JUDGMENT Hon’ble Mrs. Sangeeta Chandra, J.—This writ petition has been filed by subsequent allottee who was allotted the Fair Price Shop dealership after cancellation of Fair Price Shop Licence of Smt. Shanti Devi. Smt. Shanti Devi filed a writ petition No. 60770 of 2015 which was allowed on 31.10.2017 by this Court quashing the order 17.7.2012 by which the Fair Price Shop Licence of Smt. Shanti Devi was cancelled and the order dated 18.8.2015 by which the appeal filed by Smt. Shanti Devi was rejected. In compliance of the orders passed by this Court in writ petition No. 60770 of 2015 the Licensing Authority has passed the impugned order on 27.12.2017 cancelling the Fair Price Shop Licence of the petitioner who was the subsequent allottee and restoring the licence of Smt. Shanti Devi. 2. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that Smt. Shanti Devi resorted to fraud upon this Court by filing writ petition No. 60770 of 2015 with forged annexures and the respondents filed a collusive counter-affidavit purportedly on behalf of the Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 on the basis of which this Court has allowed the writ petition No. 60770 of 2015. 3. It is the case of petitioner that she has already filed a Recall Application praying for recall of the order dated 31.10.2017 which is pending before this Court and therefore, this Court should entertain this writ petition and grant stay of the cancellation order dated 27.12.2017 and hear the matter alongwith this case. 4. The learned counsel for petitioner has relied upon several judgments of the Supreme Court to say that an order obtained by fraud is a nullity and has no binding force and it can be challenged by any person and moreover, if necessary parties have not been impleaded, then also the order is a nullity. 5. The counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgment in State of U.P. and others v. Ravindra Kumar Sharma and others, 2016 (4) SCC 791 , wherein the Supreme Court was considering a case of Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 and large scale fraud by several candidates for obtaining reservation of handicapped persons to enter BTC Training Course. A fresh Medical Board was appointed by the Government which found that 21 per cent candidates applying under handicapped category were not, in fact, handicapped. The Supreme Court, therefore, held that fraud cannot be allowed to be perpetuated and authorities were free to physically verify after fresh medical test, whether the candidates claiming reservation for handicapped person are indeed handicapped. 6. In the judgment rendered in Badami (Deceased) by LR v. Bhali, (2012) 11 SCC 574 , the Supreme Court was considering a case where by an alleged family settlement the appellant widow was giving up her entire share of land of which she was exclusive owner in possession, to the grandson of her husband’s brother excluding her own daughter and son-in-law with whom she had no animosity, in lieu of nothing; and it was held that such a family settlement had no bona fides and was against common course of human conduct. A suit was filed for possession of the property and on the date of presentation of plaint i.e. on the date of first hearing, its defendant who was appellant before the Supreme Court allegedly filed a written statement admitting the assertion in the plaint to be correct and praying for decreeing the suit in favour of the plaintiffs. This affidavit was not, in fact, filed by the widow but was a forged document and fraud was played upon the Court and decree obtained by fraud was held by this Court to be a nullity. On the basis of such decree or subsequent judgment or decree passed on the claims of right, title, interest and possession were held to be vitiated by fraud and liable to be set aside. 7. At the first glance, this judgment seems to apply to the petitioner’s case as the petitioner has alleged that fraud was played upon the High Court and a collusive counter-affidavit was filed on the basis of which this Court came to the conclusion that the cancellation of Fair Price Shop Licence of Smt. Shanti Devi was vitiated in law. However, from a close reading of the judgment it is evident that the settlement itself or the consent decree was first challenged by appellant Badami before a Competent Court and when she could not obtain any order, then, she approached the Appellate Court. However, from a close reading of the judgment it is evident that the settlement itself or the consent decree was first challenged by appellant Badami before a Competent Court and when she could not obtain any order, then, she approached the Appellate Court. The Courts below had routinely followed the principle relating to a consent decree, and did not delve deep to find out how the fraud was manifest and writ large on the face of the case. The Supreme Court, therefore, interfered in the matter and set aside the consent decree as well as the order passed by the Appellate Court. 8. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, (1994) 1 SCC 1 , the most celebrated judgment on fraud played by litigants, the Supreme Court was considering a case where a partition suit was filed by the respondents-plaintiffs and a preliminary decree was obtained. An application was filed by the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents-plaintiffs i.e. Jagannath for final decree for partition and separate possession of the plaint-properties and for mesne profits without disclosing the date of Release Deed executed by him relinquishing his right to the property and the preliminary decree was obtained by fraud. At the time of admission of the application for final decree filed by the respondents-plaintiffs, respondent-appellant who was defendant in the suit, on coming to know about the fraud played by the plaintiff, challenged the application on the ground that the preliminary decree, which was sought to be made final, was obtained by fraud and the Trial Court accepted the contention and dismissed the Application for Final Decree. The High Court, however, set aside the order of Trial Court and allowed the appeal. The Supreme Court observed that the principle of finality of litigation cannot be pressed to such an extent as would lead to absurdity and become an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. One who comes to Court must come with clean hands. A person whose case is based on falsehood has not right to approach the Court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of litigation. 9. The Supreme Court was considering the order of Trial Court and of the High Court in the aforesaid case and made such observations which related to a decree obtained by fraud being a nullity in law. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of litigation. 9. The Supreme Court was considering the order of Trial Court and of the High Court in the aforesaid case and made such observations which related to a decree obtained by fraud being a nullity in law. However, the Supreme Court did not observe that it was open for the litigants to ignore such a decree as according to them it was obtained by fraud, and that there was no need to challenge the same in a Competent Court of Law. 10. In Gowrishankar and another v. Joshi Amba Shankar Family Trust and others, (1996) 3 SCC 310 , the Supreme Court was considering a case of the appellant therein who was a tenant of a property belonging to a Trust. The order of the High Court was obtained by the Trustees to sell the Trust properties at the highest price offered. The trustees entered into an agreement for sale in favour of certain private persons. A week thereafter the appellant-tenant of the Trust properties made an offer which was much higher than what was offered by the private persons but the Trustees did not consider the case of the appellant-tenant and did not place it before the High Court at all. Permission was granted by the High Court to the Trustees to sell off the property at a much lesser rate to private persons. The appellant-tenant thereafter filed an application for setting aside the permission granted by the High Court on the ground of fraud. The application was allowed by Single Judge but was dismissed by Division Bench of the High Court. An appeal was preferred before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the Trustees had obtained the permission for selling off the property by practising fraud on the Court. Therefore, the order of the High Court granting such permission was a nullity and non-est, which can be challenged in any Court. 11. It is evident from a perusal of the said judgment that it was an order passed on the facts of the case pleaded before the Supreme Court, and more specifically the litigants therein had resorted to a regular course of approaching the Court concerned first, and thereafter of filing the appeal before Supreme Court against such rejection of their case by the High Court. The Supreme Court did not hold that in such cases of fraud being played upon the High Court the other parties to the litigation were free to ignore a binding judgment of the High Court and do as they please, as according to them such a judgment was obtained by fraud. 12. In Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Singh and others, (2003) 8 SCC 319 , the Supreme Court was again considering a Partition Suit which was filed before the original Trial Court and where a preliminary decree was obtained by practising fraud on the Lower Court. A Review Petition was filed by an affected third party against a consent decree. The mortgager and alleged co-sharers (mortgager’s sister) filed a First Appeal against the decree and the First Appellate Court with the consent of the creditor permitted them to deposit the decretal amount. The auction purchaser filed a Review Petition before the First Appellate Court stating that the appellant before it had suppressed in appeal that the auction sale and confirmation thereafter had already taken place. In such a circumstance, the effect of creation of auction purchaser’s right ought to have been taken into consideration by the Court as a third party right cannot be set at nought by consent. It was only after the appeal was dismissed a Review Petition was filed before the High Court which Review Petition was also decided against such auction purchaser that a Special Leave Petition was filed before the Supreme Court. This case is also one in which the parties approached the proper Trial Court first and then, the Appellate Court and Revisional Court before approaching the Supreme Court. 13. In this case also the Supreme Court did not hold that any person who is aggrieved by a decree allegedly obtained by fraud is free to ignore such a decree or that the State-Respondents were free not to follow such a decree because in their opinion it was obtained by fraud. 