JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. Instant Regular Second Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Una, H.P. in Civil Appeal No.59/2002, dated 23.2.2006, affirming the judgment and decree passed by learned Sub Judge Ist Class, Court No.2, Amb, District Una, H.P. in Civil Suit No.196 of 1993, dated 25.6.2002, praying therein to dismiss the suit having been filed by the plaintiff-respondent after setting aside the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts below. 2. Necessary facts, as emerged from the record, are that the respondent-plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as the ‘plaintiff’) filed a Civil Suit praying therein for decree of permanent prohibitory injunction and possession in the Court of learned Sub Judge Ist Class, Court No.2, Amb, District Una, restraining the defendants-appellants (hereinafter referred to as the ‘defendants’) from interfering in any manner, in the suit land owned and possessed by them. Plaintiff averred in the plaint that he is owner in possession of the land measuring 0-02-70 hectares, bearing Khewat No.21 min, Khatauni No.60 min, Khasra Nos.642, 643 and 642/1 as entered in the Missalhaquiat for the year 1988-89, situate in village Mubarikpur, Tehsil Amb, District Una, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as the ‘suit land’). Plaintiff averred that the defendants, who are head strong persons, threatened him to take forcible possession of the suit land by raising construction and in this regard have already collected material. During the pendency of case, plaint came to be amended, whereby the plaintiff further averred that during the pendency of the suit, defendants have encroached upon the portion marked with letters ABCDEFGHIJ as shown in the site plan filed by the plaintiff in Khasra Nos.642, 642/1 and have also raised Khadposh Tapri over the portion marked with letters EFGH and have encroached upon the whole portion marked with letters A to J without the consent of the plaintiff. Plaintiff further claimed that possession of the defendants over this portion is that of a trespasser and as such they are liable to be ejected from this land. In this background, the plaintiff sought a decree for possession and injunction against the defendants. 3. Defendants, by way of filing their joint written statement, refuted the claim of the plaintiffs on the ground of maintainability, estoppel and limitation. In this background, the plaintiff sought a decree for possession and injunction against the defendants. 3. Defendants, by way of filing their joint written statement, refuted the claim of the plaintiffs on the ground of maintainability, estoppel and limitation. On merits, defendants refuted the claim put forth by the plaintiff and claimed that the land denoted by letters KBCD, out of the land comprised of Khasra No.643, is in their possession since the time of their ancestors and they are using the same for storing fuel wood and also to go to answer the call of nature as a matter of right. Defendants also claimed that they have become owners by way of adverse possession. Defendants further averred that there exists an old cattle shed over Khasra No.642, which was reconstructed by their father in the month of June, 1960 over the same place and land of Khasra No.642 denoted by letters EFGJ is situated in between the cattle shed, Abadi and court-yard of defendants. Defendants also claimed that apart from constructing cattle shed over Khasra No.642/1, their father also constructed a ‘KUP’ and also installed chaff cutting machine over Khasra No.642 in the month of June 1960 in the presence of plaintiff. Apart from above, defendants claimed that vacant area of Khasra No.642 is also used by them for tethering cattle since the time of their father. According to defendants, they are coming in open, continuous and peaceful possession of the suit land to the knowledge of plaintiff and they are in hostile and adverse possession of the same and as such have become owners with the passage of time. In the aforesaid background, the defendants prayed for dismissal of the suit. 4. By way of replication, the plaintiff, while denying the allegations made in the written statement reaffirmed the averments made in the plaint and controverted the contrary averments made in the written statement. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed the following issues for determination:- “1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of injunction as prayed for? OPP. 2. Whether the defendants have become owners of the suit land by way of adverse possession? OPD. 3. Whether the entries in the revenue record in favour of plaintiff as owner in possession are wrong and illegal as alleged? OPD. 4. Whether the suit is not maintainable in its present form? OPD. OPP. 2. Whether the defendants have become owners of the suit land by way of adverse possession? OPD. 3. Whether the entries in the revenue record in favour of plaintiff as owner in possession are wrong and illegal as alleged? OPD. 4. Whether the suit is not maintainable in its present form? OPD. 5. Whether the plaintiff is estopped by his act and conduct to file this suit? OPD. 6. Whether the suit is within time? OPP. 7. Relief.” 