JUDGMENT By the Court.—This is a defendant’s appeal filed under Section 96 of Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as “CPC”) arising from judgment and decree dated 25.11.2010 passed by Sri Mangal Prasad, Additional District Judge, Court No. 3, Agra in Original Suit No. 234 of 2004, whereby it has decreed suit for specific performance of agreement for sale, dated 29.7.1988, and directed defendant-appellant to execute sale-deed and get it registered within two months, failing which plaintiff may get execution through Court. 2. Sri H.N. Singh, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Vineet Kumar Singh, Advocate has advanced his submissions on behalf of defendant-appellant (hereinafter referred to as “Appellant”) while Sri Swapnil Kumar, Advocate has made his submissions on behalf of plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter referred to as “Plaintiff”). 3. Plaintiff-M/s Doctors Sahkari Grah Nirman Samiti Ltd., is a Society registered under Societies Registration Act, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1860”). Original Suit No. 234 of 2004 was instituted by Plaintiff through its Secretary, Dr. Prakash Narain Gupta in the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Agra vide plaint dated 29.3.2004. Details of disputed land is given at the bottom of plaint and reads as under: “25% Developed plot area of 1/2 of land out of following Khasra plots measuring an area of 2562 Sq. Yards, 1151/0-4-0, 1158/1-4-0, 1159/1-6-0, 1160/2-1-0, 1165/1-6-0, 1166/1-13-0, 1169/1-7-0, 1170/1-2-0, 1171/0-15-0, 1172/1-1-0, 1240/0-14-0, 1241/0-17-0, 1242/1-7-0, 1243/1-2-0, 1248/1-7-0, 1249/3-5-0, 1250/0-12-0, 1251/0-9-0, 1252/1-0-0, 1253/1-4-0, 1254/1-5-0, 1255/1-5-0, 1256/1-3-0 and 1259/1-0-0, total area 26 Bigha 17 Biswa situated at Village Basai Mustqil Tehsil and District Agra now a residential colony named as Rani Bagh/Niti Bah, mentioned as below: (1) Plot numbers, purchased by Defendant No. Ajanta Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. vide sale-deed dated 18.9.1989 in Rani Bagh Colony. (2) Plot numbers situated in Niti Bagh Colony as per correction deed dated 27-11-1992 executed by Ajanta Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. in favour of defendant. 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 117, 121, 122, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156 and 158 total 22 plots.” 4. (2) Plot numbers situated in Niti Bagh Colony as per correction deed dated 27-11-1992 executed by Ajanta Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. in favour of defendant. 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 117, 121, 122, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156 and 158 total 22 plots.” 4. Plaint case set up by Plaintiff is that Sri Abdul Aziz and Abdul Qadir, both, sons of Sri Mahboob Khan, and Smt. Salima Begum daughter of Smt. Jamila Begum were Bhumidhars of Khasra plot numbers detailed at the foot of plaint, sold and transferred their Bhumidhari rights in aforesaid land to Plaintiff vide three sale-deeds of same date, i.e., 10.8.1983, first executed by Sri Abdul Aziz, second executed by Sri Abdul Qadir and third executed by Smt. Salima Begum through her Power of Attorney Holder, Sri Abdul Qadir. 5. Appellant-M/s Darvesh Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd., a Cooperative Housing Society, approached Plaintiff with a request to transfer half of disputed land in favour of Appellant. Plaintiff set out a condition that Appellant will develop land and thereafter transfer 25% of land to Plaintiff or any nominated member of Plaintiff Society on the principle of “no profit no loss” to which Appellant agreed. A registered sale-deed was executed between Plaintiff and Appellant on 29.7.1988. In the said sale-deed Vendors of Plaintiff also joined as part of sale consideration payable by Plaintiff to them was still unpaid. Appellant also executed an agreement to sell, dated 29.7.1988, duly registered, stipulating therein that after developing land in dispute, Appellant would transfer 25% thereof to Plaintiff on the principle of “no profit and no loss”. Remaining part of land