JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned senior counsel Mr. N.D. Nanavaty appearing with Ms. Disha Nanavaty for the applicant and learned Public Prosecutor Mr. Mitesh R. Amin for the respondent No.1 – State. 2. The applicant herein is accused No.3 before the Sessions Court at Vadodara in Special A.C.B. Case No.2 of 2017. Such Sessions case has been initiated pursuant to Vadodara City A.C.B. Police Station I-C.R. No. 3 of 2017 registered under Sections 7, 8, 10 and 13(1)(b) and 13(2) of The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (‘PC Act’, for short) read with Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’, for short) based upon the complaint filed by one Dr. Jasminaben Dilipbhai Devda (herein after referred to as the ‘complainant’). After investigation, when the investigating agency has filed a chargesheet against several accused, including present applicant, the present applicant has filed an application at Exh.13 on 16.11.2017 before the Sessions Court. Such application has been rejected by the impugned order dated 29.11.2017 by the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Vadodara. Being aggrieved by such impugned order, present Criminal Revision Application is filed. 3. If we peruse such application, copy of which is at Annexure-P1, it transpires that the applicant has in the heading of the application, described such application as “an application for dropping the proceedings on behalf of accused No.3 – Dr. Mansukh K. Shah”. In the prayer clause also, the applicant has prayed to drop the proceedings of Special A.C.B. Case. In view of such disclosure, there is preliminary objection by the respondents that there is no provision in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘Cr.P.C.’, for short), which permits the Sessions Court or empowers it to drop the proceedings of any criminal trial and therefore, there is no irregularity or illegality in the impugned order, and thereby present application needs to be rejected. Whereas, it is submitted by the applicant that, in fact, the application is u/s.227 of the Cr.P.C. For the purpose, the applicant has referred the contents of the application, wherein in first line of first paragraph itself, there is categorical disclosure that the application is filed under the provisions of Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. Even in impugned order, the Sessions Court has in first line categorically disclosed that the application is filed u/s.227 of the Cr.P.C. Therefore, though there is a word drop both in the heading and prayer to drop the proceedings in such application, practically, this application is u/s.227 of the Cr.P.C. and therefore, considering the settled legal position that disclosure of improper provision of law, would not debar the litigant from getting appropriate relief by the court, it is to be held that the application is for discharging the applicant from the charges levelled against him and it is u/s.227 of the Cr.P.C. for that purpose. Therefore, such contention of the respondents are rejected holding that using the word “dropping” instead of word “discharging” in such application by the accused, would not curtail the right of the accused – applicant to get appropriate relief in accordance with law i.e. considering the available prima facie material and applicable law u/s.227 of the Cr.P.C. Thereby, practically, when the application is u/s.227 of the Cr.P.C. and the trial Court has also considered the application for discharge under such section, it is to be treated as such and thereby, when such order refusing to discharge the applicant is challenged in such revision application, the consideration in revision application is regarding discharging the applicant by scrutinizing that whether he can be discharged from the charges levelled against him or not. 4. Similarly, before coming to the factual details, it is to be recorded and make it clear that in addition to the above-referred technical ground, the respondents have taken another two technical grounds while opposing the revision application to be heard on merits and therefore, such grounds are to be treated as preliminary objections and dealt with accordingly. 5. 4. Similarly, before coming to the factual details, it is to be recorded and make it clear that in addition to the above-referred technical ground, the respondents have taken another two technical grounds while opposing the revision application to be heard on merits and therefore, such grounds are to be treated as preliminary objections and dealt with accordingly. 5. It is submitted by the respondents that the matter is under active consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) No.6228 of 2017 and therefore, though it is not submitted in clear words, the stand taken is to the effect that this court may not proceed further in the revision application, so as to decide the issue raised in the present revision application. However, the fact remains that the SLP under reference is against the order dated 10.8.2017 in Criminal Misc. Application No.14901 of 2017 passed by the co-ordinate Bench of this court, wherein bail is refused to the applicant for the alleged offences against him. Therefore, when such co-ordinate Bench has already observed in paragraph 6.17 of its order dated 10.8.2017 that the observations made in this order are confined to the consideration u/s.439 of the Cr.P.C. and the authorities concerned, including the court would not be influenced by the same and would decide the case or other proceedings, if any, strictly in accordance with law; it is clear that the issue pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India is with reference to granting any relief to the applicant u/s.439 of the Cr.P.C. and not u/s.227 of the Cr.P.C. though the factual details of the case may be common, and more particularly, when the order of co-ordinate Bench is clear as referred herein above. It is also clear that the consideration of bail application would be altogether on a different footing, whereas, consideration of an application to discharge, would rest upon altogether different issues though factual details may be common in both the cases. So far as granting bail is concerned, it is purely the discretionary powers of the concerned court, though it is to be exercised in accordance with law and consideration for granting or refusing the bail would be different i.e. whether there is chance of commission of similar offence or not and whether there is chance of tampering with the evidence or not by the accused, pending trial. Whereas, stage of discharge application is certainly after filing of chargesheet, which is generally filed only after completion of investigation and therefore, there is least chance of tampering with evidence. Moreover, at the stage of discharge application, now, probable evidence in the form of statement of witnesses as prima facie evidence is available on record of the court and thereby, court has to verify that whether there is sufficient evidence available with the prosecution so as to proceed further against the accused under particular sections or not. Therefore, it cannot be said that pendency of the bail application would curtail the right of the accused – applicant either to apply for discharge or for the same reason, the competent court is not empowered to decide the application for discharge. 6. Similarly, there is another technical issue raised by the respondent that an application u/s.227 of Cr.P.C., cannot be filed on 16.11.2017 because before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in pending SLP, there was a disclosure on 10.11.2017 that the case is coming up before the trial Court for framing of charge on 20.11.2017. Thereupon, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has hoped that the trial Court shall hear the arguments on charge on that date and take a view insofar as framing of charge is concerned. In view of such submission, it would be appropriate to recollect the record of proceedings dated 10.11.2017 in SLP, which reads as under:- “We are informed by the learned counsel for the parties that the case is coming up before the Trial Court for framing of chargeon 20.11.2017. We hope that the Trial Court shall hear the arguments on charge on that date and take a view insofar as framing of charge is concerned. List the matter in the first week of December, 2017.” 7. Based upon the above record and proceedings, it is submitted that when it is disclosed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that when the matter is coming up for framing of charge, and when framing of charge is provided u/s.228 of the Cr.P.C. and therefore, the case is at the stage of Section 228 of Cr.P.C. the application u/s.227 of Cr.P.C., cannot be entertained. If we believe such submissions, which is surprising, but it seems that respondents want to submit that once charge is framed u/s.228, no order under any sections prior to Section 228 can be passed by the trial Court. Thereby, the trial Court may not be entitled to even issue warrant or summons in case of absence of accused, pending trial, since provisions for issuance of summons and warrant of arrest so also proclamation and attachment for absconding accused are provided between Sections 61 to 90. Similarly, the trial Court may not be entitled to issue witness summons or other appropriate orders in accordance with law. 8. Whereas, even if we consider the submission of respondent as it is, even then, it becomes clear that even the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has hoped that trial Court shall hear the arguments on charge and take a view insofar as framing of the charge is concerned and therefore, it is absolutely in order when the applicant has preferred an application u/s.227 of the Cr.P.C. to discharge him at the time of framing of charge so as to enable the trial Court to decide the issue regarding framing of charge, by conclusive determination that whether there is sufficient and prima facie evidence placed before it with the charge by the prosecution so as to continue the trial or to discharge the accused. 9. Therefore, there is no substance in the submissions made by the respondent that pursuant to disclosure in record of proceedings dated 10.11.2017 by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the SLP between the parties, which is reproduced herein above, the trial Court should not entertain the application for discharge and applicant may not be discharged. There is one another reason for such determination i.e. perusal of impugned order makes it clear that respondent has not taken such stand before the trial Court and to that extent, it is a new plea at this stage. However, since there is no substance in such plea, the present revision application cannot be dismissed solely for such reason and thereby, we have to decide the revision application on merits. 10. The third similar technical plea by the respondent is to the effect that, now, when the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India is seized with the issued in above-referred SLP, this court should not entertain such revision application. 10. The third similar technical plea by the respondent is to the effect that, now, when the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India is seized with the issued in above-referred SLP, this court should not entertain such revision application. It is already observed herein above, that SLP pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India though between the same parties and though factual details before both the courts may be similar, the fact remains that the issue before the SLP is with reference to the entitlement of the applicant u/s.439 of the Cr.P.C. to be released on bail, wherein consideration would be altogether different; whereas, at present, the issues under consideration are with reference to the entitlement of the applicant to be discharged u/s.227 of the Cr.P.C. Moreover, it is also settled legal position that in absence of specific direction by the higher authority not to proceed further in particular case or in absence of stay of further proceedings by higher authority, no court is restricted or prohibited to proceed further in accordance with law to dispose of any matter as early as possible so as to meet the ends of justice. 11. Therefore, there is no substance in any technical ground raised by the respondent and thus, now, we shall verify the factual details to examine that whether there is any irregularity or illegality in the impugned order or not; in rejecting the application to discharge the applicant from the charges levelled against him. 12. It is undisputed fact that the applicant is the President-Trustee of Sumandeep Vidyapeeth, a Deemed university, which runs four Educational Institutions, including one Medical College. 13. Complaint has been lodged by one Dr. Jasminaben, wife of Dilipbhai Devda; doctor by profession, alleging a demand of Rs. 20 lakh by the applicant and other co-accused who are stated to be in conspiracy with each other. The complainant has averred that her daughter Maurvi was MBBS student since August, 2012 and for MBBS degree course, a sum of Rs. 31,59,000/- towards fees for 4 years was paid in advance to the Educational Institution and not a single paisa was due when her final year examination was due in the year 2017. The examination was held between 19.1.2017 and 16.2.2017. 31,59,000/- towards fees for 4 years was paid in advance to the Educational Institution and not a single paisa was due when her final year examination was due in the year 2017. The examination was held between 19.1.2017 and 16.2.2017. As the date of examination was fast approaching, the students were required to fill up necessary form in the students section of the institute and accordingly, when Maurvi approached the student section for form; she was told that she would be able to fill up the form only if no objection certificate was obtained from the applicant herein. This fact was informed by the student to his father; husband of the complainant who is also a doctor by profession. He met the applicant who demanded from him a sum of Rs. 20 lakh. He retorted saying that what for such a huge sum was demanded from him though the entire fee was paid in advance. He was told to meet the co-accused Bharatbhai Sawant and pay him the said money. Particulars of Bharatbhai Sawant including his mobile number were also given by the applicant to the husband of the complainant. After meeting Bharatbhai Sawant, the husband of the complainant repeated the same question that on what account such huge demand was made from him but accused Bharatbhai Sawant is stated to have insisted for the money. As the facts detailed in the complaint would suggest, Bharatbhai Sawant kept on insisting for the payment on different occasions. It is also borne out from the complaint that the husband of the complainant was told that owing to demonetisation, if he does not have huge amount of cash, cheque in the sum of Rs. 20 lakh can be deposited and such cheque would be returned once cash amount is paid. It is also borne out from the FIR that the complainant’s husband went on asking for time on few occasions for arrangement of cash. It is also borne out from the FIR that one Dr. Dhruvin had close relations with the applicant and at the time of initial admission process in the Medical Institution he was of the help to the complainant’s husband. He had given mobile number to enable the complainant’s husband to contact him in case of need. The complainant and her husband, therefore, contacted Dr. Dhruvin had close relations with the applicant and at the time of initial admission process in the Medical Institution he was of the help to the complainant’s husband. He had given mobile number to enable the complainant’s husband to contact him in case of need. The complainant and her husband, therefore, contacted Dr. Dhruvin; on intervention of whom eventually it was agreed that cheque in the sum of Rs. 20 lakh would be deposited within two days in the name of the Institution and would be returned on payment of Rs. 20 lakh in cash. The complainant’s daughter was permitted to fill in the examination form upon intervention of Dr. Dhruvin. However, the cheques were not deposited and the date of examination was fast approaching. This delay made the applicant and Bharatbhai restless and upon insistence of Bharatbhai Sawant, eventually, in order to see that the complainants daughter is not deprived of the seat in the examination, two cheques of each in the sum of Rs. 10 lakh were deposited with the Institution. It is also borne out that for the purpose of depositing of the cheques the student who was in the midst of the examination was disturbed and called to the office and was told that she was required to deposit the cheques. 