6. Learned trial Court, subsequently, vide judgment dated 25.6.2002 decreed the suit of the plaintiff and held them entitled for decree of permanent injunction against the defendants restraining them from interfering in any manner, taking forcible possession and raising construction of suit land. Learned Court below also decreed the suit of the plaintiff for possession by removal of encroachment and demolition of super-structure raised over the portion marked as letters A to Z as reflected in site plan Ex.PW-1/A. 7. Being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court, defendants preferred an appeal before the learned Additional District Judge, Una, which also came to be dismissed vide judgment dated 23.2.2006. 8. Being still aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment passed by learned Additional District Judge, Una, defendants have approached this Court by way of instant proceedings, seeking therein dismissal of the suit having been filed by the respondent-plaintiff after setting aside judgments and decrees passed in their favour by the Courts below. 9. This Court vide order dated 11.08.2006, admitted the appeal on the following substantial questions of law:- “1. Whether the appellants-defendants were in possession of a portion of Khasra No.642 even at the time of the settlement, which concluded in the year 1988-89, and had their coop and cattle-shed on a portion thereof? If so, its effect.” 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record of the case. 11. Whether the appellants-defendants were in possession of a portion of Khasra No.642 even at the time of the settlement, which concluded in the year 1988-89, and had their coop and cattle-shed on a portion thereof? If so, its effect.” 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record of the case. 11. Since during the proceedings of the case, this Court was made to peruse entire evidence, be it ocular or documentary, adduced on record by the learned counsel representing the parties, this Court is not persuaded to agree with the contention raised by Mr.Bhupender Gupta, learned Senior counsel, representing the appellants that Courts below have not appreciated the evidence in its right perspective and there is complete mis-reading, mis-appreciation and mis-construction of evidence, rather this Court having closely perused evidence available on record has no hesitation to conclude that the defendants have miserably failed to prove on record by leading cogent and convincing evidence, if any, that they are in adverse possession of the suit land as claimed by them in the written statement. Though the defendants have claimed that they are coming in possession of the suit land from the time of their ancestors, but such claim is not corroborated by evidence, be it documentary or ocular, if any, adduced on record by the defendants. To the contrary, it is quiet apparent from the material adduced on record by the plaintiff that they are coming in possession of the suit land in the capacity of absolute owners up to the year 1988-89, whereafter possession of the defendants over some part of the suit land came to be recorded in terms of order passed by Settlement Naib Tehsildar, Gagret (for short ‘SNT’) on 17.12.1988. Though learned Senior Counsel placed much reliance upon aforesaid entry came to be reflected in favour of the defendants, pursuant to orders passed by ‘SNT’, but this Court is unable to lay its hands on the copy of aforesaid order, if any, passed by ‘SNT’, Gagret. Similarly, no evidence has been led on record by the defendants to show that ‘SNT’, Gagret had power, if any, to record defendants as ‘Kabzan’ and whether while effecting such entry plaintiff was afforded opportunity of being heard or not. Needless to say that detailed procedure has been provided under the H.P. Land Revenue Act to effect entry in the revenue records. Needless to say that detailed procedure has been provided under the H.P. Land Revenue Act to effect entry in the revenue records. Plaintiff has also placed on record documentary evidence i.e. Ex.P-1, perusal whereof suggests that he has been shown as owner in possession of the suit land and it nowhere reflects possession, if any, of the defendants over the suit land, as claimed by them in their written statement. Though perusal of copy of Missalhaquiat for the year 1988-89 Ex.P-2 suggests that the defendants came to be recorded as ‘Kabzan’ of land comprised in Khasra No.642/1 the order of ‘SNT’, Gagret in case No.222/88 dated 17.12.1988, but, as has been observed hereinabove, order of ‘SNT’, Gagret has not been placed on record. Similarly, perusal of Ex.P-3 i.e. copy of Jamabandi for the year 1983-84 as well as Ex.P-4 copy of Missalhaquiat for the year 1964-65 placed on record by the plaintiff clearly substantiates his claim that he has been coming in possession over the suit land continuously without any interference. Plaintiff has also placed on record Jamabandi for the year 1953-54 Ex.PX which further suggests that predecessors-in-interest of the plaintiff and others have been coming as owners in possession of different Khasra numbers. 