JUDGMENT : DAMA SESHADRI NAIDU, J. Introduction: 1. In a couple of villages, in Thiruvananthapuram District, Government proposed to acquire lands for an on-going project. It took steps. Out of many landowners affected, eight persons have challenged the acquisition proceedings, in their entirety. But, in the end, they confined their objections-bereft of pleadings, though-to only two issues: (a) that the Government’s invocation of urgency clause is an abuse of process (b) that the award was passed beyond two years from the date of initial notification. 2. The writ petition, we will see in this writ appeal whether those two pleas could be sustained. Case in Brief: 3. Thoufeeq and six others (“the landowners”) owned properties in Villages Pallipuram, Andoorkonam, Velloor, and Melthonnakkal of Thiruvananthapuram District. They faced acquisition proceedings. 4. The Government wanted to develop Techno City. For Phase IV of its development, it invoked urgency clause under Section 17 (4) of the Land Acquisition Act (“the Old Act”) and, on 05.10.2006, issued a Notification under Section 4 (1), read with Section 17 (4). The daily newspapers had the Notification published on 07.10.2006. 5. First, the Government intended to acquire 732 acres; later it reduced the extent to 507 acres. The draft declaration under Section of the Old Act was published on 31.05.2007 for Pallipuram Village and on 03.12.2007 for the other villages. 6. Later, Ext. P1 Notification under Section 9(1), read with Section 17(1), was published in the Kerala Gazette, dated. 01.06.2007. Given the landowners’ persistent petitions to the authorities often about, what the landowners call, gross irregularities in the land acquisition, the Government, in May 2007, issued Ext.P10 showing the category of lands proposed to be acquired. Later, in January 2008, it issued Ext.P11 modifying Ext.P10. After fixing the rates of compensation for a possible negotiated acquisition, the Government issued Ext.P12 G.O. Dated 16.1.2008. 7. Again, the landowners, in May and August 2008, submitted Ext.P8 and P8(a) memoranda to the Hon'ble Chief Minister. It seems to have resulted in the revised rates of compensation, in December 2009, through Ext.P13 G.O. At any rate, complaining that the acquisition was flawed, the landowners filed WP (C) No. 18175 of 2009. 8. The landowners have questioned the land acquisition proceedings as unnecessary and an abuse of process. And they obtained an interim stay against dispossession, too. In the course of time, they filed a couple of interlocutory applications for different purposes. 8. The landowners have questioned the land acquisition proceedings as unnecessary and an abuse of process. And they obtained an interim stay against dispossession, too. In the course of time, they filed a couple of interlocutory applications for different purposes. In those IAs they introduced other pleas, reflecting the later developments. They also aligned their later pleadings with the new Act: The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (“the New Act”). But the landowners never amended the writ pleadings. 9. Nevertheless, the landowners ended up in the writ petition raising two principle pleas: (a) that the Government invoked the urgency clause with no justification; (b) that the acquisition proceedings have lapsed under Section 11A of the old Act, because the LAO did not pass the award in two years from the date of notification. 10. On 13.8.2009, the landowners obtained an interim stay against its possession. It was granted till 13.11.2009, three months. The order of stay stood extended intermittently. 11. Eventually, the Land Acquisition Officer (LAO) passed the award on 29.1.2010. Reckoning the date of initial notification under Section 9(1), that is 3.12.2007; the landowners contended that the award was passed beyond two years, so it is hit by Section 11 of the old Act. According to them, the notice of the award dated 01.04.2017 under section 12(2) was communicated to the landowners only on 04.4.2017. Throughout, the possession continued with the landowners. The Writ-Outcome: 12. After appreciating the rival contentions and after examining the issues exhaustively, a learned Single Judge rendered the impugned judgment on 4th November 2016, dismissing the writ petition. 13. Aggrieved, Thoufeeq, Ashique A.K. and Sheeja Beevi, Petitioners 1, 3 and 5 in the writ petition, filed W.A. No. 380 of 2017 and Babu and Sainudeen, petitioners 2 and 4, filed Writ Appeal No. 772 of 2009; Seenathu Beevi and Arifa Beevi, Petitioners 6 and 7, do not seem to have filed an appeal. Submissions: Appellants: 14. In the above factual background, Sri Jayakumar, the learned counsel for the appellants, and Sri P.K. Ibrahim, the learned counsel for the respondents 6 to 9, have advanced their contentions. The appellants and the respondents 6 to 9 have no conflict of interest. According to them, the Government has miserably failed to sustain its invoking the urgency clause. 