JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr.Vakil, learned advocate for the petitioner and Mr.Oza, learned advocate for respondent no.1 and Ms.Vashi learned advocate for respondent no.4 and Mr.Devnani, learned AGP for respondent nos.2, 3 and 5. 2. In the present case, the petitioner has prayed, interalia, that: “9(A). Your Lordships may be pleased to issue writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside the impugned resolution dated 05.05.2016 being resolution No. 332/2016 passed by the respondent no.1 and further be pleased to direct the respondent no.1 to cancel the recognition of Sugnan Vidhya Vihar High School Secondary and Higher Secondary School (General Stream and Science Stream, granted and non-granted School); 9(AA). Your Lordship may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, quashing and setting aside the order dated 30.05.2016 passed by the respondent no.1. 9(B). Pending admission, and till final disposal of this petition Your Lordships be pleased to grant stay against the implementation, execution and operation of the impugned resolution dated 05.05.2016 being resolution no. 332 of 2016 passed by the respondent no.1. 9(BB). Pending admission and till final disposal of this petition, Your Lordships may be pleased to grant stay against the implementation, operation and execution of the order dated 30.05.2016 passed by the respondent no.1. 9(C). Be pleased to grant such other and further reliefs which may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice.” 3. From the relief prayed for by the petitioner, it appears that the petitioner is essentially aggrieved by the order passed by the respondent no.1 – Board. 4. From the facts mentioned by the petitioner, it has emerged that the petitioner has grievance against respondent no.4. 5. On strength of the allegations against the conduct of respondent no.4 including allegation about irregularity in matter of appointments of teachers, the petitioner approached the respondent – Board with the demand that the registration of respondent no.4 should be cancelled. 6. It also appears that initially the order to that effect was passed. 7. However, feeling aggrieved by the respondent – Board’s order, the respondent no.4 approached Appellate Authority (State Government) and challenged the Board’s order. 8. The State, being Appellate Authority, considered the appeal and partly allowed the appeal by remanding the proceeding to the Board. 9. 6. It also appears that initially the order to that effect was passed. 7. However, feeling aggrieved by the respondent – Board’s order, the respondent no.4 approached Appellate Authority (State Government) and challenged the Board’s order. 8. The State, being Appellate Authority, considered the appeal and partly allowed the appeal by remanding the proceeding to the Board. 9. Subsequently, in remand proceedings the Board passed impugned order dated 30.06.2016, with which the petitioner is aggrieved. 10. One of the grounds on which the petitioner has challenged impugned order, is that the order is unreasoned and non-speaking. 11. On the other hand, respondent no.4 has vide affidavit-in-reply dated 17.11.2016, raised preliminary objection against maintainability of the petition on the ground that the petitioner can avail statutory alternate remedy under Section 31(10) of Gujarat Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Act, 1972, whereby an appeal can be preferred against the order passed by respondent no.1 Board. It is prayed that the petitioner be directed to avail statutory alternative remedy. 12. From the details mentioned in the petition, it has emerged that on earlier occasion, the Board passed order dated 22.05.2015. Against the said order present respondent no.4 had at relevant time, availed statutory remedy. Therefore, there is no good reason and petitioner has also failed to make out any strong ground to short circuit the statutory alternative remedy and/or to not follow same course which the respondent followed on previous occasion. 13. In this context, it is appropriate to take into account the observations by Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in the cases of (1) CCT, Orissa and Others Vs. Indian Explosives Ltd. reported in (2008) 3 S.C.C. 688 in Para 3, 4 and 8 thus: “3. The Revenue filed its counter-affidavit. When the writ petition was taken up for hearing, it was pointed out that disputed questions of fact arise for decision which can be adjudicated by the authorities under the Act and the High Court should not exercise power under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was also submitted that the interpretation given by the assessee was not correct. It was pointed out that in the case of M/s ICI Ltd., a similar plea. The High Court was of the view that the writ petition can be entertained even though an alternative remedy is available. It was also submitted that the interpretation given by the assessee was not correct. It was pointed out that in the case of M/s ICI Ltd., a similar plea. The High Court was of the view that the writ petition can be entertained even though an alternative remedy is available. Accepting the stand of the assessee the High Court held that the notice issued was to be quashed and accordingly quashed the impugned notice dated 14.01.2004. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition more particularly when for Assessment Years 1997-1998 and 1998-1999 another Division Bench in Writ Petition OJCs Nos. 16928 of 1998 and 1500 of 2000 had rejected the stand of the assessee. Though it was brought to the notice of the High Court that such is the position, unfortunately the High Court did not even refer to the said decision. 