12. On the other hand, defendants have only produced copy of site plan Ex.DW-1/A to suggest that cattle shed constructed by their father exists over Khasra No.642/1. Defendants have also not led any evidence on record to prove that they were in possession of portion of Khasra No.642 even at the time of settlement which concluded in the year 1988-89. As has been noticed above, defendants in support of their claim have not placed on record any documentary evidence, save and except, site plan Ex.DW-1/A, whereas there is ample evidence led on record by the plaintiff suggestive of the fact that he is owner in possession of the suit land and as such there is no force in the arguments of Mr.Gupta, learned Senior Counsel representing the appellants, that learned Court below, while decreeing the civil suit of the plaintiff failed to take note of the fact that the appellants-defendants were in possession of portion of Khasra No.642 at the time of settlement, which was admittedly concluded in the year 1988-89. Leaving everything aside, defendants have not bothered to place on record, if any, of settlement proceedings held in 1988-89 to substantiate their aforesaid claim. Leaving everything aside, defendants have not bothered to place on record, if any, of settlement proceedings held in 1988-89 to substantiate their aforesaid claim. Stray entry, if any, reflected in revenue record, on the basis of order, if any, passed by ‘SNT’, Gagret is of no consequence and has rightly been discarded by Courts below, especially when no evidence has been led on record by the defendants to prove the proceedings initiated by ‘SNT’, Gagret, which ultimately culminated into order dated 17.12.1988. Documentary evidence available on record totally belies the stand taken by the defendants in their written statement and, as such, there appears to be no illegality and infirmity in the judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below. As has been noticed hereinabove, defence of adverse possession has been taken by the defendants just for the sake of opposition because no specific evidence has been led on record to prove adverse possession, if any, of defendants qua the suit land by the defendants. 13. It is well settled law that plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. As such, a person who claims adverse possession should prove; (a) on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Hemaji Waghaji Jat vs. Bhikhabhai Khengarbhai Harijan & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 103 , has held that since a person claiming adverse possession intends to defeat the rights of the true owner, onus is heavily upon him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession. Rather, in the case referred above, Hon’ble Apex Court termed the law of adverse possession as irrational, illogical and wholly disproportionate and recommended Union of India to seriously consider and make suitable changes in the law of adverse possession. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held:- “18. In Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Govt. of India (2004) 10 SCC 779 at para 11, this court observed as under :- "In the eye of the law, an owner would be deemed to be in possession of a property so long as there is no intrusion. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held:- “18. In Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Govt. of India (2004) 10 SCC 779 at para 11, this court observed as under :- "In the eye of the law, an owner would be deemed to be in possession of a property so long as there is no intrusion. Non-use of the property by the owner even for a long time won't affect his title. But the position will be altered when another person takes possession of the property and asserts a right over it. Adverse possession is a hostile possession by clearly asserting hostile title in denial of the title of the true owner. It is a well-settled principle that a party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession is "nec vi, nec clam, nec precario", that is, peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. It must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period." The court further observed that plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show: (a) on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession. 19. In Saroop Singh v. Banto (2005) 8 SCC 330 this Court observed: "29. In terms of Article 65 the starting point of limitation does not commence from the date when the right of ownership arises to the plaintiff but commences from the date the defendant's possession becomes adverse. (See Vasantiben Prahladji Nayak v. Somnath Muljibhai Nayak (2004) 3 SCC 376 ) 30. ‘Animus possidendi' is one of the ingredients of adverse possession. Unless the person possessing the land has a requisite animus the period for prescription does not commence. (See Vasantiben Prahladji Nayak v. Somnath Muljibhai Nayak (2004) 3 SCC 376 ) 30. ‘Animus possidendi' is one of the ingredients of adverse possession. Unless the person possessing the land has a requisite animus the period for prescription does not commence. As in the instant case, the appellant categorically states that his possession is not adverse as that of true owner, the logical corollary is that he did not have the requisite animus. (See Md. Mohammad Ali (Dead) by LRs. v. Jagdish Kalita and Others (2004) 1 SCC 271)" 20. This principle has been reiterated later in the case of M. Durai v. Muthu and Others (2007) 3 SCC 114 para 7. This Court observed as under: "...In terms of Articles 142 and 144 of the old Limitation Act, the plaintiff was bound to prove his title as also possession within twelve years preceding the date of institution of the suit under the Limitation Act, 1963, once the plaintiff proves his title, the burden shifts to the defendant to establish that he has perfected his title by adverse possession." 