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2018 DIGILAW 3817 (MAD)

Punjab & Sind Bank v. Dewa Properties Limited

2018-10-12

P.T.ASHA

body2018
ORDER : P.T. Asha, J. 1. The issue which is called into question in the above application is: "Can the Court allow the plaintiff to move an application under the provisions of Order 7, Rule 14(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure for receiving additional documents after the suit is posted for arguments?" Case of the plaintiff: 2. The Applicant herein, who is the plaintiff in the suit, has filed the suit C.S.No.668 of 2004 for the following relief: "(a) To specifically enforce the performance of the Contract as per the Offer letters dated 12.11.1980 and 19.09.1983 and the Acceptance letters dated 24.11.1980 and 19.04.1984 and execute and register the 99 years Sale-cum-Lease Deed in favour of the plaintiff insofar as the schedule property is concerned. (b) To issue permanent injunction restraining the defendants or their men, agents, servants or subordinates or any other persons from in any way interfering or disturbing, alienating, by way of mortgage, sale or lease or demand rent or do any other act in deviation to the terms of the offer letters dated 12.11.1980 and 19.09.1983 and Acceptance letters dated 24.11.1980 and 19.04.1984 in the property more fully described in the schedule which is under the possession and custody of the plaintiff and for the cost of the suit." 3. The applicant in their Plaint would submit that the respondent herein had made an Offer to sell an extent of 6521 sq. ft. on the ground floor, 6616 sq. ft. on the first floor and 200 sq. ft. in the basement situated on the ground, first floor and basement of the building known as Spencer Towers-I at No.770A, Anna Salai, Chennai-600 002. The applicant would submit that they had paid to the respondent a sum of Rs. 51,39,538.20p which was the basic cost inclusive of additional interest and escalation cost for the purchase of the property for their use for 99 years. In addition to this, they had also agreed to pay a sum of Rs. 5,000/-per annum as annual lease amount for 99 years. 4. It is the case of the applicant that pursuant to the above Offer, they had taken possession of the ground and first floor for running their Banking business. In addition to this, they had also agreed to pay a sum of Rs. 5,000/-per annum as annual lease amount for 99 years. 4. It is the case of the applicant that pursuant to the above Offer, they had taken possession of the ground and first floor for running their Banking business. The Letter of Offer dated 12.11.1980 addressed to the Chairman and the General Manager of the applicant/Bank is for the ground and first floor and the Letter of Offer dated 19.09.1983 is for the basement area. This Offer was accepted by the applicant on 24.11.1980 for the ground and first floor and on 19.04.1984 for the basement area. 5. The applicant would further contend that despite their readiness and willingness to pay the balance amount, the respondent herein was not coming forward to execute the Sale-cum-Lease Deed. They would further contend that though the Sale Deed was not executed in their favour by the respondent/ Company which was originally known as Spencer Estates Limited and thereafter, amalgamated as M/s. Music World Entertainment Limited, they continued to be in possession of the entire extent which was given to them pursuant to the Letters dated 12.11.1980 and 24.11.1980. The applicant would submit that after the respondent herein had taken over, they had instituted proceedings under the Rent Control Act for fixation of fair rent which was in total violation of the terms agreed upon by themselves and the applicant. Therefore, the applicant was left with no other alternative but to file a suit for Specific Performance for enforcing the terms of the Contract as per the Letters of Offer dated 12.11.1980 and the Letters of Acceptance dated 24.11.1980 and 19.04.1984. Along with the Plaint, the plaintiff had filed 20 documents which included the two Offer Letters dated 12.11.1980 written by the respondent to the applicant and the reply of the applicant dated 24.11.1980 and 19.04.1984 besides other documents. 6. The respondents herein had resisted the suit inter alia raising the following main defenses: (a) The suit is barred by limitation. (b) There was no concluded contract. (c) Since the parties had not reached a consensus there was no grant of the premises for a period of 99 years. (d) There was no mutually agreed Draft Lease Deed between the parties. (e) The allegation that the applicant has deposited a sum of Rs. (b) There was no concluded contract. (c) Since the parties had not reached a consensus there was no grant of the premises for a period of 99 years. (d) There was no mutually agreed Draft Lease Deed between the parties. (e) The allegation that the applicant has deposited a sum of Rs. 51,39,538.20p is false as they have admitted in the rent control proceedings that they have deposited only a sum of Rs. 46,50,000/-. (f) The Offer and Acceptance which is referred to by the applicant only relates to the Offer for leasing the premises and not for sale. (g) The applicant has never asserted any right of ownership or title to the property since they had been inducted only as a Lessee. (h) The fact that the deposit was interest free would only show that it was not a sale but a lease and the applicant has admitted to pay a sum of Rs. 5,000/-per annum towards lease amount. (i) The plaintiff has chosen to wait till 2004 to file the suit though the rent control proceedings had been initiated in the year 2001 which would clearly establish the falsity of their claims. (j) The other averments in the Plaint were denied. Proceedings in the suit: 7. This Court had framed 10 issues and Issue No.7, which is cited as one of the reasons for filing the petition, is as follows: "Whether it is a Lease or a Sale/a Purchase?" 