JUDGMENT Amit Rawal, J. - The appellant-plaintiffs are in Regular Second Appeal against the judgment and decree dated 22.09.2000 of the Lower Appellate Court, whereby, judgment and decree rendered by the trial Court decreeing the suit of the plaintiffs for possession of the suit property, has been set aside, in essence, suit decreed by the trial Court, has been dismissed. 2. The plaintiffs-Didar Singh, Amrik Singh and Gurnam Singh instituted the suit against defendant-Amar Singh son of Telu Ram for possession after demolition of any construction raised in the land comprised in khata no.1954/2187 khasra no.477/2(0-4) situated in Kharar as per the jamabandi for the year 1986-87 (hereinafter referred to as "suit property") on the premise that in pursuance to the partition proceedings initiated in 1966 and decided on 10.08.1988, the instrument of partition (sanad takseem) and warrants of possession were issued/executed on 04.08.1989. The portion of khasra number, ibid was vacant, whereas portion where the defendant constructed a wall had fixed a gate but only symbolic possession of the same was delivered to the plaintiffs as the revenue authorities did not have power to demolish the same and in lieu thereof, photocopy of rapat roznamcha dated 4.8.1989 was attached. Defendant being strong head person by taking advantage that suit property was lying vacant taken the forcible possession on 24.12.1989. The mater was, immediately, reported to the Kharar police by lodging a report but no action was taken. The suit for permanent injunction during the vacation period was filed and the vacation Judge was pleased to grant the injunction restraining the defendant from encroaching and raising any construction in khasra no.477/2 but by the time, the said injunction order could be served upon the defendant, he had already trespassed upon the land of the plaintiffs, therefore, the suit for possession was filed. 3. The aforementioned suit was contested by the defendant-Amar Singh by raising a plea that land, alongwith other khasra nos.477 (0-12) and 483, was jointly owned and possessed by the plaintiffs and defendant and many other right-holders. It was not covered by the definition of the land as per the provisions of Punjab Land Revenue Act, therefore, revenue officer was not competent to entertain the application for partition or pass partition order, thus, the orders were without jurisdiction. The allotment of khasra no.477/2 to the plaintiffs was denied as well as the instrument of partition. It was not covered by the definition of the land as per the provisions of Punjab Land Revenue Act, therefore, revenue officer was not competent to entertain the application for partition or pass partition order, thus, the orders were without jurisdiction. The allotment of khasra no.477/2 to the plaintiffs was denied as well as the instrument of partition. The defendant had constructed a boundary wall around khasra no.477 which bore a municipal number and occupied house, therefore, jurisdiction of the revenue Court was ex facie barred. Even during the consolidation, khewat and khasra numbers were bifurcated. In order to create the confusion, the suit for partition of only one khasra number was filed which was in possession of answering defendant but did not include the other khasra number, i.e., 483. The entire area of khasra no.483 was of six marlas. No warrants of possession were ever issued or executed. However, in paragraph 2 raised the following pleas:- "In fact, the answering is in possession of the land in dispute since the last more than 30 years without any interruption from any person and his possession has been open hostil, notorious to all co-sharers and hence the defendant has become owner by adverse possession also." It was further averred that defendant in his own right has constructed shops and two rooms and entire land was surrounded by boundary wall as no portion of khasra no.477 was lying vacant at any point of time. The defendant had also additionally raised the plea of maintainability of the suit and sought dismissal of the suit being bad for want of arraying the necessary parties. 4. Replication was filed, wherein, the plea of adverse possession was emphatically denied. 5. Since the parties were at variance, the trial Court framed the following issues:- "1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the possession of the land in suit after demolition of construction, if any?OPP 2. Whether earlier the land in suit was jointly owned and possessed by the plaintiff and defendants and some other cosharers as alleged in para 1 of the plaint?OPP 3. Whether the land of the suit was validly partitioned by the revenue authorities? OPP 4. Whether the suit has not been valued properly for the purposes of Court fee and jurisdiction?OPP 5. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable in present form?OPD 6. Whether the land of the suit was validly partitioned by the revenue authorities? OPP 4. Whether the suit has not been valued properly for the purposes of Court fee and jurisdiction?OPP 5. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable in present form?OPD 6. Whether no cause of action has arisen to the plaintiff for filing this suit?OPP 7. Whether suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties?OPD 8. Whether the revenue Court has no jurisdiction to partition the property in suit as alleged by the defendant?OPP 9. Relief." The plaintiffs examined the following witnesses:- PW1- Karam Singh, Patwari Halqa Kharar, brought on record original roznamcha waqiati dated 4.8.1989, Ex.P1 PW2-Mohinder Singh, Constable brought on record the report Ex.P2 PW3-Surinder Singh, record keeper, D.C.Office PW4-Gurdeep Singh, Section Officer, Finance Department, Punjab Civil Secretariat, Chandigarh brought on record documentary evidence Ex.PW4/A, Ex.PW4/B and Ex.PW4/C. PW5-Gurdeep Singh, record keeper, judicial record room, Ropar PW6- Vijay Kumar Sharma, Local Commissioner PW7-Amrik Singh, Advocate Kharar PW8-Amrik Singh, plaintiff son of late Sh. Khushal Singh and closed the evidence by tendering the documentary evidence, Ex.PX, Ex.PY, Ex.P3 to Ex.P6. 6. Defendant examined DW1 Harjit Singh from the Municipal Committee, Kharar who brought on record resolution Ex.D1, DW2-Amar Singh/defendant, DW3-Gian Chand, Civil Draftsman, Kharar, brought on record site plan, Ex.D2 and tendered into evidence copies of order dated 10.08.1977 and mode of partition, Ex.DX and Ex.DY. 7. The plaintiffs in rebuttal, vide statement dated 07.10.1993 tendered into evidence documents Ex.P9, Ex.P10, Ex.P11 and Ex.P12. 8. On the preponderance of the evidence, the trial Court by noticing the fact that partition proceedings had already taken place, decreed the suit. The Lower Appellate Court in appeal filed by the defendant reversed the findings by holding that revenue Court did not have any jurisdiction to entertain the application for partition as part of the land was not agricultural, much less subservient to agriculture and being constructed portion, the remedy was only with the Civil Court, thus, by brushing away the partition proceedings dismissed the suit. It was also held that the defendant had raised the construction of shops and two rooms after having obtained the sanction from the Municipal Committee. It was also observed that there was abadi area "Around" the site in dispute and thus, remedy for the plaintiffs was to seek separate possession by way of partition. It was also held that the defendant had raised the construction of shops and two rooms after having obtained the sanction from the Municipal Committee. It was also observed that there was abadi area "Around" the site in dispute and thus, remedy for the plaintiffs was to seek separate possession by way of partition. It is in these circumstances, the present Regular Second Appeal has been filed. 9. As per the written arguments of Mr. Paramjit Batta, Mr. Jatinder Pal Singh and Ms. Suman, learned counsel representing the appellants, judgment and decree of the Lower Appellate Court is not sustainable in the eyes of law for the following reasons:- i) Once the defendant had taken a plea of adverse possession, ownership of the plaintiffs was thus admitted. ii) The defendant miserably failed to prove on record the ingredients of the adverse possession, i.e., animus possidendi, (one of the ingredients of adverse possession). All these essential requirement of law are required to be proved on record for claiming the exclusive, continuous, hostile possession having become owners by afflux of time. iii) Prior to the consolidation, i.e., chakbandi khatoni, Ex.P4 and khatouni istemal, Ex.P5, khasra no.1173 measuring 16 biswas and 1171/1 measuring 4 biswas, in place of khasra no.1173, new khasra no.477 (0-12) was formed. On partition of this khasra number, a new khasra number 477/2 measuring 4 marlas was allotted to the plaintiffs of which possession was delivered to them on 04.08.1999 in execution of the instrument of partition Ex.PW6/A. The order, (Ex.P6) of the Settlement Officer proved on record that consolidation scheme was sanctioned on 21.07.1970. iv) The Lower Appellate Court abdicated in ignoring the overwhelming evidence both oral and documentary as the land in question was agricultural in 1966. v) The proceedings of partition had become final and not assailed by the defendant in the competent Court of law and in the absence of counter claim, could not raise the plea of jurisdictional error. vi) The question of title, thus, attained finality. All the revisions and appeals preferred before the competent authorities including the Commissioner, Patiala had attained finality. The order of Commissioner Patiala dated 19.03.1979 (Ex.P10) has been proved on record. vii) As per the provisions of Section 158(2) of Punjab Land Revenue Act, jurisdiction of the Civil Court to challenge the partition proceedings was emphatically barred. All the revisions and appeals preferred before the competent authorities including the Commissioner, Patiala had attained finality. The order of Commissioner Patiala dated 19.03.1979 (Ex.P10) has been proved on record. vii) As per the provisions of Section 158(2) of Punjab Land Revenue Act, jurisdiction of the Civil Court to challenge the partition proceedings was emphatically barred. viii) Ex.DX and Ex.DY, orders of the revenue officers dated 10.08.1977 produced on record by the defendant, Ex.P4 Chakbandi khatoni and Ex.P5 khatouni istemal proved on record that previous khasra no.1173 measuring 16 biswas and 1171/1 measuring 4 biswas accorded the numbers, ibid. ix) Respondent-Amar Singh when appeared as DW2 admitted that plan Ex.D1 did not show any khasra number whether it pertained to disputed site, i.e., 477 or not. x) Resolution Ex.D1 is also silent with regard to identity of the property. xi) The joint holding was barani at the time of its partition which was sought in the year 1966 and the construction raised subsequently would not render the order passed by the revenue court to be nullity. xii) The proceedings under Sections 145,107 and 151Cr.P.C were initiated and compromise dated 19.12.1963, Ex.DW7/A was arrived at. It was agreed that status quo regarding possession of land of khasra no.1173 measuring 16 biswas would be maintained and Khushal Singh, father of the plaintiffs would seek the partition of the same between the co-sharers and the possession will be re-adjusted according to the partition. xiii) Report of the Local Commissioner has also not been looked into in correct perspective and therefore, there is abdication, much less perversity. 