ORDER : D.N. Patel, J. 1. When the matter is called out, counsel for the appellant is absent. 2. It appears that this appellant is the original petitioner whose writ petition being W.P.(C) No.1391 of 2012 was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide judgment and order dated 16.07.2012, whereby the order passed by the Labour Court, Jamshedpur in M.J. Case No.46 of 2000 dated 15.12.2011 was upheld. The aforesaid M.J application was preferred by the respondent - workman under Section 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act for recovery of the wages for the period running from 17.03.1997 to 19.07.1999. 3. Labour Court, Jamshedpur has awarded the wages on the basis of the evidence on record because the workman has worked for the aforesaid period. It has been observed by the Labour Court, Jamshedpur in paragraph – 6 of the order passed in M.J. Case No.46 of 2000 dated 15.12.2011 that no evidence has been given by the Management. Thus, on the basis of the evaluation of the evidence on record while deciding the application preferred by the respondent – workman under Section 33- C of the Industrial Disputes Act, wages were awarded for the period for which the respondent – workman has worked. 4. The order passed by the Labour Court, Jamshedpur in M. J. Caase No.46 of 2000 was under challenge by way of writ by this appellant and the writ petition was dismissed vide judgment and order dated 16.07.2012, and hence, original petitioner has preferred this Letters Patent Appeal. 5. It appears from the evidence on record and the facts and circumstances of the case that the respondent – workman was working with this appellant from 21.09.1993. It further appears from the facts of the case that his services were confirmed from 17.09.1994. 6. It further appears from the facts of the case that the respondent – workman was under suspension from 17.03.1997 and he was dismissed from the service with effect from 19.07.1999. An application was preferred by the respondent – workman before the Labour Court, Jamshedpur under Section 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act for recovery of the wages for the period for which work was taken by this appellant – Management. During his period of suspension, it is alleged by the respondent – workman that despite he was suspended from the service, the work was taken by this appellant – Management. During his period of suspension, it is alleged by the respondent – workman that despite he was suspended from the service, the work was taken by this appellant – Management. During adjudication of M.J. Case No.46 of 2000 before the Labour Court, Jamshedpur, evidences were given by the respondent – workman, both documentary as well as oral. Workman was also cross-examined by the Management. 7. It has been observed in paragraph – 6 of the order passed by the Labour Court, Jamshedpur that no evidence was led by this appellant – Management. Thus, on the basis of the evidence on record, Labour Court, Jamshedpur has decided in M.J. Case No.46 of 2000, which was preferred under Section 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act, and on the basis of principle that for the work done, the respondent – workman was paid wages. The Labour Court, Jamshedpur has arrived at conclusion on the basis of the evidence that during the period of suspension, work was taken by the Management, and hence, order for payment of wages was passed. 8. Thus, we see no reason to interfere with the order passed by the Labour Court, Jamshedpur. This Court is not sitting in appeal against the order passed by the Labour Court, Jamshedpur. 9. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Tulsidas Paul Vs. Labour Court, reported in (1972) 4 SCC 205 (2), in paragraph no.8, which reads as under :- “8. It is well established that in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court does not sit in appeal over the orders of industrial-tribunals. Its jurisdiction is supervisory, and therefore, it interferes if the jurisdiction conferred on such tribunals is improperly, or in noncompliance of well-established principles, exercised or for any such other reason.” (emphasis supplied) 10. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Corpn., Faridabad Vs. Siri Niwas, reported in (2004) 8 SCC 195 , in paragraph no.16, which reads as under :- “16. No reason has been assigned by the High Court as to why the exercise of discretional jurisdiction of the Tribunal was bad in law. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Corpn., Faridabad Vs. Siri Niwas, reported in (2004) 8 SCC 195 , in paragraph no.16, which reads as under :- “16. No reason has been assigned by the High Court as to why the exercise of discretional jurisdiction of the Tribunal was bad in law. In a case of this nature, it is trite, the High Court exercising the power of judicial review, would not interfere with the discretion of a Tribunal unless the same is found to be illegal or irrational.” (emphasis supplied) 11. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Madurantakam Coop. Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. Viswanathan, reported in (2005) 3 SCC 193 , in paragraph no.12, which reads as under :- “12. Normally, the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, is the final court of facts in these types of disputes, but if a finding of fact is perverse or if the same is not based on legal evidence the High Court exercising a power either under Article 226 or under Article 227 of the Constitution can go into the question of fact decided by the Labour Court or the Tribunal. But before going into such an exercise it is necessary that the writ court must record reasons why it intends reconsidering a finding of fact. In the absence of any such defect in the order of the Labour Court the writ court will not enter into the realm of factual disputes and finding given thereon. A consideration of the impugned order of the learned Single Judge shows that nowhere has he come to the conclusion that the finding of the Labour Court was either perverse or based on no evidence or based on evidence which is not legally acceptable. Learned Single Judge proceeded as if he was sitting in a court of appeal on facts and item after item of evidence recorded in the domestic enquiry as well as before the Labour Court was reconsidered and findings given by the Labour Court were reversed. We find no justification for such an approach by the learned Single Judge which only amounts to substitution of his subjective satisfaction in the place of such satisfaction of the Labour Court.” (emphasis supplied) 12. We find no justification for such an approach by the learned Single Judge which only amounts to substitution of his subjective satisfaction in the place of such satisfaction of the Labour Court.” (emphasis supplied) 12. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Iswarlal Mohanlal Thakkar Vs. Paschim Gujarat Vij Co. Ltd., reported in (2014) 6 SCC 434 , in paragraph no.15, which reads as under :- “15. We find the judgment and award of the Labour Court well reasoned and based on facts and evidence on record. The High Court has erred in its exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to annul the findings of the Labour Court in its award as it is well settled law that the High Court cannot exercise its power under Article 227 of the Constitution as an appellate court or reappreciate evidence and record its findings on the contentious points. Only if there is a serious error of law or the findings recorded suffer from error apparent on record, can the High Court quash the order of a lower court. The Labour Court in the present case has satisfactorily exercised its original jurisdiction and properly appreciated the facts and legal evidence on record and given a well reasoned order and answered the points of dispute in favour of the appellant. The High Court had no reason to interfere with the same as the award of the Labour Court was based on sound and cogent reasoning, which has served the ends of justice.” (emphasis supplied) 13. In view of the aforesaid facts, reasons, and judicial pronouncements, no error has been committed by the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition being W.P.(C) No.1391 of 2012 vide judgment and order dated 16.07.2012, and we see no reason to take any other view than what has been taken by the learned Single Judge. 14. Accordingly, this Letters Patent Appeal is, hereby, dismissed.