ORDER : Devan Ramachandran, J. Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer has famously said in his celebrated judgment in Chairman, Board of Mining Examination and Chief Inspector of Mines and another v. Ramjee ( AIR 1977 SC 965 ) that “Natural justice is no unruly horse, no lurking land mine, nor a judicial cure-all. If fairness is shown by the decision-maker to the man proceeded against, the form, features and the fundamentals of such essential processual propriety being conditioned by the facts and circumstances of each situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained of.” 2. We are reminded of these words since the facts presented before us in this revision petition relate to the contention of an employee that she has been terminated from service in violation of the applicable Regulations though pertinently she does not even sotto voce say that any prejudice has been caused to her on account of such alleged breach of the Regulations. It is now too well settled for any doubt that an order is required to be examined on the touchstone of the doctrine of prejudice. 3. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and others v. B. Karunakar and others [ (1993) 4 SCC 727 ] considered this issue at great length and has decisively declared the law that the theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the law and to assess the individual to vindicate his just rights but that they are not mere incantations to be invoked or rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions and the fact whether prejudice has been caused to the employee or not has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case; that it is only if the Courts find that the alleged violations in the process of enquiry would have made a difference to the final result that it should set aside the order of punishment. 4. We have begun bearing the above broad principles in mind since the singular facts of this case would show that even if the allegations of violations of the Regulations are accepted, it would not cause any difference to the final result particularly because even the petitioner has no case that she has really suffered any prejudice. 5. 4. We have begun bearing the above broad principles in mind since the singular facts of this case would show that even if the allegations of violations of the Regulations are accepted, it would not cause any difference to the final result particularly because even the petitioner has no case that she has really suffered any prejudice. 5. We will first state some of the most vital facts as under: 6. This revision petition is at the instance of a dismissed employee of the Fathima Matha National College, Kollam. The revision petitioner was appointed, according to her, as a Peon in the service of the college on 02.06.1995 and the management alleged that she was derelict in her duties and that she had used abusive language against the Principal and another teachers of the college, when they reminded of her duties at work. The management issued a memo of charges against her on the specific allegation that though the revision petitioner was appointed as a sweeper, she was refusing to do her duties of sweeping and maintaining the premises; that she had used abusive language and that her conduct was egregiously improper. This memo of charges, which is marked as Ext.A1 in the enquiry, was served on the revision petitioner, who made a detailed reply to it, vide reply dated 19.07.1997, which is marked in evidence as Ext.A2. Pertinently in Ext.A2, she denied all the allegations relating to the charge that she was derelict in her duties as a sweeper vehemently asserting that she was appointed as a Peon, but, however, chose not to answer any of the allegations regarding misbehaviour and use of abusive words against the Principal and another members of staff. 7. The management appointed an enquiry officer and an enquiry was conducted wherein the revision petitioner, though allegedly given full opportunity to participate, appears to have not used such opportunity to its full extent. The counter allegation of the petitioner to the accusation that she did not participate in the enquiry is two fold; Firstly, that the enquiry officer had been appointed even before her statement of defence, namely Ext.A2, had been considered by the Disciplinary Authority; and secondly, that she is entitled to the assistance of a defence representative, who either shall be a lawyer or a legally trained person under Statute 71(6) of the Kerala University First Statutes, 1979. The Enquiry Officer, however, overturned these two objections and found that since the Presenting Officer in the enquiry is not a legally trained person, the revision petitioner is not entitled to a lawyer or to a legally trained person as her representative. 8. The enquiry, thereafter, transpires to have proceeded, which finally culminated in an enquiry report finding the revision petitioner guilty of the charges and recommending that she may be dismissed from service. The Disciplinary Authority accepted the enquiry report and imposed the punishment of dismissal on the petitioner, which led her to file an appeal before the University Appellate Tribunal, Thiruvananthapuram, numbered as Appeal No.5 of 1999. The Tribunal, on an assessment of all the relevant factual factors and inputs, however, dismissed her appeal finding that she is not entitled to be reinstated or that the charges against her can be found to be without merit. 9. The revision petitioner has filed this revision challenging the order of the Appellate Tribunal on various grounds but primarily on the ground that the enquiry against her ought to have been found to be vitiated on account of the alleged violation of Statutes 71(2) and 71(6) of the Kerala University First Statutes, 1979. 