JUDGMENT : DAMA SESHADRI NAIDU, J. 1. Sajan P.M. the appellant, is the petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 12962 of 2017. As this is the second round of litigation, we will begin at the beginning. Case in Brief: First Round of Litigation: 2. The matter concerns land acquisition. Initially, the proceedings began under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the “Old Act”) and, later, continued under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation, and Resettlement Act, 2013 (the “New Act”). 3. Sajan owned 9.90 ares of land in Puliyannur Village, Kottayam District in 2013, the Government proposed to acquire the property for laying a road within the limits of Pala Municipality. Accordingly, the Government issued Section 4(1) notification under the Old Act and proceeded to determine the compensation. 4. Questioning the very acquisition, Sajan filed W.P. (C) No. 4024 of 2014. But, as there was no stay against the acquisition proceedings, the Land Acquisition Authority (LAO) proceeded with the acquisition and passed awards. So, when the writ petition was taken up for hearing, Sajan attacked the proceedings on two grounds: (i) that the Government has no justification to acquire his land; therefore, the proceedings have been vitiated and (ii) that, by the time the awards were passed, the New Act had come into force. So, according to him, the compensation ought to have been determined under the New Act. 5. Eventually, a learned Single Judge through judgment, dated 05.10.2015, allowed the writ petition, holding that the compensation ought to be determined under the New Act. To conclude thus, the learned Single Judge has relied on Section 24 (1) (a) of the New Act. 6. Still aggrieved, Sajan filed W.A. No. 2744 of 2015, which a learned Division Bench of this Court dealt with elaborately. It, in fact, affirmed the findings in the impugned judgment. 7. As seen from the record, in compliance with the directions in the Writ Appeal, the LAO—here the 6th respondent—passed two awards. Now comes the second round of litigation. Second Round of Litigation: 8. After the LAO’s passing the awards, Sajan once again knocked the doors of this Court by filing W.P. (C) No. 12962 of 2017. 7. As seen from the record, in compliance with the directions in the Writ Appeal, the LAO—here the 6th respondent—passed two awards. Now comes the second round of litigation. Second Round of Litigation: 8. After the LAO’s passing the awards, Sajan once again knocked the doors of this Court by filing W.P. (C) No. 12962 of 2017. In this writ petition, he has merely contended that the 6th respondent has lacked the authority to determine the compensation; for under the New Act, both Section 3(g) and Section 26 show Collector and his delegate (LAO) in a different light. And an LAO under the Old Act could not suit the scheme of the New Act to discharge his duties. Therefore, Sajan has urged this Court to set aside the awards and direct the authority to appoint an LAO under the New Act and let him determine the compensation de novo. 9. Eventually, the learned Single Judge through judgment, dated 02.02.2018, dismissed the writ petition holding that Exts.P21 and P22 awards passed by the 6th respondent accord with the powers conferred on him under Sections 3(g) and 26 of the New Act. Again aggrieved, Sajan filed this intra-Court appeal. Submissions: Appellants: (a) Technical Plea: 10. Sri O.V. Radhakrishnan, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, has submitted elaborately on every nuance of the New Act, besides covering the Old Act as well. He has taken us through the record to contend that under Section 3(g), the Government ought to have specially appointed an LAO as a delegate of the Collector to determine the compensation. For this purpose, it ought to have exclusively adopting the entire procedure under the New Act. 11. That apart, Sri Radhakrishnan has also laid much emphasis on Section 24(1) of the New Act. He contends that if an award was not passed within one year, then inevitably the mechanism set up under the New Act, which takes in its sweep even the LAO, must alone apply. He has made strenuous efforts to distinguish the Division Bench’s decision in W.A. No. 2744 of 2015, which also elaborately dealt with the same issue: the scope of the New Act in acquisition proceedings initiated under the Old Act. 12. He has made strenuous efforts to distinguish the Division Bench’s decision in W.A. No. 2744 of 2015, which also elaborately dealt with the same issue: the scope of the New Act in acquisition proceedings initiated under the Old Act. 12. Eventually, the learned Senior Counsel has submitted that Section 114 of the New Act, read with Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, clarifies that it is only the New Act in its entirety that applies. He has also submitted that Section 26 deals with determining compensation under the New Act. And that provision also treats Collector or his delegate under the New Act as different from the one appointed under the Old Act. 13. The learned Senior Counsel has drawn our attention to Ext.P23, issued under the New Act. The LAO for Pala Municipality, in that proceeding, is described differently from what the 6th respondent actually is. Sri Radhakrishnan has also drawn our attention to the 6th respondent’s counter affidavit, in which he has, according to the learned Senior Counsel, asserted that he was earlier appointed by the District Collector before the New Act came into force. 