JUDGMENT K.R.MOHAPATRA,J. - The allegations are convicted under Sections 302/34 IPC and have been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life in S.T. Case No.17/433 of 1996 and S.T. Case No.19/518 of 1996 of the Court of learned 2nd “Additional Sessions Judge, Puri. 2. Prosecution case, as revealed from FIR, briefly stated as follows : Pravakar Kandi (appellant No.1) had married to Nalini Kandi (deceased). Accused-Kapila Kandi is the father, accused-Sita Kandi is the mother and Urmila Kandi (appellant No.2) is the sister of appellant No.1. Accused-Manju Kandi is the sister-in-law (Bhauja) of appellant No.1. Marriage between the appellant No.1 and the deceased was solemnized 4 to 5 years prior to the occurrence. Two years after the marriage, her in-laws started ill-treating the deceased. On 06.05.1996 at about 9.00 P.M., one Basanta Senapati of Chadhei Gaon informed the brother of the deceased (P.W.13) that his sister was lying dead in the courtyard of the appellants with cut and bleeding injuries. Hence, P.W. 13 immediately rushed to the house of the appellants and found her sister lying dead in the courtyard with bleeding injuries on her body. On enquiry, P.W. 13 came to know that due to quarrel in the family, all the above named accused persons including the appellants assaulted his sister, as a result of which she sustained injuries and succumbed to the same. Hence, he orally lodged a report ( Ext.11), which was reduced to writing. On the basis of an F.I.R. Gop P.S. Case No.48 (6) dated 06.05.1996 was registered against the appellants as well as Kapila Kandi, Sita Kandi and Manju Kandi under Section 302 IPC. As the F.I.R. revealed a cognizable case the I.O. ( P.W.15) took up investigation. 3. During investigation, P.W. 15 visited the spot, held inquest over the dead body of the deceased-Nalini, prepared inquest report (Ext.1) and sent the dead body for post-mortem examination. P.W. 15 also seized some blood stained earth and sample earth from the spot, vide Ext. 12. He also seized a knife (M.O.I.) with blood stain marks from the spot, vide Ext.4. Some documents were also produced by the informant before the I.O., which were seized, vide Ext.9. The wearing apparels of the deceased were seized, vide Ext.8 on being produced by the escort party,. As the appellant No.,2 had also received injuries, she was sent to Gop Hospital for medical examination on 07.05.1996, vide Ext.10/2 (requisition). Some documents were also produced by the informant before the I.O., which were seized, vide Ext.9. The wearing apparels of the deceased were seized, vide Ext.8 on being produced by the escort party,. As the appellant No.,2 had also received injuries, she was sent to Gop Hospital for medical examination on 07.05.1996, vide Ext.10/2 (requisition). I.O.-P.W.-15 arrested the accused persons including the appellants and forwarded them to the Court on 10.05.1996. After completion of the investigation. P.W.15 submitted charge-sheet against all the accused persons under Sections 498-A, 304-B, 302 and 34 IPC read with Section 4 of the D.P. Act. On the basis of the FIR, G.R.Case No.230 of 1996 was registered on the file of J.M.F.C., Nimapara and on being committed to the Court of Sessions, S.T. Case Nos.17/433 of 1996 and 19/518 of 1996 were registered on the file of Sessions Judge, Puri. On transfer, learned 2nd.Additional Sessions Judge, Puri tried the Sessions cases. 4. All the accused persons pleaded their innocence and denied their involvement in the alleged occurrence. They further took the plea that on the date of occurrence, i.e. 06.05.1996, the deceased-Nalini set fire to their house and also assaulted appellant No.2. She also slit her neck, as a result of which she succumbed to the injuries. 5. The prosecution, in order to bring home the charges, examined as many as 15 witnesses, where as the defence examined none in support of its case. 6. Out of the witnesses, P.Ws. 2, 3 and 9 do not support the case of the prosecution for which they were allowed to be cross-examined by the prosecution under Section 154 of the Evidence Act. P.W. 1 is a co-villager; P.Ws. 6 and 14 are the Medical Officers, who conducted autopsy over the dead body,. P.W. 11 is the Medical Officer. CHC, Gop, who examined injured-Urmila Kandi (appellant No.2) on police requisition. P.W. 13 is the informant and P.W. 15 is the I.O. The prosecution also relied upon the documentary evidence in support of its case. Ext.1 is the inquest report, Ext. 2, 3 ,4,8 and 9 as well as 12 are seizure lists of the weapons of offence as well as wearing apparels of the appellants land the deceased. Ext. 5 is the post-mortem examination report; Ext. 6 is the preliminary examination report of the Scientific Officer, D.F.S.L., Puri, Ext. Ext.1 is the inquest report, Ext. 2, 3 ,4,8 and 9 as well as 12 are seizure lists of the weapons of offence as well as wearing apparels of the appellants land the deceased. Ext. 5 is the post-mortem examination report; Ext. 6 is the preliminary examination report of the Scientific Officer, D.F.S.L., Puri, Ext. 10 is the injury certificate of the appellant No.2; Ext.11 is the F.I.R. and Ext.3 is the spot map. The prosecution also relied upon M.O.I. and M.O.II, the weapons of offence and M.O.III, a Kerosene tin, M.Os.IV, V and VIII, are the apparels of the deceased. There being no eyewitness to the occurrence, the prosecution tried to prove the charges through circumstantial evidence. 7. Learned Sessions Judge discussing the materials on record and contentions raised by learned Counsel for parties, acquitted Kapila Kandi, Sita Kandi and Manju Kandi from all the charges. Learned Sessions Judge further held the appellants not guilty of offences under Sections 304-B/498-A and 4 D.P. Act and acquitted them from the said charges. However, the appellants were found guilty and were convicted under Sections 302/34 I.P.C. and were sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. The prosecution did not challenge the order of acquittal. Thus, the question that remains to be adjudicated in this appeal is whether the appellants are guilty of commission of offence under Sections 302/34 I.P.C. 8. Mr. Debasis Patnaik, learned Counsel for the appellants resisting the judgment of conviction and sentence contended that although the F.I.R. was lodged at Gop Police Station by P.W. 13 on 06.05.1996 at about 12.00 P.M., i.e., shortly after the occurrence took place, but the same was sent to the Court of learned J.M.F.C., Nimapara on 10.05.1996, i.e. four days after lodging of the F.I.R. The delay in sending the FIR was not explained by the P.W. 15. The accused-Kapila Kandi, Sita Kandi and Urmila Kandi, were available at their house when the I.O. visited the spot, i.e. on 07.05.1996, but they were not arrested. All the accused persons were arrested only on 10.05.1996 at 6.00 A.M. Thus, it raises a serious doubt about the truthfulness of the prosecution case. The FIR was subsequently prepared by the prosecution to suit their case and the report stated to have been submitted by PW-13 has been suppressed. The manner of seizure of the weapons of offence are also doubtful. The FIR was subsequently prepared by the prosecution to suit their case and the report stated to have been submitted by PW-13 has been suppressed. The manner of seizure of the weapons of offence are also doubtful. It is the case of the prosecution that the appellant No.1 was not at the spot at the time of occurrence. Injuries on the person of the appellant No.2 has not been explained by the prosecution. Although I.O. in his examined in-chief at paragraph-16, stated that the chemical examination report is marked as Ext.15, neither the same was produced before the Court nor the same is available on record. The place where the dead body was lying was accessible to outsiders. The materials available on record suggest that the deceased had lost their mental equilibrium due to death of her daughter a few days prior to the occurrence. He further submitted that appellant No.2 was a juvenile on date of occurrence. Hence, the trial is vitiated against her. These material aspects were not taken into consideration by learned trial Court, which has resulted in miscarriage of justice. As a result, innocent persons like of the appellants are languishing. Hence, he prayed for setting aside the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence. 9. Per contra, Mr. Mohapatra, learned Additional Standing Counsel, supported the impugned judgment. He submitted that the prosecution has been successful in establishing the chain of circumstances to prove that the appellants are the authors of the crime. The Appellant No.1 although claimed that he was not present at the time and spot of occurrence, he could not prove such plea. The prosecution, although failed to prove the allegation of demand of dowry, but nevertheless the incident occurred due to a family quarrel and ill-feeling of the in-laws towards the deceased. The plea of the defence to the effect that the injuries on the deceased were self-inflicted is neither probable nor believable, inasmuch as the appellant No.2, namely, Urmila in her statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., although admitted that she had