10. We have heard Sri. R. Reji, the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner and Sri. Babu Varghese, the learned senior counsel, assisted by Sri. C.V. Alexander, appearing for respondents 1 and 2. 11. We have examined the order of the Tribunal impugned in this revision petition very intently. Sri. R. Reji, the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner has vehemently argued the contentions on behalf of his client and he has tried to impress upon us that the order of the Tribunal does not deserve to be sustained in law. According to him, the primary objection against the enquiry that should have been found by the Tribunal in favour of the petitioner is that the Enquiry Officer had been shown to have been appointed even Ext.A1 memo of charges, which, according to him, is in violation of Section 71(2) of the First Statutes. According to him, the primary objection against the enquiry that should have been found by the Tribunal in favour of the petitioner is that the Enquiry Officer had been shown to have been appointed even Ext.A1 memo of charges, which, according to him, is in violation of Section 71(2) of the First Statutes. He points out that as per this Statute, an Enquiry Officer could have been appointed only after the statement of defence had been considered and assessed by the disciplinary authority and that the appointment of an Enquiry Officer along with Ext.A1 charge memo would show that the management moved in a premeditated manner. He thereafter reiterated the contentions, which we have already recorded above, that the order of the Enquiry Officer rejecting his client's application for the appointment of a lawyer or a legally trained person as a defence representative would cut at the very root of the validity of the enquiry on the assertion that it is flagrant violation of Statute 71(6) of the First Statutes. Sri. R. Reji adds to these contentions by submitting that the memo of charges itself is incapable of favour in law since it did not contain statement of allegations, as is also warranted under Statute 71(2) of the First Statutes. 12. The learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 refutes all these contentions of Sri. R. Reji with equal vehemence and says that the college is a minority institution under the constitutional provisions, thus with the right to maintain discipline and to ensure that the violations of discipline of this nature are dealt with in the most commensurate manner. The learned senior counsel further submits that whatever be the contentions of the revision petitioner, unless she is able to show prejudice, much less substantial prejudice, as having been caused to her, it would not be open for this Court, while exercising powers under revisionary jurisdiction over the order of the Tribunal, to interdict or intervene with the findings in the impugned order. 13. We have considered the above submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties at the Bar and we have also gone in detail into the evidence on record. 14. 13. We have considered the above submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties at the Bar and we have also gone in detail into the evidence on record. 14. When we carefully assess the evidence on record, we find a particularly extenuating problem glaring at the revision petitioner, which are on account of two documents, namely Exts.M7 and M13, which are letters admittedly written by her to the Principal. Ext.M7 is the reply written by her to Ext.M6 memo, dated 04.11.1996, issued to her by the Principal, alleging that she had not been performing her duties diligently. In Ext.M7 reply, the revision petitioner concedes unequivocally that she had been engaged in sweeping work in the college for the last one and half years and she does not say there, even in muted terms, that she had been appointed as a Peon. Similarly, in Ext.M13, which is a reply issued by her to a similar memo issued by the Principal, namely Ext.M12, about a year later, she apologises for all her lapses and then assures the Principal that such incidents would not happen in future. These documents would make it obvious that the petitioner's case, that she was appointed as a Peon and not a sweeper, would find no corroboration from the pleadings or the materials on record and it is rather baffling that she did not choose to produce on record her appointment order if she wanted to prove her case, since that would have been the most primary piece of evidence to establish her position in the college one way or the other. We notice that the learned Tribunal has considered this issue quite in detail and that the factual scenario in this case has been discussed rather threadbare. We are certain that while we sit in revisional jurisdiction, it would not be proper for us to re-appreciate or re-valuate the factual circumstances which have been proved in evidence and our attention should be confined only to instances of glaring legal violations. 15. As we have already indicated above, the only contention, against the impugned order and the enquiry proceedings, that is impelled by the learned counsel for the petitioner before us in law is that there is a violation of Statutes 71(2) and 71(6) of the Kerala University (Conditions of Service of Teachers and Members of Non-teaching Staff) First Statutes. 16. 15. As we have already indicated above, the only contention, against the impugned order and the enquiry proceedings, that is impelled by the learned counsel for the petitioner before us in law is that there is a violation of Statutes 71(2) and 71(6) of the Kerala University (Conditions of Service of Teachers and Members of Non-teaching Staff) First Statutes. 