15. In the above factual background, Sri Jayakumar, the learned counsel for the appellants, and Sri P.K. Ibrahim, the learned counsel for the respondents 6 to 9, have advanced their contentions. The appellants and the respondents 6 to 9 have no conflict of interest. According to them, the Government has miserably failed to sustain its invoking the urgency clause. 15. Section 17(4) of the Old Act, they further contend, is to be invoked in exceptional circumstances and with due application of mind, at that. But the Government has neither produced any sound material or legally sustained before the Court why it had invoked the urgency clause. 16. Both the learned counsel assert that the LAO has a legal obligation under Section 11A to pass an award within two years from the date the Government published its Ext.P1 recognition. Here, demonstrably and indisputably, the LAO passed the award beyond two years. 17. The learned counsel have drawn our attention to I.A. No. 1291 of 2013, filed on 18th February 2013, to stress that, despite its invoking the urgency clause, the Government did not utilize the land. Both the learned counsel have laid much emphasis on the fact that none of the landowners was present when the award was passed; so their absence resulted in a miscarriage of justice. Nor was there any hearing in terms of the Section-9 notice. They concede that the landowners submitted their objections. But it cannot be taken, according to them, as proof that the landowners were present when the award was passed. 18. In the end, the learned counsel have drawn our attention to specific portions of the impugned judgment to assert that it has been legally flawed. According to them, a case in point is the learned Single Judge’s observation that non-compliance with Section 12(2) would not be fatal to the acquisition proceedings. This observation, further contended the learned counsel, is grossly erroneous. 19. They urged this Court with a rhetorical flourish that right to property is a constitutional right and its deprivation ought to strictly comply with the statutory mandate. The learned counsel have urged this Court to allow the writ petition. Respondents: 20. The learned Government Pleader and the learned Standing Counsel for the 5th respondent, on the other hand, have submitted that the Government has been diligent and scrupulous in complying with the statutory mandate. The learned counsel have urged this Court to allow the writ petition. Respondents: 20. The learned Government Pleader and the learned Standing Counsel for the 5th respondent, on the other hand, have submitted that the Government has been diligent and scrupulous in complying with the statutory mandate. According to them, if there has been any delay, it was caused by the landowners, and none else. They have also contended that, given the initial stay granted in the writ petition, the authorities have proceeded with the matter cautiously. And as soon as the stay ended, the LAO passed the award. 21. On the question of invoking the urgency clause, the learned Standing Counsel for the 5th respondent and the learned Government Pleader have reminded us that the Techno Park has already been established, and the land was acquired only for its expansion in its IVth phase. Smt. Reshmi, for the 5th respondent Techno Park, took us through the record to contend that the authorities have held numerous rounds of negotiation with the landowners and eventually acquired the property, as a last resort. 22. To sum up, both the learned Government Pleader and the learned Standing Counsel have asserted that the entire land acquisition has been by law and that the appellants’ neither ground could sustain itself. 23. Heard Sri Jayakumar, the learned counsel for the appellants, Sri Jaffer Khan, the learned Senior Government Pleader, Smt. K.V. Reshmi the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the 5th respondent and Sri. P.K. Ibrahim, the learned counsel appearing for respondents 6 to 9, besides perusing the record. Discussion: (a) The Notifications and Writ Petition: 24. The Government, in February 2005, decided to acquire 732 acres but, later in February 2006, it brought the extent down to 507 acres. The landowners’ property in the Villages of Pallippuram, Andoorkonam, Veiloor and Melthonnakkal in Thiruvananthapuram District were also acquired. The acquisition was for the Techno City’s IV Phase. The Ext.R5(a) notification under section 4(1) read with section 17(4) was published in Gazette on 5.10.2006, and in newspapers on 7.10.2006. Draft declaration under Section 6 of the Act was issued on 31.05.2007 for Pallipuram Village; for the remaining villages on 03.12.2007. 