JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. Vijoy Pratap Singh, learned senior counsel for the petitioner assisted by Miss Ragini Kumari, Advocate. 2. Heard Mr. Manish Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent no. 1. 3. Heard Mr. Badal Vishal, learned counsel appearing for the respondent nos. 2,3,5 and 6. 4. Heard Mr. Umesh Kumar Choubey, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no. 4. 5. This writ petition has been filed by the writ petitioner challenging the order/judgment dated 04.03.2006 (Annexure-4 to the writ petition) passed by the Additional Judicial Commissioner No. XVI, Ranchi in Misc. Case No. 66/1995, whereby the prayer to grant permission to the applicants/respondent nos. 2 to 8 to sell the trust property has been rejected. The petitioner has further prayed for issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding upon the respondents to execute and register the sale deed in connection with the property involved in this case in favour of the petitioner. 6. Counsel for the writ petitioner submits as under:- a. By referring to Annexure-1 to the writ petition, which is the petition filed before the Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi and was numbered as Misc. Case No. 66/1995, it is submitted that six persons namely Basudeo Prasad Budhia (respondent no. 2 herein), Sachchidanand Budhia (respondent no. 3 herein), Gyan Prakash Budhia (respondent no. 4 herein), Rajendra Kumar Budhia (respondent no. 5 herein), Vijay Kumar Budhia (respondent no. 6 herein), Madan Lal Agarwala (respondent no. 6 herein who on account of his death has been deleted vide order dated 28.07.2009), Jadia Devi Budhia Trust (respondent no. 8 herein) filed a petition before the Judicial Commissioner in view of clause-15 of the registered trust deed dated 14.03.1957 seeking permission to sell the trust property as mentioned in the Schedule of the plaint. b. Jadia Devi Budhia Trust was constituted for charitable purposes and the purpose of the trust has been mentioned in clause-11 of the trust deed which includes services to the society in the field of education, health, social service with particular reference to the women and child. c. During the pendency of the proceedings being Misc. Case No. 66/1995, a petition for intervention was filed by the writ petitioner who was added as opposite party no. 2 vide order dated 11.12.2002. d. Earlier another petition was filed to implead Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Board, Patna as opposite party no. 1 in Misc. c. During the pendency of the proceedings being Misc. Case No. 66/1995, a petition for intervention was filed by the writ petitioner who was added as opposite party no. 2 vide order dated 11.12.2002. d. Earlier another petition was filed to implead Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Board, Patna as opposite party no. 1 in Misc. Case No. 66/1995 which was allowed vide order dated 15.04.1995. e. He further submits that another person namely Om Prakash Choudhary was also added as opposite party no. 3 in Misc. Case No. 66/1995 vide order dated 29.01.2003. f. So far as the petitioner is concerned, he was added as a party respondent in the case due to the reason that during pendency of the Misc. Case No. 66/1995, an agreement dated 16.10.1996 for sale of the property which was involved in Misc. Case No. 66/1995 was entered into between the trust namely Jadia Devi Budhia Trust and the writ petitioner and the said agreement of sale was registered at a total consideration amount of Rs. 50,01,101/-. It is submitted that the petitioner also paid a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- as part of the consideration for the property. The application for impleading the petitioner in Misc. Case No. 66/1995 has been annexed with the writ petition and marked as Annexure-2. g. He submits that as per the provisions of the said trust, there is restriction imposed so far as the sale or mortgage of the property is concerned. As per clause-15 of the trust deed, the procedure which has been prescribed for the sale of the trust property contemplates that at first, it has to be determined as to whether the property is required to be sold for the purposes of the trust and then a decision has to be taken by their Board consisting of the trustees and thereafter the petition for permission is required to be filed before the Judicial Commissioner and upon getting such permission only, the property can be sold. h. Counsel for the petitioner submits that as per the mandate of clause-15 of the registered trust deed, a decision was taken to sell the trust property as mentioned to the schedule of the plaint and as per the condition precedent prescribed in Clause-15, an application was filed before the learned Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi as back as on 21.03.1995 for seeking permission to sell the property. i. It is submitted that the Judicial Commissioner had exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and decide the said petition and the said petition could not have been transferred to any other authority including the Additional Judicial Commissioner, but in spite of such clear provision under the trust deed, the matter was transferred from the Judicial Commissioner to Additional Judicial Commissioner who has passed the impugned order dated 04.03.2006 as contained in Annexure-4 to the writ petition. j. Counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order passed by the Additional Judicial Commissioner is wholly without jurisdiction and he submits that on account of this, the matter should be remanded back to the Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi to take a fresh decision in the matter. k. Without prejudice to this contention, counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order is otherwise also bad in law particularly in view of the fact that the applicants to Misc. Case No. 66/1995 had entered into an agreement for sale of the trust property in favour of the writ petitioner and having done so, it was incumbent upon the authority to grant permission, as condition precedent for requirement of selling the property of the trust was duly satisfied. He submits that the impugned order as contained in Annexure-4 to the writ petition is illegal, arbitrary and perverse. 