JUDGMENT : John Michael Cunha, J. This appeal is by the sole accused who is convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 363 and 366 of Indian Penal Code (hereinafter called as ‘IPC’) and Section 6 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (hereinafter called as ‘POCSO Act’). He is sentenced to life imprisonment i.e., 14 years and a fine of Rs.50,000/- for the offence under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and rigorous imprisonment of five years each and a fine of Rs.1,000/- each for the offences punishable under Sections 363 and 366 of IPC. 2. The victim of the offence was a minor girl aged about 17 years as on the date of the incident. According to the prosecution, accused was residing in the neighbourhood and was driving a Tata Ape vehicle belonging to one Basavaraj Ningappa Hanchinamani. He used to pickup and drop the villagers. He developed intimacy with the victim who was also traveling in the said vehicle. The father of the victim had even warned the accused not to take liberty with the victim girl. On 02.04.2013, the victim girl along with her mother had been to the market at Kalaghatagi. The accused met the victim as well as her mother in the said market. After a while, when the mother of the victim had gone inside the market to purchase vegetables, the accused enticed the victim girl and took her to Harihar and from there he took her to Balehonnur and stayed for two nights in a Mutt. During this period, he committed intercourse on the victim. 3. On the basis of the complaint lodged by the father of the victim on 12.04.2013, a case came to be registered against the accused under Section 366 (A) of IPC. On 13.04.2013, the accused and the victim girl were traced and were produced before the PSI of Kalaghatagi P.S. They were subjected to medical examination. On the basis of the statement of the victim, charge under Section 376 of IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act were incorporated and a charge sheet was laid against the accused for the above offences. 4. The accused denied the charges and faced trial. In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution examined 11 witnesses including the victim of the offence as PW.1 and her father as PW.2. 4. The accused denied the charges and faced trial. In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution examined 11 witnesses including the victim of the offence as PW.1 and her father as PW.2. The prosecution also produced in evidence 20 documents marked as Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.20 and the material objects as M.O.1 to M.O.17. In rebuttal, the accused examined himself as DW.1 and examined two other witnesses on his behalf as DW.2 and DW.3. 5. Considering the above evidence and on hearing the respective counsels appearing for the parties, by the impugned judgment, the trial Court convicted the accused/appellant under Sections 363, 366 and 376(2)(i) and (n) of IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. However, considering the alternate punishment prescribed under Section 42 of the POCSO Act, the trial Court found it appropriate to sentence the accused only under Section 363 and 366 of IPC and Section 6 of POCSO Act and accordingly imposed the sentence as above. 6. Feeling aggrieved by the impugned judgment of conviction and the order of sentence, the appellant has preferred the above appeal. 7. We have heard the learned counsel Sri. Srinand A. Pachhapure appearing for the appellant and the learned Additional SPP Sri.V.M.Banakar appearing on behalf of the State. 8. Assailing the impugned judgment, the learned counsel for the appellant – accused has raised two fold contentions namely: (i) The genesis of the crime is suppressed by the prosecution. The evidence on record indicates that the victim was in love with the accused. She was pressurizing the accused to marry her. She eloped with the accused on her own accord. Even after she was traced by the Police, she refused to return to her parents, making it evident that on her own accord she accompanied the accused and stayed with him. Therefore, the conviction of the accused under Sections 363 and 366 of IPC is wholly illegal and contrary to the evidence on record. The medical evidence produced by the prosecution does not support the theory of penetrative sexual assault on the victim. Therefore, conviction of the accused under Section 6 of the POCSO Act is unsustainable. (ii) There is inordinate delay in lodging the complaint. According to the prosecution, the victim is alleged to have been kidnapped on 02.04.2013. The complaint was lodged after a delay of 10 days on 12.04.2013. Therefore, conviction of the accused under Section 6 of the POCSO Act is unsustainable. (ii) There is inordinate delay in lodging the complaint. According to the prosecution, the victim is alleged to have been kidnapped on 02.04.2013. The complaint was lodged after a delay of 10 days on 12.04.2013. There is no satisfactory explanation by the prosecution for the said delay. If the said delay is considered in the light of the circumstances brought out in the evidence, it indicates that the accused did not commit any offence against the victim, rather the victim of on her own accord followed the accused and therefore, the finding recorded by the trial Court holding the accused guilty of the offences charged against him is perverse and cannot be sustained in law or on the fact of the case and thus, he has sought for acquittal of the accused. 