was transferred by sale by Plaintiff to another Housing Society, i.e., M/s Kanhaiya Kunj Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. and had got a similar agreement to sell dated 29.7.1988 executed with said society in respect of 25% of developed land. Appellant committed breach of agreement dated 29.7.1988. Instead of developing land and thereafter transferring 25% to Plaintiff-Appellant transferred entire land vide registered sale-deed dated 18.9.1989 to one M/s Ajanta Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. Transfer of land to M/s Ajanta Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. must be deemed to be subject to conditions of Agreement dated 29.7.1988 and being subsequent transferee, it was also liable to observe obligations of Appellant. Plaintiff requested Appellant as well as M/s Ajanta Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. to transfer 25% developed land as per agreement dated 29.7.1988 but they refused and threatened to transfer disputed land to third parties. Consequently, Plaintiff filed Original Suit No. 815 of 1991 in the Court of Civil Judge, Agra impleading Appellant, M/s Ajanta Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. and one, M/s Eldeco Housing Construction Ltd. as Defendants-1, 2 and 3, respectively. In the aforesaid suit, Plaintiff sought a permanent injunction restraining Defendants therein from carving out any plot, sell or transfer the same to any other person and also not to raise any construction on 25% of developed land which was to be reserved for Plaintiff. Prayer made in Original Suit No. 815 of 1991 is reproduced as under: “A) To issue a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from carving out any plot, selling or transferring the same to any other person, from raising or getting raised any construction in 25% area of developed land out of the plots detailed at the foot of the plaint i.e. 25% area be reserved for the plaintiff. B) To allow costs of the suit to the plaintiff against the defendants. C) To grant such other and further relief as the nature of the case may be admit off in favour of the plaintiff against the defendants.” 6. Suit was filed on 29.8.1991. Trial Court formulated 12 issues but for present appeal, suffice it to mention that Trial Court vide judgment dated 3.5.2003 held the suit barred by Section 41(h) of Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as “S.R. Act, 1963”) and consequently dismissed. In respect of Defendants-2 and 3, in the aforesaid judgment, Court clearly mentioned in para 6 that they had entered a compromise on 15.5.1997 and suit stood decided qua Plaintiff vis-a-vis Defendants-2 and 3 in terms of compromise dated 15.5.1997. Trial Court also observed, while deciding Issue-12, that compromise mentioned the fact that Defendant-2 has already returned 25% of land to Defendant-1 through a supplementary sale-deed (Titamma Vikray Patra) dated 27.11.1992, therefore, Defendant-1 got back disputed land vide supplementary sale-deed dated 27.11.1992. 7. Thereafter suit in question was filed by Plaintiff seeking specific performance of agreement dated 29.7.1988 against Appellant stating that by notice dated 8.1.2004, sent by Plaintiff, Appellant was required to remain present in the office of Sub-Registrar on 28.1.2004 but it failed though Plaintiff was present. 7. Thereafter suit in question was filed by Plaintiff seeking specific performance of agreement dated 29.7.1988 against Appellant stating that by notice dated 8.1.2004, sent by Plaintiff, Appellant was required to remain present in the office of Sub-Registrar on 28.1.2004 but it failed though Plaintiff was present. Another notice was given on 7.2.2004 requesting Appellant to remain present in the office of Sub-Registrar on 20.2.2004 but again Appellant failed, hence the suit. 8. Appellant contested suit by filing written statement dated 3.2.2005 wherein execution of Agreement to Sell, dated 29.7.1988, was not disputed. However, it is said that agreement was executed alongwith one more party, i.e., Kanhaiya Kunj Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. and in absence of said society, impleaded