25. On 25.06.2009 the landowners filed the writ petition; they challenged the acquisition proceedings in their entirety. They have, among other things, accused the officials of exempting certain properties and including certain other properties. Draft declaration under Section 6 of the Act was issued on 31.05.2007 for Pallipuram Village; for the remaining villages on 03.12.2007. 25. On 25.06.2009 the landowners filed the writ petition; they challenged the acquisition proceedings in their entirety. They have, among other things, accused the officials of exempting certain properties and including certain other properties. They have also accused them of abusing the process of acquisition. So, they sought a direction to the authorities to prepare and issue revised notifications. The landowners, in the course of time, amended the writ petition incorporating additional prayers: to have Exts.P10 and P13 category lists quashed. As seen from the order, dated 29.10.2003, in IA No. 11026 of 2011, Sheeja Beevi, the 5th petitioner, opted out of the writ petition. The record also reveals that Sheeja Beevi and Arifa Beevi have received the compensation and let the Techno Park possess the land. (b) Interim Order: 26. On 13.08.2009 this Court granted a temporary stay against the landowners’ dispossession. On 13.11.2009, it was extended by five weeks. It was not extended beyond that five-week period. (c) Laconic Pleadings and Improvisation: 27. Though the landowners-both in the writ petition and, here, in the writ appeal, have taken numerous pleas, the pleadings are destitute of details. That is, much of what they have urged before does not find a place in the pleadings. The reliefs they sought are these: (a) To quash Ext.P1 Notification. (b) To direct the respondents to prepare and issue revised notifications and revised subdivision demarcation sketches of the lands exempted from the acquisition and of those included in their place. (c) To issue norms relating to the rehabilitation of those landowners who are likely to be dispossessed of their houses /places of business. (d) To quash Exts. P10 to P13 category lists and government orders. 28. But both in the writ petition and in the writ appeal, the landowners have urged only two issues: (a) that the Government invoked the urgency clause with no justification; (b) that the acquisition proceedings have lapsed under Section 11 of the old Act, because the LAO did not pass the award in two years from the date of notification. 29. We wonder whether these two contentions could be considered without the foundational pleadings. We reckon both the issues are mixed questions of fact and law. 29. We wonder whether these two contentions could be considered without the foundational pleadings. We reckon both the issues are mixed questions of fact and law. Perhaps, the landowners’ focus-shift was because of the later developments: the new enactment—The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (the New Act)—arriving on the scene from 01.01.2014. As rightly observed by the learned Single Judge, the landowners did not amend the pleading but pressed ahead, based on the pleadings in the interim applications. But the learned Single Judge did consider these two pleas—elaborately—and held that neither could be sustained. So we, too, address these issues, instead of rejecting the landowners’ pleas on technicalities. Issue No. 1: Award Beyond Two Years: Under Section 11A of the Old Act, the Collector must make an award within two years “from the date of the publication of the declaration” and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceeding for acquiring the land shall lapse. The Section has an explanation: in computing two years, the period during which any action or proceeding under this Act is stayed by Court must be excluded. 30. So we will examine the chronology of events. 05.10.2006 Section 4(1), read with Sec. 17(4), notification. 01.06.2007 Section 6, read with Sec. 17(4), notification. 24.06.2009 The Writ Petition was filed. 13.08.2009 Stay of possession was granted. It was without prejudice to the respondents’ bringing up the matter. 13.11.2009 The interim stay was extended by three weeks. 04.12.2009 The extended stay expired. 09.12.2009 The stay was revived and extended by five weeks. 13.01.2010 The stay, finally, expired and was not renewed. 29.10.2010 The award was passed. 31. Techno Park, the requisitioning authority, has placed on record that it possessed the entire land save those of the landowners; it has also begun the next phase of the project. It further avers that because of the interim orders, it could not take over the land. According to Techno Park, the new Act does not apply, for the award was passed in 2010 itself. 32. In Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh vs. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1961 SC 1500 the Supreme Court has held that the date of the award would mean the date on which it was communicated. In M. Ramalinga Thevar vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2000) 4 SCC 322 , the acquisition proceedings were challenged. 