JUDGMENT : DAMA SESHADRI NAIDU, J. Introduction: 1. Central Government, through a notification, banned the export of shark fins. Internationally too “shark fining” is a detestable fishing activity, leading to environmental and ecological calamities. The Government first imposed this ban in 2001, relaxed it the same year. But, again, in 2015, re-imposed it. 2. One marine produce exporter, dealing exclusively in shark fins, assails the ban. It argues that India stands on a different footing, and the international parameters have no application here. It also questions the prohibition as ultra-vires of the Government power under the relevant statutes. We will examine whether the Government’s action sustains itself. Case in Brief: 3. Marine Fins, a proprietary concern, deals in import and export of marine products. It exports mainly dried shark fins to North-East countries. Though dried shark fin has no domestic use, it has a high demand in North-East countries, especially China. 4. In 2001 Union of India issued the Gazette Notification No. SO 665(E) dated 11.7.2001; it banned catching of all species of Shark in India, treating it as an endangered animal under the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972. 5. Later, because of widespread protests, especially from the fishermen communities, the Government limited the ban to nine out of ninety nine species of Sharks available within territorial waters of India. It was through Notification SO 1197(E) dated 6.12.2001. 6. Later, in 2015, the Government exercised its power under section 5 of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act 1992, read with para-1.3 of Foreign Trade Policy, 2009-2014. The Director General of Foreign Trade issued a Notification No. 110 (RE-2013)/2009-2014, dated 06.02.2015. The notification inserts a new entry at S. No. 31 A, in chapter III of Schedule 2 of ITC (HS) Classification of Export and Import Items (Ext.P3). With this legislative change, the Government has banned export of all shark fins, of whatever species. 7. Because of the ban, Marine Fins cannot buy shark fins from the fishermen in the local market. Aggrieved, Marine Fins challenges Notification SO 1197(E) dated 6.12.2001, as affecting its fundamental right to trade. Reliefs Sought: (i) Declare that Ext.P3 Notification is illegal and unconstitutional. (ii) Strike down Ext.P3 Notification, as it is void, and ultra-vires the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992. Submissions: Appellants: 8. Aggrieved, Marine Fins challenges Notification SO 1197(E) dated 6.12.2001, as affecting its fundamental right to trade. Reliefs Sought: (i) Declare that Ext.P3 Notification is illegal and unconstitutional. (ii) Strike down Ext.P3 Notification, as it is void, and ultra-vires the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992. Submissions: Appellants: 8. Sri M.A. Abdul Hakim, the learned counsel for the appellant, maintains that, unlike other countries, shark in India is considered a protein-rich diet, and there is great demand for shark meat. Besides meat, shark yields Shark Liver Oil, Shark Cartilage Powder, Shark Skin, and so forth. In sum, all parts of the Shark are used for different purposes in India, and hence the practice of hunting the shark only for its fins is not prevalent in India. There are about 99 species of Sharks available within the territorial waters of India. 9. Given the modified ban, now the ban is against nine species, which are rarely in Indian territorial waters. Shark Fin has no domestic use, market, or value; but it has a high demand in North-East Countries for making Chinese foods, soups etc. In other words, a domestically useless part of shark is exported to foreign countries to earn much-needed foreign exchange for the country. 10. Sri Hakim further contends that Marine Fins has export obligations, and it has stocked huge quantity of shark fin, for which it took a loan of two crore rupees from a bank. 11. Ext.P3 Notification, Sri Hakim asserts, is ultra-vires of section 5 of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulations) Act, 1992. The notification, according to him, also falls foul of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Assailing R(2) (e) Meeting, the learned counsel contends that it went beyond its intended purpose, and a ban on exporting shark fin could not have been within its contemplation. 12. Ext P10 Meeting, held earlier, has decided to educate, and to spread awareness among, the fishermen not to indulge in the fishing of sharks. The learned counsel submits the awareness drive was to ensure that no harm is caused to the fishes of the banned category. Even the departments concerned were directed to take steps to conduct such awareness programmers, Sri Hakim adds. 13. One of his principal contentions is that Commerce Ministry has purposefully avoided consulting the experts, such as Joint Director of Wildlife, of the Ministry of Environment and Forest and Fisheries Development Commissioner. Even the departments concerned were directed to take steps to conduct such awareness programmers, Sri Hakim adds. 13. One of his principal contentions is that Commerce Ministry has purposefully avoided consulting the experts, such as Joint Director of Wildlife, of the Ministry of Environment and Forest and Fisheries Development Commissioner. Instead, it included a representative of "People for Animals" in Ext. R2(e) meeting. The intention was mala-fide and the decision to ban shark fining was pre-determined 14. Sri Hakim strenuously contends that Ext. P3 Notification was issued solely based on Ext P5 request from Smt. Maneka Sanjay Gandhi, an incumbent Minister. And it was without considering the facts. 