9. The learned Additional SPP has argued in support of the impugned judgment. He contends that the evidence of the prosecutrix alone is sufficient to bring home the guilt of the accused. The prosecution having convincingly established that the prosecutrix was below 16 years of age as on the date of the commission of offence, the consent of the victim becomes inconsequential, and therefore, the trial Court was well justified in convicting the accused and thus, seeks for dismissal of the appeal. 10. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions made at the bar and have carefully examined the records. 11. Insofar as the delay in lodging the complaint is concerned, the offence is stated to have taken place on 02.04.2013 and the complaint was lodged only on 12.04.2013 by the father of the victim (PW.2). He has deposed about the circumstances that drove him to lodge the complaint. In his evidence, he has specifically stated that he searched the victim for 2-3 days and having failed to trace her, he reported the matter to the police. He has further stated that 5-6 days thereafter, he lodged another report and before lodging the said report, he even approached the parents of the accused and learnt that the accused was also not seen in the house ever since the disappearance of his daughter. He has further stated that 5-6 days thereafter, he lodged another report and before lodging the said report, he even approached the parents of the accused and learnt that the accused was also not seen in the house ever since the disappearance of his daughter. Though the prosecution has not produced the complaint which is stated to have been lodged by PW.2 at the first instance, yet, the prosecution has examined PW.11, Head Constable attached to Kalaghatagi P.S. This witness has deposed on oath that on 04.04.2013, PW.2 had come to the police station and informed him that his daughter had been kidnapped by one Badiger and requested the police to secure back his daughter. According to this witness, the information given by PW.2 was treated as lower petition (LPT) and the same was signed by PW.2. During his examination, the prosecution marked the said petition as Ex.P.18 and the endorsement made by PW.11 thereon as Ex.P.18(a). Though in the cross-examination it is elicited that if a missing complaint is received in the police station, FIR would be registered based on the information; but the testimony of this witness that PW.2 did report the matter to the police and LPT case was registered and the same was closed after the registration of a formal FIR has remained unshaken. If this evidence is analysed in the context of the other circumstances brought out in the evidence of PW.2, it clearly reveals that PW.2 was aware that his daughter, namely, PW.1 and the accused both were missing and PW.2 has specifically stated in his evidence that he enquired the whereabouts of the accused with his father. These circumstances, therefore, clearly go to show that PW.2 and his relatives frantically searched for the victim and the accused and having failed to trace them, PW.2 was driven to lodge the complaint. Therefore, the delay in lodging the complaint in our opinion, is suitably explained by the prosecution and on that count, the case of the prosecution cannot be doubted. 12. Coming to the proof of the offences charged against the accused, the prosecution has based its case on the direct evidence of the prosecutrix, who has been examined as PW.1. Her evidence was recorded on 11.09.2013. She has given her age as 17 years as on the date of her examination, which fact has not been disputed by the accused. Coming to the proof of the offences charged against the accused, the prosecution has based its case on the direct evidence of the prosecutrix, who has been examined as PW.1. Her evidence was recorded on 11.09.2013. She has given her age as 17 years as on the date of her examination, which fact has not been disputed by the accused. In her evidence, she has stated that she studied up to 7th standard and thereafter she discontinued her studies. She has specifically stated that she knew the accused and sometimes while going for the field work, she used to travel in the Tata Ape of the accused and at that time, the accused was talking to her intimately. In this regard, her father had scolded and advised her not to talk with the accused but the accused wanted to marry her. On 02.04.2013 at about 9.00 a.m., she along with her mother had gone to Kalaghatagi market. In the evening, her mother proceeded to buy beaten rice. She