16. As far as Statute 71(2) is concerned, the submission of the petitioner is two fold: (a) that the memo of charges did not contain a statement of allegations and (b) that an Enquiry Officer was appointed in the said order even without waiting for the statement of defence. As regards Statute 71(6) of the First Statutes is concerned, the accusation of the petitioner is that in spite of her request, no legally trained person/lawyer was allowed to be appointed as her defence representative and therefore, that she was unable to lead substantive and effective evidence during the enquiry. 17. We have considered these two submissions made by Sri. R. Reji very carefully and keenly, but our opinion are against these contentions, as we will record presently. 18. As has been recorded in paragraph 34 of the impugned order by the learned Tribunal, the memo of charges, which is included in Ext.B1 file, would clearly show that there were 14 charges against the revision petitioner and that even though the term 'statement of allegations' is not shown in the memo of charges, it contains all the details of the charges against her, including the details and sequence of events and its explanation. Further, it is conceded before us by Sri. Reji that in Ext.A2 defence statement, dated 19.07.1997, the revision petitioner did not have a case that she was put to any prejudice on account of a formal statement of allegations not being appended to the charge memo or that she had, therefore, failed to understand the true import of the charges or allegations against her. In fact, as is also seen by the Tribunal, the statement of defence of the revision petitioner is very exhaustive on the charge relating to dereliction of duty but very interestingly, it is completely silent as regards the alleged use of abusive language and improper behaviour imputed against her. 19. In fact, as is also seen by the Tribunal, the statement of defence of the revision petitioner is very exhaustive on the charge relating to dereliction of duty but very interestingly, it is completely silent as regards the alleged use of abusive language and improper behaviour imputed against her. 19. In the above factual over view, we will now refer to some of the important judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in this area to conclude whether the order of punishment requires to be interdicted even though even an allegation of prejudice being caused to her has not been urged by the petitioner. 20. As we have already seen in the opening lines of this judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramjee (supra) has said unequivocally that “if the decision-maker demonstrated fairness to the man proceeded against, the form, features and the fundamentals of essential processual propriety, no breach of natural justice can be complained of.” 21. In Dr. Umrao Singh Choudhary v. State of M.P. [ (1994) 4 SCC 328 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has implicitly held that the principles of natural justice do not supplant the law, but supplements the law. 22. In Syndicate Bank and others v. Venkatesh Gururao Kurati [JT 2006 (2) SC 73], the Hon'ble Supreme Court spoke about the doctrine of prejudice and has said categorically that even to sustain the allegation of violation of principles of natural justice, one must establish that prejudice has been caused. 23. Thereafter, in the year 1993, the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in B. Karunakar (supra), after considering its own judgment in Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan [ AIR 1991 SC 471 ] declared that an employee is entitled to obtain a copy of the enquiry report and to have his reply considered by the disciplinary authority, as also a right and opportunity to object to the findings of the enquiry report. The Court then went on to say that the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the employee in his just rights and remedies, but to be assessed on the touchsone of the doctrine of prejudice. The words of their Lordships are portentous and hence are extracted for a full reading as under : “They are not incantations to be invoked no rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. The words of their Lordships are portentous and hence are extracted for a full reading as under : “They are not incantations to be invoked no rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the report, no different consequence would have followed, it would be a perversion of justice to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an “unnatural expansion of natural justice” which in itself is antithetical to justice.... It is only if the Court/Tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment.” 24. In State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma [ (1996) 3 SCC 364 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court ingeminated the importance of doctrine of prejudice and held that unless the employee has at least pleaded prejudice to him, Courts are not justified in interfering with orders of punishment. The specific words in paragraph 32 of the said judgment are as under : “Justice means justice between both the parties. The interests of justice equally demand that the guilty should be punished and that technicalities and irregularities which do not occasion failure of justice are not allowed to defeat the ends of justice. Principles of natural justice are but the means to achieve the ends of justice. They cannot be perverted to achieve the very opposite end. That would be a counter-productive exercise.” 