as Defendant in suit, it was not maintainable. It also pleaded that time for enforcement of Agreement has already lapsed and suit is barred by limitation prescribed under Article 54, Schedule of Indian Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as “L.A. Act, 1963”) having been filed after more than 12 years though period of limitation was only 3 years. In additional pleas some usual grounds like bar of suit by principle of estopple and acquiescence, non-joinder of proper parties, limitation, Sections 16 and 19 of S.R. Act, 1963 and lack of any cause of action were taken. It was also pleaded that plaint is liable to be dismissed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. 9. Trial Court formulated following eight issues as under: ^^1- D;k okn i= of.kZr vk/kkjksa ij lafonk fnukad 29-07-1988 dks fofufnZ"V vuqikyu djk;k tk ldrk gS\ 2- D;k fookfnr lEifRr dk foØ; dk djkj foys[k fnukad 29-07-1988 ds vuqikyu gsrq oknh lnSo rRij o bPNqd jgk gS\ 3- D;k okn dky ckf/kr gS\ 4- D;k oknh dk okn vko';d i{kdkjksa ds vla;kstu ds nks"k ls nwf"kr gS tSlk fd izfrokn i= esa vfHkdfFkr gS\ 5- D;k mier foca/ku ds fl)kUrksa ls ckf/kr gS\ 6- D;k oknh dk okn iks"k.kh; ugha gS tSlk fd izfrokni= esa vfHkdfFkr gS\ 7- D;k oknh dk okn fof'k"V vuqrks"k vf/kfu;e ls ckf/kr gS tSlk fd izfrokni= eas vfHkdfFkr gS\ 8- D;k oknh fdlh vuqrks"k dks izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gS\ ;fn gkW rks D;k\** 1. Whether the specific performance of the contract dated 29.7.1988 can be ensured on the basis of grounds mentioned in the plaint? 2. Whether the specific performance of the contract dated 29.7.1988 can be ensured on the basis of grounds mentioned in the plaint? 2. Whether the plaintiff has always been ready and willing for performance of instrument of agreement to sale dated 29.7.1988 with respect to the disputed property? 3. Whether the suit is time barred? 4. Whether plaintiff’s suit suffers from non-joinder of necessary parties, as stated in the written statement? 5. Whether the suit is barred by the Principle of Estoppel? 6. Whether the plaintiff’s suit is not maintainable, as stated in the written statement? 7. Whether the plaintiff’s suit is barred by the Specific Relief Act, as stated in the written statement? 8. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get any relief? If so, to what relief?” (English translation by Court) 10. Issues-1 and 2 were answered in favour of Plaintiff and Issues-3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 were answered against Appellant. Consequently, Issue-8 was answered in affirmance and suit was decreed. 11. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for Appellant contended that Trial Court has miserably failed to consider that suit in question was barred by limitation. Further, Plaintiff having failed to show that he was ready and willing to get the sale-deed executed within the period of limitation, failed to show any surviving cause of action when suit in question was filed, hence it was liable to be dismissed and Trial Court has erred in law in decreeing the same. 12. Learned counsel appearing for Plaintiff, on the contrary, argued that in earlier suit Court below has already held that time was not an essence in execution of sale-deed and, therefore, cause of action continued and there was no bar of limitation since agreement for sale was admitted, Trial Court has rightly decreed suit and present appeal, therefore, is liable to be dismissed. 13. In the light of rival submissions, following four points for determination have arisen which need be answered in this appeal: (I) Whether suit was barred by limitation prescribed under L.A. Act, 1963 and Trial Court in holding otherwise has erred in law. (II) Whether there was any period specified in agreement for the purpose of execution of sale-deed and when limitation for a suit for specific performance would commence. (III) Whether plaint case set up by Plaintiff clearly specified any cause of action having arisen within the period of limitation. (II) Whether there was any period specified in agreement for the purpose of execution of sale-deed and when limitation for a suit for specific performance would commence. (III) Whether plaint case set up by Plaintiff clearly specified any cause of action having arisen within the period of limitation. (IV) Whether Plaintiff has shown compliance of Section 16 of S.R. Act, 1963 that he was ready and willing throughout for execution of sale-deed pursuant to agreement for sale dated 29.7.1988. 