7. This case was heard on various dates and during the course of argument, specific query was raised by this Court as to the Act by which this particular trust is governed. As the Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Board, Patna was made a party respondent in Misc. Case No. 66/1995, this Court vide order dated 07.02.2018 raised a specific point regarding the applicability of Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Act 1950 and the provisions contained therein, particularly Section 44 of the said Act raising a point as to whether the petition for seeking permission to transfer of property of the trust could have been filed before any other authority apart from the authority prescribed under the Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Board itself. The order dated 07.02.2018 is quoted for ready reference:- 1. During the course of the argument some basic questions have been put forth by the Court : (a) from the plaint as contained in Annexure-1 to the writ petition, it appears that the Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Board, Patna was made a party as respondent no. The order dated 07.02.2018 is quoted for ready reference:- 1. During the course of the argument some basic questions have been put forth by the Court : (a) from the plaint as contained in Annexure-1 to the writ petition, it appears that the Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Board, Patna was made a party as respondent no. 1, vide order dated 15.04.1995 before the lower court and it is apparent that the trust is governed by Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Act, 1950. In view of this observation, this Court finds that power to transfer of the immovable property of a religious trust under the Act is governed by section 44 of Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Act, 1950 and accordingly, the issue which may crop up in this litigation is whether the petition for seeking permission for transfer of the property of the trust could have been filed before any other authority apart from Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Board itself. Upon this, counsel for the petitioner submits that he is yet to examine the issue over and above the issue as to whether the trust is governed by Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Act, 1950 or by any other Act. He submits that since the issue put forth by this Court and the parties have not joined this issue. He needs to examine it further. Since, the point of jurisdiction is involved in this case as to how the application for transfer of property of a religious trust was to be dealt with, therefore, the parties may advance their argument on the point on the next date. 2. List this case on 15.02.2018 under the heading “for final disposal”. 8. As the point of jurisdiction was involved in this case as to the authority who had the power to grant permission to sell the trust property, this court was of the view that the issue as to before which authority the application seeking permission for sale of the trust property can be filed is also required to be considered and answered. 9. There after the matter was posted on 15.02.2018 when the matter was heard at length and the matter has been listed today for pronouncement of judgment in open court. 10. 9. There after the matter was posted on 15.02.2018 when the matter was heard at length and the matter has been listed today for pronouncement of judgment in open court. 10. Counsel for the petitioner on the point of jurisdiction submits as under :- (a) That there is no dispute that aims and objectives of the trust relates to the public charitable purposes, but the counsel for the petitioner while referring to the Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Act referred to the preamble of the Act to submit that Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Act 1950 was only applicable to Hindu Religious Trust and has no applicability so far as other charitable trusts are concerned. (b) Counsel for the petitioner submits that definition of the religious trust as defined in Section 2 (l) has to be given a restricted interpretation and is required to be read down so as to exclude the charitable trust other than the religious trust. (c) Counsel for the petitioners also submits that definition of religious trust is in conflict with the preamble itself. (d) Counsel for the petitioner has also referred to the dictionary meaning of charitable purpose and religious purpose and submitted that the religious trust as defined under the Act has to be given a restrictive meaning. (e) Counsel for the petitioner submitted that if such restrictive interpretation is given to the definition of Religious Trust as defined under Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Act 1950, then trust involved in this case will be out of the purview of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Act 1950. He also submits that otherwise the charitable trust involved in this case will be governed by Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Act 1950. 