JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereafter the ‘Act’), at the instance of the appellant/insurer, is directed against an award dated 31st March, 2012 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-cum-Additional District Judge, 9th Court, Alipore in Motor Accident Claims Case No. 76 of 2010. 2. The said case was registered on an application under Section 166 of the Act presented by the victim of a motor vehicular accident (hereafter the ‘claimant’). She suffered serious injury while riding pillion on a motor cycle. A lorry coming from behind in a rash and negligent manner dashed the motor cycle, as a result whereof the claimant fell down on the road. She was immediately removed to R.G. Kar Medical College and Hospital and thereafter, to different hospitals and nursing homes. As a result of the fall, the claimant suffered multiple fractures on her person and allegedly became immobile. Ultimately, she obtained a certificate from a private nursing home certifying that she had suffered 60% permanent physical disablement. Armed with such certificate, the tribunal was approached by the claimant seeking compensation in a sum of Rs.20,00,000/-. 3. Upon considering the pleadings as well as the oral and documentary evidence that were led in course of the trial, the tribunal proceeded to award Rs.19,73,214/- in favour of the claimant together with interest @ 8% per annum from the date of filing the claim application. In course of assessing compensation payable to the claimant, the tribunal proceeded on the basis that Rs.1,58,727/- was the annual income of the claimant. The certificate of disability was not entirely accepted by the tribunal and the compensation was assessed as if the claimant had suffered 50% disability. The multiplier of 17 was selected and for pecuniary loss, the tribunal awarded Rs.18,68,018/-. In addition thereto, Rs.1,00,196/- on account of medical expenses as well as Rs.5,000/-towards pain and suffering were awarded, totalling to Rs.19,73,214/-. 4. Appearing in support of the appeal, Mr. Singh, learned advocate had on an earlier occasion disputed the disability certificate produced by the claimant. The multiplier of 17 was selected and for pecuniary loss, the tribunal awarded Rs.18,68,018/-. In addition thereto, Rs.1,00,196/- on account of medical expenses as well as Rs.5,000/-towards pain and suffering were awarded, totalling to Rs.19,73,214/-. 4. Appearing in support of the appeal, Mr. Singh, learned advocate had on an earlier occasion disputed the disability certificate produced by the claimant. Considering the fact that the disability of the claimant had not been assessed by a medical board of a Government hospital and also that immediately after the accident she had been rushed to R.G. Kar Medical College and Hospital, for the ends of justice, a co-ordinate Bench by an order dated 17th February, 2017 had directed constitution of a medical board by the Medical Superintendent-cum-Vice Principal, R.G. Kar Medical College & Hospital and had also directed the claimant to appear before it for an examination. A report from the medical board has since been received which certifies that the claimant had suffered 32% permanent physical disability. 5. None of the parties has taken any exception to that report and therefore, we shall proceed on the basis that the claimant suffered 32% disability and not 50% as assumed by the tribunal or 60% as assessed by the doctor of a private nursing home from where the claimant obtained such certificate. 6. Today, Mr. Singh has raised an additional point. According to him, the claimant did not produce any evidence to establish that her business had been closed and/or that she had lost her earning capacity because of the injuries suffered by her as a consequence of such accident. According to Mr. Singh, production of evidence to this effect was necessary in order to enable the tribunal assess just compensation payable to the claimant. He has, accordingly, prayed for modification of the award. 7. Per contra, Mr. Mondal, learned advocate for the claimant has contended that even if the extent of disability were reduced to 32%, the tribunal grossly erred in assessing compensation by not reckoning the gross income of the claimant after deducting income tax paid by her as well as by not providing any amount on account of future prospect as well as future medical treatment of the claimant. He has, accordingly, prayed for enhancement of compensation. 8. Responding to our query, Mr. Mondal frankly submitted that the claimant had not filed any cross-objection. 9. He has, accordingly, prayed for enhancement of compensation. 8. Responding to our query, Mr. Mondal frankly submitted that the claimant had not filed any cross-objection. 9. In the absence of any cross-objection having been filed by the claimant, we have no other alternative but to follow the decision of the Supreme Court reported in (2011) 14 SCC 639 (Ranjana Prakash and others Vs. Divisional Manager and Another) wherein it has, inter alia, been observed as follows :- “6…But where in an appeal filed by the owner/insurer, if the High Court proposes to reduce the compensation awarded by the Tribunal, the claimants can certainly defend the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal, by pointing out other errors or omissions in the award, which if taken note of, would show that there was no need to reduce the amount awarded as compensation. Therefore, in an appeal by the owner/insurer, the appellant can certainly put forth a contention that if 30% is to be deducted from the income for whatsoever reason, 30% should also be added towards future prospects, so that the compensation awarded is not reduced. The fact that the claimants did not independently challenge the award will not therefore come in the way of their defending the compensation awarded, on other grounds. It would only mean that in an appeal by the owner/insurer, the claimants will not be entitled to seek enhancement of the compensation by urging any new ground, in the absence of any cross-appeal or cross-objections. 