14. It is also borne out from the FIR that after consuming some time and upon insistence of Bharatbhai, eventually, the complainant’s husband arranged for money but as the complainant was not in favour of paying illegal gratification, she registered the case against the applicant and others. 15. It is stated that three different panchnamas were drawn and raid was successfully carried out. Necessary procedure was followed and phenolphthalein powder was applied to the currency notes and were delivered to accused - Bharatbhai who is stated to have accounted the said money by means of counting machine and the said amount tainted with phenolphthalein powder was recovered from him. 16. In another raid 220 undated cheques drawn in the name of the Institution, worth more than Rs. 100 crore as also certain fixed deposits came to be recovered from the accountants office of the Institution, which was managed by one Purvi. It is quite clear that presence of cheques and FDRs may never prove the offence under the PC Act. 17. 100 crore as also certain fixed deposits came to be recovered from the accountants office of the Institution, which was managed by one Purvi. It is quite clear that presence of cheques and FDRs may never prove the offence under the PC Act. 17. In the third raid it is stated that the incriminating material came to be recovered from the office of the applicant. However, there is no clarity that what is incriminating in such other material. 18. In the background of the aforesaid facts, rival contentions are required to be answered. 19. As against that, the applicant has come forward, both before the trial Court as well as this court with following submissions to get him discharged from the charges levelled against him. a. From the perusal of chargesheet filed by the investigating agency, no prima facie case is established under the provisions of the PC Act. b. Whatever is submitted with chargesheet, is not sufficient for proceeding against the applicant under the PC Act and to prove that, applicant had demanded or accepted any illegal gratification. c. The applicant is neither a public servant as defined under the provisions of Section 2(c) of the PC Act nor he has aided any public servant in commission of alleged offence. d. The applicant does not hold any post, whatsoever in Sumandeep Deemed to be an University and therefore, invocation of Sections of PC Act is unwarranted. e. So far as Educational Institutions are concerned, special provisions are there under definition clause in PC Act, however, applicant does not come within the purview of any of the said provision and therefore, he cannot be charged with the offences under the PC Act. f. The applicant is neither a Chairman, Member or an employee of any Service Commission or Board or Member of any Selection Commission appointed by such Service Commission or Board for conducting any examination or making any selection on behalf of such Service Commission or Board within the meaning of Section 2(c)(x). g. The applicant is also not a Vice-Chancellor nor a Member of any governing body, neither Professor, Reader, Lecturer or Teacher of any other cadre of any University and his services were never availed by any University or any other public authority in connection with holding or conducting of examinations. g. The applicant is also not a Vice-Chancellor nor a Member of any governing body, neither Professor, Reader, Lecturer or Teacher of any other cadre of any University and his services were never availed by any University or any other public authority in connection with holding or conducting of examinations. h. Applicant is also not an office bearer or an employee of any educational, scientific, social, cultural or other Institution receiving any grant or financial assistance from the Central or State Government or local or other public authority and therefore, he does not fall within the definition of public servant. i. The applicant has been wrongly arrayed as a public servant and therefore, the charges under the PC Act, cannot be framed against him. j. When special provisions are in existence and when charges cannot be framed under such special provisions, resort cannot be made to general provisions, since general provisions cannot abrogate such special provisions. Therefore, applicant not being a public servant under the special provisions, cannot be arrayed as a public servant under other general provisions. k. The applicant does not hold any office, authorising or requiring him to discharge any public duty. l. There is no evidence in the chargesheet submitted against the applicant to suggest that applicant hold any office or he was authorised by any authority of the State Government or Central Government to discharged any public duty and therefore, he cannot be arrayed as a public servant. m. Otherwise also, chargesheet is bad in law in view of provisions of Section 19(1)(c) of the PC Act and Sections 50 and 51 of the Gujarat Public Trusts Act, 2011 (‘Trusts Act’, for short). n. The office of the Charity Commissioner is not entitled to accord any sanction to prosecute the applicant as a public servant and sanction for prosecution obtained by the prosecuting agency from the incharge Joint Charity Commissioner is bad in law. o. The provisions of law invoked for the purpose of granting sanction against the applicant is in fact relates to the filing of the civil suit and does not contemplate any authority to grant sanction for prosecution under the PC Act. o. The provisions of law invoked for the purpose of granting sanction against the applicant is in fact relates to the filing of the civil suit and does not contemplate any authority to grant sanction for prosecution under the PC Act. p. The Charity Commissioner has neither the power to appoint the applicant nor remove the applicant and there is no power under Sections 50 and 51 of the Trusts Act, which authorises the Charity Commissioner to grant sanction as contemplated under Section 19 of the PC Act. q. The grant of valid sanction is sacrosanct for proceeding further under the PC Act. However, there is no valid sanction, which is prerequisite. r. The applicant was a Trustee of a public charitable trust, which does not administer or govern the Deemed to be University and the Colleges constituted under it. s. The Deemed University is governed by the Board of Management and its officers as per the University Grants Commission Regulations, 2016 (‘UGC Regulations’, for short) and all other applicable regulations from time to time. t. There is no authority conferred upon the trust so as to administer and manage the Educational Institution and trust is not declared as Deemed to be University, control of which is conferred upon the governing Board. u. Section 2(c)(xi) of the PC Act does not include in its purview any Deemed University and thereby, when the legislature intended to cover only the University and not Deemed to be University, and when it is otherwise clear that the Deemed to be University, is not an University, provisions of PC Act, cannot be invoked in reference to an Institution, which is not recorded, but which is only an institution, Deemed to be an University and therefore, what is included by the legislature, cannot be undone by adopting the principle of purposive interpretation because the legislature has specifically not provided the deeming fiction in Section 2(c)(xi) of the PC Act though deeming fiction has been provided whenever the legislature has thought it fit. v. UGC Regulations restrict the word of ‘University’ by the Institutions, which are defined as ‘Deemed to be University’. Thus, the Institution which is defined as ‘Deemed to be University’, is certainly different from the regular University as defined under the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 (‘UGC Act’, for short). v. UGC Regulations restrict the word of ‘University’ by the Institutions, which are defined as ‘Deemed to be University’. Thus, the Institution which is defined as ‘Deemed to be University’, is certainly different from the regular University as defined under the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 (‘UGC Act’, for short). Therefore, provisions of PC Act cannot be invoked against the office bearers of an Institution, which is defined as Deemed to be University and thereby, present proceedings are required to be dropped since the Institution under reference is not an University. w. One cannot imply anything in penal statute, which is inconsistent with the words expressly used, since the particular word used by the legislature has to be understood strictly and thereby, there is no scope for interpreting criminal statute broadly, elaborately and progressively when the scheme of statute clearly shows that certain words were deliberately omitted by the legislature for a particular purpose or motive and thus, it is not open to the investigating agency or the courts to add those words either by confirming to the supposed intention of the legislature or because the insertion or the omission suits the ideology of the investigating agency. Otherwise, it would amount to interpolation of the statutory provisions. In support of such submission, applicant is relying upon the judgment by a Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Tolaram Relumal Vs. State of Bombay reported in AIR 1954 SC 496 . 20. In addition to above-referred submissions against the impugned order, learned senior counsel Mr. Nanavaty for the applicant is also submitting as under:- (1) It is unfortunate that the investigating agency and complainant have averred false statement in the complaint itself so as to initiate proceedings against the applicant. It is undisputed fact that neither Sumandeep Vidyapith nor any of its trust or associate Institutions are getting grant from the Central Government. In complaint, it is stated that Sumandeep Vidyapith is getting grant from the Central Government. Similarly, though there is not a single piece of evidence to confirm that applicant has been authorised by any law or any authority to perform any duty. In its averred that applicant has misused his powers assigned under the statute by accepting bribe. In complaint, it is stated that Sumandeep Vidyapith is getting grant from the Central Government. Similarly, though there is not a single piece of evidence to confirm that applicant has been authorised by any law or any authority to perform any duty. In its averred that applicant has misused his powers assigned under the statute by accepting bribe. (2) It is specifically submitted that disclosure regarding grant from Central Government and assignment of powers by statute to the applicant is absolutely incriminating statement and that Sumandeep Vidyapith is unaided self-financed institute. Thereby, it is specifically emphasized by the applicant that neither the trust nor its Institutions are getting any financial support or aid to carry out educational activities from either of the Government i.e. State or Central and that all the expenses incurred by such Institutions are managed from self-finance. (3) It is also specifically submitted and emphasized that applicant is not permanent President of any Institution, but he is Trustee of Sumandeep Charitable Trust, which is sponsoring such Educational Institutions, including Sumandeep Vidyapith, which is unaided, self-financed Educational Institution run by its governing body, purely on self-finance. (4) It is specifically emphasized that no authority whatsoever is conferred upon the applicant in any law to take part in administration of such Deemed to be University and thereby, he is not a public servant with reference to either of the provisions viz. Section 2(c)(viii) or (x), (xi) and (xii) and that he is not holding any office or not performing any public duty and not authorised in any manner and therefore, he is not a public servant so as to prosecute him under PC Act. In support of such submission, applicant is relying upon UGC Regulations, more particularly, as per paragraphs 5.4, 5.5 and 5.7 of such Regulations, the highest governing body of the Deemed to be University, shall be of Board of Management to be headed by the Vice Chancellor; whereas, pursuant to paragraph 5.5, such Board of Management of the Institution shall be independent of the sponsoring Society/Trust/Company and manage the Society/Trust/Company with full autonomy to perform its academic and administrative and responsibilities and that number of representative(es)/nominee(es) sponsoring Society/Trust/Company on the Board of Management shall be limited to maximum four. Thereby, when in paragraph 5.7, list of 9 category of members are prescribed, confirming that there shall be Board of Management consisting of them and therein the nominees sponsored by the Society/Trust/Company shall be maximum four in number, there is least chance of having any possibility of misdeed. (5) Reference and reliance is also placed on paragraph 4.4 of A-1 of UGC Regulations, which provides for the powers of Board of Management, wherein different activities are described, which includes fixation of fees and other financial activities. (6) Reference and reliance is also placed on A-2 to such UGC Regulations, which is describing other authorities of the Institutions, which are considered as Deemed to be University, submitting that list of such Officers do not include the trustee as one of the trustee of such educational institution and therefore, applicant being trustee of Sumandeep Charitable Trust, cannot be identified as an Officer of an Institution. Similarly, in paragraph 6.8 of such A-2, there is details with reference to Controller of Examination and it also do not include the trustee as such. (7) Factual allegation has no relevance considering the position of the applicant, not being a public servant and not holding any public office and not performing any public duty. (8) Reference is made to provisions of Sections 2(f) and 3 of the UGC Act so as to understand the definition and difference between the “University” and “Deemed University”. Section 2(f) defines the word “University” confirming that it means a University established or incorporated by or under a Central Act, a Provincial Act or a State Act and includes any such Institution as may be in consultation with the University concerned be recognized by Commission in accordance with Regulations made in this behalf under this Act. Section 2(f) defines the word “University” confirming that it means a University established or incorporated by or under a Central Act, a Provincial Act or a State Act and includes any such Institution as may be in consultation with the University concerned be recognized by Commission in accordance with Regulations made in this behalf under this Act. Whereas, Section 3 provides that the Central Government may, on the advice of the Commission, declare by notification in Official Gazette that any Institution for higher education, other than a University, shall be Deemed to be a University, for the purpose of this Act and on such a declaration being made, all the provisions of this Act shall apply to such Institution as if it were an University within the meaning of Clause (f) of Section 2; submitting that thereby, Deemed University is different than a University as defined under the Act, because to consider any Institution as a Deemed University, is different than identifying particular Institution as Deemed University; because Section 23 of the same Act prohibits the use of the word “University” associated with its name in any manner whatsoever. Section 23 makes it clear that no Institution, whether a corporate body or not, other than a University established or incorporated by or under Central Government or Provincial Act or a State Act, shall be entitled to have the word “University” associated with its name in any manner whatsoever. Further reference is made to Section 12A(1) of the Act, wherein it is made clear that University means a University or an Institution referred to in Sub-Section (1) of Section 22 while providing Regulation of Fees and Prohibition of Donations in Certain Cases. (9) In furtherance to above provisions, it is submitted that the stand of the UGC on such issue is declared by the UGC itself