11. Counsel for the petitioner on the merits of the case has referred to the various depositions which has been annexed with the writ petition to submit that each one of the applicants in Misc. Case No. 66/1995 were in support of selling the trust property and after the disposal of Misc. Case No. 66/1995 vide impugned order dated 04.03.2006, it is not open to the applicant of Misc. Case No. 66/1995 (respondents herein) to take U-turn and deny the right of the petitioner which has accrued to him by virtue of registered agreement of sale dated 16.10.1996. The trust deed is contained in Annexure-A to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent nos. 2,3,5 and 6. Case No. 66/1995 (respondents herein) to take U-turn and deny the right of the petitioner which has accrued to him by virtue of registered agreement of sale dated 16.10.1996. The trust deed is contained in Annexure-A to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent nos. 2,3,5 and 6. However, the agreement of sale dated 16.10.1996 is not the part of the record. 12. Counsel for the respondent nos. 2,3,5 and 6 submitted as under:- (a) The impugned order has been rightly passed by the learned Additional Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi in which the concerned parties have appeared and duly contested the matter by leading evidence. He submits that the petitioner having participated in the proceedings and after having lost cannot be permitted to question the jurisdiction of the authority who had passed the impugned order. (b) He submits that the only statute which he could find which contains the definition of “Judicial Commissioner” is Chotanagpur Tenancy Act,1908 which defines the “ Judicial Commissioner” as follows:- “Commissioner” and “Judicial Commissioner” mean respectively the Commissioner and Judicial Commissioner of Chota Nagpur and include any other person specially empowered by the [State] Government to discharge the functions of the Commissioner or Judicial Commissioner, as the case may be in any particular area;” He submits that there is huge volume of work which the Commissioner or Judicial Commissioner has to take up, therefore the State Government had appointed Additional Commissioner and Additional Judicial Commissioner in discharge of their duties. (c) He also submits that there is no indication in the entire writ petition that the Additional Judicial Commissioner who has passed the impugned order was not empowered to discharge the functions of the Judicial Commissioner. Accordingly, on the point of jurisdiction of the Additional Judicial Commissioner, the petition filed before the Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi was assigned to the Additional Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi who has passed the impugned order. Therefore the counsel submits that there is no illegality in exercise of such power as has been done in the impugned order. (d) He submits that otherwise also, from perusal of the impugned order and the proceedings it appears that all the parties in Misc. Therefore the counsel submits that there is no illegality in exercise of such power as has been done in the impugned order. (d) He submits that otherwise also, from perusal of the impugned order and the proceedings it appears that all the parties in Misc. Case No. 66/1995 duly participated in the proceeding, adduced evidence and now the writ petitioner is challenging the impugned order on the ground of jurisdiction of the authority who has passed the order which is not open to the writ petitioner that too without taking this point in the writ petition. (e) He also submits that jurisdiction has been conferred upon the Commissioner, as the authority under the trust deed and not under any statute. Accordingly even otherwise, the parties having participated in the proceedings before the Additional Commissioner cannot turn around and question the jurisdiction of the said authority. (f) Counsel for the respondents also submits that the application for seeking permission to sell the trust property was filed by the trustees and the trust and they are not aggrieved by the impugned order. So far as the writ petitioner is concerned, he is 3rd party and stranger in as much as he has got no right on the trust. (g) He further submits that the writ petitioner had entered into the agreement of sale during the pendency of the Misc. Case No. 66/1995 and after being fully aware of the fact that the trust property cannot be sold without due permission, he has consciously taken a calculated risk and was conscious of the fact that permission to sell the property itself is a subject to permission and the learned court below after considered all the aspects refused to grant permission. (h) Under such circumstances the petitioner should not have any grievance, rather the only remedy which the petitioner could avail is to get the refund of the amount which he claims to have paid to the trust by virtue of agreement of sale. (i) He further submits that otherwise also, the requirement to sell the property which was there in the year 1995 for the benefit of the trust does not exist as on date and accordingly the trust does not intended to sell this property as on date. (i) He further submits that otherwise also, the requirement to sell the property which was there in the year 1995 for the benefit of the trust does not exist as on date and accordingly the trust does not intended to sell this property as on date. So far as latest position of the property is concerned, he submits that now the property which was valued at 50 lacs at that point of time, its value is in crores as on date. The petitioner with an intention to grab the valuable property is insisting upon such permission