14. In our view, Points-1, II and III being integrally connected, can be considered together. 15. Copy of agreement dated 29.7.1988 is on record. Plaintiff is first party. M/s Kanhaiya Kunj Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. is second party and Appellant is third party. 14. In our view, Points-1, II and III being integrally connected, can be considered together. 15. Copy of agreement dated 29.7.1988 is on record. Plaintiff is first party. M/s Kanhaiya Kunj Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. is second party and Appellant is third party. The contents of agreement reads as under: ^^Tkks fd Qjhd vOoy us tehu 26 ch?kk 17 fcLok okdS ekStk clbZ eqLrfdy rglhy o ftyk vkxjk] ftldks mlus Jh vCnqy vtht o vCnqy dnhj iq=x.k Jh egcwc [kkW ,oa Jherh lyhek csxe nq[rj vCnqy j'khn fuoklh clbZ eqLrfdy rktxat okMZ vkxjk ls Ø; dh gqbZ Fkh] mldks Qjhd vOoy us }kjk cSukeksa ds vkt fnukad 29-07-1988 dks cgd Qjhd nks;e o lks;e mDr lfefr dks Qjks[r dh gS] ftlds lEcU/k esa Qjhd vOoy o nks;e o lks;e ds chp ;g bdjkj gqvk gS fd tc Hkh mDr Hkwfe dks fodflr djus ds ckn lnL;ksa esa vkoaVu fd;k tk;sxk] rks fcyk fdlh ykHk gkfu ds 25 izfr'kr IykV ,fj;k Qjhd vOoy lfefr ds lnL;ksa ds gd esa vkoafVr gksxk ,oa 75 izfr'kr IykV ,fj;k Qjhd nks;e o lks;e mDr lfefr;ksa ds lnL;ksa ds i{k esa vkoafVr gksxkA ftldks ge tqeyk QjhdSu lfefr;ksa us vkil es rlyhe o dcwy dj fy;k gSA 'kjk;r nLrkost gktk dh ikcanh ge QjhdSu o dk;e eqdkeku ge tqeyk QjhdSu ij ykteh o t:jh gS vkSj jgsxhA leLRk O;; nLrkost gktk lfefr;ksa }kjk ogu fd;k tk;sxkA fygktk ;g bdjkjukek okgeh ge QjhdSu us viuh jkth o [kq'kh ls fy[k fn;k fd lun jgs] vkSj oDr t:jr ij dke vkosA uht&tehu etdwj dk vkoaVu ge QjhdSu lfefr;ksa ds v/;{kksa dh lgefr ls fd;k tkosxkA rgjhj rkjh[k 29 ekg tqykbZ lu~ 1988 bZŒ oelkSnk& lfpo lfefr&eq> izdk'k pUnz 'kekZA** “The first party has sold the land measuring 26 bigha and 17 biswa situated in Village - Basai Mustkil, Tehsil and District-Agra, which has been purchased from Shri Abdul Aziz and Shri Abdul Kadir Ss/o Shri Mehboob Khan and Smt. Saleema Begum d/o Abdul Rashid r/o Basai Mustkil, Tajganj ward, Agra, to the said Society being second and third parties through a sale-deed today i.e. 29.7.1988, in the respect of which first, second and third parties have reached into an agreement that when the allotment shall be made of the said land after developing the same, 25 percent area of the plot shall be allotted in favour of the first party, and 75 percent of the same shall be allotted in favour of second and third parties; which we, the Societies, have as joint parties agreed and accepted. The conditions of the document are, and would be, binding on us, all the parties inclusive of us, the joint parties, in respect of lands mentioned therein. All costs as to the documents shall be borne by the Societies herein. Hence, we, the parties have willingly and happily executed the agreement so that this may serve as a certificate if there be any such need. The land as mentioned shall be allotted with the approval of the Chairpersons of the Societies. Executed on 29th July, 1988 as drafted by me, Prakash Chandra Sharma, Secretary to the Society.” (English translation by Court) (emphasis added) 16. As per agreement, 25% of land was to be allotted to members of Plaintiff-Society after development of land by Appellant. 