21. This court had an occasion to examine the concept of adverse possession in T. Anjanappa & Others v. Somalingappa & Another [ (2006) 7 SCC 570 ]. The court observed that a person who bases his title on adverse possession must show by clear and unequivocal evidence that his title was hostile to the real owner and amounted to denial of his title to the property claimed. The court further observed that the classical requirements of acquisition of title by adverse possession are that such possession in denial of the true owner's title must be peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be open and hostile enough to be capable of being known by the parties interested in the property, though it is not necessary that there should be evidence of the adverse possessor actually informing the real owner of the former's hostile action. 22. In a relatively recent case in P. T. Munichikkanna Reddy & Others v. Revamma & Others (2007) 6 SCC 59 ] this court again had an occasion to deal with the concept of adverse possession in detail. The court also examined the legal position in various countries particularly in English and American system. We deem it appropriate to reproduce relevant passages in extenso. The court also examined the legal position in various countries particularly in English and American system. We deem it appropriate to reproduce relevant passages in extenso. The court dealing with adverse possession in paras 5 and 6 observed as under:- "5. Adverse possession in one sense is based on the theory or presumption that the owner has abandoned the property to the adverse possessor on the acquiescence of the owner to the hostile acts and claims of the person in possession. It follows that sound qualities of a typical adverse possession lie in it being open, continuous and hostile. [See Downing v. Bird 100 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 1958), Arkansas Commemorative Commission v. City of Little Rock 227 Ark. 1085 : 303 S.W.2d 569 (1957); Monnot v. Murphy 207 N.Y. 240, 100 N.E. 742 (1913); City of Rock Springs v. Sturm 39 Wyo. 494, 273 P. 908, 97 A.L.R. 1 (1929).] 6. Efficacy of adverse possession law in most jurisdictions depend on strong limitation statutes by operation of which right to access the court expires through effluxion of time. As against rights of the paper-owner, in the context of adverse possession, there evolves a set of competing rights in favour of the adverse possessor who has, for a long period of time, cared for the land, developed it, as against the owner of the property who has ignored the property. Modern statutes of limitation operate, as a rule, not only to cut off one's right to bring an action for the recovery of property that has been in the adverse possession of another for a specified time, but also to vest the possessor with title. The intention of such statutes is not to punish one who neglects to assert rights, but to protect those who have maintained the possession of property for the time specified by the statute under claim of right or color of title. (See American Jurisprudence, Vol. 3, 2d, Page 81). It is important to keep in mind while studying the American notion of Adverse Possession, especially in the backdrop of Limitation Statutes, that the intention to dispossess can not be given a complete go by. Simple application of Limitation shall not be enough by itself for the success of an adverse possession claim." 34. 3, 2d, Page 81). It is important to keep in mind while studying the American notion of Adverse Possession, especially in the backdrop of Limitation Statutes, that the intention to dispossess can not be given a complete go by. Simple application of Limitation shall not be enough by itself for the success of an adverse possession claim." 34. Before parting with this case, we deem it appropriate to observe that the law of adverse possession which ousts an owner on the basis of inaction within limitation is irrational, illogical and wholly disproportionate. The law as it exists is extremely harsh for the true owner and a windfall for a dishonest person who had illegally taken possession of the property of the true owner. The law ought not to benefit a person who in a clandestine manner takes possession of the property of the owner in contravention of law. This in substance would mean that the law gives seal of approval to the illegal action or activities of a rank trespasser or who had wrongfully taken possession of the property of the true owner. 