before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Vijay Kumar & Ors. Vs. Kartar Singh & Ors., which is connected with the case of Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Ltd. Vs. Rabi Sankar Patro & Ors. Vs. Kartar Singh & Ors., which is connected with the case of Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Ltd. Vs. Rabi Sankar Patro & Ors. In Civil Appeal Nos.17869 – 17870 and 17902 – 17905 of 2017 when Additional Solicitor General of India appearing for UGC has submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that inclusive definition of “University” in UGC Act was in a completely and different context and the idea was essentially to recognize Deemed to be University for the purpose of funding and that such Deemed to be University is not an University for all purposes. In light of above submission, applicant is relying upon determination in paragraph 42 by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Ltd. (supra), which reads as under:- “42. The grant or empowerment in Bharathidasan (supra) in favour of the University in question came from the State enactment which was its Charter. There is no such Charter or grant in favour of a Deemed to be University under any provision of the UGC Act. All that the UGC Act does is to confer Deemed to be University status on an Institution which has achieved excellence in its chosen field so that its development in the concerned field and its attempts to attain excellence and conduct research are not hampered on any count and at the same time it could be extended the facilities of Aid. It is precisely for this that the distinction between a regular University established under a Central Act, a Provincial Act or a State Act and an Institution Deemed to be University is maintained in the UGC Act. A Deemed to be University can certainly award degrees but cannot use the word “University” by virtue of Section 23 of the UGC Act. Even after conferral of such status it still continues to be “an Institution Deemed to be University” and if it is equated with a University in every sense of the term it would lead to incoherent and incongruous results, in that its area of operation or the field of its activity would be completely unlimited and unregulated. Even after conferral of such status it still continues to be “an Institution Deemed to be University” and if it is equated with a University in every sense of the term it would lead to incoherent and incongruous results, in that its area of operation or the field of its activity would be completely unlimited and unregulated. In our view that is certainly not the intent of the UGC Act.” Though such observation is with reference to the activities of the Deemed Universities and in the field of educational activities, and that it has been held that Deemed Universities are required to abide by the provisions of 1994 AICTE Regulations and could not introduce courses leading to award of degrees in Engineering without the approval of AICTE. 1994 AICTE Regulations, the fact remains that Hon’ble the Supreme Court of India has categorically held in paragraph 43 that conceptually, there is some difference between the status of the University established under State Law and that of a Deemed to be University and that the expectation from a Deemed to be University are of a different dimension i.e. excellence, research and advancement in its chosen field for which such status was accorded. (10) The UGC has issued a Circular on 10.11.2017 to restrict use of word “University” by the “Deemed University”. Pursuant to paragraph 20 of UGC Regulations and in case between A. Subramaniam Vs. The Inspector of Police, CBI Economic Offences Unit II. by its judgment dated 25.6.2014 in Crl.RC.No.124 of 2013, the High Court of Judicature at Madras has while discharging the applicant before it from the charges and while quashing the order framing the charges under PC Act hold that the applicant before it, who is Dy. Registrar (Academics) of a Deemed to be University is not a public servant and does not come under the purview of Section 2(c) of the PC Act. Therefore, it is submitted that though SLP against such order may be pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court since such judgment is neither stayed nor there is any specific order so as to negativate the observations in such judgment, till date, the judgment is certainly effective and holds the field on the subject that whether persons connected with Deemed University can be termed as a public servant or not. It is also submitted that facts of the applicant is far better than the applicant before the Madras High Court inasmuch as, applicant before the Madras High Court was in fact serving in Deemed University; whereas, the present applicant is simply a Trustee of the trust and not directly connected in activities of the Deemed University, which is under reference. The applicant has relied upon paragraphs 24, 27, 30, 35, 38, 39, 40, 47, and 48 of such judgment. (11) With reference to above submissions, it is reiterated by the applicant that the Institution before us is not getting any aid from the Government and therefore, strict view of definition of public servant and public duty is to be taken and thereby, it is submitted that even if there is factual material regarding acceptance of some amount, it cannot be termed as bribe. 21. The applicant is relying upon several decisions in support of above submissions, which are briefly discussed as under:- (1) In Tolaram Relumal’s case (supra), it is held that it is a well settled rule of construction of penal statutes that if two possible and reasonable constructions can be put upon a penal provision, the Court must lean towards that construction which exempts the subject from penalty rather than the one which imposes penalty. It is not competent to the Court to stretch the meaning of an expression used by the Legislature in order to carry out the intention of the Legislature and therefore, though there was acceptance of money by the appellant before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is held that it was not made punishable under relevant statute. (2) In Spicer v Holt reported in (1976) 3 AllER 71, the House of Lords has quoted the following paragraphs from the case of Barnard Vs. Gorman reported in (1941)3 AllER 45:- “Our duty in the matter is plain. We must note give the statutory words a wider meaning merely because, on a narrower construction, the words might leave on a loophole for fraud against the Revenue. If, on the proper construction of the section, that is the result, it is not for judges to attempt to cure it. That is the business of Parliament. We must note give the statutory words a wider meaning merely because, on a narrower construction, the words might leave on a loophole for fraud against the Revenue. If, on the proper construction of the section, that is the result, it is not for judges to attempt to cure it. That is the business of Parliament. Our duty is to take the words as they stand and to given them their true construction, having regard to the language of the whole section, and, as far as relevant, of the whole Act, always preferring the natural meaning of the word involved, but none the less always giving the word its appropriate construction according to the context.” (3) In Bijaya Kumar Agrawala Vs. State of Orissa reported in (1996)5 SCC 1 , Hon’ble the Supreme Court of India has hold that strict construction is the general rule of penal statutes and reproduced the determination in the case of Tolaram Relumal’s case (supra) confirming that the same principle was echoed in the judgment of the five Judge Bench in the case of Sanjay Dutt v. The State through C.B.I., Bombay reported in (1994)5 JT(SC) 225 : (1994 AIR SCW 4360) which approved an earlier expression of the rule by us in Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijiava, (1990)4 SCC 76 to reconfirm that “when a law visits a person with serious penal consequences extra care must be taken to ensure that those whom the legislature did not intend to be covered by the express language of the statute are not roped in by stretching the language of the law” (4) In Sakshi vs. Union of India reported in (2004)5 SCC 518 again the Hon’ble the Supreme Court of India has held that It is well settled principle that the intention of the Legislature is primarily to be gathered form the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence a construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. It is contrary to all rules of construction to read words into an Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. Similarly it is wrong and dangerous to proceed by substituting some other words for words of the statute. It is contrary to all rules of construction to read words into an Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. Similarly it is wrong and dangerous to proceed by substituting some other words for words of the statute. It is equally well settled that a statute enacting an offence or imposing a penalty is strictly construed. The fact that an enactment is a penal provision is in itself a reason for hesitating before ascribing to phrases used in it a meaning broarder than that they would ordinarily bear. Relying upon such determination, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has further held that Prosecution of an accused for any offence on radically enlarged meaning of any provision as suggested by the petitioner may violate the guarantee enshrined in Article 20(1) of the Constitution which says that no person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. The first and foremost requirement in criminal law is that it should be absolutely certain and clear. An exercise to alter any definition by a process of judicial interpretation, and that too when there is no ambiguity in the provisions of the enactment, is bound to result in good deal of chaos and confusion, and will not be in the interest of society at large. (5) In Aparna A. Shah Vs. Sheth Developers Private Limited & Anr. reported in (2013)8 SCC 71 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has reiterated the principle that strict interpretation is required to be given to penal statutes. (6) In D.R. Venkatachalam & Ors. Vs. Dy. Transport Commissioner & Ors. reported in (1977)2 SCC 273 , the larger Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has observed as under:- “28. It is, however, becoming increasingly fashionable to start with some` theory of what is basic to a provision or a chapter or in a statute or even to our Constitution in order to interpret and determine the meaning of a particular provision or rule made to sub-serve an assumed "basic" requirement. I think that this novel method of construction puts, if I may say so, the cart before the horse. I think that this novel method of construction puts, if I may say so, the cart before the horse. It is apt to seriously mislead us unless the tendency to use such a mode of construction is checked or corrected by this Court. What is basic for a section or a chapter in a statute is provided: firstly, by the words used in the statute itself; secondly, by the context in which a provision occurs, or, in other words, by reading the statute as a whole; thirdly, by the preamble which could supply the "key" to the meaning of the statute in cases of uncertainty or doubt; and, fourthly, where some further aid to construction may still be needed to resolve an uncertainty by the legislative history which discloses the wider context or perspective in which a provision was made to meet a particular need or to satisfy a particular purpose. The last mentioned method consists of an application of the Mischief Rule laid down in Heydon's case long ago. 29. If we start from a theory as to. what the real purpose or need is or could be, the danger is that we may be injecting a subjective notion or purpose of our own into what is, after all, a legal question of construction or interpretation, according to well recognised principles, although it may be necessary, in exceptional eases, to explain or fortify the interpretation adopted in the light of so well under- stood and. well known a purpose or theory that we could take judicial notice of it and refer to it. The exposition of the well known purpose or theoretical foundation must, however, generally, flow from and explain an interpretation adopted, on the strength of legally acceptable and accepted canons of construction, if we are to avoid the danger of an a priori determination of the meaning of a provision based on our own preconceived notions of an ideological structure or scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somehow fitted. The path of judicial certainty and predictability has to be paved with well settled principles of construction and interpretation. We cannot let it develop into a slippery slope be-set with hazardous possibilities. The science of statutory construction and interpretation- I think can call it that-rests on certain systematised principles and rules of common sense, logic, and reason. The path of judicial certainty and predictability has to be paved with well settled principles of construction and interpretation. We cannot let it develop into a slippery slope be-set with hazardous possibilities. The science of statutory construction and interpretation- I think can call it that-rests on certain systematised principles and rules of common sense, logic, and reason. It can not be transformed into a happy hunting ground for whatever may captivate the forensic or judicial fancy or become something akin to poetry without even the attractions of euphony. (7) In State of Bihar Vs. Bhagirath Sharma & Anr. reported in (1973)2 SCC 257 Hon’ble the Supreme Court of India has held that according to the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence, which reflects fair play, the statute should clearly specify what is ones obligation and what act of commission or omission constitute a criminal offence. 22. The learned senior counsel Mr. Nanavaty for the applicant has also pressed upon to consider the principle against doubtful penalisation submitting that whenever it can be argued that an enactment may have a legal meaning regarding infliction of a detriment of any kind, the principle against doubtful penalisation comes into play. If the detriment is minor, the principle will carry little weight. If the detriment is severe, the principle will be correspondingly powerful. It is a matter of degree – the greater the unfairness, the more it is to be expected that Parliament will make it clear if that is intended. However, it operates, the principle requires that persons should not be subjected by law to any sort of detriment unless this is imposted by clear words. Those who content that a penalty may be inflicted must show that the words of the Act distinctly enact that it shall be incurred under the present circumstances. They must fail if the words are merely equally capable of a construction that would, and one that would not, inflict the penalty. The strict construction of penal statutes seems to manifest itself in four ways: in the requirement of express language for the creation of an offence; in interpreting strictly words setting out the elements of an offence; in requiring the fulfillment to the letter of statutory conditions precedent to the infliction of punishment; and in insisting on the strict observance of technical provisions concerning criminal procedure and jurisdiction. 23. 