8. The evidence was completed and the matter was posted before Court on 31.08.2012 for arguments. Since the suit had reached the arguments stage, the respondent had agreed not to proceed further with R.C.O.P.No.1517 of 2012 which had been filed to evict the applicant on the grounds of wilful default for not paying the fair rent fixed in R.C.O.P.No.1109 of 2001. The applicant had first filed A.No.3195 of 2004 to stay the fair rent proceedings in R.C.O.P.No.1109 of 2001. The Interim Order sought for was not granted and consequently, orders were passed in the R.C.O.P. Challenging the order in the rent control proceedings, the applicant had filed a Rent Control Appeal. Once again the applicant had filed A.No.5408 of 2011 to stay the proceedings in the Rent Control Appeal pending disposal of this suit. The applicant was once again denied the relief. Once again the applicant had filed A.No.5408 of 2011 to stay the proceedings in the Rent Control Appeal pending disposal of this suit. The applicant was once again denied the relief. As the Rent Control Appeal ended in a dismissal, the applicant had filed C.R.P.Nos.3186 and 3187 of 2012. In the revision petitions, the applicant had obtained a conditional order of Stay and a direction that the same should be taken up along with the suit. Application under Order 7, Rule 14(3) CPC 9. On 27.08.2018, the applicant has come forward with the above application to file additional documents listed in the Judge's summons thereto. This application has been filed under the provisions of Order 7, Rule 14(3) and section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the affidavit filed in support of the said application, the applicant would once again reiterate the contentions raised in the Plaint and would further submit that since the respondent had filed R.C.O.P.No.1109 of 2001 for fixation of fair rent, the applicant/Bank was left with no other option except to file the present suit. Considering the urgency they had filed the suit with the documents then available with the Zonal Office at Chennai. The deponent would further submit that after he had taken over charge as a Chief Manager, he had requested the Head Office to search for documents which would be useful for substantiating the applicant/Bank's case in the present suit that it was a Sale and not a Lease. He would further contend that after a search, the documents relating to the negotiation and correspondence between the parties prior to the Letters of Offer and Acceptance, could be traced. He would further state that the documents were executed by Spencer Estates Limited as it then was and the present respondent is only a Successor in interest. The documents produced were of the period 1978 to 1982. Objection to the application: 10. The respondent herein had resisted the said application by filing a very detailed counter affidavit in which they had questioned the right of the applicant to file such an application at this late stage in the proceedings, when the suit was posted for arguments which have been pending for the last four years. Objection to the application: 10. The respondent herein had resisted the said application by filing a very detailed counter affidavit in which they had questioned the right of the applicant to file such an application at this late stage in the proceedings, when the suit was posted for arguments which have been pending for the last four years. The respondent has questioned the invocation of the provisions of Order 7, Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure 14 years after the institution of the suit. 11. The respondent would contend that the evidence of the applicant had concluded on 22.07.2011 itself and even after 7 years from the date of filing of the suit to the conclusion to the plaintiff's side evidence, there was no whisper about these documents which are now sought to be brought on record. The application has been resisted primarily on the following grounds: (i) The documents now sought to be marked are not supported by pleadings. (ii) The Plaint does not mention any negotiation or meeting prior to 24.11.1980 for which purpose the documents are sought to be marked. (iii) The suit is filed to enforce the Contracts based on Offer letters dated 12.11.1980 and 19.09.1983 and Acceptance letters dated 24.11.1980 and 19.04.1984, none of which referred to a Sale but only to a Lease. (iv) In the counter filed in R.C.O.P.No.l 109 of 2001, the applicant has clearly admitted that the transaction was only a Lease. (v) The Rent Control Petition was filed on 04.06.2001, the applicant was served on 13.07.2001 and the counter in the R.C.O.P. was filed on 14.12.2001 but the suit is filed only in June 2004. Therefore, the contentions