ORDER : Pushpendra Singh Bhati, J. 1. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been preferred claiming the following reliefs: "(A) That, the order passed by the disciplinary authority dated 11th Dec. 2003 and affirmed by the Appellate and Reviewing Authority dated 17.06.2005 and 29th Aug., 2008 respectively (Annex.8, 10, 12) whereby punishment of dismissal from service has been inflicted may kindly be quashed and set aside. (B) That, consequent to aforesaid petitioner may kindly be directed to be reinstated in service with all consequential benefits. (C) Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit may kindly be granted in favor of the petitioner; (D) Cost of the writ petition may kindly be awarded to the petitioner." 2. Sans the unnecessary factual details, suffice it would be to set out the woodcut preface of the case. The petitioner was selected as a Constable in the respondent-Department in the year 1992. The petitioner, while being posted at Deogarh on 13.08.2002, proceeded on leave for three days; but did report back on 19.08.2002, when he was supposed to join the duty. 3. A criminal case, meanwhile, was lodged against the petitioner for causing the death by crushing the deceased under the jeep. The preliminary enquiry was conducted and the memorandum of charge-sheet dated 28.01.2003 was served upon the petitioner vide Annexure-1 of the writ petition. The petitioner, thereafter, was suspended. The petitioner later on was acquitted by the trial court from the criminal charges on 08.10.2003 vide Annexure-4 of the writ petition. 4. The petitioner however, was terminated from service vide order dated 11.12.2003 passed by the disciplinary authority, against which the petitioner preferred a departmental appeal before the appellate authority, which was rejected on 17.06.2005. The review was also preferred by the petitioner, which too was rejected vide order dated 29.08.2008. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner stated that the petitioner's stand was taken into consideration and a show cause notice for imposing major punishment was served upon him. 6. The review was also preferred by the petitioner, which too was rejected vide order dated 29.08.2008. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner stated that the petitioner's stand was taken into consideration and a show cause notice for imposing major punishment was served upon him. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn the attention of this Court towards the order of acquittal dated 08.10.2003 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nathdwara, particularly paras 27 and 28 of the said order, which read as under:- ^^¼27½ tgka rd vfHk;qDr fgeflag o bZdcky [kka dk iz'u gS] ?kVuk ds ckn rhl fnu rd ihŒM+Œ 32 tks/k flag 'kkar jgk] ljiap izrkiflag dks lgh ?kVuk crkbZ rc iqfyl ds ek/;e ls xokg tks/k flag dks M+jk;k /kedk;k x;k] fQj Hkh tks/k flag us e`rd ds ifjtuksa dks ?kVuk ns[kus dh o lR; fLFkfr dh tkudkjh ugha nhA ;g vkpj.k ihŒM+Œ 21 tks/k flag dk iw.kZr% vLokHkkfod gSA xokg tks/k flag us U;k;ky; ds c;ku ihŒM+Œ 21 o /kkjk 164 lhvkjihlh ds vUrxZr eftLVªsV dks fn;s x;s c;ku izŒihŒ 31 esa thi pkyd yksds'k xkSjok gksus dh fLFkfr c;kuksa esa ugha crkbZ gS tcfd izŒM+hŒ 2 iqfyl dFkuksa o 'kiFki= izŒihŒ 4 esa tks/k flag us yksds'k xkSjok dks igpkuus dh fLFkfr crkbZ gSA vr% ;g xokg yksds'k xkSjok dks ?kVuk esa fyIr gksus ds ckotwn cpkus dh dk;Zokgh U;k;ky; esa fn;s x;s iwoZ ,oa orZeku nksuksa c;kuksa esa dj x;k gS ,sls xokg dks LVjfyax oFkZ o lR;Hkk"kh ugha ekuk tk ldrkA ihŒM+Œ 21 tks/k flag ds ,d ek= dFkuksa dh lk{; ds vk/kkj ij vfHk;qDrx.k bZdcky o fge flag dh nks"kflf) lqjf{kr o U;k;ksfpr ugha gSA ihŒM+Œ 21 xokg dh ekSdk dj mifLFkfr ds ckotwn lkoZtfud ekxZ ij thi ls nq?kZVuk dkfjr djus ds