so that the agreement of sale could be executed. Accordingly, he submits that the writ petition is fit to be dismissed on the point of jurisdiction and on the point of merit. He submits that it is not in the interest of the trust to sell the property to the petitioner. (j) Counsel for the respondents also submits that the very fact that in Misc. Case No. 66/1995, the Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Board, Patna was a party respondent, it suggests that there was no dispute that this trust is governed by the provisions of Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Act,1950 and accordingly it is not open to the petitioner to contend that this trust is not governed by the Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Act 1950. Counsel for the respondent also submits that the impugned order is appealable order under Section 55 of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Act 1950. (h) A counter-affidavit has been filed by the Jharkhand Hindu Religious Trust Board wherein specific plea has been taken at paragraph no. 4 that the Trust involved in this case is not registered with the Authority and accordingly they are not sure whether religious trust will be governed by the Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Act 1950 (herein after referred to as Act of 1950) . It has been further stated in the counter-affidavit that the very fact that the trust board was impleaded as party respondent in Misc. Case shows that the parties to the Misc. It has been further stated in the counter-affidavit that the very fact that the trust board was impleaded as party respondent in Misc. Case shows that the parties to the Misc. Case had no doubt that the trust is governed by the Act of 1950, but till date, they have not yet got themselves registered and it was incumbent upon the trust to get itself registered with the Board and obtain permission of Board under Section 44 of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Act,1950 for transfer of land belonging to the trust. Counsel for the Jharkhand Religious Trust Board also submits that otherwise also the impugned order has been rightly passed after appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the case and its requires no interference. 13. After hearing counsel for the parties I see no reason to interfere with impugned order in the writ jurisdiction on account of following facts and reasons. (i) The first issue which has been raised is the jurisdiction of the Additional Judicial Commissioner to pass the impugned order. The specific case of the petitioner is that under the trust deed only the Judicial Commissioner could have passed the order and the same could not have been passed by the Additional Judicial Commissioner. This court rejects this argument of the petitioner and fully agrees with the arguments advanced by the private respondents that definition of “Judicial Commissioner” as defined under Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 can be looked into to understand the scope and jurisdiction of powers of judicial commissioner as well as additional judicial commissioner. Chotanagpur Tenancy Act,1908 defines the “ Judicial Commissioner” as follows:- “Commissioner” and “Judicial Commissioner” mean respectively the Commissioner and Judicial Commissioner of Chota Nagpur and include any other person specially empowered by the [State] Government to discharge the functions of the Commissioner or Judicial Commissioner, as the case may be in any particular area;” This court further agrees with the argument of the respondent that there is huge volume of work which the Commissioner or Judicial Commissioner has to take up, therefore the State Government had appointed Additional Commissioner and Additional Judicial Commissioner in discharge of their duties. Thus it is for the State Government to appoint Additional Judicial Commissioner to discharge the functions of Judicial Commissioner. Thus it is for the State Government to appoint Additional Judicial Commissioner to discharge the functions of Judicial Commissioner. Accordingly in the instant case, the Additional Judicial Commissioner while passing the impugned order has exercised the power of the Judicial Commissioner itself as per the definition of the Commissioner as defined in the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act,1908 . Moreover ,in the entire writ petition, this court does not find any statement made in the writ petition that the Additional Judicial Commissioner was not assigned the work of the Judicial Commissioner and in fact except the point on the question of law that the impugned order as contained in Annexure-4 to the writ petition is illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction, there is no foundational facts on the argument regarding the impugned order being wholly without jurisdiction . The question of jurisdiction of Additional Judicial Commissioner in the instant case is not a pure question of law but is a mixed question of fact and law and in absence of any foundational pleading regarding the jurisdiction of Additional Judicial Commissioner, this point appears to be an after thought after having filed the writ petition. Further this court finds that the parties had submitted before the jurisdiction of Additional Judicial Commissioner, led evidence and fully contested the matter and accordingly it is not open to them to question the jurisdiction of Additional Judicial Commissioner that too without raising any point to that effect even in the writ petition. (ii) The second issue which is to be decided is whether the trust involved in this case is governed by the provisions of Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Act 