of the applicant that they had to rush into filing the suit on account of the filing of R.C.O.P. with the available documents and the present documents could not be filed is proved to be false. (vi) The statement in the affidavit that the suit was filed only with the documents that were available with the Zonal Office is palpably false since even in the Original Suit, interoffice letters between the Zonal Office and the Head Office dated 29.11.2003, 05.12.2003 and 13.12.2003 (Ex.P.17 to Ex.P.19) would show that the Head Office had already given documents to the Zonal Office and these documents have been sent in the interregnum between the Rent Control Proceedings and the suit. (vii) The affidavit is totally bereft of any detail as to when the deponent had approached the Head Office and the Head Office had conceded to the request and forwarded the documents. The introduction of these documents is completely contradictory to the pleadings already on record as well as the evidence. (viii) A glaring example of this contradiction is the cross examination of the applicant's witness on 08.06.2010 where the witness has stated as follows: "In 1980, it was only an Offer and Acceptance and no sale took place. Even today, the plaintiff is in enjoyment of the property only as a tenant." Therefore, the respondent had objected to the said application. Submissions: 12. Mr. TV. Ramanujan, learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant would contend that the present application has been filed taking into account the fact that this Court has framed Issue No.7 which is, whether the Contract was a Lease or a Sale / Purchase. In order to substantiate the same, the applicant is coming forward with the present application since these documents were not available when the suit was filed. He would draw my attention to the Written Statement filed by the respondent herein and to the Letter of Offer dated 12.11.1980 marked as Ex.P.l, wherein the market rates have been quoted at Rs. 500/-and juxtaposing this with the lease rent fixed at around Rs. 5/-per sq.ft. in 1978 and Rs. 6/-to Rs. 7/-in 1980 would only prove that the parties had negotiated for a sale. He would further argue that there is no concluded contract and the original agreement of sale remains. He would submit that the respondent after receiving the deposit amount is now trying to convert the sale into a lease. He would further argue that the prayer was restricted only to sale though it should be a Lease-cum-Sale Deed. 13. The learned Senior counsel would further contend that the respondent has admitted the documents now sought to be filed but have only contended that the same is prior in time and not relevant to the suit. He would further argue that in the Letters that are now sought to be marked, the name Spencer Estates Limited and Spencer and Company Limited is found and it is not the case of the respondent that Spencer and Company Limited and Spencer Estates Limited are two different entities totally unrelated to the respondent/Company. He would further argue that in the Letters that are now sought to be marked, the name Spencer Estates Limited and Spencer and Company Limited is found and it is not the case of the respondent that Spencer and Company Limited and Spencer Estates Limited are two different entities totally unrelated to the respondent/Company. He would further submit that the documents that are now sought to be marked are only prior to the two Letters of Offer, Ex.P.l and Ex.P.2. Ex.P.l and Ex.P.2 are the conclusion of these negotiations. He would further submit that the delay in filing of these documents is not a ground for dismissal. Since the entire consideration had been paid the question of readiness and willingness pales into insignificance. He would also refer to the Judgment of the Supreme Court reported in (1982) 1 Supreme Court Cases 223 [Chhaganlal Keshavlal Mehta vs. Patel Narandas Haribhai] and would rely on Paragraphs 22 and 23 therein. He would further submit that the respondent cannot contend that the applicant having accepted the Offer of a lease was estopped from claiming the case of sale. The learned Senior Counsel would submit that there can be no estoppel, in a case where both parties are aware as to the transaction that they were undertaking and it is this principle that is emphasized in Paragraphs 22 and 23 of the Judgment supra, where the principles of an estoppel has been dealt with. The learned Senior Counsel would also plead adverse possession. He relied upon the following Judgments also: A. 2015-2-L.W.889 The New India Assurance Company Limited vs. M/s.Dewa Properties This is a case relating to another portion of the property in which the suit schedule property is also situate. This Judgment is pressed into service to prove the applicant's contention that there is no concluded contract. B. 2013-1-L.W. 330 = (2012) 13 Supreme Court Cases 80 Mathai Samuel and others vs. Eapen Eapen (dead) by LRs and others In paragraph 19 therein, the Honourable Supreme Court held that the primary rule of Construction of documents is the intention of the executant which must find place in the document. The issue of construction would arise only if the terms of the document are ambiguous and the meaning uncertain. The issue of construction would arise only if the terms of the document