17. DW-1, Sri Kali Charan admitted in his cross-examination that no development was carried out by Appellant-Society over disputed land. On the other hand, within a year of purchase of disputed land from Plaintiff, vide sale-deed dated 18.9.1989 it was transferred by sale to M/s Ajanta Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. He also admitted that there was a compromise between Plaintiff, M/s Ajanta Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. and M/s Eldeco Housing Construction Ltd. in Original Suit No. 815 of 1991 and said suit was decided in terms of compromise dated 15.5.1997 between aforesaid three parties. He also admitted that M/s Ajanta Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. re-sold 22 or 23 plots (area 4400 square yard) to Appellant after development of land. Said plots, however, were not allotted to members of Plaintiff-Society since no such information was given to Plaintiff-Society. He also admitted that Appellant Society did not observe conditions of agreement and instead transferred entire land to M/s Ajanta Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. without informing that there was an agreement of giving back 25% of developed land to Plaintiff for allotment to members of Plaintiff-Society. He also admitted that Appellant Society did not observe conditions of agreement and instead transferred entire land to M/s Ajanta Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. without informing that there was an agreement of giving back 25% of developed land to Plaintiff for allotment to members of Plaintiff-Society. It would be appropriate to reproduce relevant extract of cross-examination of DW-1, Kali Charan, where he has admitted non-compliance of terms of agreement on the part of Appellant: ^^4- gekjh lfefr }kjk mDr Ø; dh x;h Hkwfe dk fodkl ugha fd;k cfYd Ø; djus ds ,d lky i'pkr vtUrk lgdkjh lfefr dks viuh lfefr dh Hkwfe csp nh FkhA geus vtUrk lgdkjh lfefr dks ;g ugha crk;k Fkk fd mDr foØ; dh tk jgh Hkwfe esa ls 25 izfr'kr fodflr IykV ,fj;k oknh lfefr ds lnL;ksa dks nh tkosxhA 7- oknh lfefr us okn la[;k 815@91 esa 25 izfr'kr fodflr Hkwfe muds lnL;ksa ds i{k es vkoaVu dh ekax ugha dh FkhA eq>s ;g ;kn ugha fd orZeku okn nk;j gksus ls iwoZ oknh lfefr dh vksj ls eq>s ;k esjh lfefr dks dksbZ uksfVl izkIr gq, Fks ;k ughaA eq>s ;g Hkh ;kn ugha fd mDr uksfVl dk dksbZ tokc oknh lfefr dks fnyk;k Fkk ;k ughaA 8- gekjh lfefr }kjk oknh ls Hkwfe Ø; djus ds i'pkr blfy, fodkl ugha fd;k D;ksafd ge fodkl dj ugha ldrs FksA blfy, vfodflr Hkwfe dks gh csp fn;k FkkA 9- oknh ls Hkwfe Ø; djus ds i'pkr bdjkjukesa dh 'krksZ ds vuqlkj geus mldk ikyu ugha fd;kA ;g ckr lgh gS fd 25 izfr'kr Hkwfe dk vkoaVu rHkh gksuk Fkk tc Hkwfe dk fodkl gks tkrkA 10- bdjkjukesa dh 'krksZ ds vuqlkj gekjh lfefr us u rks Hkwfe dk fodkl fd;k u 25 izfr'kr fodflr {ks= oknh lfefr ds lnL;ksa dks vkoafVr fd;kA 11- bdjkjukesa dh 'krksZ ds vuqlkj oknh lfefr ds lnL; 25 izfr'kr fodflr IykV ikus ds vf/kdkjh FksA bdjkjukesa dh 'krkZs ds vuqlkj oknh lfefr lnL;ksa dh fyLV nsrs o IykWVl dk iSlk gekjh lfefr es tek djkrs rHkh vkoaVu gksuk FkkA ;g lgh gS fd oknh lfefr dks lnL;ksa dh fyLV o IykWVl dk iSlk gekjh lfefr }kjk Ø; dh xbZ Hkwfe dks fodflr gksus ds ckn nsuk FkkA 12- iz'u & pawfd vkidh lfefr }kjk Hkwfe dk fodkl ugha fd;k x;k Fkk blfy, ;g dguk xyr gS fd oknh lfefr }kjk iSlk IykWVl dks nsuk ;k lnL;ksa dh fyLV nsus dk dksbZ vkSfpR; ugha Fkk\ mRrj & oknh dk mDr dFku xyr gSA ekSds ij tehu dk fodkl gks pqdk FkkA 13- ;g dguk xyr gS fd foØ; vuqcU/k ¼bdjkjukesa½ dh 'krksZ dk ikyu djus ds fy, gekjh lfefr rS;kj u jgh gksA** 4. The aforesaid purchased land was not developed by our society; rather, an year after its purchase, it was sold by our society to Ajanta Cooperative Society. We had not informed the Ajanta Cooperative Society that out of total land under sale, 25 percent developed plot area would be given to the members of the plaintiff society. 7. The plaintiff society had in suit no 815/91 not made any prayer for allotment of 25 percent developed land in favour of its members. I do not remember whether I or my society had prior to filing of the instant suit received any notice or not from the plaintiff society. I also do not remember whether any reply to the aforesaid notice was sent on behalf of the society or not? 8. Having purchased the land from plaintiff we did not undertake any development of the land because we were unable to do so. Hence, we sold even the undeveloped land. 9. Having purchased the land from plaintiff we did not follow the terms and conditions of the agreement. It is true that 25 percent land was to be allotted only after development was effected. 