was waiting for her near Kalaghatagi bus stand. At that time, the accused approached PW.1 and promised to marry her and took her to Balehonnur in a bus. Even though she told the accused that she wanted to inform her mother, the accused asked her not to inform her mother. She further deposed that from Kalaghatagi, both of them went in a bus to Shimogga and in the night they stayed in the bus stand. On the next day morning they proceeded to the house of the elder sister of the accused at Balehonnur, but she was not available in the house, and therefore, the accused took her to Rambapur Mutt at Balehonnur and both of them stayed in the guest house of the Mutt. PW.1 has further deposed that when they were staying in the guest house, the accused committed intercourse on her on two nights. On the third day she had menstruation. The accused received a phone call from his brother that a complaint has been lodged against him. On receiving this information, the accused brought her back to Kalaghatagi. On the way, they stayed in the house of a relative of the accused at Mundagod. In Kalaghatagi police station, the police recorded her statement and she was taken to the hospital for examination. On receiving this information, the accused brought her back to Kalaghatagi. On the way, they stayed in the house of a relative of the accused at Mundagod. In Kalaghatagi police station, the police recorded her statement and she was taken to the hospital for examination. She further stated that she showed the spot from where the accused abducted her and in this regard the police prepared a mahazar as per Ex.P.1 and the photographs taken during the mahazar are identified by the witness as Ex.P.2. Thereafter she showed the place in the Kalaghatagi bus stand from where she was taken in the bus. She further stated that she does not remember her date of birth, but asserted that inspite of her objection, the accused committed forcible intercourse on her. 13. Referring to the above evidence, the learned counsel would submit that the very fact that the victim was waiting for the accused in the Kalaghatagi bus stand would indicate that she willingly accompanied the accused to different places and stayed with him continuously for about 10 days without making any attempt to either escape or to raise any alarm. Her conduct indicates that she did not protest either at the time of boarding the bus or at the time of returning to Kalaghatagi. On the other hand, during investigation by the police she refused to go back to her parents house. All these circumstances clearly indicate that there was no forcible abduction or forcible rape as contended by the prosecution. 14. We are unable to accept the argument advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the accused. Undisputedly the victim was aged below 16 years as on the date of the commission of the offence. Though in her evidence she has stated that she does not remember the exact date of her birth, during her examination before the Court on 11.09.2013, she has given her age as 17 years. The prosecution has examined PW.10, the In-charge Head Master of the school, where the victim studied up to 7th standard. In his evidence, PW.10 the In-charge Head Master of the Government Higher Primary School, Astakatti, has clearly stated that as per the records maintained in the school, the date of birth of the victim girl is shown as 03.08.1997. The prosecution has examined PW.10, the In-charge Head Master of the school, where the victim studied up to 7th standard. In his evidence, PW.10 the In-charge Head Master of the Government Higher Primary School, Astakatti, has clearly stated that as per the records maintained in the school, the date of birth of the victim girl is shown as 03.08.1997. In support of this fact, the prosecution has marked the certificate issued by PW.10 as per Ex.P.15 and it is elicited that on the basis of the information furnished by the parents of the victim, the date of birth has been entered in the concerned register. Though it is argued that the said document does not conclusively establish the date of birth of the victim, yet in the absence of any other contra evidence, this document has to be given due weight. PW.10 has spoken about the basis on which the said entry was made in the school records. From his evidence, it stands established that the registers were regularly maintained in the ordinary course of business. In our view, the evidence of PW.10 coupled with the certificate Ex.P.15 and the entries made therein could be relied on in proof of the age of the victim, which establish that the victim was aged 15 years and 8 months as on the date of the commission of the offence. Thus, by virtue of the definition contained in Section 2(d) of POCSO Act, the victim has to be considered as ‘child’ within the meaning of the said provision. 