1950 and accordingly whether the permission to sell the trust property was to be given by the board under Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Act 1950 or by the Judicial Commissioner as per the provisions of the Trust Deed dated 14.03.1957. This court finds that the property involved in this case is governed by the provision of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Act 1950. This court finds that the property involved in this case is governed by the provision of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Act 1950. The definition of the religious trust as defined under Section 2 (l) of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Act 1950 is quoted as follows:- “2(l) ‘religious trust’ means any express or constructive trust created or existing for any purpose recognised by Hindu Law to be religious, pious or charitable, but shall not include a trust created according to the Sikh religion or purely for the benefit of the Sikh community and a private endowment created for the worship of a family idol in which public are not interested” From perusal of the definition of the religious trust this court finds that religious trust means the trust created for any purpose recognised by the Hindu Law to be religious pious or charitable. In the instant case, it is not disputed by the petitioner that the charitable trust meant for the purpose of education, health and health care of child and women is certainly a charitable purpose recognised by the Hindu Law to be religious pious and charitable and the trust itself is of public nature. As per the argument of the counsel for the petitioner itself if the definition of religious trust is not given a restricted meaning then, certainly the trust will governed by the Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Act 1950. So far as the preamble of the Act is concerned it reads as follows:- “An Act to provide for the better administration of Hindu Religious Trusts and for protection and preservation of properties appertaining to such trusts. Whereas it is expedient to provide for the better administration of Hindu Religious Trusts in the State of Bihar and for the protection and preservation of properties appertaining to such trusts;” This court does not find any conflict between the preamble of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Act 1950 and the definition of ‘religious trust’ as defined under the Act and accordingly this court is not inclined to give any restrictive interpretation to the definition of religious trust as defined under the Act or to read down the same. The definition of ‘religious trust’ is very clear and unambiguous there is no necessity of referring to the preamble of the Act of 1950 or to the dictionary meaning of the term religious or charitable in order to interpret the definition of religious trust as defined under the Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Act 1950. Moreover, the counsel for the petitioner has no answer as to why the Hindu Religious Trust Board Patna was made a party respondent in Misc. Case No. 66/1995. As per the provisions of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Act 1950 ,property of the trust can be sold only after due compliance and permission as provided under Section 44 of the Act which reads as under:- 44. Power to transfer immovable property of a religious trust- (1) No transfer made by a trustee of any immovable property of a religious trust by way of sale, mortgage, gift or exchange or by way of lease, for a term exceeding three years shall after the Board has been established under this Act, be valid unless made with the previous sanction of the Board. (2) Subject to the provisions regarding conversion of trust property in clause (j) to sub section (2) of section 38, no transfer of any immovable property of religious trust by way of sale, mortgage, gift or exchange or by way of least, shall be sanctioned by the Board against the terms of deed of instrument creating the trust, or in case where no deed or instrument creating the trust is available, against the wishes of the founder so far as they can be ascertained. As per the provisions of section 3 of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Act 1950, this Act applies to all the religious Trust , whether created before or after the commencement of the Act if any part of the property is situated in the state. Section 3 of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Act 1950 reads as follows:- “3.Application- This Act shall apply to all religious trusts, whether created before or after the commencement of this Act, any part of the property of which is situated in the State of Bihar.” Accordingly, this court finds that the condition precedent for transfer of immovable property of a religious trust is the sanction of the Board. Admittedly, in this case, no sanction of the Board has been taken and accordingly even if the Additional Judicial Commissioner would have granted the permission, the same could not have been transferred in view of the specific Bar under Section 44 of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Act 1950. (iii) This court further finds that it was the trust and its trustees who had approached the authority seeking permission to sell the property of the trust but the trust and trustees are not aggrieved by the impugned order and only the petitioner is aggrieved by the impugned order who had entered into an agreement during the pendency of the petition before the Judicial Commissioner and became a party to the said proceedings after making of payment of Rs. 1 lakh for sale of the property involved in Misc. Case No. 66/1995 . (iv) ON THE MERRITS OF THE CASE So far as merits of the case is concerned, this court finds that the learned court below has given specific finding from the paragraph no. 35 onwards which reads as under:- 35. These facts also show that rupees one crore is also a lesser, insufficient and improper price of the schedule land of 22.47 acres. 