32. In Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh vs. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1961 SC 1500 the Supreme Court has held that the date of the award would mean the date on which it was communicated. In M. Ramalinga Thevar vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2000) 4 SCC 322 , the acquisition proceedings were challenged. The allegation was identical: that the award was passed after two years from the date of notification under Section 6; so the acquisition suffers under Section 11A of the Old Act. As is the case here, the High Court of Allahabad stayed only the petitioners’ dispossession; there was no stay against the LAO’s passing the award. 33. In that factual backdrop, the Supreme Court has held that even when there was a stay of dispossession alone, to get the benefit of Section 11A, the petitioner should have obtained no order from a court, restraining any action that would delay the award or disables them from taking possession of the land. The Court has, in fact, observed: Even when the Court stays the dispossession alone, the period during which the stay operates would stand excluded from the time fixed for passing the award. To the same effect is the judgment in Yusufbhai Noormohamed vs. State of Gujarat, (1991) 4 SCC 531 . 34. Here, the stay order against dispossession was in force till 13.1.2010; the award was said to have been passed on 29.1.2010. Apex court approved the stand of the acquisition officers in not taking action when there is an interim order, referring to Section 11A of the Act, though the stay covered only possession and nothing else. 35. Of some interest is the fact that even by the time the landowners filed the writ petition, the two-year period had lapsed. But they took no plea on that count. Urgency Clause: 36. The other objection related to the urgency clause. The Government granted administrative sanction on 19.02.2005 for acquiring the lands. On 21.02.2006, the extent was reduced to 507 acres. The notification under Section 4(1) read with 17(1) of the Act was issued on 5.10.2006, and draft declaration was published on 31.05.2007 and 3.12.2007 regarding lands in different villages. 37. Indeed, Techno Park contends that possession was handed over to it between 1st September and 15th September 2009. The landowners’ properties alone were not touched because of the stay. The notification under Section 4(1) read with 17(1) of the Act was issued on 5.10.2006, and draft declaration was published on 31.05.2007 and 3.12.2007 regarding lands in different villages. 37. Indeed, Techno Park contends that possession was handed over to it between 1st September and 15th September 2009. The landowners’ properties alone were not touched because of the stay. Techno Park has filed its counter affidavit, detailing how it possessed the acquired properties and how it used them. 38. In Garg Woollen (P) Ltd. vs. State of U.P. (2012) 11 SCC 784, the Supreme Court quoted with approval its earlier Judgment in Radhy Shyam vs. State of U.P. (2011) 5 SCC 553 . The Court observed that Section 17(1) and Section 17(4) of Act conferred extraordinary powers upon State to acquire private property without complying with mandate of Section 5A of Act. These provisions could be invoked only when the purpose of acquisition could brook no delay of even a few weeks or months. So, before excluding Section 5A of Act, the authorities concerned must satisfy themselves that any time spent under Section 5A of Act—ruling on objections—would frustrate the intended public purpose. 39. Techno Park, in its counter affidavit, explained the urgency. It has averred that, given the immense urgency, the Government fast-tracked the acquisition, announced financial packages to the affected, even rehabilitated certain oustees and eventually took possession of the lands. It asserted that barring the landowners’ land, it took possession of all other acquired lands. And the landowners’ properties alone were left because of the Court’s stay. At any rate, Techno Park submits, even among the landowners, Sheeja Beevi and Arifa Beevi, the 5th and 7th petitioners in the writ petition, already delivered possession of the land, besides receiving compensation. 40. We reckon that urgency is a relative term and, essentially, turns upon the facts of each case. To determine what is urgent and what is not, we must accept that it is subjective and, in fact, a question of fact. In a judicial review, we go by the pleadings and uncontroverted evidence, if any, produced before the Court. Here, supported by the Government, Techno Park contends that it had urgency and that it had used the acquired property. After all, the acquisition was for an already established project; it was for the project’s expansion. 