14. In Committee of Management Shiksha Prasar Samiti and another v. Deputy Registrar. Firms, Societies and Chits, Azamgarh and another, (2002) 49 ALR 75, a Coordinate Bench of this Court was considering a case where a Society was registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and a fair and reasonable opportunity was given to the members of the Society to produce the original documents. Firms, Societies and Chits, Azamgarh and another, (2002) 49 ALR 75, a Coordinate Bench of this Court was considering a case where a Society was registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and a fair and reasonable opportunity was given to the members of the Society to produce the original documents. The said opportunity was not availed and delaying tactics were resorted to. In the meantime, a Renewal Application was moved, which renewal was obtained on wrong facts and this Court was apprised that, in fact, no election had taken place and all the affidavits that were submitted before the Authority concerned were forged. The Authority concerned had, therefore, set aside the order of Renewal. This Court held that fraud vitiates all actions and since the impugned order had recorded a clear finding that the petitioner had succeeded in obtaining a renewal certificate after concealing facts and by playing fraud in the matter, the High Court should not interfere in such an order passed by the respondent No. 1 therein i.e. Deputy Registrar and he was well within his jurisdiction in recalling such an order obtained by fraud. 15. In Khestrabasi Bisal v. Ajaya Kumar Baral and others, (2004) 1 SCC 317 , the Supreme Court was considering a case where necessary party to the dispute had not been impleaded and without hearing such a party the order was passed by the High Court. The High Court did not think it fit to issue notices to such persons who had suffered prejudice by the reason of directions issued by the High Court. The Supreme Court, therefore, observed that all those persons whose interests were being adversely affected by allowing the writ petition, ought to have been heard. The procedural law as well as the substantive law both mandate that in the absence of a necessary party the order passed is a nullity and does not have a binding effect on a litigant who was not arrayed as party in the writ petition. 16. The procedural law as well as the substantive law both mandate that in the absence of a necessary party the order passed is a nullity and does not have a binding effect on a litigant who was not arrayed as party in the writ petition. 16. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for petitioner on the basis of judgments of the Supreme Court that the writ petitioner in this case Smt. Akash Devi was a necessary party and also the complainant who had filed complaints against the erstwhile Fair Price Shop Licensee and she was a necessary party and ought to have been heard by the High Court and since the High Court did not hear her in writ petition No. 60770 of 2015 such a judgment of the High Court dated 31.10.2017 was a nullity and ought to be ignored by the State-Respondents as well as by this Court. 17. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is being recorded only to be as misconceived. It has been held by this Court in Dharam Raj v. State of U.P. and others, 2010 (2) AWC 1878 (LB), Ram Baran v. State of U.P. and others, 2010(2) AWC 1947 (LB); Amin Khan v. State of U.P. and others, 2008(4) ADJ 559 (DB); and by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v. State of Maharashtra and others, (2013) 4 SCC 465 , that a person can be annoyed by an order that adversely affects his interest, but it is not necessary that such a person can be considered to be an aggrieved person. An aggrieved person is one whose legal right is affected in any manner or infringed. The complainants cannot be heard as no legal right of such complainants subsists which is infringed by the High Court in passing an order in favour of a person challenging an order which directly affects his rights. 18. Also, with regard to a subsequent allottee there are several decisions of this Court passed by Division Benches and also by Coordinate Benches that a subsequent allottee has no right. The right of a subsequent allottee only arises after allotment of Fair Price Shop Licence on a vacancy created on account of cancellation of the Fair Price Shop Licence of erstwhile licensee. The right of a subsequent allottee only arises after allotment of Fair Price Shop Licence on a vacancy created on account of cancellation of the Fair Price Shop Licence of erstwhile licensee. Once such vacancy is held by this Court to have been wrongly created as the cancellation order was wrongly passed, the such cancellation order can be set aside without hearing the subsequent licensee. 19. The counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon paragraph 55 of the judgment passed in New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Smt. Sushma Gupta and others, (2018) 126 ALR 305, to argue that welfare legislation has to be interpreted to protect the interest of affected parties. Paragraph 55 of the said judgment is being quoted herein below : “Having considered the same what we find is that the scheme of Legislation being a welfare Legislation has to be interpreted in order to protect the interest of the affected parties. This aspect of the matter has no where been touched upon by the Full Bench of Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case of Lata v. United India Insurance Company Limited and others (Supra). The entire purpose of the scheme under the 1988 Act is to provide for just and fair compensation and speedy disposal of such claims. It may be apt to mention that such claims are usually contested by widows and minor children or even destitutes at times who have to endlessly wait for the adjudication of their claims for years together. At the end of the day if