JUDGMENT : 1. This Habeas Corpus Petition seeks quashing of order No. 151/DMB/PSA/2017 dated 30.11.2017 passed by the District Magistrate Baramulla, herein respondent No. 3, whereby and where under petitioner, Gh. Mohi-Ud-Din Malik, has been taken in preventive detention under clause (a) of section 8 of the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 to prevent him from acting in any manner which is prejudicial to security of the State. 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 3. The order of detention has been challenged on various grounds. One of the grounds urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. M. Y. Lone, is that admittedly the petitioner at the relevant time was custody of the State Authorities pursuant to his arrest in a case registered as FIR No. 119/2017 of Police Station, Tarzo under section 13 of the Unlawful (Prevention) Activities Act, 1967. Learned counsel submitted further that there was no possibility of immediate release of the petitioner in the said case inasmuch as the petitioner had not even moved any application for bail. Learned counsel submitted further that the impugned order suffers from non application of mind by the detaining authority inasmuch as neither the order nor the grounds of detention formulated by the detaining authority indicates that the detaining authority apprehended immediate release of the petitioner from the custody. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel on the Supreme Court judgments in Binod Singh v District Magistrate Dhanbad, Bihar and others, (1986) 4 SCC 416 and Surya Prakash Sharma v State of U.P. and others, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 195. 4. As per grounds of detention formulated by the detaining authority, the petitioner, who is a hard core OGW of JeM Outfit, was apprehended at a police naka along with another on 15.11.2017. On their personal search, two leaves of letter pads belonging to JeM Outfit were recovered from the possession of the petitioner and once such leaf was recovered from the other. FIR No. 119/2017 was, thus, registered. It is, thus, indisputable that the petitioner had been taken in custody by the police on 15.11.2017 for his alleged involvement in commission of offence under a substantive law. This aspect has not been denied in the objections filed on behalf of the respondents. 5. FIR No. 119/2017 was, thus, registered. It is, thus, indisputable that the petitioner had been taken in custody by the police on 15.11.2017 for his alleged involvement in commission of offence under a substantive law. This aspect has not been denied in the objections filed on behalf of the respondents. 5. Legal position in regard to preventive detention of a person, who is already in custody of the State Agencies in connection with commission of an offence under substantive law allegedly committed by him, is well settled. Normally, preventive detention of such a person should not be ordered. Nonetheless, preventive detention of such a person can still be ordered, if the detaining authority has compelling reasons to believe that he is likely to be released in the substantive offence either on bail or due to his acquittal or discharge. In Binod Singh's case (supra) Supreme Court has held that "if a man is in custody and there is no imminent possibility of his being released, the power of preventive detention should not be exercised." In Surya Prakash Sharma’s case, Supreme Court has referred to an earlier three-Judge Bench decision of the Court in Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat v Union of India, (1990) 1 SCC 746 , where the question has been answered in following words: “The decisions referred to above lead to the conclusion that an order for detention can be validly passed against a person in custody and for that purpose it is necessary that the grounds of detention must show that (i) the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenu is already in detention: and (ii) there were compelling reasons justifying such detention despite the fact that the detenu is already in detention. The expression "compelling reasons" in the context of making an order for detention of a person already in custody implied that there must be cogent material before the detaining authority on the basis of which it may be satisfied that (a) the detenu is likely to be released from custody in the near future and (b) taking into account the nature of the antecedent activities of the detenu, it is likely that after his release from custody he would indulge in prejudicial activities and it is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities." 6. That the petitioner in this case was in custody of the State Authorities pursuant to his arrest on 15.11.2017 is not denied. The impugned order and the grounds of detention formulated by the detaining authority would show that this aspect of the matter was brought to the notice of the detaining authority but was not addressed by the said authority inasmuch as the order of detention and the grounds of detention does not disclose any compelling reason for passing the order of preventive detention even if the petitioner was already in detention. No such compelling reason is stated even in the objections filed on behalf of the respondents or could be made out by the learned counsel appearing on their behalf. 7. To sum up thus, the order of detention or the grounds of detention formulated by the detaining authority san any compelling reason necessitating the preventive detention of the petitioner, notwithstanding that he was already in custody for his alleged involvement in commission of an offence under a substantive law. Such an order cannot sustain and is liable to be quashed on this score alone and in the view of the legal position prevailing in the matter. 8. Viewed thus, this petition is allowed as it has merit and in the result, the impugned order is quashed. Petitioner be set at liberty, if not required in any other case. 9. Record of the case be remitted back to the learned counsel for the respondents.