7. This principle also flows from Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure which enables an appellate court to pass any order which ought to have been passed by the trial court and to make such further or other order as the case may require, even if the respondent had not filed any appeal or cross-objections. This power is entrusted to the appellate court to enable it to do complete justice between the parties. Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code can however be pressed into service to make the award more effective or maintain the award on other grounds or to make the other parties to litigation to share the benefits or the liability, but cannot be invoked to get a larger or higher relief. Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code can however be pressed into service to make the award more effective or maintain the award on other grounds or to make the other parties to litigation to share the benefits or the liability, but cannot be invoked to get a larger or higher relief. For example, where the claimants seek compensation against the owner and the insurer of the vehicle and the Tribunal makes the award only against the owner, on an appeal by the owner challenging the quantum, the appellate court can make the insurer jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation, along with the owner, even though the claimants had not challenged the non-grant of relief against the insurer. Be that as it may. 8. Where an appeal is filed challenging the quantum of compensation, irrespective of who files the appeal, the appropriate course for the High Court is to examine the facts and by applying the relevant principles, determined the just compensation. If the compensation determined by it is higher than the compensation awarded by the Tribunal, the High Court will allow the appeal, if it is by the claimants and dismiss the appeal, if it is by the owner/insurer. Similarly, if the compensation determined by the High Court is lesser than the compensation awarded by the Tribunal, the High Court will dismiss any appeal by the claimants for enhancement, but allow any appeal by the owner/insurer for reduction. The High Court cannot obviously increase the compensation in an appeal by the owner/insurer for reducing the compensation, nor can it reduce the compensation in an appeal by the claimants seeking enhancement of compensation.” 10. It would follow from the above decision that in the absence of any cross-objection, a claimant aggrieved by the award is not entitled to anything more than what has been awarded in his/her favour. However, a high court would be justified in maintaining the compensation awarded by the tribunal if after accepting the contention advanced by a party for reduction under any one head, increase under other heads is warranted but limited to the compensation awarded. 11. We have considered the contention raised by Mr. Singh today and for such purpose, we have looked into the examination-in-chief of the claimant as well as the cross-examination to which she was subjected by the insurer. Excerpts from her evidence on affidavit reads as follows :- “7. 11. We have considered the contention raised by Mr. Singh today and for such purpose, we have looked into the examination-in-chief of the claimant as well as the cross-examination to which she was subjected by the insurer. Excerpts from her evidence on affidavit reads as follows :- “7. That at the relevant time of said accident I was about 33 years and I used to Run a Business as SUPPLIER OF NON FOOD ITEMS AND READIMADE GARMENTS and Used to earn Rs.1,70,727/- per year. 8. That due to injury of said pathetic accident I have become totally disabled and as such my said business has been closed and I have lost my earning capacity as I have totally lost sensation of both of my legs. At present, I can not walk without help, even I can not sit on hard surface, and feel pain while sitting. I always feel pain on WAIST BONE AND KNEE JOINT, I can not fold my legs, I also unable to lie on back. Even I can not do any house hold work and for the said reasons at present I am suffering tremendous physical difficulties and also facing tremendous financial problems and many other problems.” 12. The claimant was subjected to cross examination by the insurer. Only one question was put to her in course thereof and her answer was as follows:- “I have not filed the audited balance sheet for three years prior to the date of my accident.” 13. It would, therefore, appear from the above that the claimant was not subjected to any cross-examination qua the point sought to be argued by Mr. Singh in Court today. 