10. Per contra, Mr. Ashish Kapoor and Mr. M.S.Rana, learned counsels representing the respondent-defendant submitted that findings of the Lower Appellate Court being the last Court of facts and law after appreciating all the documentary evidence are sustainable in the eyes of law holding that revenue Court did not have the jurisdiction to entertain and try the partition proceedings which is correct appreciation of law, for, it has come on record through documentary evidence that boundary wall around the site in dispute had already been raised. The plaintiffs had not included the other khasra number and therefore, the application for partition was barred by "doctrine akin to partial partition." 11. The plaintiffs had not included the other khasra number and therefore, the application for partition was barred by "doctrine akin to partial partition." 11. Having taken the plea of adverse possession would not render the categoric defence to be otios as it is recognized principle of law as per the provisions of Article 65 and Section 27 of the Limitation Act, in other words, they submitted that plaintiffs had extinguished the right of ownership in the suit property. 12. The property still remained joint and the remedy was to seek separate possession by way of partition but not in the manner and mode as indicated above. 13. The findings arrived at by the Lower Appellate Court after examining all the documents thread bare which do not call for any interference until and unless there is gross illegality and perversity which is not made out either in the submissions or in the memorandum of appeal. 14. It is fundamental principle that decree passed by the Court without jurisdiction would be nullity, in other words, order passed by the revenue Court entertaining the application of partition ordering sanad taksheem was without jurisdiction. 15. All the witnesses have been coherent and consistent in stating that there was boundary around site in dispute. The plaintiffs have failed to place on record any revenue entries showing that suit land was ever cultivated during the year 1966. Chakbandi khatouni, Ex.P4 does not help the plaintiffs as nature of the land was barani and thus, urged this Court for upholding the judgment and decree under challenge. 16. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties, appraised the judgment and decrees and seen the record of the Courts below thread bare and of the view that there is force and merit in the submissions of counsel representing the appellant-plaintiffs. 17. It is settled law that where the defendant, in defence, taken a plea of adverse possession, it tantamounts to admitting the title/ownership of the adverse party, i.e., the plaintiffs. 18. It is also settled law that in order to prove the ingredients of adverse possession, animus, hostility, long and settled possession to the knowledge of the entire world including the plaintiffs has to be categoric and specific. The bald assertion of long possession would not culminate into ownership by efflux of time. 18. It is also settled law that in order to prove the ingredients of adverse possession, animus, hostility, long and settled possession to the knowledge of the entire world including the plaintiffs has to be categoric and specific. The bald assertion of long possession would not culminate into ownership by efflux of time. The aforementioned view of mine is derived from the ratio decidendi culled out in Civil Appeal No.7266 of 2013 titled as Ram Nagina Rai and another vs. Deo Kumar Rai (D) by Lrs and another, decided on 21.08.2018. 19. The foundation/genesis of the Lower Appellate Court in setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court had been that defendant had been able to prove the resolution and site plan of the Municipal Committee but the construction raised was in accordance with law. 20. I am afraid the aforementioned findings are without any substance and basis. The plain and simple reading of the Ex.D1 and Ex.D2 does not reveal the identity of the property, i.e., khasra number. The defendant ought to have connected the property as depicted in the site plan and resolution vis-a-vis property in dispute, if otherwise through the assistance of the independent expert i.e., by way of demarcation. Jamabandi Ex.P3 for the years 1986-87 reveals that partition proceedings noted in column no.12 whereby mutation no. 11634 in respect of khasra no.477/2 measuring 4 marlas has been entered into ownership of the plaintiffs i.e., Amrik Singh, Didar Singh and Gurnam Singh. There was no reference to the aforementioned documents, thus, there is perversity. Ex.P4 showed the old khasra no.1173 measuring 16 biswas i.e. 12 marlas and Ex.P5 is the order whereby new khasra number 477 in lieu of khasra no.1173 was allotted. The scheme of consolidation has been proved on record as Ex.P6. The documents, aforementioned, carried a presumption of truth as per the provisions of Section 44 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act unless any evidence contrary to the same has been proved or placed on record. 