are ambiguous and the meaning uncertain. C. 2002 (2) SCC 256 Om Prakash Gupta vs. Ranbir B. Goyal This Court has held that the ordinary Rule is that the right of the parties stand crystallized on the date of the institution of the suit and decree passed should be in accordance with the rights of the parties as it stood before the commencement of the lis. D. AIR 1991 Supreme Court 1040 Raghunath and another vs. Raju Ramappa Shetty This Judgment has been cited to canvass the applicant's plea that evidence relevant to the case should not be shut out. 14. Per contra, Mr. Roshan Balasubramaniam, who is appearing on behalf of the respondents would contend that the application is highly belated and the suit itself is barred by limitation. The counsel would draw my attention to Paragraph 2 of the Plaint, wherein the applicant had clearly stated that he was put in possession for a period of 99 years which would clearly show that the contract was one of lease and not of sale since, had it been a sale there would be no restriction on the period of possession, this statement is once again reiterated in Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Plaint. He would further submit that in the application, the applicant has come forward with an allegation that they have filed this application belatedly as they were constrained to rush into filing the suit with the available documents as the respondent had filed the rent control proceedings. According to the counsel for the respondent, this is an absolutely false statement as the rent control proceedings were initiated in June 2001 and the applicant was served with summons on 30.07.2001 and they had filed their counter on 14.12.2001. The suit has been filed only three years later which means it was not prepared in haste. The second reason which was portrayed in the application was that the Plaint was filed with the documents then available with the Zonal Office and the documents of the head Office could be obtained only now and therefore, this Application has come to be filed. Countering this argument, the learned counsel for the respondent would draw my attention to Ex.P.17 and Ex.P.18 both of which have been filed along with the suit and which emanates from the Head Office. Countering this argument, the learned counsel for the respondent would draw my attention to Ex.P.17 and Ex.P.18 both of which have been filed along with the suit and which emanates from the Head Office. He would argue that there is an immense delay in taking out this application and the reasons put forward in the affidavit filed in support of the Judge's Summons that these documents have to be filed to prove that the agreement between the applicant and the respondent is one of a sale is absolutely false. He would rely on the cross examination of P.W.l, the Senior Branch Manager of the applicant/Bank who would admit that the applicant/Bank is enjoying the property only as a tenant. He would place reliance on the following Judgments in support of his contentions: 1. 2009-2-L.W. 485 = (2008) 17 Supreme Court Cases 491 Bachhaj Nahar vs. Nilima Mandal and another 2. 2011-4-L.W.544 M/s.Pan Resorts Limited having its Regd. Office at No.125, St. Mary's Road, Alwarpet, Chennai-18 rep. By its Director Sri K.Subbiah vs. H.H.Karthika Thirunal Lakshmi Bayi and others 3. (2013) 14 Supreme Court Cases 1 Bagai Construction through its Proprietor Lalit Bagai vs. Gupta Building Material Store 15. In the Judgment reported in 2009-2-L.W. 485 = (2008) 17 Supreme Court Cases 491 [Bachhaj Nahar vs. Nilima Mandal and another] at Paragraph 30, the Honourable Supreme Court would hold that when there is no prayer for a particular relief and no pleading to support such a relief if the Court considers and grants such a relief it will lead to miscarriage of justice. Thus, no amount of evidence on a plea that is not put forward in the pleadings can lead to any relief being granted. 16. The Judgment reported in 2011-4-L.W.544 [M/s.Pan Resorts Limited having its Regd. Office at No.125, St. Mary's Road, Alwarpet, Chennai-18 rep. By its Director Sri K.Subbiah vs. H.H.Karthika Thirunal Lakshmi Bayi and others] has been relied upon to buttress the point that when documents were already in the custody of the plaintiff at the time of the institution of the suit and there is no pleading in the application for reopening the evidence as to why such a document was not produced at the earliest point of time, the said application cannot be allowed. The Bench has also held that the words "any stage" used in Order 17, Rule 6 and 7 of the Original Side Rules would only mean the period prior to trial and once trial is over the plaintiff or defendant are estopped from marking documents to substantiate their claim. In that case, the trial had been concluded and the matter posted for arguments and therefore, the application was dismissed by the learned Single Judge and confirmed by the Division Bench. 