36. O2w1 has stated in para 13 that only he has right to purchase as in 1996 he entered into agreement with the applicants and paid advance amount, and that any other person including O.P. no. 3 has no legal right to purchase the land. On this point AW 1 has stated in para 7 that even on offer of hither price, the trustees have objection to sell to any other person due to the special reason that agreement by registered deed has already been done for sale with O.P. no. 2, on getting Rs. 1,00,000/- as earnest money. These statements shows that the Trustees intend to sell the land to O.P. No. 2 only and only on the consideration shown in the agreement. So impliedly the trustees are denying to sell at higher price or at present market value. 37. So the cumulative effect of these facts establish that attempt was not done to sell the schedule land at fair market price. 38. It is apparent that before permission, any agreement for sale much less with O.P. no. 2 is bad and against the spirit of the Trust deed. 37. So the cumulative effect of these facts establish that attempt was not done to sell the schedule land at fair market price. 38. It is apparent that before permission, any agreement for sale much less with O.P. no. 2 is bad and against the spirit of the Trust deed. The trustees have unnecessarily presumed that permission for sale to O.P. no. 3 shall be given, as a better method of Auction Sale is available which is essential for the interest of the Trust property. 39. The provision for the grant of permission by the Ld. J.C. Ranchi is not a mere formality, but it has been embodied to diligently safeguard the interest of the Trust and the Trust property. As discussed above, in the present case, the objectives shown by the applicants is either not in consonance with the Trust-Deed, or not specific. The properly estimated amount required for achieving objectives has also not been shown. The pleaded insufficient income of the Trust has not been shown. Even the proposed consideration amount is also highly suspicious. In such circumstances, it would not be valid and proper to grant permission to sell the schedule land, in the interest of the Trust. Had the applicants able to establish the specific objectives and the genuine expected expenditure thereon, even than the proper course would have been to procure the consideration amount by Auction Sale, through court or Govt. machinery. 40. Apart from the above, this Misc. Case has been filed in 1995. So, it would also not be proper to grant permission to sell the land in 2006 at the expected rate of land in 1995. 41. So on an over-all consideration of entire facts and circumstances, the prayer to grant permission to the applicants to sell the Trust property mentioned in the schedule of the Permission Petition, is rejected. In the result, this Misc. Case is dismissed. 42. However, in future, if the Trustees feel necessity of money for the advancement etc. of the Trust, he may file petition for permission, in which it would be incumbent for them to clearly mention the specific objectives and the estimated expenditure thereon with full transparency, and it would also be incumbent for them to pray for the sale of Trust property by Auction Sale, as only this method of sale would be safe and in the interest of the Trust. In any such future petition, the Trustees are directed to refer this decision of this Misc. Case. 14. This court finds no reason to differ with the aforesaid findings of the impugned order and there is no material on record to differ with the said findings. No argument has been advanced by the counsel for the petitioner challenging the said findings including the finding that the property involved in this case was a high valued property and it was sought to be sold at a price much less than the market value of the property. This court also agrees with the finding that before permission, any agreement for sale is bad and against the spirit of the Trust deed. From perusal of the impugned order, this court finds that the same is well reasoned order and accordingly the same does not require any interference. This court also agrees with the submission advanced on behalf of the respondent-trust and its trustees that the requirement to seek permission to sell the trust property has itself has become infructuous, because application for seeking permission was filed as back as in the year 1995 and we are in the year 2018 and much water has flown. Moreover this court finds that the petitioner had entered into an agreement with open eyes and conscious mind that the property would be subject to sale only after permission as duly granted. It has to be taken into consideration that the agreement of sale was entered during the pendency of the Misc. Case No. 66/1995 and in anticipation of permission which as per the petitioner himself was yet to be granted by the Judicial Commissioner. In view of this fact that the petitioner has taken calculated risk of entering into an agreement and in the case of refusal to grant permission by the impugned order, the petitioner at best can approach the competent court of civil jurisdiction for the refund of money which he had given at the time of agreement. 15. The writ petition is hereby dismissed with the aforesaid liberty to the petitioner to approach the competent court of civil jurisdiction for the refund of money which he had given at the time of agreement.