41. In a judicial review, we go by the pleadings and uncontroverted evidence, if any, produced before the Court. Here, supported by the Government, Techno Park contends that it had urgency and that it had used the acquired property. After all, the acquisition was for an already established project; it was for the project’s expansion. 41. So we find no reason to disturb the learned Single Judge’s finding on urgency, too. Not Giving Notice of Award: 42. The landowners’ last objection is that the authorities have not communicated the award to them on time. First, they disputed whether the award was passed on 29.01.2010; then, they disputed their presence before the LAO when the award had been passed. Finally, they disputed the service of award-notice on them. Contrary to their stand that they did not know of the award, the landowners did file their objections under Section 9(3) of the Old Act. And those objections were considered, too. So the landowners have limited their contention, now, to only one thing: non-communication of the award. 43. Section 12 (2) of the Old Act mandated that the Collector shall give “immediate notice of his award to such of the persons interested as are not present personally or by their representatives when the award is made.” 44. We may examine one of the earliest judgments on this point Harish Chandra Raj Singh vs. Dy. Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1961 SC 1500 . The Supreme Court has observed that if the award is treated as an administrative decision taken by the Collector in valuing the property sought to be acquired, then that decision ultimately affects the rights of the owner and, in that sense, like all decisions which affect persons, it is fair and just that the said decision be communicated to the party. 45. In Harish Chandra Raj Singh, the facts reveal that the award was made and signed on March 25, 1951. No notice of this award was, however, given to the appellant, as required by S. 12(2). And it was only on or about January 13, 1953, the appellant received information about the award. He then applied on February 24, 1953, for a reference to civil court under Section 18. But the Collector took the view that the appellant’s application was beyond time, as per the mandate under Section 18 (Proviso). He rejected it. 46. And it was only on or about January 13, 1953, the appellant received information about the award. He then applied on February 24, 1953, for a reference to civil court under Section 18. But the Collector took the view that the appellant’s application was beyond time, as per the mandate under Section 18 (Proviso). He rejected it. 46. In that case, possession was taken on 19.03.1960. The appellant filed his claim for compensation. On 25.3.1951, the LAO made the award, signed and filed it in his office. Notice of the award was not given to the appellant as provided in Section 12(2). The landowner received the information about the award on 13.1.1953 and applied under Section 18 on 24.2.1953. In this factual context, the Supreme Court has observed (in para 6 of the judgment) that the knowledge of the party affected by such a decision, either actual or constructive, is an essential element which must be satisfied before the decision can be brought into force. Thus considered, the making of the award cannot consist of the mere physical act of writing the award, or signing it, or even filing it in the office of the Collector; it must involve the communication of the said award to the party concerned either actually or constructively. 47. Harish Chandra Raj Singh goes on to observe that if the award is pronounced in the affected party’s presence, it can be said to have been made when pronounced. If the date for the pronouncement of the award is communicated to the party, and it is accordingly pronounced on the date announced; the award is said to have been communicated to the party—even if the party is not actually present—on the date of its pronouncement. Similarly, without intimating the date, if an authority passes an award, and if the party is not present, the award is deemed to have been made only when it is communicated to the party later. 48. So the Court emphasised that the knowledge of the party affected by the award, either actual or constructive is an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice. Accordingly, the expression ‘the date of the award’ used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively. 49. Accordingly, the expression ‘the date of the award’ used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively. 