14. To sum up, the learned Senior Counsel has submitted that the 6th Respondent himself admitted that he was appointed under the old Act; he could not have been appointed under the New Act, that is through Ext.P23, because there found mentioned is a different designation: Special Tahsildar, Addl. LA, Pala. The 6th respondent is Special Tahsildar (LA) (General), Pala. (b) Plea on Merits: 15. Sri Radhakrishnan has, on merits, contended that the 6th respondent issued the Ext.P19 notice, calling on Sajan to attend a hearing. It was for determining the compensation. But before the appointed day of the hearing, he determined the compensation through Ext.P20 and, later, passed the award. No hearing took place. 16. To sum up his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has submitted that going either by the 6th respondent’s admission or by Section 24(1)(a) read with Section 3(g) of the New Act, the Court must conclude that the impugned awards have been vitiated for lack of authority on the 6th respondent’s part. Or even on the principle of natural justice—not giving an opportunity of hearing—the awards must suffer and yield to a de novo enquiry. Or even on the principle of natural justice—not giving an opportunity of hearing—the awards must suffer and yield to a de novo enquiry. Therefore, Sri Radhakrishnan has urged this Court to set aside the entire proceedings and to directing the Government to appoint a new LAO under the New Act, to determine the compensation. Governments: 17. Per contra, Sri Tek Chand, learned Government Pleader, has with equal vigour submitted that the Old Act has not been entirely done away with. To elaborate, he has argued that Section 24(1)(a) applies the other provisions of the New Act only to the extent they concern the pecuniary aspects of the compensation. In this context, he has drawn our attention to the Division Bench’s judgment in W.A. No. 2744 of 2015. The issue, according to him, concerns which Act applies. Or to be more precise, it concerns which procedural parameter applies to the proceedings already begun under the old Act? Then, he responds by saying that the earlier Division Bench decision—in an inter-party appeal— squarely covers the issue. 18. Eventually, Sri Tek Chand has submitted that, in the earlier round of litigation, Sajan has taken a singular plea the validity of acquisition proceedings. In other words, he only insisted that the compensation must be determined under the New Act. That means, he has never questioned the 6th respondent’s authority to determine the compensation—even under the New Act. 19. To sum up his submissions, the learned Government Pleader submitted that the second writ petition suffers from res-judicata, at least to the extent of the 6th respondent’s authority to act under the New Act. He concludes that the same LAO appointed under the Old Act could act under the New Act as well. But the LAO must apply the principles under the New Act to determine the compensation. 20. Heard Sri O.V. Radhakrishnan, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant and Sri Tek Chand, learned Government Pleader, besides perusing the record. Discussion: 21. As we have already observed, this is the second round of litigation. First, Sajan filed W.P. (C) No. 4024 of 2014, questioning the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the old Act. Pending the writ petition, when the 6th respondent passed the awards, Sajan’s challenge included a challenge against the award also: that it must have been under the New Act. First, Sajan filed W.P. (C) No. 4024 of 2014, questioning the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the old Act. Pending the writ petition, when the 6th respondent passed the awards, Sajan’s challenge included a challenge against the award also: that it must have been under the New Act. In fact, the learned Single Judge has extracted the submission of the learned Senior Counsel then appearing for Sajan: “Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend that inasmuch as Exts.P9 and P10 awards have been passed after the coming into force of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as "the 2013 Act"), by virtue of Section 24 of the said Act, the provisions of the 2013 Act relating to determination of compensation have to be applied while passing as award, pursuant to acquisition proceedings that were initiated under the old Act.” 22. That apart, while disposing of the writ petition, the learned Single Judge has observed: (a) Award passed by the respondents, in respect to the Land Acquisition proceedings initiated under the old Act, but not concluded with the passing of an award till the coming into force of the new Act, must determine the compensation amount payable in accordance with the principles for determination of compensation as stipulated in the new Act. (Emphasis added) 23. When the judgment in W.P. (C) No. 4024 of 2014 was appealed against in W.A. No. 2744 of 2015, a learned Division Bench of this Court has elaborately dealt with one important issue: whether the New Act applies in its entirety to the proceedings already initiated under the Old Actor applies only to the limited extent: that is, just to the extent touching on monetary matters of the award, thus, keeping intact the rest of the procedural mechanism under the old Act. Because the judgment is inter-party and, so, binds both in all later proceedings, we proceed to consider the Division Bench’s judgment. 