Court and file his written statement, it is obligatory on the part of the court to send a copy of the plaint and other documents appended thereto, in terms of Order 5, Rule 2 CPC. 10. The learned Judge did not address itself the question as to how a defendant, in absence of a copy of the plaint and other documents, would be able to file his written statement. The Court, furthermore, in our opinion, committed a manifest error in so far as it failed to take into consideration that the summons having been served upon the appellant after the date fixed for his appearance, it was obligatory on its part to fix another date for his appearance and filing written statement and direct the plaintiff to take steps for service of fresh summons. This legal position is explicit in view of the provisions of order 9 Rule 6(1)(c) of CPC which reads: "6.(1)(c) When summons served but not in due time - if it is proved that the summons was served on the defendant, but not in sufficient time to enable him to appear and answer on the day fixed in the summons, the Court shall postpone the hearing of the suit to a future day to be fixed by the Court and shall direct notice of such day to be given to the defendant." 11. The court, therefore, committed an illegality in dismissing the application for setting aside the ex-parte decree. It was a fit case where the Court should have exercised its jurisdiction under order 9 Rule 13 of CPC." 24. In Sushil Kumar Sabharwal (supra), at paragraphs 10 and 11, the Supreme Court stated as follows: "10. The learned counsel for the landlord-respondent submitted that there is an inter- pleader suit filed by the appellant because there was a dispute between the heirs of the original landlord who unfortunately died and his widow and the grandsons (who are the respondents herein), each of the two was claiming itself to be the landlord and entitled to recover rent setting up a will in its favour. The appellant has admitted in the plaint therein that he was aware of the pendency of the suit filed by the respondent in the court of the Rent Controller, Amritsar. The appellant has admitted in the plaint therein that he was aware of the pendency of the suit filed by the respondent in the court of the Rent Controller, Amritsar. In fact, this admission of the appellant has weighed heavily with the High Court which has opined that even if the summons was not duly served, the appellant was aware of the pendency of the suit and, therefore, the application under Order 9, Rule 13 C.P.C. did not have any merit. 11. The High Court has over looked the second proviso to Rule 13 of Order 9 C.P.C. added by the 1976 Amendment which provides that no court shall set aside a decree passed ex-parte merely on the ground that there has been an irregularity in the service of summons if it is satisfied that the defendant had notice of the date of hearing and had sufficient time to appear and answer the plaintiff's claim. It is the knowledge of the date of hearing and not the knowledge of pendency of suit which is relevant for the purpose of the proviso above said. Then the present one is not a case of mere irregularity in service of summons; on the facts is a case of non-service of summons. The appellant has appeared in the witness box and we have carefully perused his statement. There is no cross-examination directed towards discrediting the testimony on oath of the appellant, that is, to draw an inference that the appellant had in any manner a notice of the date of hearing and had sufficient time to appear and answer the plaintiff's claim which he did not avail and utilise." 25. From the above, it is manifestly clear that it is the knowledge of the date of hearing and not the knowledge of the pendency of the suit, which is relevant for the purpose of considering an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC to set aside an ex-parte decree. Viewed in the aforesaid context, there was no suppression of material facts in the application filed under Order IX Rule 13 read with Section 151 CPC and the decision in V. Chandrasekharan (supra), which emphasized that a petition or an affidavit containing a misleading and/or an inaccurate statement, only to achieve an ulterior purpose, amounts to an abuse of the procedure of the court, is not attracted. 26. 26. It is not a case of a mere irregularity of service of summons, but is a case of non-service of summons and drawing of presumption of service of summons by the learned trial court in an improper exercise of discretion. Though there is no controversy that the appellant was aware of the pendency of the suit, nothing has been brought on record to indicate that the appellant was also aware of the date of hearing. Having come to know about the ex-parte decree on 22.04.2013, the application under Order IX Rule 13 read with Section 151 CPC was filed on 18.05.2013, i.e. within a period of one month. 27. On consideration of the materials on record, I am of the considered opinion that the learned trial court failed to exercise its jurisdiction in accordance with law and committed illegality in not setting aside the ex-parte decree. 28. Taking that view, the impugned order dated 20.07.2015, passed by the learned Civil Judge No. 1, kamrup (Metro), Guwahati, in Misc. (J) Case No. 308/2013 in Money Suit No. 117/2004 is set aside. Consequently, the ex-parte decree passed in Money Suit No. 117/2004 is also set aside. 29. The plaintiff will take appropriate steps in the trial court. 30. The appeal is allowed and disposed of in terms of the above observations and directions. No cost.