21. Concededly, Khushal Singh instituted the suit for injunction against the defendant. It was agreed that parties to resolve issue by seeking partition. It is in these circumstances, the partition proceedings were filed, instead the focus of the Lower Appellate Court had been on the statement of the witnesses particularly of the Local Commissioner. The present case was basically based upon the documentary evidence. 22. It was agreed that parties to resolve issue by seeking partition. It is in these circumstances, the partition proceedings were filed, instead the focus of the Lower Appellate Court had been on the statement of the witnesses particularly of the Local Commissioner. The present case was basically based upon the documentary evidence. 22. The Lower Appellate Court committed illegality, much less the judgment is fallacious, for, in the absence of counter claim, it could not hold that revenue Court did not have any jurisdiction. The simple and plain reading of the orders placed on record showed that order of the partition proceedings had attained finality and the same was never assailed by the defendant in the competent Court, in other words, the Lower Appellate Court cannot go behind the orders in the absence of any specific claim of declaration. 23. No doubt, this Court, on earlier occasions had been framing the substantial questions of law while deciding the appeals but in view of the ratio decidendi culled out by five learned Judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pankajakshi (dead) through LRs and others vs. Chandrika and others AIR 2016 SC 1213 , wherein the proposition arose as to whether in view of the provisions of section 97(1) CPC, provisions of Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 would apply or the appeal i.e. RSA would be filed under section 100 of Civil Procedure Code and decision thereof could be without framing the substantial questions of law. The Constitutional Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the decision in Kulwant Kaur and others vs. Gurdial Singh Mann (dead) by LRs and others 2001(4) SCC 262 on applicability of section 97(1) of CPC is not a correct law, in essence, the provisions of Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 had been restored back. 24. For the sake of brevity, the relevant portion of the judgment of five learned Judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pankajakshi 's case (supra) reads thus:- "Since Section 41 of the Punjab Act is expressly in conflict with the amending law, viz., Section 100 as amended, it would be deemed to have been repealed. 24. For the sake of brevity, the relevant portion of the judgment of five learned Judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pankajakshi 's case (supra) reads thus:- "Since Section 41 of the Punjab Act is expressly in conflict with the amending law, viz., Section 100 as amended, it would be deemed to have been repealed. Thus we have no hesitation to hold that the law declared by the Full Bench of the High Court in the case of Ganpat [ AIR 1978 P&H 137 : 80 Punj LR 1 (FB)] cannot be sustained and is thus overruled." [at paras 27 - 29]" "27. Even the reference to Article 254 of the Constitution was not correctly made by this Court in the said decision. Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act is of 1918 vintage. Obviously, therefore, it is not a law made by the Legislature of a State after the Constitution of India has come into force. It is a law made by a Provincial Legislature under Section 80A of the Government of India Act, 1915, which law was continued, being a law in force in British India, immediately before the commencement of the Government of India Act, 1935, by Section 292 thereof. In turn, after the Constitution of India came into force and, by Article 395, repealed the Government of India Act, 1935, the Punjab Courts Act was continued being a law in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of the Constitution of India by virtue of Article 372(1) of the Constitution of India. This being the case, Article 254 of the Constitution of India would have no application to such a law for the simple reason that it is not a law made by the Legislature of a State but is an existing law continued by virtue of Article 372 of the Constitution of India. If at all, it is Article 372(1) alone that would apply to such law which is to continue in force until altered or repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent authority. We have already found that since section 97(1) of the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976 has no application to Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, it would necessarily continue as a law in force." 25. Therefore, I do not intend to frame the substantial questions of law while deciding the appeal aforementioned. We have already found that since section 97(1) of the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976 has no application to Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, it would necessarily continue as a law in force." 25. Therefore, I do not intend to frame the substantial questions of law while deciding the appeal aforementioned. 26. As an upshot of my findings, the judgment and decree of the Lower Appellate Court is set aside and that of trial Court is restored. 27. Resultantly, regular second appeal is allowed.