sustained three injuries but failed to explain the same. The statement of witnesses with regard to the circumstances of the commission of crime is well-corroborated by P.W. 14, who conducted autopsy over the dead body. The statement of witnesses with regard to the circumstances of the commission of crime is well-corroborated by P.W. 14, who conducted autopsy over the dead body. The in-laws were only present in the house at the time of occurrence and the incident occurred in the inner courtyard of the house of the appellant. Thus, they have special means of knowledge of commission of the offence and non-explanation of the same by the defence creates a strong presumption against the appellants. Delay in sending the F.I.R. to the Court is not by itself fatal to the prosecution unless the defence makes out a case of prejudice for the same. Thus, the same cannot be viewed with suspicion. The clear and consistent statement of the prosecution witnesses leads to the only conclusion that the appellants are the authors of the crime. As such, the impugned judgment warrants no interference. 10. We heard learned Counsel for the parties at length and perused the case record. P.W. 14 who conducted the post-mortem of the deceased, found the following External Injuries:- “i. There is penetrating wound anterior and lower part of neck adjacent to the upper part of sternal notch obliquely placed of size 1 ½” x 2 1/2" x 1" posterior part of trachea. Its lower and is situated 1 ½” above to the right stern calvicular joint. It waged separate. Its lower end is sharp and upper end is blunt and the margin are clean cut. The trachea was punctured interiorly where a slit of size 1.25 c.m. x 1.25 c.m. was present ii. Similar type of waged separate penetrating injury half inch below and parallel to injury no.i. Its lower end was half an inch above the stornal notch in the mid line of neck of size 2.2" x 1” anterior surface of trachea. iii. Incized injury on the mid line of chin horizontally place of size 2" x ½” x bon deep with tailing to the left side. On dissection of the dead body of the deceased, he found the following Internal Injuries :’ “i. Lower part of right platysma muscle and lower part both medial and lateral aspect of right streno plide mastoid muscle are cut corresponding to external injury nos. i. & ii. ii. Lower part of right side external jugular vain and internal jugular vain are cut corresponding to external injury nos. i. & ii. iii. i. & ii. ii. Lower part of right side external jugular vain and internal jugular vain are cut corresponding to external injury nos. i. & ii. iii. Structure opposite to external injury nos. i & ii are also cut. iv. There was collection of clotted blood in the entire mediastrinum.” He opined that cause of death is due to the injuries to the vessels of neck. He further confirmed that the injuries were ante-mortem in nature. In his cross-examination, he has categorically stated that the External Injuries Nos. II and III can be caused while withdrawing the weapon of offence after inflicting the injury No.1. Although a plea was taken by the defence to the effect that the deceased succumbed to the self-inflicted injuries, in course of argument, learned counsel for the parties submitted that the death is homicidal in nature. As such, the rigorous of “Section 113 (A) of the Evidence Act cannot be restored to. On the oral information of P.W. 13, formal F.I.R. (Ext.11) was drawn up on 06.05.1996 at about mid-night. It is the evidence of P.W. 15, the I.O. that upon receiving the F.I.R., he registered P.S. Case No.48 dated 06.05.1996 and visited the spot at 1.45 A.M. During his stay at the spot, he found Kapila Kandi, Sita Kandi and Urmila Kandi (appellant No.2) were present in their house, but other family members were absent. He stayed at the spot till 11.00 A.M. of the next day, i.e 07.05.1996. Although the allegations were made against all the in-laws of the deceased, surprisingly P.W. 15 did not arrest the accused persons present in the house. However, all the accused persons were arrested on 10.05.1996 at about 6.00 A.M. and forwarded to Court. Till then, the F.I.R. was not sent to the Court. As such, there is serious infraction of provision of Section 157 Cr.P.C. by not sending the F.I.R. to the Court forthwith. Mr. Pattnaik, learned Counsel for the appellants relied upon the decision reported in (2007) 38 OCR (SC) 783 between Ramesh Baburao Devaskar & others v. State of Maharashtra and others submitted that delay in sending the F.I.R. to the nearest Magistrate within 24 hours of its registration casts serious doubt on the genesis of