they are informed that they have no right to file a Cross Objection, the same would be negating an opportunity to raise their plea which otherwise would be available to them had they filed an appeal. To deny such an opportunity would be against the scheme of the Act which does not prohibit the filing of a Cross Objection. The form of appeal and its manner of presentation as provided for under Section 176 of the 1988 Act read with Rule 222 of the 1998 Rules does not in any where restrict the filing of a Cross Objection which otherwise is available for the reasons given hereinabove in terms of Order XLI Rule 22 C.P.C. read with Rule 33 thereof and the reasoning of the Full Bench judgment in the case of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Smt. Janki Devi and others (Supra). We also find support from Rule 10 of Order XLI-A C.P.C. as introduced by way of High Court Amendment in the State of U.P. The judgment of the Full Bench of this Court therefore appears to be more purposive and is in tune with the views taken by the other High Courts as well. In the matter of interpretation of a beneficial Legislation the approach of the Courts is to adopt a construction which advances the beneficient purpose underlying the enactment in preference to a construction which tends to defeat that purpose. This was held by the Apex Court while pronouncing on the interpretation of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 in the case of Shivaji Dayanu Patil v. Vatschala Uttam More, 1991 (3) SCC 530 .” 20. It is evident from a perusal of the judgment rendered in New India Assurance Company Limited (supra) that this Court was considering the right to file cross objection under Order 41 Rule 22 C.P.C. by a co-respondent in appeal filed by an Insurance Company under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. This Court took into account the scheme of Motor Vehicle Act specifically with regard to motor accident claim decided by the Tribunal and the Appeal filed under Section 173 by the aggrieved party i.e. the Insurance Company. This Court held that an opportunity to the respondents to point out defect about any finding recorded adverse to the respondents can be asserted by way of a cross-objection in an appeal filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. 21. It is not clear from a perusal of the writ petition filed by the petitioner who is the subsequent allottee as to how the right created out of a licence or a privilege to distribute essential commodities at a fair price to eligible cardholders can be said to be creating a right in favour of such subsequent allottee that the welfare legislation meant for fair distribution of essential commodities at fair prices to common citizens of the State out of honest tax-payers’ money can be utilized and interpreted by this Court to protect the right of such subsequent allottee. 22. 22. Moreso, it is evident from the order impugned cancelling the Fair Price Shop Licence of the petitioner that initially when such a licence was given to the petitioner she had filed an affidavit to the effect that in case the erstwhile licensee obtained an order of a Competent Court which results in restoration of a licence of such a person, then, the State-Respondents would be free to cancel the licence of petitioner. 23. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the judgments of the Supreme Court and Coordinate Benches of this Court have been distinguished only on the facts and ratio decidendi of a judgment is a binding precedent and ought to be followed. 24. This Court finds such argument to be misconceived because no “ratio decidendi” can be followed without context to the facts as mentioned in a particular case. No judgment can be read out of context of the facts in the light of which it is being rendered. The presence or absence of one additional fact may change the very nature of the observations made by the Court. The judgments of this Court and of the Hon’ble Supreme Court cannot be interpreted as Statutes but have to be read in the context in which they have been rendered; and a judgment can be a binding precedent for what has been considered and held in it and not for what that can be logically inferred therefrom. 25. This Court is of the considered opinion that since a judgment has already been rendered on 31.10.2017 by this Court after considering the affidavits filed in the said writ petition No. 60770 of 2015, the Authorities cannot be asked not to comply with order passed by this Court during the pendency of Review/Recall Application moved by the subsequent allottee. 26. The subsequent allottee as well as State-respondents are bound by the judgment and order dated 31.10.2017 till it is recalled or set aside by the Competent Court. It will result in complete chaos and mayhem if the parties/litigants are allowed to resort to the argument that the judgment and order of this Court has been obtained by fraud and therefore, they are free not to follow the same. 27. For the reasons as aforesaid this Court finds no merit in this writ petition. It will result in complete chaos and mayhem if the parties/litigants are allowed to resort to the argument that the judgment and order of this Court has been obtained by fraud and therefore, they are free not to follow the same. 27. For the reasons as aforesaid this Court finds no merit in this writ petition. This writ petitioner is liable to be dismissed and it is, therefore, dismissed. 28. The petitioner is free to pursue the Recall Application already moved by her in writ petition No. 60770 of 2015. 29. No order as to costs.