15. The argument of the learned counsel for the accused that the victim willingly accompanied the accused and consented for the sexual act is contrary to the evidence of the prosecutrix. In her evidence she has asserted that when she was waiting for her mother in the Kalaghatagi bus stand, the accused took her with him on the promise of marrying her. There is nothing in the evidence of PW.1 to suggest that she had either asked the accused to come to the Bus stand to pick her up or that she had entered into any mutual arrangement with the accused to elope with him. The circumstances brought out in the evidence of PW.1 manifest that she had not taken any clothes or other necessaries for living with the accused. The circumstances brought out in the evidence of PW.1 manifest that she had not taken any clothes or other necessaries for living with the accused. On the other hand, her evidence indicates that on the promise of marrying her, the accused took her in the bus. Even in his evidence before the Court, the accused who examined himself as DW.1 has stated that the victim girl used to tell him that she was loving him and offered to marry him. Though in his evidence he has narrated that he used to convince her that he was married and having three children, but the very fact that the accused had taken the victim with him knowing fully well that he was already married and having three kids would completely demolish the version of the accused that PW.1, willingly followed him to different places with intention to marry him. Therefore, the contention urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that there was no forcible abduction cannot be accepted. 16. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the victim was a consenting party to the sexual act is once again contrary to the evidence on record. As already stated above, in her evidence, PW.1 has unequivocally stated that inspite of her protest, the accused committed forcible sexual intercourse on her. This testimony has not been challenged in the cross-examination of PW.1. Even though the accused has taken up a plea that the victim herself was in love with him, the accused has not suggested the said defence to PW.1 in the course of cross-examination. On the other hand, her evidence indicates that she was very well aware that the accused was a married person having children, and therefore, the theory of the victim herself offering to marry the accused falls to the ground. The answers elicited during the cross-examination of PW.1 completely demolishes the contention of the appellant that the victim was in love with the accused, and therefore, she willingly accompanied him to different places and consented for the sexual act. Even otherwise, being a minor, the consent of the victim becomes wholly inconsequential. Therefore, viewed from any angle, we do not find any reason to accept the contention urged by the learned counsel for the accused in this regard. 17. Even otherwise, being a minor, the consent of the victim becomes wholly inconsequential. Therefore, viewed from any angle, we do not find any reason to accept the contention urged by the learned counsel for the accused in this regard. 17. On perusal of the impugned judgment, it is seen that the trial Court had considered all the aspects of the case in proper perspective. While holding the accused guilty of the above offences, the trial Court has bestowed attention to the ingredients of the offences and having satisfied itself that the evidence let in by the prosecution establishes each and every ingredients thereof has returned the finding of guilt. Even on re-appreciation of the evidence, we do not find any reason to differ with the reasonings and the findings recorded by the trial Court. We do not find any error or infirmity whatsoever either in the appreciation of evidence or in the findings recorded by the trial Court holding the accused guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 363, 366 and 376 (2) (i) and (n) of IPC and Section 6 of POCSO Act. Even in the matter of sentence, the trial Court has taken into consideration the provisions of Section 42 of the POCSO Act and has imposed the punishment prescribed therein. We are in complete agreement with the sentence awarded by the trial Court. 18. The accused, though a married person, has committed the above offence against a minor, which is an aggravating factor that warrants the maximum punishment prescribed under the POCSO Act. Therefore, on consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case, the gravity of the offences committed by the accused against a minor knowing fully well that he was a married person and could not marry her, in our opinion, even the sentence awarded by the trial Court does not warrant interference. We do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. We do not find any merit in the appeal. As a result, the appeal is liable to be dismissed. Hence, the following: ORDER The appeal is dismissed. The impugned Judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 02.04.2014 and 03.04.2014 respectively passed by the Principal District and Sessions (Special) Judge, Dharwad in Special Sessions Case No.6/2013 is confirmed.