17. The Judgment in (2013) 14 Supreme Court Cases 1 [Bagai Construction through its Proprietor Lalit Bagai vs. Gupta Building Material Store] was relied upon in support of contention that the plaintiff, who was all along in possession of all documents, had not placed it on record and only when the case was listed for arguments and after arguments were concluded, the plaintiff had moved two applications, one under Order 7, Rule 14 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to place on record certain documents and the other application under Order 18, Rule 7 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to recall P.W.l to mark those documents. The Honourable Supreme Court had held that the application is belated and no acceptable reason has been given by the plaintiff as to why the documents had not been placed on record at the earliest point of time. The Hon'ble Supreme Court went on to observe that the applications were filed only to overcome the lacunae in the pleadings and the evidence. The Supreme Court therefore rejected the order of the High Court and restored the trial Court's order dismissing these applications. The counsel would argue that the facts of this case applied on all fours to the facts of the case on hand. Discussion: 18. Before proceeding to discuss the issue on hand, it is necessary to briefly understand the Procedure contemplated under the Code of Civil Procedure and the Rules framed under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent known as the Original Side Rules from the institution of the suit to the stage of the Judgment. (i) Procedure under the Code 19. The first schedule to the CPC deals with the various rules governing the various stages of a suit and the appeals thereafter. Order 4 deals with the institution of a suit which Rule 1 contemplates is by presenting a Plaint. (i) Procedure under the Code 19. The first schedule to the CPC deals with the various rules governing the various stages of a suit and the appeals thereafter. Order 4 deals with the institution of a suit which Rule 1 contemplates is by presenting a Plaint. Order 6 exhaustively deals with pleadings i.e., the plaint or written statement and the contents of such pleadings and the verification of such pleadings, its amendments, etc., Order 7 of the Code exclusively deals with a Plaint it gives details about the particulars that should be contained in a plaint on the basis of the case that is sought to be filed, etc., Rule 14 thereunder deals with the production of documents that a plaintiff seeks to rely upon. It exhaustively provides for a contingency when the document is not in possession but he is aware' of where the same is. Sub-Rule (3) therein (which forms the basis of the issue on hand) provides the procedure to be followed when a plaintiff gets hold of a document after the institution of the case. It states that the same can be produced with the leave of the Court but however with a rider that such a document should be produced "at the hearing of the suit." Order 18 deals with hearing of the suit and the examination of witnesses. After this stage, the arguments are heard and the Court moves on to the procedure contemplated under Order 20 which is pronouncement of the Judgment and the contents of the decree. (ii) Procedure as per the Original Side Rules: 20. These rules known as the Rules of the High Court, Madras, Original Side 1994, prescribes the procedure for the institution of the suits on the Original Side of the High Court. Order 2 deals with the form and presentation of proceedings which also contemplates the filing of a plaint under Rule 1 therein. Rule 11 contemplates that all the proceedings and documents should be presented to the Registrar. Order 9 deals with the production, inspection and discovery of documents and Rule 1 contemplates that filing of typewritten copies of the documents along with the original document. It is after this stage that the summoning and attendance of witnesses under Order 16 is contemplated followed by the final disposal under Order 17. 21. Order 9 deals with the production, inspection and discovery of documents and Rule 1 contemplates that filing of typewritten copies of the documents along with the original document. It is after this stage that the summoning and attendance of witnesses under Order 16 is contemplated followed by the final disposal under Order 17. 21. Therefore, from an analysis of the above provisions, it is clear that after the Amendment to the Code in 2002, the provisions of Order 18, Rule 17A has been omitted. Therefore, it appears that the intention of the Legislature was that after hearing of the suit commences no new document can be filed. This amendment was introduced with the laudable object of curbing inordinate delay in courts. 20. These provisions, viz; the deletion of the provision Or. XVIII Rule 17A, were called into question and the Honourable Supreme Court in the decision in Salem Advocates Bar Association, Tamilnadu vs. Union of India reported in AIR-2003-SCC-189 and the Honourable Supreme Court answered the argument advanced on the side of the petitioners that this deletion would cause hardship to the litigants in Para 21 of the judgment which reads as follows: "21.We find that in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, a provision similar to Rule 17-A did not exist. This provision, as already noted, was inserted in 1976. The effect of the deletion of this provision in 2002 is merely to restore status quo ante, that is to say, the position which existed prior to the insertion of Rule 17-A in 1976. The remedy if any, that was available to a litigant with regard to adducing additional evidence prior to 1976 would be available now and no more. It is quite evident that Rule 17-A has been deleted with a view that unnecessarily applications are not filed primarily with a view to prolong the trial." However, the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not spell out the modalities. This anamoly was rectified/clarified by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its judgment reported in AIR-2005-SCC-3353, Salem Bar Association vs. Union of India and others, which was a sequel to the earlier judgment in the Salem Bar Association Case reported in AIR-2003-SCC-189. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the earlier judgment had observed that modalities have to be formulated for the manner in which these amendments have to be implemented and made given effect to. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the earlier judgment had observed that modalities have to be formulated for the manner in which these amendments have to be implemented and made given effect to. In para 14 of the judgment in AIR-2005-SCC-3353 the Hon'ble Supreme Court had clarified as follows: "14. In Salem Advocates Bar Association's case, it has been clarified that on deletion of Order 18, Rule 17-A which provided for leading of additional evidence, the law existing before the introduction of the amendment, i.e., 1st July, 2002, would stand restored. The Rule was deleted by Amendment Act of2002. Even before insertion of Order 18, Rule 17-A, the Court had inbuilt power to permit parties to produce evidence not known to them earlier or which could not be produced in spite of due diligence. Order 18, Rule 17-A did not create any new right but only clarified the position. Therefore, deletion of Order 18, Rule 17-A does not disentitle production of evidence at a later stage. On a party satisfying the Court that after exercise of due diligence that evidence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced at the time the party was leading evidence, the Court may permit leading of such evidence at a later stage on such terms as may appear to be just." Therefore, it is clear that though the provisions of the Order 18, Rule 17A was removed, the parties were permitted to produce evidence but however on the condition of their satisfying the court that after exercise of due diligence that evidence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced at the time of the party leading evidence on such terms as may appear to be just. In fact, the provisions of Order 7, Rule 14 (3) also spells out a similar provision even if a document which ought to be produced when the Plaint is presented or to be entered in the list to be added or annexed to the Plaint but is not produced or entered accordingly the same shall not be received in evidence post trial except by the leave of the court at the hearing of the suit. Order 18 deals with the hearing of the suit and examination of witnesses and it is after this stage that the parties move to the stage of arguments. Order 18 deals with the hearing of the suit and examination of witnesses and it is after this stage that the parties move to the stage of arguments. The like procedure is also contemplated under the Original Side Rules narrated supra. Given below is the chronology of the dates and events with reference to the suit on hand. No Date Description 1 14.06.2004 Plaintiff files C.S.668 of 2004 together with interim applications for injunction & stay of RCOP 2 23.11.2004 Counter to interim applications filed by Respondent 3 13.06.2005 O.A.681 of 2004 filed by Applicant for interim injunction is dismissed 4 August 2007 Written Statement filed 5 18.09.2008 Proof Affidavit filed by PW1 & Examination in Chief 6 21.11.2008 12.12.2008 8.06.2010 24.06.2011 22.07.2011 Cross Examination of PW1 7 13.09.2011 Proof Affidavit filed by Dwl & Examination in Chief 8 18.10.2011 08.08.2012 17.08.2012 27.08.2012 Cross Examination of DW1 9 21.11.2011 Appln 540, & 5408 of 2011 filed by Applicant seeking transfer & stay of RCA respectively 10 01.12.2011 Appln 540r, & 5408 of 2011 dismissed as in-fructuous as orders passed on merits in RCA 11 31.08.2012 Trial is completed and matter posted before this Hon'ble Court for final disposal 12 24.10.2013 Appln. 5601 of 2013 filed by Applicant seeking stay of RCOP 1570 of 2012 filed by Respondent for evictio 13 05.02.2014 Counter filed in Appln 5601 of 2013 by Respondent 14 28.02.2014 Appln 5601 of 2013 disposed off recording submission of both counsels that since suit is ripe for arguments, enquiry in RCOP. 1570 of 2012 will not be pressed. 15 06.01.2016 Counsel for Applicant gives letter seeking tagging of CRP and suit 16 2016-July 2018 Suits & CRPs are listed multiple times for final arguments. From 06.07.2018, matters were being listed under the caption "For Orders" 17 21.08.2018 Present Application under Order 7, Rule 14 is served on the Counsel for Respondent 22. From the above, it is clear that the suit was first posted for arguments on 31.08.2012 and for 6 years the matter is being adjourned for this purpose and it is only on 27.07.2018 that this application has been moved by the applicant. This clearly shows the inordinate delay in taking out this application. From the above, it is clear that the suit was first posted for arguments on 31.08.2012 and for 6 years the matter is being adjourned for this purpose and it is only on 27.07.2018 