ckn thi okil ykSVdj vkos o lkbZfdy dks dwpys] ?kVuk ds le; thi ls mrjdj bZdcky lfj;s ls ekjihV djs o bZdcky rFkk fge flag xokg tks/k flag ihŒM+Œ 21 dks ekSds ij M+jk;s&/kedk;s ;g lkjh fLFkfr;ka Hkh vLokHkkfod o vlR; izrhr gksrk gSA vr% vfHk;qDrx.k fge flag o bZdcky [kka dks lansgksa dk ykHk fn;k tkdj bl izdj.k esa nqHkkZouk dh ?kVuk ds nks lky ckn ?kfVr ?kVuk ds vk/kkj ij gR;k o gR;k ds "kM+;a= ds vkjksi izekf.kr ugha ekus tk ldrsA vfHk;kstu i{k bu nksuksa vfHk;qDrx.k ds fo:) vkjksi lansg ls ijs izekf.kr djus esa vlQy jgk gSA vr% vkns'k gS fd%& ¼28½ vfHk;qDr yksds'k xkSjok dks lk{; ds vHkko esa rFkk vfHk;qDrx.k fgeflag o bZdcky [kka dks lansgksa dk ykHk fn;k tkdj /kkjk 302] 120ch lifBr/kkjk 34 HkkŒnaŒlŒ ls vkjksiksa ls nks"keqDr fd;k tkdj muds tekur eqpyds fujLr fd;s tkrs gSA eky[kkyk ckn xqtjus fe;kn vihy u"V fd;k tkosA ,lMh@& ;'kiky flag pkS/kjhA** 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has pointed out that the sole evidence of Jodh Singh does induce confidence and is a probable version of the incident. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner also took this Court through the enquiry report, which is Annexure-6 of the writ petition, whereby six charges were levelled against the petitioner under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner also took this Court through the enquiry report, which is Annexure-6 of the writ petition, whereby six charges were levelled against the petitioner under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958. The said charges read as under:- ^^¼1½ ;g fd fnuakd 13-08-2002 dks vki Fkkukf/kdkjh Fkkuk nsox<+ ,d ;kse vkdfLed vodk'k ,oa ,d ;kse jktif=r vodk'k Lohd`r djk dj vius fuokl LFkku ij jokuk gq,] ftlds vuqlkj vkidks fnuakd 16-08-2002 dks ,Œ,lŒ esa M~;wVh ij mifLFkfr ns nsuh pkfg;s Fkh ijUrq vki }kjk le; ij M~;wVh ij mifLFkr ugha nsdj fnuakd 19-08-2002 dks 3 fnu vuqifLFkr jg dj M~;wVh ij mifLFkfr nh] tks fjdkM++Z ls izekf.kr gSA ¼2½ ;g fd vkius vuqifLFkfr dky esa mifLFkfr ds dkj.kksa ls fdlh Hkh vf/kdkjh dks voxr ugha djk;k ,oa u gh dksbZ bZtkQk izsf"kr fd;k gS] tks fjdkM+Z ls izekf.kr gSA ¼3½ ;g fd vkius vius fuokl LFkku ij fnaukd 15-08-2002 dks vodk'k ds nkSjku Jh Hkoajflag iq= pUnuflag jktiwr fuoklh jkoksa dh xqM+yh tks fd ihM+CY;wMh foHkkx ukFk}kjk esa yksdj gh viuh M~;wVh ij tk jgk Fkk fd vkids o Hkoajflag ds chp tehu laca/kh fookn gksus ls vkius vius lkFk yksds'k] bZdcky dh lgk;rk ls Hkaojflag dh gR;k djus dh n`f"V ls Hkhy cLrh dqaBok ds ogka thi dh VDdj ekjh] ftlls og fxj x;k vkSj geyk djus ij ekj fn;k ftlls mldh ekSds ij gh e`R;q gks xbZA vki ,d vuq'kkflr foHkkx ds deZpkjh gks dkuwu dh tkudkjh j[krs gS] vkius bl rjg dh xEHkhj vijk/k dkfjr fd;k gS] ftlls turk esa iqfyl dh Nfo /kwfey gqbZ gS] tks izkFkfed tkap ls izekf.kr gSA ¼4½ ;g fd vki }kjk Hkaojflag dh gR;k djus ds ckn vki o vkids lkFk ?kVuk lhy ls Hkkx x;s o dkuwuh dh tkudkjh j[krs gq, ,oa gR;k ds izdj.k dks ,DlhM+saV dk :i fn;k tks fjdkM+Z ,oa izkFkfed tkap ls izekf.kr gSA ¼5½ ;g fd vkius mDr ?kVuk ds ckn Fkkuk nsox<+ ij fnuakd 19-08-2002 dks M~;wVh ij mifLFkfr ns okLrfodrk fNikrs gq, vius dkdk Hkaojflag dk ,DlhM+saV dk dkj.k crkrs gq, Fkkukf/kdkjh us 3 ;kse xSj gkftjh fifj;M+ dk vkdfLed vodk'k Lohd`r djk fy;k tcfd vki }kjk gR;k dh xbZ FkhA bl izdkj vkius vius mPp vf/kdkjh dks tku cw>dj xqejkg fd;k gS] tks izkFkfed tkap ,oa fjdkM+Z ls izekf.kr gSA** 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has stated that charges No. 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 are ancillary charges and do have any self-sustaining value. However, charge No. 3 is serious in nature and is the main charge. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also drawn the attention of this Court towards the portion of the enquiry report dealing with charge No. 3. However, charge No. 3 is serious in nature and is the main charge. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also drawn the attention of this Court towards the portion of the enquiry report dealing with charge No. 3. The said portion reads as under:- ^^;g fd vki ,d vuq'kkflr foHkkx ds deZpkjh gh dkuwu dh iw.kZ tkudkjh j[krs gS ,oa dkuwu ds tkudkj gksrs gq, vkius ,d cgqr gh t?kU; vijk/k fd;k gS] ftlls vke turk esa iwjs iqfyl foHkkx dh Nfo dks xgjk vk?kkr igqapk ,oa vkids mDr d`R; ls turk esa iqfyl dh Nfo /kwfey gqbZ gS vkidk mDr d`R; j{kd gh Hk{kd cukus dh Js.kh esa vkrk gS] tks izkFkfed tkap ,oa fjdkM+Z ls izekf.kr gSA mDr vkjksi ds ifjizs{; esa iSjoh i{k dh vkSj ls xokgku tks/kflag ihMCY;w&01] nsoh flag ihMCY;w&02 , 'kadjflag ihMCY;w&3] gesjflag ihMCY;w&04 ds dFku djk;s x;s gS] ftuesa ls xokg Jh tks/kflag ihMCY;w&1 us vius dFkuksa esa oDr ?kVuk vkjksfir dkfuŒ dh ?kVuk lfy ds ikl Lo;a o VsªDVj gksus dh iqf"V dh gSA blh izdkj xokg 'kadj flag ihMCY;w&03 us ?kVuk LFky ds vklikl ?kVuk ls vk/kk ikSu ?k.Vk igys vkjksfir dkfuŒ dk pDdj yxkuk o oDr ?kVuk VªsDVj iM+k gksuk ns[kuk crk;kA blh rjg xokg Jh gesjflag ihMCY;w&4 us vkjksfir dkfuŒ o e`rd Hkaojflag ds chp iqjkuh jaft'k gksuk o vkjksfir dkfuŒ ds firk dh e`R;q ls iwoZ xokg ds tfj;s Hkoajflag dks ;g dgyokuk dh eSa mls thi ;k eksVj lkbZfdy dh VDdj nsdj ekj Mkywaxk crk;k gS vkSj blh rjg dh ?kVuk dkfjr gqbZ gSA blh izdkj xokg Jh ukukyky Fkkukf/kdkjh [keukSj ihMCY;w&9 us Hkh vius dFkuksa esa vuqla/kku ls vkjksfir dkfuŒ ds fo:) tqeZ izekf.kr gksus ij mls fxjrkj djuk o ?kVuk esa iz;ksx esa yk;s x;s yksgs dk lfj;k] thi VsªDVj dks tCr djuk crk;k gSA bl izdkj mijksDr leLr foospu ls vkjksfir dkfuŒ ds fo:) mDr vkjksi iw.kZr;k izekf.kr gksrk gSA vkjksfir dkfuŒ us mDr vkjksi ds cpko esa ekuuh; vij ls'ku U;k;ky; ukFk }kjk ds mDr ?kVuksa ls lacaf/kr izdj.k esa tkjh fu.kZ; vkns'k dh izfr is'k dh gS] ftldk voyksdu djus ls ik;k tkrk gS fd ekuuh; U;k;ky; }kjk mDr dkfuŒ dks iw.kZ :i ls nks"keqDr ugha fd;k gS cfYd lansgksa dk ykHk nsrs gq, nks"keqDr fd;k gSA blls Li"V gS fd U;k;ky; }kjk Hkh vkjksfir dkfuŒ dks Lora= :i ls nks"keqDr ugha fd;k x;k gSA vr% eSa mDr vkjksi dks iw.kZr;k izekf.kr ekurk gwa ftlds dkj.k iqfyl dh Nfo/kwfey gqbZ gSA** Thus, learned counsel for the petitioner stated that it is reflected from the aforequoted portion that the enquiry officer has gone into the evidence on the same footing as that of the criminal case, and found it to be true. 11. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court at Jaipur Bench in Vasudeo K. Hardasani v. State of Rajasthan, reported in (1989) 1 Rajasthan LR 99, relevant paras 6 to 12 of which read as under:- "6. We have gone through the report of the Enquiry Officer (Annexure R-2). The Enquiry Officer, after considering the evidence, has stated that from the above, much credence can be given except that there was a definite fight between Shri V.K. Hardasani and Shri Lakhi Ram Malik. The Enquiry Officer has very categorically and pacifically given any firm finding as to whether the allegations No. 1, 2 and 3 have been proved though it can be inferred that according to the Enquiry Officer, these charges have been proved. As regards Charge No. 4, the Enquiry Officer has categorically stated that it is sufficiently proved. The Disciplinary Authority in its order dated 1.10.1985 (Annexure-6) has only reproduced the four charges levelled again to petitioner and mentioned about holding of enquiry but has discussed any evidence and has merely stated 'on perusal of the findings given by the Enquiry Officer most of the charges have been found established', and thereafter, has mentioned that Charges No. 1, 2 and 3 have been found proved and charge No. 4 partly proved against the petitioner and therefore, the petitioner