JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal under section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereafter the ‘Act’) is at the instance of an unsuccessful claimant, who had approached the relevant motor accident claims tribunal with an application under section 163A thereof. 2. The claimant/appellant (hereafter the ‘appellant’) was the driver of a bus. It met with an accident resulting in the death of three passengers. The appellant also sustained injury as a result of the accident. An F.I.R. was registered and investigation thereof culminated in filing of a police report (charge sheet) under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, inter alia, charging the appellant with an offence punishable under section 304 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. The claim application was dismissed by the tribunal by the impugned judgment and award dated March 31, 2014 on the ground that the appellant having been booked under section 304 of the Indian Penal Code, which is a sessions triable offence, he is not entitled to maintain the claim application. The relevant portion from the impugned award reads as follows: “Hence in the instant case the claimant being the principal offender in a case u/s. 304 I.P.C. has no scope to come before this forum for claiming compensation for his own wrongful act which resulted in the death of many innocent passengers, rather the claimant herein is to be held solely liable for the tragic accident that took place on 19.3.10 as had the claimant while driving the offending vehicle been alert and careful, the question of the offending bus dashing against the electric post and thereafter against a tree could not had been arisen. In view of the above discussion this Tribunal holds that the claimant Gopal Chandra Mondal being sole responsible for the accident dated 19.3.10 cannot in any way be compensated for his own wrongful act……” 4. The point that arises for our consideration is, whether the tribunal was justified in dismissing the claim application on the aforesaid ground. 5. Mr. Banerjee, learned advocate appearing for the appellant has placed before us the decision in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Sunil Kumar & Anr., reported in 2018 (1) T.A.C. 3 (SC), and decisions of coordinate Benches of this Court in Bhikham Yadav vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors., reported in 2010 ACJ 2255 , and in Arati Doloi & Ors. Ltd. vs. Sunil Kumar & Anr., reported in 2018 (1) T.A.C. 3 (SC), and decisions of coordinate Benches of this Court in Bhikham Yadav vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors., reported in 2010 ACJ 2255 , and in Arati Doloi & Ors. vs. Baser Ali Bux & Ors., reported in 2009 ACJ 1569 . It is contended by him that having regard to the object section 163A of the Act seeks to achieve, the question as to whether the driver of the offending vehicle was at fault is immaterial; irrespective of whether he was rash and negligent in driving the vehicle, relief has to follow keeping in mind the beneficial intent that is an integral part of section 163A. 6. We had called upon Mr. Das, learned advocate for the respondent no.1/insurer to persuade us to take a different view. In his usual fairness, Mr. Das has left the matter to the discretion of the Court. 7. The decision in Sunil Kumar (supra), though rendered on interpretation of section 163A of the Act, was in a factual situation which is different from the one before us. The driver of the offending vehicle was not the claimant in the proceedings that went upto the Supreme Court. 8. We, however, see no reason to take a view different from those taken by the coordinate Benches in Bhikham Yadav (supra) and Arati Doloi (supra). The aspect of lack of diligence on the part of the appellant to drive the offending vehicle does not take away his right of claiming compensation under section 163A of the Act, which is based on the principle of ‘no fault liability’. 9. In the result, the impugned awards stands set aside and the appeal stands disposed of by ordering a remand. The M.A.C. Case No. 371 of 2010 on the file of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-cum-Additional District & Sessions Judge, Fast Track 4th Court, Diamond Harbour shall stand revived. 10. The tribunal is requested to decide the application on its own merits in accordance with law as early as possible but preferably within a period of a year from date of receipt of copy of this judgment and order, subject to its convenience. 11. There shall be no order as to costs. 12. Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be furnished to the parties expeditiously.