Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors. to be Rep. by the Commissioner of Central Excise Morello Compound M. G Road Shillong Medhalaya
2018-03-06
AJIT SINGH, MANOJIT BHUYAN
body2018
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT AND ORDER : AJIT SINGH, J. By this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has prayed for quashing of Notice dated 26.6.2015 issued by the Assistant Commissioner, Central Excise Division, Guwahati-II directing it to pay outstanding interest amount of Rs. 11,27,03,669/- pursuant to judgment dated 14.5.2015 of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 4458-4459 of 2015. 2. Although detailed facts are narrated in a decision of the Supreme Court rendered in Dharampal Satyapal Limited v. Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, Gauhati, (2015) 8 SCC 519 , we, for the sake of convenience, deem it proper to briefly mention some relevant facts here also. A new industrial policy vide Memorandum dated 24.12.1997 was introduced by the Union of India for North Eastern Region. The purpose of policy was to give stimulation to the development of industrial infrastructure in the Region. Pursuant to the policy, the Region was made tax free zone for a period of 10 years with incentives to those who wanted to establish industries. And in conformity with the policy, Notification dated 8.7.1999 was issued granting new industrial units that had commercial production on or after 24.12.1997 and certain types of industrial units that increased their installed capacity after that date, exemption on goods cleared from units located in growth centres and integrated industrial centres. This Notification was issued under the provisions of the Central Excise Act, 1944. 3. But soon thereafter, on 31.12.1999, another Notification was issued whereby exemption of Central Excise was withdrawn in respect of goods - pan masala, tobacco and tobacco substitutes, including cigarettes, chewing tobacco etc. The withdrawal Notification dated 31.12.1999 was challenged by the petitioner in WP(C) No. 1525/2001 which was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of this High Court vide order dated 11.4.2002 Aggrieved, the petitioner challenged that order in WA No. 220/2002 and the Division Bench allowed the same vide order dated 3.12.2002 essentially on the ground of ‘doctrine of promissory estoppel’. The Division Bench held that once a promise was made by the Union of India assuring that no excise duty would be charged for a period of 10 years, it was not open for the Union of India to withdraw the same.
The Division Bench held that once a promise was made by the Union of India assuring that no excise duty would be charged for a period of 10 years, it was not open for the Union of India to withdraw the same. The Union of India then filed petitions for special leave before the Supreme Court against the order dated 3.12.2002 which were granted and the petitions were registered as Civil Appeal Nos. 8841-44 of 2003. 4. During the pendency of aforesaid Civil Appeals in the Supreme Court, Parliament enacted Section 154 of the Finance Act, 2003 (in short “Act, 2003”). The Section reads as under:- “154. Amendment of notifications issued under Section 5-A of the Central Excise Act.—(1) The notifications of the Government of India in the Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue) Nos. G.S.R 508(E) dated 8-7-1999 and G.S.R 509(E), dated 8-7-1999, issued under subsection (1) of Section 5-A of the Central Excise Act read with sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957 (58 of 1957) and sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Additional Duties of Excise (Textiles and Textile Articles) Act, 1978 (40 of 1978), by the Central Government shall stand amended and shall be deemed to have been amended in the manner as specified against each of them in column (3) of the Ninth Schedule, on and from the corresponding date specified in column (4) of that Schedule retrospectively, and accordingly, notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any court, tribunal or other authority, any action taken or anything done or purported to have been taken or done under the said notifications, shall be deemed to be and always to have been, for all purposes, as validly and effectively taken or done as if the notifications as amended by this sub-section had been in force at all material times.
(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), the Central Government shall have and shall be deemed to have the power to amend the notifications referred to in the said sub-section with retrospective effect as if the Central Government had the power to amend the said notifications under sub-section (1) of Section 5-A of the Central Excise Act read with subsection (3) of Section 3 of the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957 (58 of 1957) and sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Additional Duties of Excise (Textiles and Textile Articles) Act, 1978 (40 of 1978), retrospectively at all material times. (3) No suit or other proceedings shall be maintained or continued in any court, tribunal or other authority for any action taken or anything done or omitted to be done, in respect of any goods under the said notifications, and no enforcement shall be made by any court, tribunal or other authority of any decree or order relating to such action taken or anything done or omitted to be done as if the amendments made by sub-section (1) had been in force at all material times. (4) Recovery shall be made of all amounts of duty or interest or other charges which have not been collected or, as the case may be, which have been refunded but which would have been collected or, as the case may be, which would have not been refunded if the provisions of this section had been in force at all material times, within a period of thirty days from the day on which the Finance Bill, 2003 receives the assent of the President, and in the event of non-payment of duty or interest or other charges so recoverable, interest at the rate of fifteen per cent per annum shall be payable from the date immediately after the expiry of the said period of thirty days till the date of payment. Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that no act or omission on the part of any person shall be punishable as an offence which would not have been so punishable if the notifications referred to in sub-section (1) had not been amended retrospectively by that subsection.” 5. With the enactment of Section 154 of the Act, 2003, the exemptions available to the manufacturer of pan masala, cigarettes, tobacco etc. were rescinded retrospectively.