deserved to be strictly penalized. The Disciplinary Authority has even referred to the defence or the reply submitted by the petitioner against the charge-sheet. The order dated 27.09.86 passed by the Appellate Authority is laconic and cannot be called a speaking order. At this stage, we shall like to refer to Rule 16(7), 16(8) and 16(9) of the Rules of 1958, which are reproduced below:- "Rule 16(7) At the conclusion of the inquiry, the inquiring authority shall prepare a report of the inquiry, recording its findings on each of the charges together with reasons therefore. If in the opinion of such authority the proceedings of the inquiry establish charges different from those originally framed it may record findings on such charges provided that findings on such charges shall be recorded unless the Government Servant has admitted the facts constituting them or has had an opportunity of defending himself against them. Rule 16 (8) the record of the inquiry shall include. Rule 16 (8) the record of the inquiry shall include. (i) The charges framed against the Government Servant and the statement of allegations furnished to him under sub-rule (2): (ii) his written statement of defence, if any ; (iii) the oral evidence taken in the course of the enquiry ; (iv) the documentary evidence considered in the course of the enquiry; (v) the orders, if any, made by the Disciplinary Authority and the Inquiring Authority, consider the record of the inquiry and record its findings on each charge. The Disciplinary Authority may while considering the report of the Inquiring Authority for just and sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing remand the case for further/de novo enquiry, in case it has reason to believe that the enquiry already conducted has been laconic in some respect or the other". 7. In the present the Disciplinary Authority was different from the Inquiring Authority and therefore it was necessary for the disciplinary authority to consider the record of the enquiry and also to record its own finding on each charge. A perusal of order dated 1.10.85 (anx.6) shows that the Disciplinary Authority has only considered the enquiry report and now the whole record of the enquiry and specially the defence of the petitioner and has failed to record its own finding on each charge. Thus, there is a clear violation of Rule 16(9) of the Rules of 1958. 8. Rule 30(2) of the Rules of 1958 provides that the appellate authority shall consider whether the procedure prescribed in these rules has been complied with and if whether such noncompliance has resulted in violation of any provision of the constitution or in failure of justice. It further imposes a duty on the appellate authority to ascertain whether the facts on which the order was passed have been established and further whether the facts established afford sufficient justification for making the order and further whether the penalty imposed is excessive, adequate or inadequate. 9. When we look at the order (Annexure-8) passed by the appellate authority we find that the appellate authority has followed the mandate of Rule 30(2), and thus the order of the appellate authority is also vitiated. 10. Supreme court in Ram Chander v. Union of India & Ors. 9. When we look at the order (Annexure-8) passed by the appellate authority we find that the appellate authority has followed the mandate of Rule 30(2), and thus the order of the appellate authority is also vitiated. 