23. In addition to above-referred submission on facts and concepts with reference to the consideration of the applicant as public servant or his duties as public duty, the applicant has also assailed the chargesheet and impugned order on procedural aspect also, submitting that no prosecution can be initiated without proper and valid sanction and that in the present case, there is neither proper and valid sanction and that in fact, when applicant is not a public servant, practically, nobody can accord sanction to prosecute him and when sanction is sine qua non to initiate the proceeding under the PC Act, on such ground also prosecution initiated by the respondent, is unwarranted and applicant needs to be discharged. In support of such submission, applicant has submitted as under:- (a) Sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act has been granted by the Incharge Joint Charity Commissioner; whereas, the provision of Section 19 of the PC Act makes it clear that no court shall take cognizance of offences punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant except with the previous sanction in following manner:- (1) By or with the sanction of the Central Government in case of a person, who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of that Government; (2) By or with the sanction of the State Government in case of a person, who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of that Government; (3) In the case of any other person, the authority competent to remove him from his office. (b) Therefore, it is submitted that the office of the Charity Commissioner, and more particularly, Incharge Joint Charity Commissioner, is not competent to remove the applicant from his office as a Trustee of the trust, the sanction accorded by the Incharge Joint Charity Commissioner is not proper and valid sanction and therefore, prosecution cannot be initiated. (b) Therefore, it is submitted that the office of the Charity Commissioner, and more particularly, Incharge Joint Charity Commissioner, is not competent to remove the applicant from his office as a Trustee of the trust, the sanction accorded by the Incharge Joint Charity Commissioner is not proper and valid sanction and therefore, prosecution cannot be initiated. It is quite clear that Section 19 is couched in mandatory terms and forbids courts from taking cognizance of any offence against public servant except with the previous sanction of competent authority enumerated in Clause a, b and c as above, which is to be considered if at all as a public servant, then, he would be governed by Clause (c) of Section 19 and sanction would be required to be accorded by the authority competent to remove him from office. However, there is no authority conferred upon the Charity Commissioner acting under the provisions of the Trusts Act. It is submitted that there is no authority conferred upon the Charity Commissioner acting under the provisions of such Act either under Sections 50 or 51 or under any other provisions to remove the trustee. Therefore, either the Charity Commissioner or his delegate, the Incharge Joint Charity Commissioner has no authority to remove the trustee and thus, sanction obtained from them is not in accordance with Section 19(1)(c) of the PC Act. It is quite clear that the sanction by a person not authorised by law would be without jurisdiction and thereby, nullity and therefore, no cognizance can be taken by the court on the basis of such sanction. It is further submitted that duties and powers of qualification of Charity Commissioner does not include the powers to remove any trustee though the Charity Commissioner may have a power to file a suit for and on behalf of any trust and or to direct the trust and to institute a suit so as to safeguard the rights of such trust. But, extending such power to accord the sanction for criminal proceedings is certainly unwarranted and amounts to exercising the jurisdiction, which is otherwise not vested in such officer by law. But, extending such power to accord the sanction for criminal proceedings is certainly unwarranted and amounts to exercising the jurisdiction, which is otherwise not vested in such officer by law. Therefore, the observation by the Charity Commissioner in sanction dated 1.5.2017 that trustees and office bearers of Sumandeep Vidyapith falls within the the definition of public servant u/s.2(c) of the PC Act, is unwarranted and illegal and that when Sections 50 and 51 of the Trusts Act is not extending any such jurisdiction to Charity Commissioner, sanction based upon Sections 50 and 51 of the Trusts Act is absolutely illegal and cannot be considered as proper sanction to prosecute the petitioner under the PC Act. 24. On the ground of sanction, the applicant is relying upon following decisions:- (a) P.A. Mohandas Vs. State of Kerala reported in (2003)9 SCC 504 , wherein it is held that even when sanction accorded by the competent authority prior to the date of such authorisation, then, it was without jurisdiction and proceedings were quashed due to non-compliance of Section 19. (b) Manoranjan Prasad Choudhary Vs. State of Bihar reported in 2004 SCC (Cri.) 1213 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has reconfirmed that in absence of sanction by competent authority, the proceeding is vitiated and liable to be quashed. (c) State of Goa Vs. Babu Thomas reported in (2005)8 SCC 130 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held that when sanction order is not issued by competent authority, even if cognizance is taken by the trial Judge, it is invalid. The applicant has read-out paragraphs 4 to 7 of such judgment and emphasized the observation in paragraph 12 that when authority that was not a competent authority to have issued even authorisation to accord the sanction and when the authority, which was not competent to accord the sanction, then, even if cognizance is taken by the Judge in absence of sanction under the law, the statute does not authorise him to take cognizance, since this is a fundamental error, which invalidates the cognizance as without jurisdiction. (d) In State, Inspector of Police, Vishakhapatnam Vs. (d) In State, Inspector of Police, Vishakhapatnam Vs. Surya Sankaram Karri reported in 2006 Cr.L.J. 4598 again the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has reconfirmed that the sanction granted by authority, who is not competent to remove the person from his service, then, such sanction being without jurisdiction is invalid and thereby, confirmed that grant of proper sanction by competent authority is a sine qua non for taking cognizance of the offence and that the question as regards sanction may be determined at an early stage and that when a sanction is granted by a person not authorised in law, the same being without jurisdiction, would be nullity and therefore, no prosecution can be permitted or in other words, the court is not empowered to take cognizance in such a case. (e) In Nanjappa Vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2015)14 SCC 186 the applicant has relied upon and read-out paragraphs 10, 11, 18 to 20 and 22. I am avoiding to reproduce these paragraphs. However, it specifically confirms that there is no manner of doubt that Section 19(1) of the PC Act is couched in mandatory terms and forbids courts from taking cognizance of any offence punishable under PC Act even against public servants; whereas, in the present case, applicant is not public servant. The court has relied upon the case of Babu Thomas (supra) while determining that if the trial Court proceeds, despite the invalidity attached to the sanction order, the same shall be Deemed to be non-est in the eyes of law and shall not forbid a second trial for the same offences, upon grant of a valid sanction for such prosecution. Thereby, it is made clear that proceeding further despite the invalid sanction order, should be Deemed as non-est. (f) Gaurishankar Purshottamdas Joshi Vs. State of Gujarat in Special Criminal Application (Quashing) No.952 of 2014, wherein the coordinate Bench of this court has in its judgment dated 29.3.2016 dealt with the similar issue while making it clear that if a general power to take cognizance of an offence is vested in a Court, any prohibition to the exercise of that power, by any provision of law, must be confined to the terms of the prohibition. The Court is primarily concerned to see that the prosecution for the offences in cases covered by the prohibition, shall not commence without complying that condition contained therein, such as previous sanction of the competent authority in the case of a public servant and any other case with the consent of the party or the party interested for the prosecution or aggrieved by the offence. Thus, from whatsoever angle, Subsection (1) of Section 19 of the Act of 1988 is viewed, no Court of a Special Judge under the Act can take cognizance of an offence except with the previous sanction of the appropriate authority. (g) In State of Uttarakhand Vs. Yogendra Nath Arora & Anr. reported in (2013)14 SCC 299 again the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has confirmed the quashing of prosecution initiated against the person without valid sanction. 25. As against that, learned APP Mr. Amin has vehemently opposed the application and read-out several pages from the chargesheet. However, those factual details are already narrated in previous paragraphs and therefore, there is no reason or sense to reproduce the same again. In addition to factual details, which may certainly tempt any individual to think against the applicant, the State has also tried to convince the court on technical issues, so as to avoid the decision in the matter at the earliest or to dismiss the application on such technical and emotional ground. So far as technical issues by respondent are concerned, they are dealt with in previous part of the judgment and therefore, it is not required to be re-discussed except reiterating the fact that – (a) Learned senior counsel Mr. Nanavaty for the applicant has specifically made a statement that he himself is appearing for the applicant before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in pending matter wherein the issue before the Hon’ble Supreme Court is limited regarding granting of bail to the applicant and that pendency of this revision application is already disclosed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court by both the parties and therefore, in absence of any specific restrictive direction to proceed further in the present matter by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, I do not see any reason to keep any matter pending on any such technical ground. (b) As already discussed herein above, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in its record of proceedings dated 10.11.2017, which is reproduced herein above that the trial Court shall hear the arguments on charge and take a view insofar as framing of charge is concerned and therefore, whether charge is to be framed or not, is to be decided by the trial Court and when trial Court has decided to frame the charge and thereafter when such order is challenged before this court, this proceeding is in continuation of framing charge and therefore, there is no restriction to proceed further in present revision application in accordance with law irrespective of its result. (c) Rest of the submission by the respondent on factual merits and issue raised by the applicant regarding consideration of ‘public servant’, ‘public duty’ and ‘sanction’ are dealt with herein after. 26. Before discussing any submission by respondent, it is to be recollected here that while framing the charge, the court has to verify the available prima facie evidence in the form of paper of chargesheet and when it is settled legal position that accused is not entitled to produce any new evidence at the time of framing of chargesheet, practically, same principle would apply to the prosecution also that while framing the chargesheet or at the time of deciding discharge application altogether new documents or facts, which are not part of the chargesheet, cannot be taken into consideration and thereby, if any documents, which are not part of the chargesheet are to be excluded while considering the discharge application. However, considering the fact that chargesheet is a bunch of more than 1000 pages, we may extend the benefit of doubt in favour of the prosecution that all relevant pages relied upon by the respondent are part of the chargesheet, though probably, it is not so. However, such papers also do not confirm the view of the prosecution so as to treat the applicant as a public servant. 27. Learned Public Prosecutor Mr. Amin has referred one affidavit dated 18.3.2017 by the applicant disclosing that he is resigning with immediate effect as a trustee of Sumandeep Vidyapith Trust because he is unable to carry out the responsibilities as such because of his busy work schedule submitting that, thereby, till 18.3.2017, the applicant was certainly trustee of the Sumandeep Trust. Learned Public Prosecutor Mr. Amin has referred one affidavit dated 18.3.2017 by the applicant disclosing that he is resigning with immediate effect as a trustee of Sumandeep Vidyapith Trust because he is unable to carry out the responsibilities as such because of his busy work schedule submitting that, thereby, till 18.3.2017, the applicant was certainly trustee of the Sumandeep Trust. Therefore, it is submitted that such resignation is after the complaint dated 23.2.2017 and therefore, it is to be presumed that applicant was trustee of Sumandeep Trust. The change report based upon such affidavit is dated 29.4.2017, which is also relied upon by learned PP. However, the fact remains that either as a trustee or in any other capacity, even if applicant is connected with Sumandeep Vidyapith, which is not a regular University getting Government grant in any manner whatsoever and thereby, when there is no dispute that it is only a Deemed University, the submissions recorded herein above on behalf of the applicant makes it clear that such Deemed University cannot considered as a regular University and thereby, applicant cannot be termed as a public servant and therefore, irrespective of such change report after the complaint, it is clear and obvious that applicant cannot be termed as a public servant. 28. The respondent is also relying upon a visiting card in the name of the applicant disclosing that he is Chancellor of Sumandeep Vidyapith, which is recovered from the drawer of his office-table in presence of the Panchas. However, such visiting card, which is lying in the table of the drawer, may not be considered as a proper and sufficient evidence to prove someones capacity, more particularly when it is undisputed fact that probably in past applicant was holding such post, but on the date of incident, he was not holding such post and it is not a case of the respondent also that applicant is Chancellor of the Sumandeep Vidyapith on the date of incident. Moreover, when card is not recovered from the person of the applicant nor it was presented to complainant or any witness, making a show that applicant is Chancellor, presence of such card at any place, including drawer of the table of the applicant in his office, does not prove anything against the applicant. Moreover, when card is not recovered from the person of the applicant nor it was presented to complainant or any witness, making a show that applicant is Chancellor, presence of such card at any place, including drawer of the table of the applicant in his office, does not prove anything against the applicant. At the most, even in case of positive evidence regarding utilisation of such card, there may be charge of impersonation, but it cannot be considered as an evidence to treat the applicant as a public servant. 29. Similarly, respondent has come forward with a bunch of documents from the Bank and Government Notification dated 17.1.2007, whereby on advice of the University Grants Commission, the Central Government has declared Sumandeep Vidyapith as Deemed to be University having four colleges, which are affiliated to Gujarat University, details of such notification and charges are not material at present because only contention by the respondent is to the effect that Chairman and Managing Team. However, as already discussed and said herein above, even if somebody is part of the management team of any such Deemed University, as decided by the Madras High Court in the case of A. Subramaniam (supra), they cannot be termed as a public servant. 30. Therefore, some other documents regarding administration of the Sumandeep Charitable Trust, are not material and relevant to hold that applicant is to be treated as a public servant because no public duty is assigned to him by any authority or by any statute in any manner whatsoever and Sumandeep Vidyapith is unaided self-finance Institution. 31. Similarly, I have perused the statements referred and relied upon by the respondent at pages 133, 495, 498, 507, 387, 809, 799, 881 etc., but it is settled legal position that when statute does not identify the applicant as a public servant, then, mere statement of the witness, would not be enough to treat the applicant as a public servant. Similarly, if the applicant is operating the account of Sumandeep Vidyapith at the relevant time, but not at the time of incident, then also, that past position cannot be considered as an evidence against the applicant to term him as a public servant. 