49. In Kaliyappan vs. State of Kerala, AIR 1989 SC 239 , the question was whether the award passed by Land Acquisition Officer was within specified time. The petitioners challenged the acquisition proceedings, alleging that it was passed beyond two years. They relied on Raja Harish Chandra's case and contended that the date on which the award was served on them him, i.e. 30.9.1986, must be treated as the date of award. Kaliyappan in that context explained the ratio of Harish Chandra's case and observed that time taken by Land Acquisition Officer for making award for proposed acquisition in favour of Petitioner could not be fatal to acquisition proceeding. 50. In Sebastian Chokkattu vs. District Collector, 2013 (4) KLT 836 , a Division Bench of this Court has observed, after referring a handful of precedents, that undoubtedly, the provision contemplates issuance of notice. Giving notice of the award enables the person interested to decide upon his future course of action. Then, by relying on Kaliyappan, it ruled that nonservice is not fatal. 51. Constructive notice in legal fiction signifies, observes the Supreme Court in Rajasthan Housing Board vs. New Pink City Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. (2015) 7 SCC 601 , that the individual person should know as a reasonable person would have. Even if they have no actual knowledge of it. Constructive notice means a man ought to have known a fact. A person is said to have notice of a fact when he actually knows a fact but for wilful abstention from inquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence he would have known it. Constructive notice is a notice inferred by law, as distinguished from actual or formal notice; that which is held by law to amount to notice. 52. The award was passed on 29.1.2010. The respondent officials have contended that the landowners submitted their objections to the acquisition, they presented themselves for the enquiry, and they were heard, too. Only then was the award passed. 52. The award was passed on 29.1.2010. The respondent officials have contended that the landowners submitted their objections to the acquisition, they presented themselves for the enquiry, and they were heard, too. Only then was the award passed. The service of notice, of course, is a disputed fact; the landowner’s constructive knowledge about the award cannot be—more particularly given the interpretation provided in New Pink City Nirman Sahkari Samiti case on the concept of constructive knowledge. We cannot be oblivious to the fact that their not getting notice of award was a plea taken at interlocutory stage. So we hold that the landowners did have constructive knowledge of the award. 53. Even otherwise, as was held in Kaliyappan and Sebastian Chokkattu, the service of notice would assume importance for saving the limitation under Section 18 of the Old Act, but not to annihilate the entire acquisition proceedings. For a provision ought to be interpreted purposively. 54. Before we conclude, we may observe that the landowners’ entire effort seems to take advantage of the New Act. Nothing wrong. But the case facts must justify the course of alternative action the landowners desired. Going by Section 24 of the New Act, a deeming provision, the acquisition proceedings initiated under the Old Act lapse under certain circumstances. 55. Under sub-section (1), the provision mandates that if no award under Section 11 of the Old Act has been made by the time the New Act came into force, then all provisions of the New Act “relating to the determination of compensation” shall apply. Sub-Section (2) is pertinent. In acquisition proceedings initiated under the Old Act, if the award under the said Section 11 has been made five years or more before the commencement of the New Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation not paid, the proceedings under the Old Act are deemed to have lapsed. 56. In other words “Section 24(2) enacts that in relation to the land acquisition proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act, where an award has been made” observes the Supreme Court in Pune Municipal Corporation vs. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183 , five years or more prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act and either of the two contingencies is satisfied viz. (i) physical possession of the land has not been taken, or (ii) the compensation has not been paid; such acquisition proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed. Section 24(2) enacts that in relation to the land acquisition proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act, where an award has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act and either of the two contingencies is satisfied viz. (i) physical possession of the land has not been taken, or (ii) the compensation has not been paid; such acquisition proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed. 57. Regrettably, the facts here do not the landowners’ desire. 58. We, therefore, find no legal infirmity in the impugned judgment, dated 04.11.2016. So we refuse to interfere with it. As a result, both the writ appeals are dismissed. No order on costs.