10. Supreme court in Ram Chander v. Union of India & Ors. ( AIR 1986 SC 1173 ) has very specifically stated that the appellate Authority should pass a reasoned order dealing with the contentions raised before it in appeal. A mechanical production of the phraseology of the rule will be sufficient. The appellate Authority should marshal the evidence on record with a view to decide about the sustainability of the finding recorded by the disciplinary authority and the order passed should show that the appellate authority ha applied its mind and considered the objections raised in the appeal. This becomes all the more important after the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution. The word 'consider' means an objective consideration by the Appellate Authority after due application of mind which implies giving of reasons for its decision. In view of the clear pronouncement of the Supreme Court, it is necessary for us to elaborate this argument and we find that both the orders of the disciplinary authority as well as that of the appellate authority cannot be upheld and the impugned orders are laconic and cryptic. 11. It may however be noted that the enquiry was field only against the present petitioner, though it was relating to a dispute or quarrel between the petitioner and L.R. Malik. Moreover, the petitioner was supplied with the copy of the enquiry report as required by Rule 16(12) of the Rules of 1958. 12. In the result, this writ petition is allowed, the order dated 1.10.1985 (Annexure-6) as also the order dated 27.9.86 (Annexure-8) are hereby quashed. The petitioner shall be deemed to be in continuous service and shall also be entitled to all consequential benefits." 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further drawn the attention of this Court towards the punitive order dated 11.12.2003 passed by the disciplinary authority, whereby the services of the petitioner have been terminated. 13. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, has supported the departmental enquiry on the ground of the same being elaborate and based on the evidence given by the witnesses. 14. 13. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, has supported the departmental enquiry on the ground of the same being elaborate and based on the evidence given by the witnesses. 14. Learned counsel for the respondents also stated that the degree of proof required for a criminal conviction and a departmental enquiry is altogether different, and therefore, even if the petitioner could be given the benefit of doubt in the criminal proceedings due to burden of proof having been sufficiently discharged by the prosecution, the same parameter cannot be held good for the purpose of the departmental enquiry. 15. Learned counsel for the respondents further stated that the degree of proof in a criminal case vis-a-vis the departmental enquiry is altogether different and acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal case, thus, would entitle the petitioner for exoneration in the departmental enquiry. 16. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the case, along with the precedent law cited by learned counsel for the petitioner. 17. For the purpose of the present adjudication, it is pertinent to refer to the precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in The Deputy Inspector General of Police & Anr. v. S. Samuthiram, reported in (2013) 1 SCC 598 , which has been followed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Sankar Ghosh, reported in (2014) 3 SCC 610 and Commissioner of Police, New Delhi & Anr. v. Mehar Singh, reported in (2013) 7 SCC 685 . 