32. Similarly, if the applicant is operating the account of Sumandeep Vidyapith at the relevant time, but not at the time of incident, then also, that past position cannot be considered as an evidence against the applicant to term him as a public servant. 32. One more technical ground is taken by the respondent that is to the effect that the application at Exh.13, which is dismissed by impugned order dated 29.11.2017 refusing to discharge the applicant, is not by the applicant himself, but signed by his advocate only and therefore, statement in such application, which is otherwise not on affidavit so also the contents of present revision application, which is also not signed by the applicant, but signed by his advocate only and thereby, all such contentions are not supported by affidavit, it cannot be relied upon. However, it is clear that for an application on law point and that too in criminal matters, signature of accused is not much material when his advocate has presented an application and when applicant has failed Vakalatnama signed by him in favour of such advocate. In the present case, applicant is still in judicial custody Vakalatnama is signed before the Jailor, which is produced on record with the revision application and therefore, it cannot be said that this revision is not filed by the applicant, but his advocate only. In my opinion, all such issues are less material than relevant merits of the case, because though not required under law, even prosecution has registered a complaint by making and endorsement by two Panch witnesses below the signature of the complainant and Police Inspector before whom complaint is registered that they have read the complaint and thereafter they have signed it. I fail to realise that when complainant is a Doctor, what is logic, requirement and under which constraint and/or provision of law, I.O. has thought it proper to get such complaint endorsed by two independent witnesses that they have read the complaint and signed it. How Panchas are material or involved in registering a complaint? Learned Public Prosecutor has also submitted that the scope of revision application is limited and in absence of non-perversity in order or if order is otherwise not improper or illegal, then, revision application cannot be entertained. How Panchas are material or involved in registering a complaint? Learned Public Prosecutor has also submitted that the scope of revision application is limited and in absence of non-perversity in order or if order is otherwise not improper or illegal, then, revision application cannot be entertained. It is also submitted that there is no merits in the revision application, since there is prima facie evidence to go for the trial. For the purpose, reference to the impugned order is material wherein it becomes clear that though the case of A. Subramaniam (supra) has been referred, the trial Court has failed to appreciate its decision only because it is under challenge before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. However, it is also clear and admitted position that, that order is not yet set-aside and therefore, pendency of any litigation before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India would not change the effective decision. The trial Court has also failed to appreciate that the decisions cited by the respondent before it and relied upon by the trial Court were not with reference to the trustee of any private charitable trust; wherein, though in the case of C.B.I. Vs. Ramesh Gelli reported in (2016)3 SCC 788 is concerning the person as a trustee of a private bank, that decision is mainly based upon the specific statutory provision in the form of Section 46(A) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, which confirms that trustees of the private banks should be treated as public servant. However, there is no such statutory provision so far as trustee of any private charitable or educational trust is concerned in any statute. However, there is no such statutory provision so far as trustee of any private charitable or educational trust is concerned in any statute. The judgment of the trial Court also shows that trial Court has failed to appreciate all the submissions by the applicant and to verify that which public duty is assigned to the applicant by whom and under which authority or statute and provision so as to treat him as a public servant and therefore, when impugned order would drag the matter for couple of years by calling different witnesses, it would be nothing, but a futile exercise to first record the evidence of several witnesses and then to decide that applicant is not a public servant so as to acquit him from all the charges and therefore, when there is lack of prima facie evidence on record to consider the applicant as a public servant, there is substance in the revision application to decide such issue and therefore, I do not see any reason to dismiss the revision application summarily. 33. Reliance is also placed on the case of Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Ltd. (supra) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has interfered in the activities of Deemed University, but it is not with reference to any criminal liability of any one, but only with reference to conducting courses in special subjects like engineering by way of distance learning, which was not permitted by the UGC. Hence, in absence of specific provision and consideration of applicability of criminal responsibility of a trustee, based upon such judgment there cannot be wider consideration as submitted by the prosecution. 34. The core issue in the matter, therefore, rest upon consideration of the identity of the applicant as a public servant so as to determine that whether applicant falls within the definition of public servant as defined under the PC Act or not and that whether any public duty is assigned to him as defined under the PC Act or not. The core issue in the matter, therefore, rest upon consideration of the identity of the applicant as a public servant so as to determine that whether applicant falls within the definition of public servant as defined under the PC Act or not and that whether any public duty is assigned to him as defined under the PC Act or not. So far as respondent is concerned, it is their case that applicant is to be Deemed to be a public servant considering the factual details of the incident; whereas it is the case of the applicant that since no public duty is assigned to him and since he could not be termed as a public servant, no prosecution can be initiated against him under the PC Act and alternatively it is submitted that if at all applicant is to be treated as a public servant, though he is not assigned any public duty and though he is not holding any post or responsibility as a trustee of a private charitable trust, and there is no valid sanction, which is mandatory under the PC Act and therefore, in absence of sanction also, he cannot be prosecuted under PC Act. 35. In support of rival submissions, both the sides have referred to and relied upon almost same set of legal provisions and therefore, instead of reproducing it separately, it would be appropriate to directly consider the legal provisions relied upon by both the sides in one set only so as to ascertain and determine above-referred issues regarding consideration of ‘public duty’, ‘public servant’ and ‘valid sanction’ for continuing the proceedings against the present applicant. 36. At first instance, we must look into the provisions of PC Act wherein Section 2(b) defines the phrase, ‘public duties’, confirming that it means a duty in the discharge of which State, Public or Committee at large has an interest. Such sub-section has explanation that ‘State’ includes a Corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act or Authority or Body under or control or aided by the Government or a Government Company as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956. Therefore, bare reading of Clause (b) of Section 2 of the PC Act makes it clear that there must be duty wherein either State or the Public or the Committee at large has a interest to that extent. Therefore, bare reading of Clause (b) of Section 2 of the PC Act makes it clear that there must be duty wherein either State or the Public or the Committee at large has a interest to that extent. Thus, it can be said that for misdeed or mismanagement or any other inappropriate activity in an educational Institution, all above i.e. State, Public and the Committee at large may have a interest. However, on one hand, it is certain and clear that performance of public duty alone would not be enough to prosectue someone under the PC Act if ingredients of the offence for which he is to be prosecuted is absent in alleged activities by him. It is clear and obvious that all activities may always not be having a colour of criminality though it may be tortuous or raising any other issue and responsibility even if it is misdeed or otherwise. In the present case, accepting an amount either as a donation or for extending some benefit, but in absence of proper evidence regarding mensrea and criminality of transactions, it cannot be considered as a crime though it may be tortuous. As against that it is submitted by the learned counsel for the applicant that though definition of public duty is wide enough, alleged activity by him cannot be termed as a public duty because he is nowhere concerned with any such public duty, and more particularly when he cannot be termed as a public servant as defined under the PC Act. 37. Therefore, identification of the applicant as a public servant is sina qua non for further consideration. Both the sides have referred and discussed the provisions of Clause (vii), (x) and (xi) of Clause (c) of Section 2 of the PC Act. Clause (c) of Section 2 of the PC Act defines the phrase ‘public servant’ and there are as many as 12 sub-clauses with two explanations, amongst which at present we are concerned with three Sub- Clauses as quoted above i.e. Sub-Clause (viii), which provides that any person, who holds an office by virtue of which he is authorised or requires to perform any public duty, can be considered as public servant. However, when there is no iota of evidence to prove that applicant is holding any office and because of holding of such office, he is authorised or required to perform any public duty, in absence of such authorisation and requirement to perform public duty, applicant cannot be identified as public servant only because he is connected with the Educational Institution. At the cost of repetition, it may be recollected here that except gathering presumption from some submissions, there is no cogent and reliable evidence on record to confirm and prove that on the date of incident, applicant was holding office and in virtue of such holding, he was authorised or required to perform any public duty. Therefore, when no public duty is attached with the activities of the applicant and when he is not holding any office as such, such Sub-Clause would not be applicable to consider the applicant as public servant. There is reason to say so, because there is no prima facie evidence in bunch of chargesheet to confirm that applicant is holding particular office and in pursuance of holding such office, he is authorised to perform any public duty. Therefore, even if any of the activity of the applicant is vulnerable on any count, either as a criminal offence or as a tortuous act or even immoral act, he cannot be defined or identified as a public servant, as defined under the PC Act so as to prosecute him in such Act. 38. In this regard, the submission of the applicant, which is recorded herein above are more reliable so as to approve and endorse it then the submissions by the respondent, which is based upon presumption only and therefore, applicant cannot be considered as a public servant pursuant to provision of Sub-Clause (viii) of Section 2(b). 39. 38. In this regard, the submission of the applicant, which is recorded herein above are more reliable so as to approve and endorse it then the submissions by the respondent, which is based upon presumption only and therefore, applicant cannot be considered as a public servant pursuant to provision of Sub-Clause (viii) of Section 2(b). 39. so far as definition Clause (x), (xi) and (xii) are concerned, the bare reading of such provision makes it clear that for being a public servant, a person must be either a Chairman, Member of an employee of any Service Commission or Board for conducting any examination or making any selection on behalf of such Commission or who is Vice-Chancellor or Member of any Government body or Professor or Reader or Lecturer or any other Teacher or employee of any University and any person, whose services have been availed by a University or public authority in connection with holding or conducting examinations or any person, who is an office bearer or an employee of an Educational, Scientific, Social, Cultural or other Institution receiving or having received any financial assistance from the Central Government or any State Government or local or other public authority. The bare reading of above three provisions make it clear that for identifying any person as a public servant, there must be any of the above title or activity attached with such person. The evidence on record categorically confirms that none of the title or activity, which is listed herein above with reference to Sub-Clauses (x), (xi) and (xii) are attached with the activity of the applicant as a trustee of a private charitable trust. Similarly, applicant is not involved in any activity referred in such Sub-Clauses viz. Conducting and holding examination or making selection. Similarly, it is quite clear and obvious that applicant’s trust is a private charitable trust and the Institutions run through the fund of such trust are self-aided Institutions and they are not getting any financial aid in any manner whatsoever from either of the Government or public authority. Conducting and holding examination or making selection. Similarly, it is quite clear and obvious that applicant’s trust is a private charitable trust and the Institutions run through the fund of such trust are self-aided Institutions and they are not getting any financial aid in any manner whatsoever from either of the Government or public authority. Therefore, when trust, wherein applicant is only one of the trustee is owning and managing the Institutions from their self-finance, without the aid of the public fund and when such trustee, though he may be involved in administration of such Educational Institution in past, is not concerned with any of the activity or administration of such Educational Institution on the date of incident, even if he has accepted any amount as alleged, since he is not a public servant and not performing any public duty with reference to the PC Act, there cannot be a prosecution against him under PC Act for any such activity. 40. Learned Public Prosecutor in support of his submission to consider the applicant as public servant, in addition to the provision of the PC Act, relied and referred several provisions of UGC Act and Regulations. On perusal of all such provisions, it becomes clear that none of the provision is applicable to consider the applicant as a public servant, because the basic difference is quite clear that Educational Institutions run and managed by the trust of the applicant are not full-fledged University as required under law, but they are part of a Deemed University only and it is settled legal position that Deemed University is not a full-fledged University as required under law, but they are part of a Deemed University only and it is settled legal position that Deemed University is not a full-fledged University, more particularly, when it is not getting any financial aid from the Government. 