With the enactment of Section 154 of the Act, 2003, the exemptions available to the manufacturer of pan masala, cigarettes, tobacco etc. were rescinded retrospectively. Meaning thereby, the excise duties already refunded to the petitioner became liable to be recovered, no further refund was to be made and the petitioner became liable to pay excise duties not paid when the exemption was in force. Not only this, non-payment of duty or interest so recoverable by the petitioner within thirty days from the day, on which, the Finance Bill received the assent of the President, interest at the rate of fifteen per cent per annum was made payable from the date immediately after the expiry of the period of thirty days till the date of payment. 6. A second bunch of writ petitions were filed before this court challenging the validity of Section 154 of the Act, 2003, but they were transferred to the Supreme Court at the instance of Union of India. This bunch of writ petitions was then heard by the Supreme Court along with Civil Appeal Nos. 8841-44 of 2003. The Supreme Court in R.C Tobacco (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2005) 7 SCC 725 upheld the validity of Section 154 as a result of which Civil Appeal Nos. 8841-44 of 2003 became infructuous and were accordingly disposed of. 7. It is, however, to be noted that after enactment of Section 154 of the Act, 2003 which had nullified the effect of exemption notification retrospectively, the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise, Silchar passed recovery order dated 3.6.2003 for recovery of Rs. 2,93,43,244/- from the petitioner which was the benefit that had been drawn by it for the period November, 1999 till February, 2001 in terms of exemption notification. And by another order dated 6.6.2003 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Central Excise, Guwahati the petitioner was directed to pay excise duty for the said period for which benefit had been availed. By the same order the Deputy Commissioner also rejected petitioner's pending claim of refund for the period March, 2001 till 31.5.2003. These recovery orders were challenged by the petitioner in appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals). Along with the appeal, the petitioner also filed an application for interim order seeking stay against the pre-deposit.
By the same order the Deputy Commissioner also rejected petitioner's pending claim of refund for the period March, 2001 till 31.5.2003. These recovery orders were challenged by the petitioner in appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals). Along with the appeal, the petitioner also filed an application for interim order seeking stay against the pre-deposit. But the Commissioner (Appeals) vide order dated 31.3.2004 dismissed the application and directed the petitioner to deposit entire duty amount within a period of thirty days. Aggrieved with the order of pre-deposit, the petitioner challenged the same before this High Court and the learned Single Judge vide order dated 18.5.2004 declined to interfere. The petitioner then filed writ appeals before the Division Bench wherein by an interim order dated 11.6.2004, the Commissioner (Appeals) was directed not to dismiss the appeals of petitioner before him for non-deposit of duty amount. Thereupon, the Commissioner (Appeals) without insisting for the pre-deposit of duty amount finally heard and allowed the appeals of petitioner vide order dated 15.6.2005 He held that issuance of show cause notice was mandatory before a valid recovery demand could be made from the petitioner and thus remanded the matter to the adjudicating authority. After passing of the final order by the Commissioner (Appeals), writ appeals of the petitioner before the Division Bench were disposed of as infructuous. 8. The Revenue challenged the order dated 15.6.2005 of the Commissioner (Appeals) by filing an appeal before the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (in short “Tribunal”). The petitioner also challenged that order by filing an appeal before the Tribunal as it was not satisfied with the nature of relief granted. The Tribunal by a common order dated 28.5.2007 set aside the order dated 15.6.2005 which resulted in allowing the appeal of Revenue and dismissing the appeal of petitioner. Undeterred, the petitioner challenged the order of Tribunal by filing Central Excise Reference No. 1 of 2008 before this High Court which was dismissed by a learned Single Judge vide order dated 1.12.2011 on the ground of res judicata holding that order dated 18.5.2004 passed earlier in the writ petitions of petitioner had attained finality. The petitioner then filed review petition but it too was dismissed vide order dated 5.6.2012 The petitioner not willing to give up, challenged both the orders dated 1.12.2011 and 5.6.2012 before the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos.