15. Summing up his submissions, the learned counsel has urged this Court to set aside the impugned judgment. Consequently, he also wants the Court to declare Ext. P3 ultra-vires of section 5 of the Act, with a further direction to the authorities to permit shark fining barring the nine banned species. Respondents: 16. The learned Assistant Solicitor General has submitted that the Central Government has ample statutory and constitutional powers to bring about Ext. P3 notification. He contends that shark is covered at S. No. 1 and 2, of Part IIA, of the Wildlife (Protection) Act. Therefore, even before Ext.P3, a policy existed covering shark fins and parts or products of cretin species, as included in the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 or CITES. 17. The learned ASG further submits that the authorities have received representations from various quarters about fragile ecological conditions. He has also argued that the authorities reintroduced the ban because it proved extremely difficult, at the time of fishing, for anyone to differentiate between the prohibited species and non-prohibited species. According to him, the Secretary and Director General, Department of Agricultural Research and Education and Indian Council of Agricultural Research, has also endorsed the proposal to ban the export of shark fins. 18. He therefore asserts that the impugned judgment suffers from no legal infirmities and, so, the appeal must be thrown out. Discussion: 19. This case involves the power of the Central Government to regulate marine trade, especially Foreign Trade Policy. A proprietary concern sues in its trade name: Marine Fins. As it is not a legal entity (not being a corporate persona) the cause must have been carried to the Court by the very proprietor, and none else. Discussion: 19. This case involves the power of the Central Government to regulate marine trade, especially Foreign Trade Policy. A proprietary concern sues in its trade name: Marine Fins. As it is not a legal entity (not being a corporate persona) the cause must have been carried to the Court by the very proprietor, and none else. The objection, we acknowledge, is technical, and the defect curable. At appellate stage, it is inappropriate to throw the cause out on this plea. So we proceed. 20. But before we proceed, we must acknowledge one fact. We reckoned the question of shark fining a technical issue. It is. But Sri M. A. Abdul Hakim has submitted the matter like a marine-biologist, rather than an uninitiated lawyer into an arcane subject. He has explained the whole concept of fishing on high seas, with specific reference to shark fining. He has taken us through various international reports on fining and standard commentaries on ecological issues affecting shark fining. Thorough is his research. But we have extracted the submissions strictly to the extent required for our purpose. 21. As asserted by the Director General of Foreign Trade and Secretary of Environmental Ministry, the Central Government has the power under section 5 of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992, to formulate and implement the Foreign Trade Policy. “5. The Central Government may, from time to time, formulate and announce, by notification in the Official Gazette, the foreign trade policy and may also, in the like manner, amend that policy.” 22. Further, as per Para 1.3 of the Foreign Trade Policy, 2009, the Central Government reserves the right, in public interest, to make any amendments to this policy. 23. First, in 2001, the Government, through Notification No. SO 665(E), dated 11.07.2001, banned catching of all species of shark in India. But in 2015, the Government, through Director General of Foreign Trade, issued Ext.P3 dated 06.02.2015. The notification bans the export of all shark fins, of whatever species. 24. Marine Fins assailed Ext.P3 notification as ultra-vires, besides affecting its right to trade. On 9th March 2018, a learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition. So this writ appeal. 25. If we examine the pleadings, Marine Fins, plainly admits that the practice of "Shark Fining" though not prevalent in India, involves catching of shark for extracting their fins alone, and dumping the carcass back into the sea. On 9th March 2018, a learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition. So this writ appeal. 25. If we examine the pleadings, Marine Fins, plainly admits that the practice of "Shark Fining" though not prevalent in India, involves catching of shark for extracting their fins alone, and dumping the carcass back into the sea. Shark Fining is a condemnable activity prevalent in some countries. Marine Fins also fairly admits that the Shark Fining has caused a major ecological issue, subjecting animals to cruelty. So many countries have banned it. 26. In other words, by banning shark fining, some countries have indirectly stopped shark hunting because those countries do not use shark for any other purpose, including meat consumption. 