the prosecution case, particularly when the parties were in loggerhead. There is every likelihood that the F.I.R. has been manipulated subsequently to suit the case of the prosecution. There is every likelihood that the F.I.R. has been manipulated subsequently to suit the case of the prosecution. P.W. 15, the I.O. did not at all explain the delay in sending the F.I.R. to the Court. Learned Additional Standing Counsel, although submitted that the delay in sending the F.I.R. to the Court by itself is not sufficient to draw adverse inference against the prosecution case, but he could not justify the delay in sending the F.I.R. to the Court. Non-explanation of delay in sending the F.I.R. to the nearest Magistrate within 24 hours of its registration is a circumstance against the prosecution, but that cannot be the sole ground to disbelieve the prosecution case. Mr. Pattnaik, referring to paragraph-16 of the cross-examination of P.W. 15, stated that the I.O. was present in the village from 1.00 A.M. to 11.00 A.M., but in his examination in-chief at paragraph-2, he stated that he seized one five liters capacity tin containing kerosene oil and having blood stain on it at 11.20 A.M., vide Ext.3. He also seized one blood stained knife at 11.40 A.M. marked as Ext. 2. That creates serious doubt with regard to the seizure of incriminating materials by the prosecution. The submissions of Mr. Pattnaik with regard to the timing of stay as well as seizure by P.W. 13, also raises doubt with regard to the manner and veracity of the investigation. 11. It is the case of the prosecution that there was intermittent quarrel between the family members of appellant No.1 and the deceased for which the deceased had left the matrimonial home and had also filed a case for maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. At the intervention of the gentries, the matter was compromised and the deceased was brought back to her matrimonial home in the month of January, 1996. She succumbed to the injuries on her body in the matrimonial home. Thus, a strong suspicion of commission of the crime exists against the appellants, but such suspicion cannot be the basis of conviction in absence of proof. Mr. Pattnaik relied upon the decision in the case of Dasari Siva Prasad Reddy v. The Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., reported in 2004 (29) OCR (SC) 229, wherein, it is held that the distance between the “may be true” and “ must be true” shall be fully covered by the reliable evidence adduced by the prosecution. Mr. Pattnaik relied upon the decision in the case of Dasari Siva Prasad Reddy v. The Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., reported in 2004 (29) OCR (SC) 229, wherein, it is held that the distance between the “may be true” and “ must be true” shall be fully covered by the reliable evidence adduced by the prosecution. The suspicion howsoever strong may be, cannot take the place of proof. In the instant case, P.W. 15, the I.O. in his evidence, has stated that P.W. 9 (Trinatha Behera) stated before him that on the date of incident at about 8.30 P.M., the mother-in-law and sister-in-law of the deceased raised hulla that their house was on fire. Hearing the hulla, he (P.W.9) along with other witnesses, rushed to the spot and found that the straw heap was burning. Thereafter, the P.W. 9 went inside the house of the appellants and found the deceased lying in a pool of blood in the courtyard of the appellants’ house. P.W. 9, in his evidence, does not support such statement stated to have been made before P.W. 15. As such, he was cross-examined by the prosecution under Section 154 of the Evidence Act. Although leading questions were put to him by the prosecution, nothing substantial could be brought out from his mouth. Chemical examination report of MOs though received by the Police, was not produced before the Court .Further, the weapons of offence, i.e., M.Os. I and II were not sent either to P.W. 11 for his opinion. P.W. 11, the Doctor, who examined the injured appellant No.3 deposed in his evidence that Urmila had received three injuries on her person. Such injuries have not been explained by the prosecution. As laid down in AIR 1976 SC 2263 between Lakshmi Singh and others v. State of Bihar, non-explanation of the injuries sustained by the accused is an important circumstance from which an inference can be drawn, that the prosecution has suppressed the genesis and origin of the occurrence and thus has not presented the true version. In the instant case, non-explanation of injuries on appellant No.2 becomes fatal for the prosecution, as the prosecution has tried to prove that to implicate the appellant No.2 in the crime as she had admitted in her statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that she had sustained injuries as per injury report Ext. 10. In the instant case, non-explanation of injuries on appellant No.2 becomes fatal for the prosecution, as the prosecution has tried to prove that to implicate the appellant No.2 in the crime as she had admitted in her statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that she had sustained injuries as per injury report Ext. 10. Surprisingly, learned Trial Court placed the burden of explaining such injuries on the appellant No.2. 