10. As per conditions of the agreement, our society neither developed the land nor allotted 25 percent developed area to the members of the plaintiff society. 11. As per terms and conditions of the agreement, the members of the plaintiff society were entitled to get 25 percent developed plot. As per stipulations of the agreement, allotments were to be made only when the plaintiff society provided a list of its members and deposited prices of plots to our society. It is true that a list of members was to be supplied and prices of plots were to be given once development of the land purchased by our society is effected. 12. Ques: Since your society did not develop the land, it is wrong to say that there was no justification for our society to deposit the prices of plots as also to provide a list of members? Ans: The aforesaid statement of the plaintiff is wrong. The land on site had been developed. 13. It is wrong to say that our society might have not been ready for performance as stipulated in the agreement.” (English translation by Court) (Emphasis added) 18. Ans: The aforesaid statement of the plaintiff is wrong. The land on site had been developed. 13. It is wrong to say that our society might have not been ready for performance as stipulated in the agreement.” (English translation by Court) (Emphasis added) 18. Appellant committed breach of agreement and sold entire land without any development to M/s Ajanta Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. concealing terms and conditions of agreement dated 29.7.1988 which was pleaded by Plaintiff in plaint dated 29.8.1991 in Original Suit No. 815 of 1991 as is evident from para 5 of plaint, which reads as under: “5. That the defendant No. 1 is bounded under law to comply with the terms and conditions of registered agreement dated 29-07-1998 but instead of doing so they are committing breach of the contract and the plaintiff society has learnt that the defendant No. 1 has sold and transferred the entire land in favour of the defendant No. 2 by means of a registered sale-deed dated 18-09-1989. The said facts came to the knowledge of the plaintiff society only in the second week of August, 1991 and they obtained a certified copy of the said sale-deed. From the perusal of the said sale-deed it further transpired that the defendant No. 1 has concealed the terms and conditions of the agreement dated 29-07-1988. Thus it is clear that instead of transferring 25% land after development to the plaintiff society, the defendant No. 1 has sold and transferred the entire land in favour of defendant No. 2. The agreement dated 29-07-1988 is also binding on the defendant No. 2 as well who is also under legal obligation to transfer 25% land after its development to the plaintiff society or its member. The defendant No. 2 is merely a subsequent purchaser having notice of the agreement dated 29-07-1988.” (emphasis added) 19. Plaintiff also admitted in para 9 of plaint dated 29.8.1991 of its earlier suit, i.e., 815 of 1991, that land was developed when suit was filed in 1991, as is evident from following: “The defendant No. 2 through defendant No. 3 has now got the land developed....” (emphasis added) 20. Plaintiff also admitted in para 9 of plaint dated 29.8.1991 of its earlier suit, i.e., 815 of 1991, that land was developed when suit was filed in 1991, as is evident from following: “The defendant No. 2 through defendant No. 3 has now got the land developed....” (emphasis added) 20. Same fact was mentioned by Plaintiff in its application dated 15.5.1997 filed under Order 23 Rules 1 and 3 read with Section 151 CPC (paper No. 13Ga), wherein it has mentioned as under: “...the defendant No. 2 has already sold back 25% of developed land area to defendant No. 1.” (emphasis added) 21. Aforesaid compromise application formed part of compromise decree between Plaintiff, M/s Ajanta Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. and M/s Eldeco Housing Construction Ltd. in Original Suit No. 815 of 1991. Relevant extract of compromise reads as under: “In these circumstances, the plaintiff has agreed to continue to fight against defendant No. 1 and has agreed to let go defendants No. 2 and 3. The result will be that the claim of the plaintiff and the stay order of 25% will be operative against defendant No. 1 only meaning thereby that the plots No. 