27. As we have already noted, from time to time, the Central Government announces Foreign Trade Policy, under Chapter II of FTP Act. Sec. 6 (3) delegates to the Director General of Foreign Trade certain powers, including those under Sec. 5. In fact, exercising those powers, the authority issued Ext. P3 Notification, dated 06.02.2015. The notification inserted a new entry at S. No. 31 A, in Chapter III of Schedule 2 of ITC (HS) Classification of Export of Shark Fins of all species of Shark. The same authority also issued a similar Ext P4 Notification, prohibiting import of Shark Fins. 28. Aggrieved by the ban, Marine Fins inquired under Right to Information Act and got Ext P7 Reply from the Secretary, Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change. Then, it came to know that the Ministry of Environment which is the Ministry concerned, was not even consulted before Director General’s issuing Ext.P3 & P4 Notifications. 29. In the writ petition, this Court initially granted stay in May 2015, extending it further. But, eventually, a learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition. 30. Indeed, under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, (CITES), only 18 out of 480 species of Shark are protected. So total ban on export, according to Marine Fins, is contrary to the Convention. It also asserts that even under Schedule I to the Wildlife Protection Act, only 6 species of Shark and 3 species of Ray are prohibited from being hunted. Therefore, the Notification cannot sustain itself. 31. So total ban on export, according to Marine Fins, is contrary to the Convention. It also asserts that even under Schedule I to the Wildlife Protection Act, only 6 species of Shark and 3 species of Ray are prohibited from being hunted. Therefore, the Notification cannot sustain itself. 31. On international trade in specimens of wild animals and plants, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), an International Agreement, first, resolved in 1963, at a meeting of the Members of the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources. The resolution came into force in July 1975. Later, in May 2014, 180 countries ratified the Convention. True, under Appendix II to the Convention, only a few varieties of Shark--about 18 species - are protected as per Article IV of the Convention. But pertinent is the fact that the parties to the Convention are given the right to adopt stricter domestic measures, as is evident from Clause 1 of Article XIV, covering species not included in Appendix I, II or III. 32. Indeed, obligations of the State under an International Convention can be enforced subject to the provisions of the Municipal law. In terms of Art. 253 of the Constitution, we reckon, International Conventions cannot supplant domestic legislation, unlike in the Constitution of the United States of America. Conflict inevitable, the Municipal law prevails. Then, if a Municipal law contains more vigorous provisions than an International Convention or prescribes a higher standard, that cannot be invalidated, in the backdrop of a less stringent International Convention. 33. In this Context, V. Ramasubramanian J. speaking for a Division Bench of Madras High Court, in Marine Products Exporters Association vs. Union of India, has examined, as is his wont, the statutory scheme threadbare. And we draw from that labour of judicial intellect in no small portion. 34. Section 9 of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972, bans the hunting of any wild animal specified in Schedules I, II, III and IV, except as provided under Sections 11 and 12. Sections 11 and 12 carve out some exceptions to the general rule in Section 9. In Part II-A of Schedule I to the Wildlife Act, all varieties of Whale Shark and 9 varieties of Shark and Ray are included. Sections 11 and 12 carve out some exceptions to the general rule in Section 9. In Part II-A of Schedule I to the Wildlife Act, all varieties of Whale Shark and 9 varieties of Shark and Ray are included. Thus, the Wildlife Act bans the hunting of all varieties of Whale Shark and nine varieties of shark and ray. 35. Section 61 of the Wildlife Act empowers the Central Government to amend Schedules I and III. So the Central Government amended Part II-A of Schedule I, by issuing a notification dated 11.7.2001, to include all types of Shark and Ray. But by a later notification, dated 05.12.2001, it constricted the ban: only nine varieties of shark and ray were covered. As for hunting, the ban is confined to nine varieties of shark and ray. 36. Marine Products Exporters Association case dispels the exporters objection that the notification discriminates between the foreign market and domestic market. It holds that the parameters for including a species of animal or plant in the Act differ from those for the Foreign Trade Policy. The scope, object, and purpose of the Wildlife (Protection) Act and the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 are different. “If the hunting of something is not prohibited under the Wildlife (Protection) Act, it does not mean that even the export of the same cannot be prohibited.” The information reveals that International trade in all wild fauna and flora, and the species covered under CITES in particular, is regulated jointly through the Foreign Trade (Development Regulation) Act 1992, the Foreign Trade Policy of Government of India and Customs Act, 1962 and the Wildlife (Protection) Act 1972. 37. The Ministry of Commerce’s Foreign Trade Policy, announced periodically, also concerns the Wildlife and Wildlife products which are either prohibited or permitted for import or export. It also contains conditions, CITES compliant, governing import and export of permissible species of Wildlife and Wildlife products. All forms of wildlife, including their parts and products, are barred from export unless they are specifically allowed under different parts of ITC (HS) Classification of Export and Import Items. 