The petitioner then filed review petition but it too was dismissed vide order dated 5.6.2012 The petitioner not willing to give up, challenged both the orders dated 1.12.2011 and 5.6.2012 before the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 4458-4459 of 2015 on the plea that no recovery proceedings could have been initiated without a show cause notice under Section 11A of the Excise Act. And the Supreme Court by an interim order dated 30.1.2012 restrained the Revenue from taking any coercive steps for recovery of the additional demand towards interest. 9. The Supreme Court finally by a detailed judgment dated 14.5.2015 reported in Dharampal Satyapal Limited (supra) held that non issuance of show cause notice prior to passing of recovery order is in violation of principles of natural justice, but in the fact situation of the case since the quantification of amount was not under dispute, the issuance of notice to the petitioner would have been an empty formality and the case is squarely covered by “useless formality theory”. To be more precise, we think it proper to reproduce paragraphs 45 and 46 of the judgment herein below:— “45. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles in mind, even when we find that there is an infraction of principles of natural justice, we have to address a further question as to whether any purpose would be served in remitting the case to the authority to make fresh demand of amount recoverable, only after issuing notice to show cause to the appellant. In the facts of the present case, we find that such an exercise would be totally futile having regard to the law laid down by this Court in R.C Tobacco. 46. To recapitulate the events, the appellant was accorded certain benefits under the Notification dated 8-7-1999. This Notification stands nullified by Section 154 of the 2003 Act, which has been given retrospective effect. The legal consequence of the aforesaid statutory provision is that the amount with which the appellant was benefited under the aforesaid Notification becomes refundable. Even after the notice is issued, the appellant cannot take any plea to retain the said amount on any ground whatsoever as it is bound by the dicta in R.C Tobacco. Likewise, even the officer who passed the order has no choice but to follow the dicta in R.C Tobacco.
Even after the notice is issued, the appellant cannot take any plea to retain the said amount on any ground whatsoever as it is bound by the dicta in R.C Tobacco. Likewise, even the officer who passed the order has no choice but to follow the dicta in R.C Tobacco. It is important to note that as far as quantification of the amount is concerned, it is not disputed at all. In such a situation, issuance of notice would be an empty formality and we are of the firm opinion that the case stands covered by “useless formality theory”.” 10. Thus, the Supreme Court applying the “useless formality theory” dismissed Civil Appeal Nos. 4458-4459 of 2015 of the petitioner. With the dismissal of appeals, the interim stay order dated 30.1.2012 restraining the Revenue from making additional demand towards interest also stood vacated. It is in this background, the Assistant Commissioner, Central Excise Division, Guwahati-II has issued the impugned notice dated 26.5.2015 directing the petitioner to pay outstanding interest amount of Rs. 11,27,03,669/-. 11. The main submission of the petitioner against the recovery notice in respect to outstanding interest amount is that no such recovery can be made without a show cause notice and adjudication of the amount. The counsel for the Revenue on the other hand strongly defended the validity of impugned notice which has been issued pursuant to judgment dated 14.5.2015 by the Supreme Court. 12. As seen above, exemption notification was nullified by Section 154 of the 2003 Act. And the validity of Section 154 was upheld by the Supreme Court in R.C Tobacco (P) Ltd. (supra). Therefore, the amount with which the petitioner was benefited under the notification became refundable and the quantification of the amount was never disputed by the petitioner. In the recovery order under challenge before the Supreme Court it was clearly mentioned that if the amount will not be refunded within thirty days as provided under Section 154(4) interest at the rate of fifteen per cent per annum shall be payable. In such a situation, again issuance of show cause notice to the petitioner for the recovery of interest amount on the undisputed amount of refundable duty would be an empty formality more particularly when it also requires no adjudication. Also the petitioner could not show any apparent mistake in the calculation of interest amount. 13.
In such a situation, again issuance of show cause notice to the petitioner for the recovery of interest amount on the undisputed amount of refundable duty would be an empty formality more particularly when it also requires no adjudication. Also the petitioner could not show any apparent mistake in the calculation of interest amount. 13. For these reasons, we find no merit in the petition. It is accordingly dismissed with cost of Rs. 5000/- payable by the petitioner to the Revenue within one month.