41. Therefore, even presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act would not be applicable as suggested by the learned Public Prosecutor in such case because when charges are under Sections 7, 8, 10, 13(1)(b) and 13(2) of the PC Act, we have to consider provisions of such sections also. Provision of Section 7 of the Act is quite clear when it says that public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of official act. Provision of Section 7 of the Act is quite clear when it says that public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of official act. Therefore, what is required to be seen even as prima facie evidence is not only restricted to consider that whether applicant is public servant or not, but it also needs to be verified that whether amount, if any received by the applicant is other than legal remuneration and in respect of official act or not. Though in general, it can be said that an amount received in addition to fees may be other than legal remuneration, the fact remains that unless there is clarity about a legal remuneration in respect of official act, provision of this section would not be attracted. In any case, though legal remuneration is not restricted to remuneration, which a public servant can lawfully demand, but include a remuneration which is not permitted by the Government or the organisation, which he serves, to accept. The fact remains that when applicant is not doing any official act whatever he has received, is not against or in addition to any legal remuneration, but it may be for the purpose of charitable trust. Similarly, though section expands the meaning of public servant by using the phrase “expected to be a public servant”, it is the case of the prosecution herein that considering the activities of the applicant, he is to be expected to be a public servant, then in that case, the Explanation (a) to Section 7 is quite clear, which makes it clear that if a person not expecting to be in office, obtains a gratification by deceiving the complainant into a belief that he is about to be in office, and that he would serve them as expected; in the present case to appear in the examination; he may be guilty of cheating, but he is not guilty of offence under Section 7. 42. Whereas, provision of Section 8 is with reference to influence public servant, but when there is no such allegation in the chargesheet, I do not see any reason to permit the trial Court to proceed further either under Section 7 or 8 of the PC Act. 42. Whereas, provision of Section 8 is with reference to influence public servant, but when there is no such allegation in the chargesheet, I do not see any reason to permit the trial Court to proceed further either under Section 7 or 8 of the PC Act. Similarly, Section 10 of the PC Act provides for abetment so also Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code, which is part of the chargesheet, but as discussed herein above, when there is no sufficient evidence to consider the applicant as public servant and thereby, there is no scope of considering alleged transaction as illegal gratification, there cannot be presumption. 43. Whereas, so far as provisions of Sections 13(1)(b) and 13(2) are concerned, again, the basic requirement is that a person against whom charges are levelled is a public servant; whereas in the present case, when applicant cannot be termed as a public servant, there is no scope of proceeding further against him because Section 13 also provides for act committed by a public servant. 44. It cannot be ignored that the maximum punishment is for 10 years and therefore, unless there is sentence to proceed further against the applicant, certainly there is no reason to allow the prosecution to proceed further when there is no prima facie evidence to confirm that applicant is a public servant. 45. Similarly, applicant is right in submitting that provision of Section 19 of the PC Act is mandatory and without sanction, no prosecution can be continued. Whereas, in the present case, there is no scope of according any prosecution, because, in fact, there is no authority to remove the applicant from his office except by following provisions of the Trusts Act. Therefore, though Trusts Act provides for certain contingencies when trustee can be removed or changed, in absence of any provision to remove the trustee by particular authority, there is no authority which can grant sanction under the PC Act against such trustee of public charitable trust to prosecute them. It is quite clear and obvious that applicant is a trustee of charitable trust and there is no direct authority, who can appoint or remove such trustee by administrative order only and therefore, there is no chance to identify the applicant as a public servant. It is quite clear and obvious that applicant is a trustee of charitable trust and there is no direct authority, who can appoint or remove such trustee by administrative order only and therefore, there is no chance to identify the applicant as a public servant. There is no substance in the submission of the respondent that for considering such legal issues that whether provision of UGC Act is applicable to consider the applicant as public servant, so that whether sanction by Incharge Jt. Charity Commissioner is proper and in accordance with law, there is need of full trial so as to understand such law point. If such submission is accepted, then, practically, it would amount to permit the abuse of process of court instead of securing the ends of justice, because, allowing the prosecution to continue the trial means dragging the judicial process for long time for no valid reason and thereafter, while interpreting any law, if it is held that applicant is not a public servant, then, it is better that such exercise is to be carried out before the trial itself, more particularly when allegations made in the FIR and the complaint even if taken on their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not make out a case against the applicant to justify to continue the trial against him under PC Act, more particularly, on legal issues raised in this revision application and discussion and determination herein. As already discussed herein above, even explanation to Section 7 confirms that in such cases, even if any person is guilty of cheating, he is not guilty of offence defined under the PC Act, it could never have been the intention of the law makers that a speculative complaint be made against a person and later, if possible, something could be fished out against him. 46. The perusal of the impugned order makes it clear that though the learned Judge has gone through the allegations, he has missed the track in not finding out how the allegations can sustain without the bone of material particulars that whether applicant is a public servant or not. Whereas, the conclusion regarding public servant by the trial Court is erroneous in view of discussion and determination made herein. 47. Whereas, the conclusion regarding public servant by the trial Court is erroneous in view of discussion and determination made herein. 47. Thereby, the scrutiny of factual details make it clear that there is no evidence on record to confirm that applicant is a public servant or any public duty is assigned to him and therefore, he could cannot be charged with the charges under the PC Act and more particularly, pursuant to explanation to Section 7, there is now clarity that, even if there is commission of any other offence, there cannot be charges under PC Act. 48. Alternatively, even if applicant is considered as a public servant, there is no valid sanction under Section 19, which is mandatory and therefore also, prosecution under PC Act against the applicant, cannot be allowed to be continued in absence of proper and valid sanction. Thereby, though prosecution may proceed further in accordance with law against the applicant pursuant to factual details of the complaint, without being emotional on such facts, the judicial authority cannot confirm that because such facts are serious, applicant should be tried even under the PC Act, though there is no clarity that applicant is a public servant and assigned with any public duty and when there is no valid sanction for such prosecution. 49. For my above conclusion, it is to be recollected that applicant is only a trustee of a charitable trust and Institutions, which are run by such trust, are also self-financed i.e. they are not getting any financial aid from the Government or authority and therefore, there is no authority to sanction prosecution as required under Section 19 against the applicant even if he is termed as a public servant and therefore, though prosecution may initiate appropriate proceedings in accordance with law, the available material and applicable law makes it clear that applicant cannot be charged with the charges levelled against him in the chargesheet filed against him before the trial Court and therefore, trial Court should have considered the discharge application irrespective of factual allegations and without being emotional on such factual allegations. Therefore, when trial Court has failed to consider such aspect, which results into irregularity and illegality and therefore, there is reason to interfere with in such impugned order so as to quash and set-aside the impugned order and to allow the Criminal Revision Application as prayed for. 50. Therefore, when trial Court has failed to consider such aspect, which results into irregularity and illegality and therefore, there is reason to interfere with in such impugned order so as to quash and set-aside the impugned order and to allow the Criminal Revision Application as prayed for. 50. Respondent has relied upon the case of Ramesh Gelli (supra), submitting that it cannot be ignored that the court need not speculate the reasons for omission of particular provision and consider that perhaps one possible reason could be wide expanse of the definition of public servant in amended Act. It cannot be ignored that court has relied upon exception after recording that rule of casus omissus i.e. what has not been provided for in the statute, cannot be settled by the courts as a strict rule of interpretation. Therefore, unless there is a consideration that the case of the applicant falls within any of such well-known expectations, as discussed in such judgment, it cannot be said that courts are free to presume or to add any provision in the Act. It cannot be ignored that the case before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was with reference to the Bank and that there is a specific provision in Banking Act and Regulations to consider its trustees as a public servant. Whereas, in the present case, there is no such provision and therefore, considering the explanation to Section 7 of the PC Act, there is least chance to add anything in the provisions of PC Act while identifying the applicant so as to define him as a public servant though there is no specific provision to that effect either under PC Act or under Trusts Act or under any other enactment whatsoever. 51. As against such judgment of regular two Judges Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, the judgment in the case of Tolaram Relumal (supra), which is by the constitutional Bench, needs to be followed, more particularly, when such judgment has not been referred in the case of Ramesh Gelli (supra). In such judgment by larger Bench, which has referred several previous judgments, it has been categorically held that it is not competent to the Court to stretch the meaning of an expression used by the Legislature in order to carry out the intention of the Legislature. In such judgment by larger Bench, which has referred several previous judgments, it has been categorically held that it is not competent to the Court to stretch the meaning of an expression used by the Legislature in order to carry out the intention of the Legislature. Where penalties for infringement are imposed it is not legitimate to stretch the language of a rule, however beneficent its intention, beyond the fair and ordinary meaning of its language. Therefore, judgment of Ramesh Gelli (supra) cannot help the respondent. 52. Above principle has already been followed in several cases including a case between Jeyaram Educational Trust Vs. A.G. Syed Mohideen reported in (2010)2 SCC 513 wherein it is held that a provision of a statute should have to be read as it is, in a natural manner, plain and straight, without adding, substituting or omitting any words. While doing so, the words used in the provision should be assigned and ascribed their natural, ordinary or popular meaning. Only when such plain and straight reading, or ascribing the natural and normal meaning to the words on such reading, leads to ambiguity, vagueness, uncertainty, or absurdity which were not obviously intended by the Legislature or the Lawmaker, a court should open its interpretation tool kit containing the settled rules of construction and interpretation, to arrive at the true meaning of the provision. While using the tools of interpretation, the court should remember that it is not the author of the Statute who is empowered to amend, substitute or delete, so as to change the structure and contents. A court as an interpreter cannot alter or amend the law. It can only interpret the provision, to make it meaningful and workable so as to achieve the legislative object, when there is vagueness, ambiguity or absurdity. The purpose of interpretation is not to make a provision what the Judge thinks it should be, but to make it what the legislature intended it to be. 53. So far as inappropriate nomenclature by applicant is concerned, applicant has relied upon the decision in the case of Mohd. Yousuf Vs. Afaq Jahan reported in (2006)1 SCC 627 , which confirms that improper disclosure in application, would not debar the litigant to get appropriate relief in accordance with law. 54. Crime is a social and economic phenomenon and is as old as the human society. Yousuf Vs. Afaq Jahan reported in (2006)1 SCC 627 , which confirms that improper disclosure in application, would not debar the litigant to get appropriate relief in accordance with law. 54. Crime is a social and economic phenomenon and is as old as the human society. Crime is a legal concept and has the sanction of the law. Crime or an offence is “a legal wrong that can be followed by criminal proceedings which may result into punishment.” The hallmark of criminality is that, it is breach of the criminal law. The criminal quality of an act cannot be discovered by reference to any standard but one: is the act prohibited with penal consequences. At the same time, for prosecuting and for awarding punishment, on found guilty, provisions of law is to be followed in its strict sense and not as per desire or wish or wisdom or requirement etc. Thus, process of criminal trial could not be molded according to requirement but provision of law and procedure should be followed properly, else there would be discriminating treatment and that would result in to arbitrariness, chaos and anarchism. 55. Generally, taking or attempting to take or doing or attempting to do any act by means or process which is not accepted by the “norms of the society”; or by unfair means may not be termed as crime, though it may be violent or silent; may be complained off or even may not be complained off by the sufferer unless it is a conduct accompanied by act or omission prohibited by law and consequential breach of which is visited by penal consequences. 56. Therefore Essentials of crime are (1) There must be some statutory provisions precisely defining crime; (2) There must be some punishment provided by the statute; and (3) There must be procedure provided for punishment. 57. The term “Crime” is probably nowhere defined in any statue but its meaning is quite clear as “an action or omission which constitutes an offence and is punishable by law.” Synonyms of the term crime are offence, unlawful act, illegal act, breach/violation/infraction of the law, misdemeanour, misdeed, wrong, felony, violation, transgression, fault, injury; malfeasance, malefaction, tort; archaic trespass; but anarchy i.e. Lawlessness (Lack of Control) or Chaos could not be considered as an offence. 58. In ordinary language, a crime is an unlawful act punishable by a state or other authority. 58. In ordinary language, a crime is an unlawful act punishable by a state or other authority. The term "crime" does not, in modern criminal law, have any simple and universally accepted definition, though statutory definitions have been provided for certain purposes. 59. The most popular view is that crime is a category created by law; in other words, something is a crime if declared as such by the relevant and applicable law. One proposed definition is that a crime or offence (or criminal offence) is an act harmful not only to some individual but also to a community, society or the state ("a public wrong"). Such acts are forbidden and punishable by law. 60. The notion that acts such as murder, rape and theft are to be prohibited exists worldwide. What precisely is a criminal offence is defined by criminal law of each country. While many have a catalogue of crimes called the criminal code, in some common law countries no such comprehensive statute exists. 