38. The Note 1 under Chapter 3 of the Current Foreign Trade Policy, as amended by the notification dated 06.02.2015, covers "Marine Products" exhaustively. In fact, all marine species that have been included in the Schedules to the Act are barred from export. 38. The Note 1 under Chapter 3 of the Current Foreign Trade Policy, as amended by the notification dated 06.02.2015, covers "Marine Products" exhaustively. In fact, all marine species that have been included in the Schedules to the Act are barred from export. It also mentions that the export of other species listed in CITES are subject to the provisions of the CITES. Evidently, Entry 31-A in the Table under Chapter 3 indicates that fins of all species of shark are unavailable for export. 39. Marine Fins has laboured to impress on us that the decision to impose a total ban on the export of sharks was taken in a meeting convened by the Commerce Secretary. It contends that no officer from the Ministry of Environment and Forests had a say in it. The further contention is that an extraneous authority, a non-governmental organisation, has participated in the meeting, at the behest of an incumbent Minister known for her proanimal movement. And that NGO and the Minister have influenced the Commerce Ministry. Marine Fins finally alleges that though the authorities have supplied justifications belatedly in their counter-affidavits, the minutes of the meeting and other proceedings do not reveal or supply any justification to governmental action. 40. From the record, including the Minutes of the Meeting, we gather these persons attended the meeting: (i) The Commerce Secretary, (ii) The Director General of Foreign Trade, (iii) Joint Secretary, Department of Commerce, (iv) Joint Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, (v) Director of Department of Commerce, (vi) Director of the Office of the Director General of Foreign Trade, (vii) Director of Marine Products Exports Development Authority and (viii) a representative of an organisation known as People for Animals. 41. We may further observe that in a matter involving public interest, particularly in matters like environmental or ecological degradation, we cannot insist on technicalities, and locus, too. Be it Courts or the Executive, any person possessing information can approach, put across his or her concern, and insist on appropriate action. In that context, what matters is not who influenced the decision or how the decision has been arrived at. It is whether that decision offends any constitutional safeguards or statutory prescription. Short of that, a policy decision is immune. In fact, policy decisions are meant to serve the public and, many times, brought about at the people’s initiative. In that context, what matters is not who influenced the decision or how the decision has been arrived at. It is whether that decision offends any constitutional safeguards or statutory prescription. Short of that, a policy decision is immune. In fact, policy decisions are meant to serve the public and, many times, brought about at the people’s initiative. The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations has poignantly noted in its website, as quoted in Marine Products Exporters Association case, that an estimated 73 million Sharks are killed each year, at the rate of 10,000 sharks per hour. According to their statistics, 90% of the large Sharks have been wiped out regionally. 42. The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), a global authority on the status of the natural world and the measures needed to safeguard it, maintains, what is called, a Red List of Endangered Species. In that, 50 shark species find place as the high-risk category, facing extinction. And 63 additional species are said to be approaching threatened status. Another 199 species of Shark are considered data deficient. Many of the estimated 73 million sharks killed each year, IUCN asserts, are killed only by the Shark Fining Industry. 43. Granted, India may not have, at any stage, indulged in shark fining or killing sharks in a genocidal proportion. But environmental protection, the preservation of flora and fauna, and the maintenance of ecological balance demand zero-tolerance. 44. Before proceeding further, we may examine the scope of judicial review in governmental policies. (a) Challenge to Subordinate Legislation: 45. The impugned Ext.P3 notification is a piece of subordinate legislation. A Division Bench of this Court has held in Union of India vs. Maliakkal Industrial Enterprises, ILR 2014 (3) Ker. 387, that notification under section 5 of the Foreign Trade Act is a piece of subordinate legislation. It has also held that the notification is susceptible to judicial review if a trader complains about violation of his fundamental right to carry on his business. 46. It is a precedentially settled proposition that a piece subordinate legislation does not carry the same immunity as enjoyed by a statute passed by a competent legislature. It has also held that the notification is susceptible to judicial review if a trader complains about violation of his fundamental right to carry on his business. 