12. Law is well settled that a duty is cast on the prosecution to prove the injuries on the accused person and has to prove that the injuries sustained by the accused was in course of the alleged occurrence. Non-explanation of the injuries on appellant No.2 creates serious doubt on the genesis and origin of case of the prosecution. Once the said burden is discharged, onus shifts to the defence to dislodge such presumption. In the case at hand, the prosecution has not at all explained as to how the appellant No.2 received injuries on her person. Thus, occasion to explain the injuries by the defence does not arise at all. 13. Mr. Mohapatra, learned Additional Standing Counsel submitted that the occurrence took place in the courtyard of the in-laws family of the deceased. At the time of occurrence, in- laws were present at the time. Thus, it is within their special means of knowledge and burden of proving the fact specially within the knowledge of the defence being not discharged properly, there would be a strong presumption that the appellants are the perpetrators of the offence. In support of his case, he relied upon the decision in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Thakur Singh, reported in (2014) 12 SCC 211 . He also relied upon the decision in the case of State of Himachal Pradesh v. Raj Kumar, reported in (2018) 2 SCC 69 and submitted that if the accused persons do not throw light on the fact, which was within their knowledge and failed to offer any explanation, the same would be a strong mitigating circumstance against them. Per contra Mr. Pattnaik, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that from the spot map (Ext.3), it is clear that the courtyard, where the dead body was lying, was accessible from outside. He further submitted that hearing the hulla, P.W. 9 and other witnesses could reach up to the dead body without any hindrance or obstruction. Per contra Mr. Pattnaik, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that from the spot map (Ext.3), it is clear that the courtyard, where the dead body was lying, was accessible from outside. He further submitted that hearing the hulla, P.W. 9 and other witnesses could reach up to the dead body without any hindrance or obstruction. Thus, it cannot be conclusively held that the appellants are authors of the crime. On perusal of the case record, it appears that upon hearing hulla of the mother-in-law of the deceased, P.W. 9 and other witnesses rushed to the spot and upon entering the courtyard found that the deceased was lying in a pool of blood receiving cut injuries. A knife and a ‘Katari’ (M.Os.I and II) respectively were lying nearby. When the villagers could reach upto the dead body without any obstruction or asking for any assistance of the inmates of the house of the appellants, it becomes apparent that the courtyard where the deceased was lying had free access. Thus, it cannot be conclusively said that the appellants had the special means of knowledge of the incident. The evidence of witnesses clearly suggests that the deceased had lost her mental equilibrium due to the death of her daughter few days back. P.W. 9 in his cross-examination by the defence, had stated that the straw heap and thatched house of Kapila was on fire. Thus, commission of offence by an outsider cannot be ruled out and it is highly vulnerable to come to a conclusion that the appellants are authors of the crime. 14. Taking into consideration the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the firm opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges under Sections 302/34 I.P.C. against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. As such, the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence is not sustainable. Accordingly, the same is set aside and the appeal is allowed. The appellants be set at liberty forthwith, if their incarceration is not required in other case. LCR be sent back. Appeal allowed.