25. Similar views as above have been restated in S.K. Singh v. Central Bank of India and others [ (1996) 6 SCC 415 ] and in State of U.P. v. Harendra Arora and another [ AIR 2001 SC 2319 ]. 26. They cannot be perverted to achieve the very opposite end. That would be a counter-productive exercise.” 25. Similar views as above have been restated in S.K. Singh v. Central Bank of India and others [ (1996) 6 SCC 415 ] and in State of U.P. v. Harendra Arora and another [ AIR 2001 SC 2319 ]. 26. In Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan [ (2000) 7 SCC 529 ], taking note of the views in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India [ (1999) 6 SCC 237 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court made a clear statement of law that even when an order is caused in violation of natural justice, it need not be set aside unless it is shown that non-observance has caused prejudice to the person concerned. In this judgment, the ratio in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan and others [ AIR 1981 SC 136 ] was also discussed wherein it has been accepted that in peculiar circumstances the observance of the principles of natural justice may merely be an empty formality because no other conclusion may be possible or admitted on the undisputed facts. 27. The sum total of the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in all the judgments above is pithly that a person complaining of non-observance of principles of natural justice or violation of the provisions of applicable Rules and Regulations must invariably satisfy that some real irreparable prejudice has been caused to him or her and that this is imperative because there is no such thing as “technical infringement of natural justice.” 28. The cumulative position evolving from all the binding precedents above is indubitable that unless the petitioner has pleaded, much less to establish and demonstrate prejudice as having been caused to her on account of the alleged transgressions of the Rules of procedure, it would not in any manner justify relief of setting aside the enquiry proceedings, as has now been prayed for by the petitioner. This is more so because her defence statement is exhaustive, indicating ineluctably that she was aware each of the charges against her, notwithstanding that a “statement of allegations” was not formally appended. 29. This is more so because her defence statement is exhaustive, indicating ineluctably that she was aware each of the charges against her, notwithstanding that a “statement of allegations” was not formally appended. 29. As regards the allegation that an Enquiry Officer was appointed even before Ext.A2 defence statement had been considered by the disciplinary authority is concerned, again we notice that the petitioner did not have a case even before the Tribunal that this has caused any prejudice to her in the enquiry that was proceeded. Even though strictly she may be justified in contending that an Enquiry Officer could have been appointed only after her defence statement had been taken into account, we are of the view that, this by itself would not be a reasonable cause available to her to challenge the merits of the enquiry, especially because she participated in it with full volition and she was given full opportunity to present and establish her case and to substantiate her defence. We, therefore, cannot find merit in this contention either. 30. Finally, coming to the allegations founded upon Statute 71(6) is concerned, her accusation is that she was not permitted to engage a lawyer/legally trained person as a defence representative. The law in this regard is now well settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in various decisions. The Hon'ble Court has declared several times, without any requirement for restatement, that until the petitioner is able to establish that the presenting officer is a lawyer/legally trained person, it would not be within her right to seek the assistance of such a person as a defence representative. In fact, the learned counsel for the petitioner explicitly concedes that the presenting officer in the enquiry was not a lawyer or a legally trained person. We are, therefore, compelled to repel those contentions also as having no merits. 31. Sri. R. Reji at this point of time exhorted us to consider the question of proportionality of the punishment contending that the punishment imposed, namely, dismissal from service is grossly disproportionate to the charges levelled against her. We are afraid that this submission of Sri. R. Reji does not forensically appeal to us because we find from the charge sheet that the allegations against her are of some gravity. We are afraid that this submission of Sri. R. Reji does not forensically appeal to us because we find from the charge sheet that the allegations against her are of some gravity. The charges show that not only has she refused to discharge her duties as a sweeper on the unsubstantiated assertion that she was appointed as a Peon; but she is also alleged to have used abusive language against the Principal and another members of staff. We are certain that since the petitioner did not even attempt to controvert the second limb of the allegations, that by itself would be sufficient reason to dismiss or discharge a person from service, especially because it entails gross violation of discipline. This is more so since it is an educational institution which caters to the requirements and needs of students and hence we are not impressed by the submission of Sri. R. Reji that the punishment imposed is disproportionate. In the result and for the reasons that we have recorded above, we dismiss this revision petition, however, without making any order as to costs and leaving the parties to suffer their respective costs.