46. It is a precedentially settled proposition that a piece subordinate legislation does not carry the same immunity as enjoyed by a statute passed by a competent legislature. Subordinate legislation may be questioned, holds the Supreme Court in Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 515 on all the grounds as are available against the plenary legislation: (i) that it ignores the statute under which it is made; (ii) that it is contrary to some other statute because subordinate legislation must yield to plenary legislation, (iii) that it is unreasonable in the sense that it is manifestly arbitrary. The embargo against arbitrariness is embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution. An enquiry into the vires of delegated legislation must be confined to the ground on which the plenary legislation may be questioned. Yet subordinate legislation cannot be questioned on the ground of violation of the principle of natural justice on which administrative action may be questioned. (b) Public Interest and Burden of Proof: 47. The Government took a consistent stand that ExtP3 notification was issued in public interest. It submits that the initial prohibition was eased and confined to a few species. Later, after 13 years, the Government realized the difficulty, or rather the impracticability, in enforcing the ban on select species. For it is well-nigh impossible for a fisherman to identify on high seas which shark or ray belongs to which species. The result, according to the authorities, is indiscriminate killing. 48. Has the Government discharged its burden in establishing that there involved public interest, and that it applied its mind to it? 49. If the Government can exercise its power in public interest, still the court may require it to exercise that power so as to accord with the Constitutional spirit, observes the Supreme Court in Dai-ichi Karkaria Ltd. vs. Union of India, 2000 (4) SCC 57 . We may, therefore, assume that when Government is given wide power, it will consider all aspects governing the exercise of that power. If a statute confers a benefit of exemption on a person, the Government may, in public interest, curtail or abridge the extent of exemption. But Government, when questioned, must establish the grounds of public interest. We may, therefore, assume that when Government is given wide power, it will consider all aspects governing the exercise of that power. If a statute confers a benefit of exemption on a person, the Government may, in public interest, curtail or abridge the extent of exemption. But Government, when questioned, must establish the grounds of public interest. We reckon the Government did discharge its burden here. (c) Policy Preferences - Judicial Interference: 50. Marine Fins has cited numerous justifications why there should not have been a total ban, and what else could have been a better and more viable alternatives. Possibilities galore, we agree. But can we substitute our view to that of the Government, merely because our view, too, is plausible or possible? 51. First, we must acknowledge that the Ext.P3 notification emerges from expert deliberations. As is often held, the courts will not ordinarily interfere in the Government’s policy matters, since these policy matters are taken based on expert knowledge. Besides, courts are usually not equipped to question the correctness of a policy decision. True, the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Dinesh Engineering Corporation, (2001) 8 SCC 491 observes: Policy matters, nevertheless, are not beyond the bounds of the judicial scrutiny; there no judicial abdication in policy matters. The courts can still scrutinise whether the Government has formulated the policy remembering all the facts and whether the policy is beyond the pale of discrimination or unreasonableness. Any decision, be it a simple administrative decision or a policy decision, if taken without considering the facts, can only be termed an arbitrary decision. If it is so, then be it a policy decision or otherwise, it will be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 52. In other words, on matters affecting policy and requiring technical expertise, Court would leave the matter for the decision of those who are qualified to address the issues. According to the Supreme Court in Federation of Railway Officers Association vs. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 289 so long as the policy or action follows the Constitution and the laws, and so long as it is not tainted by arbitrariness, irrationality or abuse of the power, the Court will not interfere in such matters. 53. According to the Supreme Court in Federation of Railway Officers Association vs. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 289 so long as the policy or action follows the Constitution and the laws, and so long as it is not tainted by arbitrariness, irrationality or abuse of the power, the Court will not interfere in such matters. 53. Second, untrammeled may be the executive discretion to change a policy, yet it is imperative and implicit, in terms of Article 14, that the executive must not change the policy arbitrarily with an ulterior motive. The wide sweep of Article 14 mandates every State action to qualify on this touchstone. The basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness in action by the state, and non-arbitrariness in essence. And substance is the heartbeat of fair play. So held the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. International Trading Co. (2003) 5 SCC 437 . 54. In fact, International Trading case further observes that actions are amenable to judicial review, only if “the State fails act validly for a discernible reasons, not whimsically for any ulterior purpose.” A basic and obvious test to apply in such cases is to see “whether there is any discernible principle emerging from the impugned action and if so, does it really satisfy the test of reasonableness?” 