36. In our considered view, there is an urgent need of fresh look regarding the law on adverse possession. We recommend the Union of India to seriously consider and make suitable changes in the law of adverse possession. A copy of this judgment be sent to the Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice, Department of Legal Affairs, Government of India for taking appropriate steps in accordance with law.” 14. Reliance is also placed upon the judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court in Nasgabhushanammal (D) By LRs. Vs. C.Chandikeswaralingam, AIR 2016 SC 1134 , Bangalore Development Authority vs. N.Jayamma, AIR 2016 SC 1294 and Prem Nath Khanna and others vs. Narinder Nath Kapoor (Dead) Through L.Rs. and others, AIR 2016 SC 1433 . 15. After bestowing my thoughtful consideration to the pleadings as well as evidence led on record by respective parties, I see no reason to interfere in the well reasoned findings returned by learned Courts below. and others, AIR 2016 SC 1433 . 15. After bestowing my thoughtful consideration to the pleadings as well as evidence led on record by respective parties, I see no reason to interfere in the well reasoned findings returned by learned Courts below. Rather, after carefully examining the material evidence led on record by the respective parties, this Court is compelled to observe that both the learned Courts below have carefully considered and appreciated the evidence made available on record by respective parties, perusal whereof certainly suggests that defendants were not able to prove on record by leading cogent and convincing evidence that they have become owners by way of adverse possession qua the suit land. 16. After having carefully perused material available on record, especially evidence led on record by the respondent-plaintiff, this Court finds no error in judgment and decrees passed by the Courts below and as such there is no occasion for this Court to interfere in the well reasoned judgment passed by Courts below, otherwise also both the Courts below have returned concurrent findings on facts and law and as such same cannot be interfered unless the same are shown to be wholly perverse. Substantial question of law is answered accordingly. 17. Shri N.K. Thakur, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent-plaintiff, supported the judgments passed by both the Courts below and vehemently argued that no interference, whatsoever, is warranted in the present facts and circumstances of the case, especially in view of the fact that both the Courts below have very meticulously dealt with each and every aspect of the matter. He also urged that scope of interference by this Court is very limited especially when two Courts have recorded concurrent findings on the facts as well as law. In this regard, to substantiate the aforesaid plea, he placed reliance upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in Laxmidevamma and Others vs. Ranganath and Others, (2015) 4 SCC 264 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:- “16. Based on oral and documentary evidence, both the courts below have recorded concurrent findings of fact that the plaintiffs have established their right in A schedule property. In the light of the concurrent findings of fact, no substantial questions of law arose in the High Court and there was no substantial ground for re-appreciation of evidence. Based on oral and documentary evidence, both the courts below have recorded concurrent findings of fact that the plaintiffs have established their right in A schedule property. In the light of the concurrent findings of fact, no substantial questions of law arose in the High Court and there was no substantial ground for re-appreciation of evidence. While so, the High Court proceeded to observe that the first plaintiff has earmarked the A schedule property for road and that she could not have full-fledged right and on that premise proceeded to hold that declaration to the plaintiffs’ right cannot be granted. In exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, concurrent findings of fact cannot be upset by the High Court unless the findings so recorded are shown to be perverse. In our considered view, the High Court did not keep in view that the concurrent findings recorded by the courts below, are based on oral and documentary evidence and the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained.” (p.269) 18. In the facts and circumstances discussed above, this Court is of the view that findings returned by the trial Court below, which were further upheld by the first appellate Court, do not warrant any interference of this Court as findings given on the issues framed by the trial Court below as well as specifically taken up by this Court to reach the root of the controversy, appears to be based upon correct appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence. Hence, the present appeal fails and is dismissed, accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs. 19. Interim order, if any, is vacated. All the miscellaneous applications are disposed of.