18. The relevant para 16 of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in The Deputy Inspector General of Police & Anr. (supra) reads as under:- "16. We may indicate that before the order of acquittal was passed by the Criminal Court on 20.11.2000, the Departmental Enquiry was completed and the Respondent was dismissed from service on 4.1.2000. The question is when the departmental enquiry has been concluded resulting in the dismissal of the delinquent from service, the subsequent finding recorded by the Criminal Court acquitting the Respondent delinquent, will have any effect on the departmental proceedings. The propositions which the Respondent wanted to canvass placing reliance on the judgment in Capt. The question is when the departmental enquiry has been concluded resulting in the dismissal of the delinquent from service, the subsequent finding recorded by the Criminal Court acquitting the Respondent delinquent, will have any effect on the departmental proceedings. The propositions which the Respondent wanted to canvass placing reliance on the judgment in Capt. M. Paul Anthony case (supra) read as follows: (i) Departmental proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar in their being conducted simultaneously, though separately. (ii) If the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in the criminal case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature which involves complicated questions of law and fact, it would be desirable to stay the departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal case. (iii) Whether the nature of a charge in a criminal case is grave and whether complicated questions of fact and law are involved in that case, will depend upon the nature of offence, the nature of the case launched against the employee on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during investigation or as reflected in the charge-sheet. (iv) The factors mentioned at (ii) and (iii) above cannot be considered in isolation to stay the departmental proceedings but due regard has to be given to the fact that the departmental proceedings cannot be unduly delayed. (v) If the criminal case does proceed or its disposal is being unduly delayed, the departmental proceedings, even if they were stayed on account of the pendency of the criminal case, can be resumed and proceeded with so as to conclude them at an early date, so that if the employee is found guilty his honour may be vindicated and in case he is found guilty, the administration may get rid of him at the earliest. 19. Thus, this Court is of the opinion that the departmental enquiry has been conducted strictly in accordance with law. The precedent law cited by learned counsel for the petitioner is applicable to the present set of facts, as in the present case, the proceedings have been conducted strictly in accordance with law and by considering all the aspects of the case. 20. The precedent law cited by learned counsel for the petitioner is applicable to the present set of facts, as in the present case, the proceedings have been conducted strictly in accordance with law and by considering all the aspects of the case. 20. The departmental enquiry, in this case, includes consideration of the evidence given by Jodh Singh, Hamer Singh, Devi Singh, Shanker Singh etc. In the departmental enquiry, the authority has categorically found that Jodh Singh has given the evidence as an eye witness and has supported the complete allegations. The other witnesses have also given strength to the circumstantial evidence. 21. Since charge No. 3 is well proved, therefore, all other charges, which depend upon charge No. 3 also stand proved. The punitive order also has considered all the charges separately and the disciplinary authority has recorded its satisfaction on each charge, and particularly charge No. 3. The authority has considered all the evidence rendered and arrived at its independent conclusion. 22. In light of the aforesaid observations and the precedent law laid down in The Deputy Inspector General of Police & Anr. (supra), no interference is called for in the present writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed.