AYAPADI CHAVADI DHARMAM, PRIVATE FAMILY TRUST v. HABIBUNNISA
2018-10-11
T.RAVINDRAN
body2018
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT T.Ravindran, J. Challenge in this Second Appeal is made to the judgment and decree dated 09.02.2015 passed in A.S.No.108 of 2011 on the file of the Additional Sub Court, Mayiladuthurai reversing the judgment and decree dated 19.09.2011 passed in O.S.No.257 of 2006 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Sirkali. 2. The Second Appeal has been admitted on the following substantial questions of law. (1)Whether the lower appellate court is right in dismissing the suit filed by the appellant only on the ground that the suit filed by a single Trustee as manager is not maintainable? (2)Whether the lower appellate court has not committed an error of law in dismissing the suit when the appellant as manager of private family Trust has filed a suit for recovery of possession from trespasser especially when earlier suit under Ex.A1 had been filed and decreed by such manager? 3. Considering the scope of the issues involved between the parties as regards the subject matter lying in a narrow compass, it is unnecessary to dwell into the facts of the case in detail. 4. It is stated that the plaintiff's Trust has laid the suit against the defendants for the recovery of possession on various grounds. The written statement has been filed by the defendants resisting the plaintiff's suit on various grounds. Based on the rival contentions put forth by the respective parties, inter alia, additional issue had also been formulated by the trial court as to whether the present Trustee is entitled to lay the suit representing the plaintiff's private Trust. 5. Therefore, the only point that arises for consideration in the Second Appeal is whether the plaintiff's suit is maintainable? 6. The plaintiff's Trust has laid the suit against the defendants represented by its present manager Selvanathan. The manager would claim that his ancestors had been Trustees of the plaintiff's Trust and also would aver that inasmuch as the second defendant being the co-Trustee and not willing to join with the plaintiff in laying the suit and accordingly he had been arrayed as a party to the proceeding as a proforma party, on that footing, laid the suit against the defendants for the reliefs prayed for.
The plaintiff's counsel contended that inasmuch as the present manager Selvanathan is one of the Trustees and the other Trustee being the second defendant, he having been added as a party to the proceeding, accordingly, submitted that the determination of the first appellate court that the suit had been laid without impleading the other Trustees of the plaintiff's Trust is erroneous and incorrect and accordingly, has prayed for setting aside the finding/determination of the first appellate court holding that the plaintiff's suit is not maintainable. To hold that only the present manager Selvanathan and the second defendant Kunjithapatham are the Trustees of the plaintiff's Trust, there is no material placed on record. The Trust deed of the plaintiff's Trust has not been filed. No reason has been adduced for the same. Furthermore, the plaintiff has not placed any material to establish that the original Trust deed empowers the manager to lay the suit on behalf of the plaintiff's Trust. There is no material placed by the plaintiff to evidence that the present manager Selvanathan had been authorised or empowered to lay the suit on behalf of the plaintiff's Trust. As abovenoted, the Trust deed had not been filed. However, as per the first appellate court, the partition deed projected in the matter goes to show that one Ramakrishna Pillai and Ranthinam Pillai are the Trustees of the plaintiff's Trust. Now, according to the plaintiff, the second defendant Kunjithapatham is the son of Ramakrishna Pillai and further it is stated, during the course of evidence that the plaintiff's Trust's present manager Selvanathan and Others are the sons and daughters of Rathinam pillai, the other Trustee. Now according to the plaintiff, the suit has been laid on behalf of the plaintiff's Trust in O.S.No.538 of 1968 marked as Ex.A8 wherein also the plaintiff's Trust has been represented by the present manager Selvanathan. On a perusal of Ex.A8, it is noted that the abovesaid suit has been laid by the Trustees in their individual capacity as the plaintiffs 1 to 8 and the suit is not found to have been laid on behalf of the plaintiff's Trust as such.
On a perusal of Ex.A8, it is noted that the abovesaid suit has been laid by the Trustees in their individual capacity as the plaintiffs 1 to 8 and the suit is not found to have been laid on behalf of the plaintiff's Trust as such. Be that as it may, it is found that, as per the judgment rendered in O.S.No.538 of 1968 marked as Ex.A8, it is seen that Rathinam Pillai, one of the Trustees of the plaintiff's Trust, had other sons and daughters and also the deceased son, whose wife had been added as 4th plaintiff in the abovesaid suit. Thus, it is found that when according to the plaintiff, the present manager Selvanathan, the second defendant are the Trustees, being the legal heirs of Rathinam pillai and Ramakrishna Pillai, however, as per Ex.A8, Rathinam Pillai had left behind his other sons and daughters and accordingly, when there is no material placed by the plaintiff to show that the other sons and daughters of Rathinam Pillai had authorized or given any power of attorney in favour of Selvanathan to lay the suit on their behalf or on behalf of the plaintiff's Trust in his capacity as the manager and furthermore, when there is no material placed on record to show that Selvanathan had been appointed as the manager of the plaintiff's Trust and he had been authorized to lay the suit on behalf of the plaintiff, in such view of the matter, the first appellate court is justified in holding that the plaintiff's Trust is not duly represented or in other wards, the suit laid by the plaintiff's Trust represented by its manager is not maintainable. In this connection, the plaintiff's counsel would rely upon Order 31 Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure and contended that as per the abovesaid provision of law in a suit concerning the property vested in a trustee, executor or administrator where the contention is between the persons beneficially interested in such property and a third person, the trustee, executor or administrator shall represent the persons so interested and therefore there is no need to make them parties to the suit ordinarily, accordingly, contended that the suit is not bad in law for not impleading the other legal representatives of Rathinam pillai as parties to the proceeding. However, the abovesaid contention does not merit acceptance.
However, the abovesaid contention does not merit acceptance. This is not a suit between the persons beneficially interested in a Trust property and a third person. On the other hand, the Trust itself has laid the suit against the third person seeking certain reliefs. In such view of the matter, in my considered opinion, the provision of Order 31 Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure would have no application to the case at hand. 7. The Trust as such being not a legal entity and all the Trustees in law being the owners of the property of the Trust and if a number of Trustees exist, they being the joint owners of the property and a Trust not in the normal course a legal entity and only the Trustees being the legal entities, it is seen that a suit by one of the Trustees on behalf of the Trust in the absence of any stipulation in the Trust deed providing otherwise, such a suit would not be legally maintainable and all the co-Trustees must join in filing the suit to recover the possession of the property and the above position of law has been decided by this Court following the decision of the Apex court as well as the decisions of the Madras High Court, the Delhi High Court as well the Gujarath High Court and the position of law with reference to the same has been outlined in the decision reported in [V.Chandrasekaran and two others Vs. Venkatanaicker Trust, rep.
Venkatanaicker Trust, rep. By its Manager Thiru.E.V.K.Elangovan and two others, (2017) 1 CTC 56 ] is as follows: Indian Trusts Act, 1882 (2 of 1881), Sections 36 & 48 Suit for possession and Damages filed by Manager of Trust defendants resisting Suit on ground that Manager of Trust has to prove his capacity and that there is no Resolution/Authority to file Suit Suit decreed and Decree confirmed by First Appellate Court Second Appeal by Defendants Trust has laid Suit through its Manager Suit not laid by Trust, represented by its Trustees No material produced to establish authority of Manager to file Suit Trust Deed not produced No reason has been given by Plaintiff for not marking Trust Deed to evidence that Trust Deed authorized manager to institute Suit on behalf of Trust Trust is not legal entity All Trustees are Owners of property and if number of Trustees exist, they are Joint Owners of property Suit by one of Trustees on behalf of Trust, in absence of any stipulation in Trust Deed providing otherwise, would not be legally maintainable All Co-Trustees must join in filing Suit to recover possession of property from Tenant, after termination of Lease Suit filed by Manager of Trust and not by all Trustees joining together, is not maintainable Further Termination Notice issued by Manager is not in accordance with Act Concurrent findings set aside Second Appeal Allowed. Facts: Suit for possession and damages was filed by Manager of a Trust. The Suit was decreed by the Trial Court and the said Decree was confirmed in Appeal. In the Second Appeal filed by the Defendants, High Court held that the Suit is not maintainable, as it was filed by the Manager of the Trust and thereby allowed the Second Appeal. As seen earlier, the Trust has laid the Suit through its Manager. It is, therefore, obvious that the Suit has not been laid by the Trust, represented by its Trustees. That the Manager is empowered to lay the Suit on behalf of the Trust, has not been established by the Plaintiff, principally, by marking the Trust Deed. No reason has been given by the Plaintiff for not marking the Trust Deed to evidence that the Trust Deed authorized the Manager to institute the Suit on behalf of the Trust, Therefore, now we are left to decide the issue in the absence of the Trust Deed.
No reason has been given by the Plaintiff for not marking the Trust Deed to evidence that the Trust Deed authorized the Manager to institute the Suit on behalf of the Trust, Therefore, now we are left to decide the issue in the absence of the Trust Deed. It could, therefore, be seen that the Trust has not placed any record before the Courts below to establish that it has the authority to file the Suit through its Manager. In the light of the above two decisions, it could be seen that the Trust being not a legal entity and all the Trustees in law being the Owners of the property and if a number of Trustees exist, they being the Joint Owners of the property and a Trust not in the normal course a legal entity and only the Trustees being the legal entities, it could be seen that as held by the above said Courts, a Suit by one of the Trustees on behalf of the Trust, in the absence of any stipulation in the Trust Deed providing otherwise, it could be seen that such a Suit would not be legally maintainable and all the Co-Trustees must join in filing the Suit to recover possession of the property from the Tenant, after the termination of the Lease. Such being the position, the argument put forth by the learned Counsel for the Plaintiff cannot be accepted. Insofar as this case is concerned, the Suit has not been laid by the Trustees. It has been laid by the Manager representing the Trust. To show that the Manager is empowered to lay the Suit on behalf of the Trust, no material is forthcoming. The Trust Deed as seen earlier has not been produced. No reason has been adduced for the same. Further, it has also not been established that the Manager is empowered to lay the Suit on behalf of the Trustees as per the provisions of the Indian Trust Act, 1882. It could, thus, be seen that the Plaintiff would not be entitled to seek any reliefs against the Defendant for the reasons that the Notice of termination of the Tenancy has not been issued by the Trustees as contemplated under law and further the Suit for possession has also not been laid by the Trustees as required under law.
It could, thus, be seen that the Plaintiff would not be entitled to seek any reliefs against the Defendant for the reasons that the Notice of termination of the Tenancy has not been issued by the Trustees as contemplated under law and further the Suit for possession has also not been laid by the Trustees as required under law. On the failure of the Plaintiff to establish that the instrument of Trust otherwise provides, following the above said decisions relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants, I hold that the Suit filed by the Manager of the Trust and not by all the Trustees joining together is not maintainable. I further hold that the Termination Notice issued by the Manager is not in accordance with the Indian Trust Act and invalid. Therefore, the Substantial Questions of Law framed in this Second Appeal are answered against the Respondent/Plaintiff and in favour of the Appellants. The other decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for the Respondents reported in Vasant Nature Cure Hospital and Prathibha Maternity Hospital Trust and Others Vs. Ukaji Kamaji and Others, (2013) AIR Gujarat 58 also could be seen not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case on hand. In this case, unlike the decision relied on, the Trust has laid the Suit, rep. By its Manager. No material placed to show that the Manager has been authorized to lay the Suit. Further in this case covered in the above decision, all the Trustees were subsequently joined as Plaintiffs. However, in our case, the Suit has not been laid by the Trust, rep. By its Trustee/Trustees. CASES REFERRED (i) [Abdul Kayum Vs. Alighai, (1963) AIR SC 309] (ii) [Atmaram Vs. Gulamhusein, (1973) AIR Gujarat 113] (iii) [Duli Chand Vs. M.P.T.C.Charitable Trust, (1984) AIR Delhi 145] (iv) [Hamsa Patel Vs. S.Balakrishnan, (1997) 1 CTC 367 ] (v) [Vasant Nature Cure Hospital and Pratibha Maternity Hospital Trust Vs. Ukaji Kamaji, (2013) AIR Gujarat 58] (vi) [Vedakannu Vs. Annadana Chatram, (1938) AIR Madras 982] 8.
Alighai, (1963) AIR SC 309] (ii) [Atmaram Vs. Gulamhusein, (1973) AIR Gujarat 113] (iii) [Duli Chand Vs. M.P.T.C.Charitable Trust, (1984) AIR Delhi 145] (iv) [Hamsa Patel Vs. S.Balakrishnan, (1997) 1 CTC 367 ] (v) [Vasant Nature Cure Hospital and Pratibha Maternity Hospital Trust Vs. Ukaji Kamaji, (2013) AIR Gujarat 58] (vi) [Vedakannu Vs. Annadana Chatram, (1938) AIR Madras 982] 8. In the light of the above position of law, it is found that as rightly determined by the first appellate court, the suit laid by the plaintiff's Trust represented by the manager without any material placed on record to show that the manager had been empowered to lay the suit on behalf of the plaintiff's Trust, the Trust, as such being not a legal entity to lay the suit, in such view of the matter, the first appellate court is justified in holding that the suit laid by the plaintiff's Trust is not legally sustainable. Even if the suit had been laid against the trespasser for recovery of possession of the suit property on behalf of the plaintiff's Trust, it is found that as per the abovesaid reported decision, all the Trustees should be made as parties to the suit or the other Trustees should empower any one of the Trustees to lay the suit on behalf of the plaintiff's Trust by a valid document. Such not being the position, in the present case, the suit having been laid by the manager and when there is no material to hold that the manager had the authority to lay the suit on behalf of the plaintiff's Trust and as abovenoted when the other Trustees had not been impleaded excepting the second defendant, as such, the suit laid by the plaintiff is not maintainable and accordingly the substantial questions of law formulated in the second appeal are answered against the plaintiff. 9. In the light of the above discussions, the second appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition, if any, is closed.