8. The High court seems to have completely lost sight of the parameters highlighted by this Court in a large number of cases relating to exhaustion of alternative remedy. Additionally the High Court did not even refer to the judgment of another Division Bench for Assessment Year 1997-1998 and Assessment Year 1998-1999 in respect of ICI India Ltd. In any event the High court ought to have referred to the ratio of the decision in the said case. That judicial discipline has not even adhered to. Looked at from any angle, the High Court’s judgment is indefensible and is set aside.” (2) In case of State of M.P. Vs. Nerbudda Valley Refrigerated Products Company Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. reported in A.I.R. 2010 S.C. 2859 Hon’ble Apex Court observed that: “12. A perusal of the order of the Nazul Officer shows that grant of NOC depends upon various factors and fulfillment of certain conditions. It is also not in dispute that the said officer is better equipped with to decide the application for grant of NOC. Undoubtedly, while deciding such an application, Nazul Officer has to consider not only the circulars but also rules and regulations framed by the State Government. Even otherwise, when the ultimate order of Nazul Officer can be canvassed before Collector, the High Court ought not to have exercised its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 as an appellate court over the finding of fact arrived at by the Nazul Officer. Even otherwise, when the ultimate order of Nazul Officer can be canvassed before Collector, the High Court ought not to have exercised its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 as an appellate court over the finding of fact arrived at by the Nazul Officer. In this context, it is useful to refer the following decision: In Punjab National Bank Vs. O.C. Krishnan and Ors., (2001) 6 SCC 3208: 2001 A.I.R. SCW 2993, this Court held: “6. The Act has been enacted with a view to provide a special procedure for recovery of debts due to the banks and the financial institutions. There is a hierarchy of appeal provided in the Act, namely, filing of an appeal under Section 20 and this fast-track procedure cannot be allowed to be derailed either by taking recourse to proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution or by filing a civil suit, which is expressly barred. Even though a provision under an Act cannot expressly oust the jurisdiction of the court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, nevertheless, when there is an alternative remedy available, judicial prudence demands that the Court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under the said constitutional provisions. This was a case where the High Court should not have entertained the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and should have directed the respondent to take recourse to the appeal mechanism provided by the Act” In State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors. Vs. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd. and Anr. (2005) 6 SCC 499 : (A.I.R. 2005 SC 3936 : 2005 A.I.R. SCW 3727, this Court observed as under: “17. We shall first deal with the plea regarding alternative remedy as raised by the appellant-State. Except for a period when Article 226 was amended by the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, the power relating to alternative remedy has been considered to be a rule of self imposed limitation. It is essentially a rule of policy, convenience and discretion and never a rule of law. Despite the existence of an alternative remedy it is within the jurisdiction of discretion of the High court to grant relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is essentially a rule of policy, convenience and discretion and never a rule of law. Despite the existence of an alternative remedy it is within the jurisdiction of discretion of the High court to grant relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. At the same time, it cannot be lost sight of that though the matter relating to an alternative remedy has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the case, normally the High Court should not interfere if there is an adequate efficacious alternative remedy, if somebody approaches the High court without availing the alternative remedy provided the High court should ensure that he has made out a strong case or that there exist good grounds to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction.” (3) Profitable reference can also be had to the observation in case of G.M. Sri Siddeshwara Co-Operative Bank Ltd. and Anr. Vs. Sri Iqbal & Ors. reported in (2013) 10 SCALE 396 in Para 30 and 31 thus: “30. In Satyawati Tondon, the Court was concerned with an argument of alternative remedy provided under Section 17 of SARFAESI Act. Dealing with this argument, the Court had observed that where an effective remedy was available to the aggrieved person, the High Court must insist that before availing the remedy under Article 226 the alternative remedies available to him under the relevant statute are exhausted. In paragraphs 44 and 45 (page. no. 123) of the Report, the Court stated as follows: “44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in Article 226 of the Constitution. 45. 45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision etc. and particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance. 31. No doubt an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 but by now it is well settled that where a statute provides efficacious and adequate remedy, the High Court will do well in not entertaining a petition under Article 226. On misplaced considerations, statutory procedures cannot be allowed to be circumvented. (4) Likewise in case United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tandon and Another (2010) 8 S.C.C. 110 Hon’ble Apex Court observed that, “19. Subsection (10) of Section 13 lays down that where does of the secured creditor are not fully satisfied by the sale proceeds of the secured assets, the secured creditor may file an application before the Tribunal under Section 17 for recovery of balance amount from the borrower. Subsection (11) states that without prejudice to the rights conferred on the secured creditor under or by this section, it shall be entitled to proceed against the guarantors or sell the pledged assets without resorting to the measures specified in clauses (a) to (d) of subsection (4) in relation to the secured assets. 