55. While exercising the power of judicial review of administrative action, “the Court is not the appellate authority and the Constitution does not permit the Court to direct or advise the executive in matter of policy or to sermonize any matter which under the Constitution lies within the sphere of the Legislature or the executive, provided these authorities do not transgress their constitutional limits or statutory power.” So observed the Supreme Court in Ashif Hamid vs. State of J & K, (1989) 3 SCR 19 . Judicial enquiry is confined to whether the decision taken by the Government is against any statutory provisions, or whether it violates the fundamental rights of the citizens, or whether it is opposed to the Constitutional provisions—cautions the Supreme Court in State of Orissa vs. Gopinath Dash, AIR 2006 SC 661 . Even if the Government’s decision does not appear to be agreeable to the Court, it cannot interfere. 56. Even if the Government’s decision does not appear to be agreeable to the Court, it cannot interfere. 56. The Court should constantly remind itself that the problems of Government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations, illogical it may be, and unscientific. But even such criticism should not be hastily expressed. What is the best is not always discernible, the wisdom of any choice may be disputed or condemned. Mere errors of government are not subject to our judicial review. Metropolis Theatre Company vs. City of Chicago, (1912) 57 L Ed 730, as quoted in Gopinath Dash. Discrimination: 57. Marine Fins consistently contends that Ext.P3 smacks of arbitrariness. According to it, the ban does not apply to domestic consumption. Instead, it only applies to export. In one case, the Government imposed, what it termed, selective restriction on importing crude palm oil to the ports in Kerala. So the petitioner claimed discrimination. The question is whether there is any nexus between the decision and the objective to be achieved. 58. In Parisons Agrotech (P) Ltd. vs. Union of India, (2015) 9 SCC 657 , the Supreme Court has held that once the court finds that there is sufficient material for the Government to take a particular policy decision; even by bringing Article 14 of the Constitution into play, courts cannot judicially review and determine the correctness of the policy decision. Backed by cogent material, if the authorities demonstrate that the decision is not arbitrary or irrational, but is taken in public interest, the Court must respect the Executive’s decision. A Question of Fact - Judicial Approach: 59. Sri Hakim has taken us through various expert reports, standard commentaries on shark fining. He has submitted that the Government has not considered various factual parameters. Then, what could be the judicial approach vis-a-vis questions of fact? 60. In Hasmattullah vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1996) 4 SCC 391 the Supreme Court dealt with data dispute between the parties, both relying on material from experts. The question is, till what age are the cattle in general useful? In that context, the court has held that the issue is a question of fact. Even in books by putative experts, the views may be of the author’s and may not be based on data scientifically collected from a reliable source. The question is, till what age are the cattle in general useful? In that context, the court has held that the issue is a question of fact. Even in books by putative experts, the views may be of the author’s and may not be based on data scientifically collected from a reliable source. So the Writ Court has to be very careful in accepting what evidence should be received and relied upon if there is a bona fide dispute between the parties about its correctness. Is the Government Insensitive to the Issue? 61. We cannot say the Government is insensitive to the demands of those who rely on fishing. Nor has it adopted an alarmist approach. First, the Government imposed a total ban by a notification, dated 11.7.2001; later it modified it: the revised notification, dated 05.12.2001. The export of only nine species of shark and ray was banned. After a gap of over 13 years, the Government re-introduced a total prohibition, once again. 62. The reasons for the ban on reintroduction are apparent. In high seas, it is impossible for the fisherman to identify one species of shark or ray from another. 63. True that the notification does not prohibit hunting of shark for domestic consumption, though it bans export of shark fins. Shark meat, we must acknowledge, is no staple food for Indians. Even among the fish consumers, those that prefer shark meat are minuscule. So, to cater to the needs of such negligible consumers, there cannot be the wholesale killing of sharks. The culprit is fining and the result is the species thinning, to the extent of disappearing—almost. Result: 64. We find no legal infirmity in the impugned judgment; so we refuse to interfere with it. As a result, the writ appeal must fail. And it has. 65. But appellant has persistently submitted that it has bona fide accumulated stock pending the writ appeal. True, the appellant never enjoyed a stay in the appeal. Yet only to adjust equities, we hold that the appellant can clear the stock it had accumulated until 31.12.2017. And the respondent authorities can ensure that the appellant will not export more than what had been gathered by then. No order on costs.