24. In paragraph 9 of the judgment, the Division Bench observed that the only issue to be considered in that Writ Appeal was whether, for preparing an award in acquisition proceedings initiated under the Old Act, the period of limitation as provided under Section 25 would apply. 25. 24. In paragraph 9 of the judgment, the Division Bench observed that the only issue to be considered in that Writ Appeal was whether, for preparing an award in acquisition proceedings initiated under the Old Act, the period of limitation as provided under Section 25 would apply. 25. True, the learned Senior Counsel has strenuously contended that the scope of writ petition then was limited and, therefore, both the learned Single Judge and later the DB have considered the singular aspect. We are afraid this contention merits no attention. We may observe that it is Sajan that raised a singular issue, though he could have, then, questioned the vires of the 6th respondent, who passed Exts.P9 and P10 awards under the Old Act. 26. After examining Sections 24 and 114 of the New Act, and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, the learned Division Bench has observed that Section 24 contains a caption process under Act No. 1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases. The section, a deeming provision, has two subsections. Under sub-section (1), the provision mandates that if no award under Section 11 of the Old Act has been made by the time the New Act came into force, then all provisions of the New Act “relating to the determination of compensation shall apply. On the other hand, sub-section (2) contains circumstances under which the acquisition proceedings are deemed to have lapsed. “Thus Section 24(1) does not contain any circumstances under which it has to be deemed that the acquisition has lapsed. Section 24(1)(a) and 24(1)(b) enumerates two different circumstances. Sub-clause (a) is applicable where no award under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has been made, and sub-clause (b) contains a situation where an award under Section 11 has been made.” 27. The Division Bench has also observed that “the present case is covered by Section 24(1)(a), since the award under Section 11 has not been made.” Indeed, it emphasized the words “all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply” in Section 24(1)(a). The provision has been enacted in a qualifying manner “confining the applicability of the new act only to the determination of compensation. The provision has been enacted in a qualifying manner “confining the applicability of the new act only to the determination of compensation. Had they intended to apply all provisions of the new Act on the acquisition proceedings which have been initiated under 1894 Act, the legislature would have used different phraseology.” 28. Thereafter, touching on Section 25 of the Act, the learned Division Bench has further observed that “the legislature consciously and deliberately qualified the applicability of the provisions of new Act” concerning the Land Acquisition proceedings initiated before the New Act. And “in a case where an award has not been issued, only limited provisions pertaining to the determination of compensation has been made applicable.” 29. Continuing in the same vein, the judgment further observes in paragraph 23 thus: “As noted above, the provisions of new Act which are applicable in a case where the award has not been passed, have been consciously qualified under Section 24(1)(a) only to the extent it relates to the determination of compensation. Thus there being no other contrary intention in any of the provisions we are of the view that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act read with Section 114 of 2013 Act clearly saves the proceedings regarding preparation of the award in so far as limitation for declaring the award is concerned.” 30. As rightly contended by the learned Government Pleader, the Division Bench’s judgment in W.A. No. 2744 of 2015, an inter-party one, has squarely dealt with this issue: whether the New Act ought to be employed in its entirety in terms of Section 24(1)(a) or only those principles that concern the determination of the monetary aspects. And there is no escaping for Sajan from its findings. 31. Indeed, the learned Senior Counsel has strenuously, and repeatedly, contended that there was no occasion for Sajan to question the 6th respondent’s competence, in the earlier round of litigation. Regrettably, this plea, too, fails to persuade us. The reason is simple and straight. 32. By the time W.P. (C) No. 4024 of 2014 was taken up for hearing, the 6th respondent had passed Exts.P9 and P10 awards under the Old Act. Both the learned Single Judge and the learned Division Bench have repeatedly observed that Sajan questioned, first, the validity of acquisition and, second, the determination of the compensation applying the principles under the old Act. Both the learned Single Judge and the learned Division Bench have repeatedly observed that Sajan questioned, first, the validity of acquisition and, second, the determination of the compensation applying the principles under the old Act. Sajan did not insist that under the New Act there ought to be a different LAO. 33. Besides, the Division Bench has emphatically clarified that the New Act applies only to the limited extent; that is, to the extent it affects the financial aspect of the acquisition. Not the entire procedural mechanism. These findings remain undisturbed, thus binding Sajan. 