14. We may, at this stage, profitably extract a passage from the decision of a co-ordinate Bench of this Court reported in AIR 1961 Cal 359 (A.E.G. Carapiet Vs. A.Y. Derderian) which reads as follows :- “10. The law is clear on the subject. Wherever the opponent has declined to avail himself of the opportunity to put his essential and material case in cross-examination, it must follow that he believed that the testimony given could not be disputed at all. It is wrong to think that this is merely a technical rule of evidence. It is a rule of essential justice. Wherever the opponent has declined to avail himself of the opportunity to put his essential and material case in cross-examination, it must follow that he believed that the testimony given could not be disputed at all. It is wrong to think that this is merely a technical rule of evidence. It is a rule of essential justice. It serves to prevent surprise at trial and miscarriage of justice, because it gives notice to the other side of the actual case that is going to be made when the turn of the party on whose behalf the cross-examination is being made comes to give and lead evidence by producing witnesses. It has been stated on high authority of the House of Lords that this much a counsel is bound to do when cross-examining that he must put to each of his opponent’s witnesses in turn, so much of his own case as concerns that particular witness or in which that witness had any share. If he asks no question with regard to this, then he must be taken to accept the plaintiff’s account in its entirety. Such failure leads to miscarriage of justice, first by springing surprise upon the party when he has finished the evidence of his witnesses and when he has no further chance to meet the new case made which was never put and secondly, because such subsequent testimony has no chance of being tested and corroborated.” 15. The claimant having tendered the saral forms for assessment years 2007-08 and 2008-09 in evidence, she had sufficiently discharged the burden of proving her income. Once such saral forms were proved, the onus shifted on the insurer to establish before the tribunal that either the saral forms are not worthy of being believed or that the claimant had set up an entirely false claim of earning only for the purpose of fastening the insurer with the liability to compensate her. In view of the complete absence of any question being put to the claimant by the insurer regarding the former’s income, it must follow that the insurer believed that the testimony given by the claimant cannot be disputed at all. What was required of the insurer was to put to the claimant so much of its case as concerns her. We are constrained to observe that the point argued by Mr. What was required of the insurer was to put to the claimant so much of its case as concerns her. We are constrained to observe that the point argued by Mr. Singh today has no factual foundation traceable to the proceedings before the tribunal. 16. There is one other aspect we cannot lose sight of. Once the claimant was categorical in her stand that she closed down her business owing to loss of capability arising out of the injuries suffered by her in course of the accident, it was not for her to prove the negative. If indeed the insurer would wish us to believe that the claimant had not lost her earning capacity, onus to prove such fact before the tribunal lay on the insurer which it utterly failed in the proceedings. 17. We, therefore, see no reason to accept the contention of Mr. Singh and accordingly, reject the same. 18. However, the first contention that Mr. Singh had raised regarding the disablement suffered by the claimant is required to be borne in mind while we proceed to re-assess compensation payable to her. 19. As has been referred to earlier, the claimant is not entitled to a single paisa more than what the tribunal awarded to her as compensation i.e. Rs. 19,73,214/-. 20. Mr. Mondal is right in his contention that instead of reckoning Rs.1,58,727/- per annum as the notional income of the claimant, the tribunal ought to have worked out compensation reckoning Rs.1,68,412/-as her notional annual income. We also find that the tribunal erred in selecting 17 as the multiplier; having regard to the age of the claimant on the date of the accident, 16 should have been the operative multiplier. Bearing in mind 32% disability suffered by the claimant, the compensation works out to Rs.18,32,322.56. To such sum is added Rs.1,00,196.00 on account of medical expenses and Rs.5,000/- on account of pain and suffering. Thus, the total sum works out to Rs.19,37,518.56. We feel that the tribunal ought to have awarded some amount of compensation on account of future medical expenses as well as for loss of amenities and enjoyment of life. To such sum is added Rs.1,00,196.00 on account of medical expenses and Rs.5,000/- on account of pain and suffering. Thus, the total sum works out to Rs.19,37,518.56. We feel that the tribunal ought to have awarded some amount of compensation on account of future medical expenses as well as for loss of amenities and enjoyment of life. Instead of awarding further amounts under such heads, which would exceed what the tribunal has awarded, we are of the considered opinion that Rs.19,73,214/- awarded by the tribunal in favour of the claimant is sufficient to serve the ends of justice and, therefore, refuse to interfere with the award of the tribunal. 21. The appeal, therefore, fails and is accordingly, dismissed. 22. The appellant had secured Rs.19,73,214/- before the Registrar General. She shall ensure that such sum together with accrued interest is made over to the claimant as early as possible but not later than a month from date of approach being made by the claimant together with a certified copy of this judgment and order. The appellant/insurer shall be liable to pay interest @ 8% per annum on the said sum of Rs.19,73,214/- from the date of filing of the application under Section 166 of the Act, also within a period of a month from date of receipt of a copy of this judgment and order. 23. The claimant is entitled to costs of these proceedings. The statutory deposit of Rs25,000/- together with accrued interest shall be made over by the registrar general to the claimant in accordance with law. 24. Lower court records be returned to the tribunal at once. 25. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment and order, if applied for, be given to the parties as expeditiously as possible.