25. Section 18 provides for an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. 31. After one year and six months, the appellant sent letter dated 06.05.2006 to Respondents 1 and 2 pointing out that repayment of loan was highly irregular. After another one year, the account of Respondent 2 was classified as nonperforming asset. On 19.07.2007, the appellant sent separate letters to Respondent 1 and 2 requiring them to deposit the outstanding dues amount to Rs.23,78,478. Thereupon, Respondent 1 deposited a sum of Rs.50,000 and gave written undertaking to pay the balance amount in installments. However, she did not fulfill her promise to repay the remaining amount. This compelled the appellant to issue notice to Respondents 1 and 2 under Section 13(2) requiring them to pay Rs.23,22,972 along with future interest and incidental expenses within 60 days. However, she did not fulfill her promise to repay the remaining amount. This compelled the appellant to issue notice to Respondents 1 and 2 under Section 13(2) requiring them to pay Rs.23,22,972 along with future interest and incidental expenses within 60 days. (5) In CAV judgment passed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 1708 of 2009 on 04.05.2011 Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court observed that, “12. The aforesaid issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of United Bank of India vs. Satyawati Tondon reported in (2010) 8 SCC 110 . Therein, the Supreme Court held that issuance of notice to guarantor-mortgagor u/Sec.13(2) and (4) and filing an application u/Sec.14 of the SARFAESI Act without first initiating action against the principal borrower is permissible. In the said case, the Supreme Court also noticed that there was alternative remedy of appeal u/Sec.17, which could have been availed by any aggrieved person, and held that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person, and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In the said case, the Supreme Court held as follows : – "42. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If respondent No.1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) or action taken under Section 14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1). The expression ‘any person’ used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective. "43. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective. "43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc., the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute". 13. In view of the settled principle under the SARFAESI Act, it is always open to the secured creditor to take measures u/Sec.14, 13(4) against a guarantor, without initiating any action against the principal borrower, as both stand in the same footing of borrower, and action can be taken against any one or other borrower, we hold that it was well within the jurisdiction of the secured creditor to take separate action against the principal borrower and/or to settle the issue with such principal borrower, and a separate action against the guarantor, and/or to settle with the guarantor. In case the provisions of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 or the Rules framed thereunder are violated, it will be always open to the aggrieved person to assail such action or measures taken by secured creditor by filing appeal u/Sec.17 before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. Learned Single Judge, thereby, having refused to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226, there being a remedy of appeal, no interference is called for against such order. Learned Single Judge, thereby, having refused to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226, there being a remedy of appeal, no interference is called for against such order. The appellant-petitioner is given liberty to move before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, if it is aggrieved, within a reasonable period, say within a month. The Letters Patent Appeal and the connected Civil Application are dismissed with the aforesaid observations, but there shall be no order as to costs.” (6) In case of Authorised Officer, State Bank of Travancore and Another Vs. Mathew K.C. rendered in Civil Appeal No. 1281 of 2018 Hon’ble Court has observed that, 11. In Satyawati Tandon (supra), the High Court had restrained further proceedings under Section 13(4) of the Act. Upon a detailed consideration of the statutory scheme under the SARFAESI Act, the availability of remedy to the aggrieved under Section 17 before the Appellate Tribunal, the object and purpose of the legislation, it was observed that a writ petition ought not to be entertained in view of the alternate statutory remedy available holding : – “43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of the such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. *** 55. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. *** 55. It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated pronouncement of this court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection. 12. Union Bank of India and another Vs. Panchanan Subudhi, 2010 (15) SCC 552, further proceedings under Section 13(4) were stayed in the writ jurisdiction subject to deposit of Rs.10,00,000/leading this Court to observe as follows: “7. In our view, the approach adopted by the High Court was clearly erroneous. When the respondent failed to abide by the terms of onetime settlement, there was no justification for the High Court to entertain the writ petition and that too by ignoring the fact that a statutory alternative remedy was available to the respondent under Section 17 of the Act.” 13. The same view was reiterated in Kanatyalal Lalchand Sachdev and other Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, 2011 (2) SCC 782 observing : “23. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court rightly dismissed the petition on the ground that an efficacious remedy was available to the appellants under Section 17 of the Act. It is well settled that ordinary relief under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India is not available if an efficacious alternative remedy is available to any aggrieved person. (see Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Lts.; Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander Rai and SBI v. Allied Chemical Laboratories.)” 