34. Because of our finding that the New Act has not disturbed the competence of the authority under the Old Act, we may conclude that Section 114 of the New Act, read with Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, reinforces our conclusion that the procedural mechanism provided under the Old Act does apply. And the awards to be passed under the New Act will follow only the principles that affect the commercial aspects of the award. Given the earlier finding of this Court, we cannot take a different stand even if there were any semblance of justification in Sajan's submissions. 35. Now the second point urged by Sajan is that the 6th respondent issued the Ext.P19 notice calling upon Sajan to appear before him on 04.03.2016, to put forward his claim for compensation. The notice, in fact, reads: “Notice is hereby given that the Government intend to take possession of the land mentioned in the list below, which is required for a public purpose under the Right to Fair compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition. Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (Central Act 30 of 2013). All the persons interested in the land are required to appear in person or by authorized agent on 04.03.2016 11.00 a.m. before the Special Tahsildar, L.A. (General), Pala and to state/put in a statement in writing signed by themselves or their agents, showing the nature of their respective interests in the land, the amount and particulars of their claims to compensation for such interests, in the land and their objections, if any, to the measurements made under Section 20 of the Act.” Denial of Hearing–Lack of Opportunity: 36. As rightly contended by the learned Senior Counsel, instead of waiting till 04.03.2016 to hear Sajan, the 6th respondent issued Ext.P20 on 23.02.2016, determining the compensation at Rs. 6,70,782/-. As rightly contended by the learned Senior Counsel, instead of waiting till 04.03.2016 to hear Sajan, the 6th respondent issued Ext.P20 on 23.02.2016, determining the compensation at Rs. 6,70,782/-. A translated copy of Ext.P20, available on record, to the extent relevant reads: “......As per your request for the purpose of fixing the value of the property acquired for the land acquisition, I have examined the properties as per sale deed Nos. 1839/12, 2118/10 of Meenachil SRO. The above properties are purchased in fancy price above the market value and the same is not similar to that of land acquisition properties herein and therefore the same are not considered. Further your complaint regarding fixation of value of the house by the PWD, the above complaint along with the certificate fixing value of the property are sent to the Division Executive Engineer, PWD, Kottayam for consideration. In order to acquire the remaining property, requisition from PWD is required. For that a copy of your application is sent to the office of the PWD. In compliance of the judgment in W.P. (C) No. 4024/2014 dated 05.10.2015, a report regarding the fixation of the basic value of the property is prepared as per LA Act, 2013 and fixed Rs. 6,70,782/- per cent as the land value by adding 100% solatium and 12% interest from the date of 4(1) notification. Since you have rejected the proposal forwarded by the District Collector in DLPC meeting held on 11.12.2016 fixing Rs. 10 lakhs per cent after adding 50% increase in the property value, in order to comply the judgment, by avoiding state policy, it is decided to pass award by fixing Rs. 6,70,782/- per cent as the value of the land under LA Act, 2013 and same is hereby communicating to you.” 37. The Exts.P21 and P22 awards, passed on 19.03.2016, were merely based on Ext.P20. Therefore, we inevitably have to conclude that Sajan has been denied a fair opportunity of hearing. So the awards stand vitiated. It may be pertinent to observe that Ext.P19 notice was issued under Section 26 of the New Act; that means it is a statutory notice, whose compliance is mandatory. Here, admittedly, Sajan was denied an opportunity, and this assertion on his part remains un-refuted. 38. So the awards stand vitiated. It may be pertinent to observe that Ext.P19 notice was issued under Section 26 of the New Act; that means it is a statutory notice, whose compliance is mandatory. Here, admittedly, Sajan was denied an opportunity, and this assertion on his part remains un-refuted. 38. Under these circumstances, we cannot but hold that Exts.P21 and P22 awards have been vitiated, for the LAO has failed to provide Sajan an opportunity of hearing and therefore deserve to be set aside, which we do. 39. Consequently, we direct the 6th respondent, whose competence is unassailable, to hear Sajan afresh upon serving on him a notice under Section 26 of the New Act and determine the compensation de novo, applying the principles for determination of compensation as contained in the New Act. 40. The writ appeal is disposed of accordingly.