61. The State (Government) has the power to severely restrict one's liberty for committing a crime. In modern societies, there are procedures to which investigations and trials must adhere. If found guilty, an offender may be sentenced to a form of reparation such as a community sentence, or, depending on the nature of their offence, to undergo imprisonment, life imprisonment or, in some jurisdictions, execution. 62. Usually, to be classified as a crime, the "act of doing something criminal" (actusreus) must – with certain exceptions – be accompanied by the "intention to do something criminal" (mens rea). 63. While every crime violates the law, not every violation of the law counts as a crime. Breaches of private law (torts and breaches of contract) are not automatically punished by the state, but can be enforced through civil procedure. 64. Bribe means dishonestly persuade (someone) to act in one's favour by a gift of money or other inducement, which is considered as crime. 65. The learned Sessions Judge is of the view that since UGC Regulations are applicable to educational institutions and therefore, the Deemed to be University are to be controlled by the Government, though it is not stated as to what extent the Government could interfere in the affairs of such institution when they are self-financed and not getting any financial aid from the Government. 66. 66. In the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.S. Dhanoa Vs. Municipal Corporation, reported at (1981)3 SCC 431 the question that came up for determination of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was whether the member of the Indian Administrative service, whose services are placed at the disposal of the Organization which is neither local authority, nor Corporation established by or under the Central Provincial or State Act by the Central Government or the Government of the State, can be treated to be public servant or not. There in it is held that such person though coming from Indian Administrative Services is not a public servant when he is not assigned any duty by the office of the Government. Such view has been confirmed in AIR 2009 SC 483 between Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab and Ors. 67. In WP(C).No. 11822 of 2013 (C) between Karthikeya Varma @ Kartik Varma, Vs. The Union of India, the High Court Of Kerala has observed that primarily, there are two approaches to determine 'public function' or 'State function' or 'public duty' carried out by a Corporation or a private body. They are structural approach and functional approach. The structural approach is one relating to examining the structure of the body to consider whether the body can be treated as a State instrumentality or an agency of the Government. 68. Thus, a public servant must be under the positive command under the law to discharge such a duty. If a body or Corporation exercises a State function, without obligation under the existing laws, it is only an exercise of State function and cannot be treated as a discharge of public duty. It is to be noted that penal law operates on ex ante mode of function of the law. The citizen must know beforehand the offence which would entail him to criminal punishment. The maxim nullapona sine lege has four different notions which states that the categories of criminal law should be determined by general rules; that a person should not be punished unless his act is a breach of Rules; that penal statutes should be strictly construed; that penal statutes should not have retrospective operation. 69. The maxim nullapona sine lege has four different notions which states that the categories of criminal law should be determined by general rules; that a person should not be punished unless his act is a breach of Rules; that penal statutes should be strictly construed; that penal statutes should not have retrospective operation. 69. As far as application of section 2(c) (viii) to the case of the applicant is concerned, learned trial judge has observed that since the applicant was a public servant within the meaning of section he obviously was performing public duty and therefore, his case could also be covered by section 2(c)(viii). In my view this interpretation is not correct in as much as if section had to be made applicable, the prosecuting agency was under an obligation to prima facie demonstrate as to what public duty the applicant was supposed to perform by virtue of his office held in the trust. Charge sheet does not indicate that the applicant was performing any public duty by virtue of his office. Chargesheet is mainly based on the factual ground that the applicant is managing the admissions and appearing in examination by student and therefore, he is a public servant. Since the contention of the prosecuting agency with regard to section 2(c)(viii) has been rejected by this court, the prosecution agency was under an obligation to independently demonstrate as to how section 2(c)(viii) will be applicable. I do not find anything in the charge sheet on the basis of which section 2(c)(viii), (x), (xi) or (xii) can be made applicable to the applicant. 70. In AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 1801 between Anil Kumar and Ors. v. M. K. Aiyappa and Anr. it is held that it is incorrect to say that the requirement of sanction is only procedural in nature and hence, directory or else S. 19(3) would be rendered otiose thus the requirement to obtain sanction is a mandatory requirement and Section 19(3) does not have effect of making it directory. (Para 13) 71. In Criminal Revision Application No.25 of 2014 between Smt. Sumitra W/o Prabhakar Thakre VS. (Para 13) 71. In Criminal Revision Application No.25 of 2014 between Smt. Sumitra W/o Prabhakar Thakre VS. State of Maharashtra, through Anti Corruption Bureau, The Bombay High Court has held that the words ‘performance of public duty’ cannot be read independently and these words will have to be read conjointly with the earlier part of clause (i) and that part deals with ‘any person in the service or pay of the Government or remunerated by the Government by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty’. In the present case, there was no material placed before the learned Sessions Judge by the prosecution to show that the applicant was receiving either pay from the Government or remuneration or fees or commission from the Government. For the reason that here also the word ‘public duty’ will have to be read with keywords ‘any person who holds an office by virtue of which he is authorised or required to perform any public duty. There is no material placed on record to show that the applicant was holding any office and was authorized by the Government or any authority to perform public duty. 72. The Apex Court in the judgment reported in (2009) 13 SCC 418 , in the case of State of Punjab vs. Nirmal Kaur, dealt with the aspect. The respondent therein was running a private coaching centre and was facing the accusation of commission of offences punishable under Section 420, 465, 467, 468, 470 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the P.C. Act. It was the stand of the appellant/State that as the respondent was running a coaching center, the respondent was performing public duty. The Apex Court, by quoting the provisions of Section 2(c), clauses (i) to (xii), observed that the stand of the applicant/State is that in any event, by running coaching centre, the respondent was performing public duty. The Apex Court in clear words held that the submission overlooks basic requirement of clause (vii) of Section 2(c) which is applicable only when a public servant holds an office by which he is authorised or required to perform any public duty. The Apex Court in clear words held that the submission overlooks basic requirement of clause (vii) of Section 2(c) which is applicable only when a public servant holds an office by which he is authorised or required to perform any public duty. Here, it is nobody’s case that the applicant was holding any office by which he was authorized or required to perform the public duty and as such the judgment in Nirmal Kaur’s case is applicable in the present matter as the applicant is similarly situated because the applicant was neither authorized nor holding any office to perform public duty. 73. The upshot of the above discussions inevitably has to conclude that the complaint is not maintainable and the entire proceedings resulting from the impugned orders have to be quashed. Accordingly, the same are quashed and the petition is allowed. In view of the fact that the complaint is not maintainable, the challenge in the writ petitions regarding validity of Sections 2(v) and 2(c)(viii) under the PC Act does not require consideration. However, if the act of the petitioners constitutes an offence under any other provisions of law, this judgment will not stand in the way of the State in proceeding against the petitioners in accordance with law. 74. Hence, I endorse the grounds in paragraphs 19(h) to (w) so also submissions of the applicant recorded in paragraphs 20(1) to (4) and (7) to (11). The perusal and discussion of judgments by both the sides also confirm that barring a traced judgment to consider the wide sense of the term ‘public servant’, the settled law of larger Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court relied upon by the applicant is required to be followed, which confirms that there cannot be an addition to statutory provisions while interpreting in any manner whatsoever. In view of above facts, now, it is very much clear that :- (a) The applicant is only trustee of a private charitable trust and he is not authorised by any statute or law to perform any duty with reference to Educational Institute where complainant’s daughter is studying and therefore, he has no role or responsibility or duty so far as Educational Institution is concerned and therefore, he cannot be termed as a public servant in any manner whatsoever. (b) It also very much clear that though prosecution has tried to pose the Educational Institution under reference as an aided institution, the institution is in fact self-financed institution and it is run by the funds available to the trust and such institution is not getting any financial aid in any manner whatsoever from the Government or any other public body in any manner whatsoever and therefore, when such institution is otherwise also not an University in its true sense and defined as Deemed University only, and its management is carried out by the Board, wherein applicant is nowhere concerned, applicant can never be termed as a public servant. (c) There is no provision in Trusts Act to accord sanction to prosecute the trustee. The Charity Commissioner has no authority whatsoever to accord sanction to prosecute the trustee like the present applicant and therefore, existence of physical document confirming that Charity Commissioner has accorded sanction, could not be considered as valid sanction under law and in absence of sanction, no prosecution can be initiated under the PC Act. (d) Section 7 of the PC Act also confirms that in such a case, if a person is not expecting to be in office, though he may be guilty of other offence like cheating etc., but he is not guilty of the offence defined in this Section. (e) The pendency of bail application before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, would not debar to decide the discharge application, moreover, such plea was never taken by the prosecution before the trial Court. 75. In view of above discussion, though there may be proof of commission of any offence, since there is no categorical and specific evidence in the chargesheet, which can even prima-facie show that the applicant – accused is a public servant, there is no reason to ask the petitioner to face the trial for couple of years. If at all it is so allowed, the entire machinery will unnecessarily waste their energy, to prove the case against the present petitioner, even in absence of any prima facie evidence against him to convict. 76. If at all it is so allowed, the entire machinery will unnecessarily waste their energy, to prove the case against the present petitioner, even in absence of any prima facie evidence against him to convict. 76. Therefore, though it is certain that any accused cannot be discharged if there is any prima-facie evidence against him, it is also certain that thereby presence of minimum and prima-facie evidence is must to frame charge and, therefore, there is provision regarding discharge of accused in Cr.P.C. that in absence of prima-facie evidence against any person, the Court may discharge such person from the alleged offences. 77. In support of such conclusion, reference to certain judgments of the Apex Court are necessary, which are as under. (1) AIR 1997 S.C. 2041 : State of Maharashtra vs. Priya Sharan Maharaj - It is held that at the stage of framing the charge, the Court has to consider the material with a view to find out if there is ground for presuming that accused has committed an offence or that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against him and not for the charges by arriving at the conclusion that it is not likely to lead to a conviction. (2) AIR 2000 SC 665 : 2000 SCC(2) 57 : State of MP vs. SB Johari - It was held that, the Court at the stage of S.227 and S.228 is not required to appreciate the evidence and arrive at the conclusion that the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused. Only prima facie case is to be looked into. The charge can be quashed if the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted, it cannot show that accused committed that particular offence. Thus it is settled law that at the stage of framing the charge, the Court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The Court is not required to appreciate the evidence and arrive at the conclusion that the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused. If the Court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out for proceeding further then a charge has to be framed. The Court is not required to appreciate the evidence and arrive at the conclusion that the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused. If the Court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out for proceeding further then a charge has to be framed. The charge can be quashed if the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged by cross-examination or rebutted by defence evidence, if any, cannot show that accused committed the particular offence. In such case there would be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. (3) 2005 SC 359: State of Orissa vs. Debendra Nath Padhi – The Apex Court has held that, it is seen from S.227 of the Code that in a case triable before the Court of Session, if the Court on consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and after hearing the submission of the prosecution and the accused if the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused after recording reasons for doing so. (4) (1997) 4 SCC 393 = 1997 AIR SCW 1833: State of Maharashtra vs. Priya Sharan Maharaj – Referring to the case of Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi (supra) held that at the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the Court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging there from taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. The Court may, for this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth and even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. Therefore, at the stage of framing of the charge, the Court has to consider the material with a view to find out that whether there is any ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence or that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against him and not for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that it is not likely to lead to a conviction. (5) AIR 2007 SC 2149 : 2007 AIR SCW 3683 – Soma Chakravarty v. State It is held that before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commitment of offence by the accused was possible. (6) AIR 2012 SC 1890 - General Officer Commanding Vs. CBI It is held that the cognizance has to be taken of the offence and not of the offender and that it is the duty of the investigating agency to collect and to produce cogent evidence against the accused for framing charge and Court can convict the accused only if such charges i.e. evidence is proved on record without reasonable doubt. Therefore, if there is no chance to prove a commission of offence by the accused, charge cannot be framed. (7) AIR 2009 SC Supp. 1744 - State of M.P. Vs. Sheetla Sahai It is held that if the Court arrives at only opinion, there is no evidence against the accused, the Court shall not put accused to harassment by asking him to face a trial. 