that this application has been moved by the applicant. This clearly shows the inordinate delay in taking out this application. Now coming to the reasons that have been adduced for filing this application at this stage, they are as follows: (a) The applicant had to file the suit in haste as the respondent had filed proceedings for fixing the fair rent before the Rent Controller and therefore, the suit was filed with the available documents. (b) Since the documents related to the period 1980 the same could be traced only now. If we consider the first reason, as pointed out by the respondent, the Rent Control Proceedings had been filed in the year 2001 and the suit in the year 2004, therefore, the contention that the suit was filed in haste cannot be countenanced. The applicant had 3 years to collate the documents and prepare for the case. 23. As regards the second point that the documents would only be traced now, the deponent has stated that it was only after he had taken charge that he had requested the Head Office to search for the documents. This statement proves that the applicant had not taken any diligent steps till the deponent had assumed charge to look for the documents and this demonstrates the utter laxity on the part of the applicant. However, the affidavit is totally bereft of any details regarding the date on which the dependent took charge, when he had asked the Head Office to look for the documents and when the Head Office has provided the details. 24. From a perusal of Ex.P.17, it is seen that this letter had been sent by FAX to the applicant from New Delhi on 02.12.2003, likewise Ex.P.18. Further, a reading of Ex.P.12 which is the counter statement filed by the applicant in R.C.O.P.1109 of 2001 would show that the applicant had taken out a defense that since they have entered into a contract for taking on lease that petition premises therein (which is the suit schedule property here) on a 99 years lease the petition for fixing a fair rent was not maintainable. This suit is also filed only to enforce the terms of the offer letters dated 12.11.1989 and 19.09.1983. However, in the instant application, the applicant has come forward with a contention that the documents are being filed to prove that the agreement between the applicant and respondent was one for sale. This counter has been filed on 14.12.2001. Even when the Plaint was filed on 14.06.2004 the applicant has made the following averment in the Para 9 of the Plaint: "9. The Plaintiff submits that the Defendant had approached the Rent control Court for enhancement of rent by suppressing the 99 years contract/lease. This is absolutely contradictory to the provisions of the contract between the Plaintiff and Defendant. This is the first time that the Defendant has deviated from the contract and has disputed the title of the plaintiff and has filed a petition before the Rent Controller claiming enhanced Rent. Now that the defendant has raised this issue, the Plaintiff has no other alternative, but to file the suit for Specific Performance for enforcement of the terms of the contract as per the Letter of Offer dated 12.11.1980 and 19.09.1983 and Letter of Acceptance dated 24.11.1980 and 19.04.1984." 25. Therefore, a conjoint reading of the counter and the Plaint would give rise to the irresistible conclusion that the applicant is claiming a right to be in possession of the Suit property for 99 years on the terms of the Letters of offer dated 12.11.1980 and 19.09.1983 and the Letters of Acceptance dated 24.11.1980 and 19.04.1984. 26. As rightly pointed out by the respondent, the contents of the affidavit are in total conflict with the pleading. 27. It would be apposite to take note of the Chronology of the dates and events detailed in Para 21 supra which would clearly show how the application is highly belated and no satisfactory reasons have been shown to explain this delay. The judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bagai Constructions, supra would squarely apply to the facts of the instant case. 28. The judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bagai Constructions, supra would squarely apply to the facts of the instant case. 28. Therefore, in my view, the application filed to receive the documents deserves to be dismissed primarily on the following grounds: (a) The application has been filed at a stage when the suit is posted for arguments contrary to the provisions of Order 7, Rule 14(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Original Side Rules without the Applicant giving sufficient reasons not only for the delay and but also why the said documents were not produced at the earliest point of time. (b) The application is highly belated. (c) The application seeks to introduce a new case not pleaded before the Rent Controller or the Plaint. (d) The reasons for filing the application is found to be false as detailed in Paragraphs 21 and 22 supra. (e) No reasons much less a convincing reason has been given for the delay. (f) The Applicant has not stated that despite their exercising due diligence they were unable to lay their hands on these documents or that they were unaware of these documents. 29. In the result, A.No.6787 of 2018 in C.S. No. 668 of 2004 is dismissed. Consequently, the suit and the connected revisions are posted for hearing on 25.10.2018.