14. In Iqbal (Supra), it was observed that the action of the Bank under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act’ available to challenge by the aggrieved under Section 17 was an efficacious remedy and the institution directly under Article 226 was not sustainable, relying upon Satyawati Tandon (Supra) observing: “27. Ram Chander Rai and SBI v. Allied Chemical Laboratories.)” 14. In Iqbal (Supra), it was observed that the action of the Bank under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act’ available to challenge by the aggrieved under Section 17 was an efficacious remedy and the institution directly under Article 226 was not sustainable, relying upon Satyawati Tandon (Supra) observing: “27. No doubt an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 but by now it is well settled that where a statute provides efficacious and adequate remedy, the High Court will do well in not entertaining a petition under Article 226. On misplaced consideration, statutory procedures cannot be allowed to be circumvented. *** 28....In our view, there was no justification whatsoever for the learned Single Judge to allow the borrower to bypass the efficacious remedy provided to him under Section 17 and invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction in his favour when he had disentitled himself for such relief by his conduct. The Single Judge was clearly in error in invoking his extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 in light of the peculiar facts indicated above. The Division Bench also erred in affirming the erroneous order of the Single Judge” 15.A similar view was taken in Punjab National Bank and another Vs. Imperial Gift House and others, (2013) 14 SCC 622, observing : “3.Upon receipt of notice, the respondents filed representation under Section 13(3A) of the Act, which was rejected. Thereafter, before any further action could be taken under Section 13(4) of the Act by the Bank, the writ petition was filed before the High court. 4. In our view, the High Court was not justified in entertaining the writ petition against the notice issued under Section 13(2) of the Act and quashing the proceedings initiated by the Bank.” 14. From above quoted observations in said decisions it emerges that when alternative remedy is available them the concerned party should first avail alternate remedy and the court should also ask the parties to avail alternate remedy instead of entertaining petition, which is filed without availing statutory alternative remedy and the petitioner may not be permitted to short circuit alternative remedy. 15. In this view of the matter and in view of the fact that Section 31(10) provides statutory alternative remedy against the decision by Board, this court is not inclined to entertain present petition. 15. In this view of the matter and in view of the fact that Section 31(10) provides statutory alternative remedy against the decision by Board, this court is not inclined to entertain present petition. Consequently, this court considers it proper to relegate the petitioner to avail alternative remedy. 16. Therefore, the petitioner is relegated to statutory alternative remedy. 17. The concerned parties are at liberty to raise all contentions, which may be available in law. 18. Mr.Vakil learned advocate for the petitioner at the outset expressed doubt/apprehension on the ground of limitation (period prescribed under the Act in preferring the appeal). 19. In view of the said submission by learned advocate for the petitioner, it is appropriate to clarify that the petitioner, in the appeal, may point out that against the order dated 05.05.2016, he had immediately filed present petition (viz. Special Civil Application No. 8654 of 2016) on 27.05.2016 i.e. within the period of limitation prescribed under the Act. 20. Therefore, the petitioner can point out the said factual aspect which the Appellate Authority will take into account if any objection is raised by any respondent on the ground of notice. 21. If such objection is raised by the respondent, the said submission would be available to the petitioner provided the petitioner submits the appeal within a period of 15 days from today. 22. Mr.Vakil, learned advocate also submitted that the Appellate Authority may decide the appeal expeditiously. 23. In that view of the matter, it is clarified that the concerned Appellate Authority will decide the appeal as expeditiously as possible and preferably within four months. 24. It is clarified that in view of the fact that one of the grounds on which the petitioner sought cancellation of registration of respondent no.4 is based on the representation submitted by District Education Officer, it would be open to petitioner to raise the said contentions before the Appellate Authority and it would be also open to respondent to reply and deal with the said contentions before the concerned Appellate Authority. 25. With the aforesaid clarifications and observations, this petition is disposed of at this stage. 26. In view of the above limited ground on which the petition is disposed of (i.e. on ground of availability of statutory alternate remedy). 25. With the aforesaid clarifications and observations, this petition is disposed of at this stage. 26. In view of the above limited ground on which the petition is disposed of (i.e. on ground of availability of statutory alternate remedy). It is clarified that this court has not entered into merits of rival contentions and this court has also not expressed any opinion with regard to rival contentions. The authority will, therefore, decide the matter independently on merits and in accordance with law and in light of material available on record. The authority shall pass speaking and reasoned order. 27. With the aforesaid directions and clarifications, the present petition is disposed of. Rule is discharged.