78. Thus, the law on the subject is now well settled, that at Ss.227 and 228 stage, the Court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging there from taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. The Court may, for this limited purpose, shift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to commonsense or the broad probabilities of the case. Therefore, at the stage of framing of the charge, the Court has to consider the material with a view to find out if there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence or that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against him and not for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that it is not likely to lead to a conviction. 79. 79. However it cannot be ignored that what is to be looked in to is “a very strong suspicion founded upon materials before the Magistrate, which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged”; therefore only because Apex Court has held so, it can not be said that even if in absence of suspicion, presumptive opinion of the commission of offence as alleged charge must be framed. Suffice to say that when enactment/statute provides for discharging accused, basically accused has a right to get discharge, which may be subject to fulfillment of certain criteria, that may be laid down either in the statute as well as its interpretation by the Apex Court and not otherwise. Therefore there can be order of discharge if there is no evidence with charge sheet which gives rise to even little suspicion to presume the commission of offence by the accused. Needless to say that even if there is suspicion regarding commission of offence, what is required to refuse discharge is suspicion of commission of offence by the accused against whom charge sheet is filed. Thus even if suspicion is possible for commission of offence, and if there is no evidence to link such suspicion with the accused, there cannot be a presumption against the accused that he had committed the offence and he may entitled to get discharged from the charges levied against him under the charge sheet. Needless to say that the charges levied against the person is to be considered and not the story or history of incident which results in to the commission of offence. For more clarity, commission of offence alone is not sufficient to frame charge against any person, there must be some suspicion that offence had been committed by the said person and not by any other person., If the suspicion is to the effect that though offence has been committed, probably accused might have not committed such offence but real offender may be some one else, Court has to see that truth comes out whereby the Investigating Agency may not be permitted to put their hands down merely by filing charge sheet against any one suspect or any innocent person. In such cases trial cannot be allowed to continue only upon opinion of the investigating agency that accused had committed the offence as alleged in charge sheet. The Court has to arrive at independent opinion, after considering the available prima facie evidenced on record – which is only in the form of charge sheet, not only tabular charge sheet but list of witnesses and their statement before the investigating agency (police papers). It can not be ignored that the ratio of conviction is quite low only because of the reason that though police papers supports the charge sheet, at the time of trail witnesses does not support their statement; this happens because of the possibility that in most of the crimes against the person/body under the Penal Code, the statement of witnesses are common to the effect that accused had acted in particular manner. However when crime is pertaining to some documents or properties – intellectual and real, the investigating agency has to find out the real culprit with probable cogent evidenced, rather than only oral evidence that accused had committed crime as alleged. This is the area when its Courts duty to frame independent suspicion regarding not only commission of crime but involvement or roll of the accused against whom charge sheet is filed and if there is no possibility of even little suspicion against the accused regarding commission of offence by him, there is no bar to discharge such person from the charges levied against him. In such cases it would be open for the original complainant and the investigating agency to keep such person under suspicion but to investigate further so as to find out real culprit, else filing of charge against a person only on suspicion but without sufficient evidence against him would be a futile exercise and it will not only increase unnecessary workload but crime in the society also, since real culprits are able to secluded them from the trial. 80. In view of above discussion, all citations which confirms rejection of discharge is to be read and understood in its real sense, rather than to consider that only because in given case, order of discharge was refused, there cannot be any order to discharge any accused in any case. If it is so, the statute book would not have the provisions of Section 227 in Cr PC. If it is so, the statute book would not have the provisions of Section 227 in Cr PC. In light of such discussion if we peruse AIR 2008 SC 2991 – Yogesh Vs. State of Maharashtra on the issue, the relevant observation will make above concept more clear, which are as under: 81. Following para from the case of Yogesh v. State of Maharashtra reported AIR 2008 SC 2991 are relevant to recollect here: 13. Before adverting to the rival submissions, we may briefly notice the scope and ambit of powers of the Trial Judge under Section 227 of the Code. 14. Chapter XVIII of the Code lays down the procedure for trial before the Court of Sessions, pursuant to an order of commitment under Section 209 of the Code. Section 227 contemplates the circumstances whereunder there could be a discharge of an accused at a stage anterior in point of time to framing of charge under Section 228. It provides that upon consideration of the record of the case, the documents submitted with the police report and after hearing the accused and the prosecution, the Court is expected, nay bound to decide whether there is "sufficient ground" to proceed against the accused and as a consequence thereof either discharge the accused or proceed to frame charge against him. 15. It is trite that the words "not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused" appearing in the Section postulate exercise of judicial mind on the part of the Judge to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. However, in assessing this fact, the Judge has the power to sift and weigh the material for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine a prima facie case depends upon the facts of each case and in this regard it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large, however, if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him gives rise to suspicion only as distinguished from grave suspicion, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused. By and large, however, if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him gives rise to suspicion only as distinguished from grave suspicion, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused. At this stage, he is not to see as to whether the trial will end in conviction or not. The broad test to be applied is whether the materials on record, if unrebutted, makes a conviction reasonably possible. [See: State of Bihar vs. Ramesh Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 39 and Union of India vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal and Anr, (1979) 3 SCC 4 ]. 16. In the light of the aforenoted principles, we may now consider whether or not in the present case the High Court was justified in declining to discharge the appellant. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 27. For the reasons aforesaid, we are constrained to allow the appeals. Consequently, the impugned orders are set aside and the appellant is discharged from the charges levelled against him in the charge-sheet. 82. Considering the above discussions, both on facts and on law point, it becomes clear that investigating agency, has squarely failed to properly investigate the incident and to collect cogent and reliable evidence so as to confirm conviction applicant by filing proper chargesheet. 83. I have scrutinized the prima facie evidence on record which categorically fails to prove the involvement of the accused in commission of crime and that there is no prima facie evidence against him for framing the charges, hence the revision applications deserves to be allowed, thereby allowing the application for discharge by the petitioner. 84. In the result, the revision application is allowed. The order dated 29.11.2017 below Exh.13 passed by the learned Special Judge, A.C.B. Court, Vadodara in Special A C B Case: No. 2/2017, is quashed and set aside. The applicant/accused is discharged in Crime No. 3195/2010 for the offences punishable under Sections 7, 8, 10, 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988., read with Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code, pending before the learned Sessions Judge Vadodara, vide Special A.C.B. Case No.2 of 2017. Therefore if petitioner is in custody, he shall be released forthwith. 85. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. Direct service today is permitted. Further Order dated 2.2.2018 1. After the pronouncement of judgment today, learned Public Prosecutor Mr. Therefore if petitioner is in custody, he shall be released forthwith. 85. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. Direct service today is permitted. Further Order dated 2.2.2018 1. After the pronouncement of judgment today, learned Public Prosecutor Mr. Amin for the respondent – State has submitted that the would like to challenge such judgment before appropriate court and for the purpose, he would like to file an affidavit while seeking stay against execution of this judgment and thereby, he has come with an affidavit of one Punamchand Ramachand Gehlot, Assistant Director of A.C.B., Vadodara, contending and practically repeating the arguments, which are already advanced during hearing of the main Revision Application and which are dealt with herein above regarding pendency of SLP (Criminal) No.622 of 2017 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India submitting that such SLP is now scheduled for hearing on 9.2.2018 and therefore, being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the judgment pronounced today by this court, he would like to challenge the order of discharge before Hon’ble Apex Court, and that for doing so, he requires certified copy of the judgment as well as the entire paper-book to be prepared for the purpose of challenging the same before the Hon’ble Apex Court with consultation of counsels before the Hon’ble Apex Court and therefore, when a question of commercialisation of Medical Education is involved with allegation regarding demand of bribe from the students, the present judgment by stayed since larger interest of public, society and State if involved. It is further disclosed and submitted that in view of the above and considering the gravity, the would require four weeks’ to approach the Hon’ble Apex Court for assailing the judgment passed today and therefore, prayed to stay the implementation, operation and execution of this judgment. Learned Public Prosecution Mr. Amin is relying upon a decision in the case of State of Gujarat Vs. Lalji Popat reported in 1988(2) GLR 1073 submitting that whenever Sessions Court releases any accused on bail on request by the Public Prosecutor, the Sessions Judge should stay such judgment of bail for few days so as to enable the State to challenge it before higher court. 2. As against that learned senior counsel Mr. Lalji Popat reported in 1988(2) GLR 1073 submitting that whenever Sessions Court releases any accused on bail on request by the Public Prosecutor, the Sessions Judge should stay such judgment of bail for few days so as to enable the State to challenge it before higher court. 2. As against that learned senior counsel Mr. N.D. Nanavaty for the applicant has submitted that there is nothing additional in such affidavit except referring the judgment of Lalji Popat (supra) inasmuch as the issue regarding pendency of bail application before the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been argued at length while arguing the main matter and if after considering such argument, court has decided such application, then, on such ground, order of discharge cannot be stayed. It is further submitted that factual details, though may be inviting any perception of seriousness, when the prosecution has failed to prove on record that how prosecution under PC Act can be initiated, and more particularly, when if this court has decided that applicant is not a public servant, then, irrespective of factual details, prosecution under PC Act cannot continue. It is further submitted that if at all there is any offence committed by the applicant, then, prosecution may initiate appropriate proceedings in accordance with law, but when there is now clarity by present judgment that prosecution under PC Act, cannot continue against the applicant, there is no reason or scope to stay the execution of such judgment, whereby … court has held that no case is made out under PC Act so as to continue the trial and therefore, applicant be released immediately since otherwise also, he is not going to abscond or going to tamper with the evidence already collected by the prosecution. It is also submitted that during hearing of discharge application before the Sessions Court, prosecution has not objected or referred the pendency of SLP before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India and therefore, when such contentions are part of the arguments of main revision application also, there cannot be rehearing of the revision application on same issue only to stay the operation and execution of judgment whereby, now, there is clarity that no trial can be continued against the applicant under PC Act. So far as the decision of Lalji Popat (supra) is concerned, it is submitted that it was a case against order of bail by Sessions Court where proceedings would remain pending against the accused and therefore, considering the constitutional right of liberty, when applicant is already been discharged from the charges levelled against him under PC Act, State has no authority whatsoever to keep the applicant in custody any further. 3. Considering the rival submissions, it becomes clear that prosecution is submitting, nothing but repetition of the issues, which are already submitted and dealt with by this court in the judgment. Therefore, I do not see any reason to endorse any such ground submitted by the respondent to stay the execution and implementation of present order. So far as judgment of Lalji Popat (supra) is concerned, learned advocate for the applicant is correct in submitting that once applicant is discharged from all the charges, his custody could not be continued any further only because of whims and desire of the prosecuting agency. If at all applicant has committed any other offence like impersonation or cheating etc., though prosecution may initiate proceedings in accordance with law, the custody of the applicant pursuant to charge under PC Act, cannot be allowed to be extended any further. 4. Therefore, I do not see any substance or reason to stay the execution and implementation of present judgment. Learned advocate for the applicant has pointed out that though case is of Vadodara District, the applicant has been shifted to Sabarmati Central Jail, Ahmedabad and therefore, requested to forward Yadi of this order to Sabarmati Central Jail, Ahmedabad also. Such request is granted as prayed for. Registry shall forward Yadi of this judgment to Jailer, Sabarmati Central Jail, Ahmedabad. Direct service today upon the Jailer, Sabarmati Central Jail, Ahmedabad is also permitted.