JUDGMENT : Since the respondent in both the above appeals is the same person and since common question of law and facts involved in both the appeals, both the appeals are taken together in order to dispose of them by this common judgment. 2. The first appeal is preferred by one Nagaraj B., S/o Sanna Bangarappa and connected appeal is preferred by one T.V. Rajashekhara Gowda, S/o Veerappa Gowda. The respondent-accused in both the appeals is the same person Abdul Rehman @ A.M. Hosapet. 3. In both the cases, it is the contention of the complainant-appellants herein that the appellants are agriculturists, growing pineapple fruits and the respondent-accused being a business man, who also deals with Pineapple fruits, was purchasing the said fruits from the complainants on credit basis and subsequently, when the amount was demanded, the respondent-accused herein issued the cheques in favour of each of the appellants for an amount of Rs.50,000/-(Rupees Fifty Thousand Only). When the cheques were presented for encashment, the cheques pertaining to both the appellants were dishonoured for the reason “payment stopped by the drawer”. Then, legal notices were issued by each of the appellants. Though the notices were served, the respondent-accused has neither sent the reply nor made the payment of cheque amount. Therefore, the appellants filed two separate complaints as against the respondent herein alleging that respondent committed an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short). 4. Subsequently, during the course of evidence, the appellants in each of the cases were examined as PW1 and they were cross-examined by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent herein. So far as the evidence of the respondent is concerned, respondent filed the affidavit evidence by way of examination-in-chief. Then the respondent-accused herein was cross-examined by learned counsel for the appellants-complainant. After closure of the evidence by both the sides and hearing arguments of both the sides, ultimately the learned JMFC comes to the conclusion that the complainants have failed to prove their case beyond all reasonable doubt and hence, acquitted the respondent-accused in both the cases. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order of acquittal in two criminal cases before learned JMFC Court, the appellants are before this Court in these two appeals. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order of acquittal in two criminal cases before learned JMFC Court, the appellants are before this Court in these two appeals. The appellants have challenged the legality and correctness of the judgment of the learned JMFC Court on the grounds as they are mentioned in the appeal memorandum herein. 5. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant in respect of both the appeals. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent though present in the morning session, when the Court informed that it will be taken up at 2.30 p.m., learned counsel for respondent is absent and there is no representation on behalf of the respondent-accused. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant while looking into the merits of the case and the legality or otherwise of the judgment of the learned JMFC Court on merits is concerned, submitted that the accused person led his evidence in examination-in-chief by way of filing the affidavit which is contrary to the provisions of Section 145(1) of the Act. Learned counsel made submission that there is no such provision allowing the accused to give his evidence by way of examination-in-chief by filing affidavit. In this connection, learned counsel relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2010 SC 1402 rendered in the case of M/s. Mandvi Cooperative Bank Ltd., vs. Nimesh B. Thakore. Learned counsel drew the attention of this Court to Synopsis (C) wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under : “(C) Negotiable Instruments Act (26 of 1881), S.145(1) – Evidence on affidavit by complainant or his witness – Omission by legislature to incorporate word “accused”, with word “complainant” in S.145(1) – Said word “accused” cannot be incorporated in S.145(1) by High Court – Further drawing analogy between evidence of complainant and accused in case of dishonoured cheque – Was not proper – Accused cannot be allowed to tender his evidence on affidavit.” Hence the learned counsel submitted that the procedure adopted by the learned JMFC is against the principle of Section 145(1) of the Act. On this ground, learned counsel submitted that both the appeals be allowed and the matters be remanded back to the concerned JMFC Court with a direction to follow the procedure contemplated under Section 145(1) of the Act so far as the evidence of the respondent-accused is concerned. 8. On this ground, learned counsel submitted that both the appeals be allowed and the matters be remanded back to the concerned JMFC Court with a direction to follow the procedure contemplated under Section 145(1) of the Act so far as the evidence of the respondent-accused is concerned. 8. I have perused the said decision and also principle enunciated in the said decision. I have also perused the original records in both the cases, wherein respondent-accused has filed the affidavit by way of examination-in-chief. 9. Therefore, learned counsel appearing for the appellants is justified in making the submission that the procedure adopted by the learned JMFC is not in accordance with Section 145(1) of the Act. Hence, both the appeals are allowed. The judgment and order of acquittal of the accused is hereby set aside. Both the cases are remanded back to the concerned trial Court with a direction that the learned JMFC has to follow the procedure contemplated under Section 145(1) of the Act. So far as the evidence of respondent-accused herein is concerned, the learned JMFC has to give an opportunity to the accused to adduce his evidence and then dispose of both the criminal cases on merits, in accordance with law. Accordingly, both the appeals are allowed.