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 117, 121, 122, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155 and 156 total 22 plots area measuring 4362 Sq. Yards of the NITI BAGH COLONY which were re-transferred by defendant No. 2 back to defendant No. 1 in toto. It may be clarified that the area of the plots having been transferred in favour of defendant No. 1, by defendant No. 2 is slightly less than 25% but as a gesture of goodwill the plaintiff has agreed to ignore this reduction in the area and the plaintiff has also ignored that the quality of the plots is not as good and thus the plaintiff has agreed to be satisfied with these plots only against defendant No. 1. The result will be that the defendant No. 2 and 3 will be free to sell their plots to their members and use them howsoever they like, and the suit shall be treated dismissed as withdrawn against defendant No. 2 and 3. The defendant No. 2 has paid as compensation for the expenses for litigation so far and also compensation for the time and trouble during the litigation a sum of Rs. The defendant No. 2 has paid as compensation for the expenses for litigation so far and also compensation for the time and trouble during the litigation a sum of Rs. 25,000/- by Cheque No. 147974 dated 26.4.1997. PRAYER It is, therefore, prayed that the Hon’ble Court be pleased to record the compromise whereof plaintiff is abandoning its claim against the defendants No. 2 and 3 only as a consequence thereof the suit be treated dismissed as withdrawn against defendants No. 2 and 3 only.” (emphasis added) 22. It is thus evident from record that Appellant committed breach of agreement when he did not proceed to make any development of land in dispute and instead sold entire land to M/s Ajanta Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. vide sale-deed dated 18.9.1989. Plaintiff also admitted that he got knowledge of said breach in second week of August, 1991 and also the factum that while executing sale-deed, in favour of M/s Ajanta Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. vide registered sale-deed 18.9.1989, Appellant concealed terms and conditions of agreement dated 29.7.1988. In the plaint dated 29.8.1991 in Original Suit No. 815 of 1991 it has also been stated that M/s Ajanta Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. has got disputed land developed through M/s Eldeco Housing Construction Ltd. and, therefore, the fact that land was already developed, is a fact admitted by Plaintiff vide plaint dated 29.8.1991. In the compromise dated 15.7.1997 Plaintiff also admitted that 22 plots, i.e., Plots No. 73 to 84, 117, 121, 122 and 150 to 156 (total area 4362 sq. yards) of Niti Bagh Colony were re-transferred by M/s Ajanta Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. in favour of Appellant constituting a little less than 25% of total land and this fact was admittedly in the knowledge of Plaintiff on the date of said compromise or before that since it has further stated that it will continue to contest the matter against Appellant. 23. Therefore, breach of agreement on the part of Appellant, as per own admission of Plaintiff, was in its knowledge atleast in second week of August, 1991 and also when plaint dated 29.8.1991 was filed. The fact that land was already developed was also in its knowledge when plaint dated 29.8.1991 was filed. 23. Therefore, breach of agreement on the part of Appellant, as per own admission of Plaintiff, was in its knowledge atleast in second week of August, 1991 and also when plaint dated 29.8.1991 was filed. The fact that land was already developed was also in its knowledge when plaint dated 29.8.1991 was filed. Appellant had got 22 plots from M/s Ajanta Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. is also a fact in the knowledge of Appellant on or before 15.5.1997 when compromise was entered by Plaintiff with M/s Ajanta Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. and M/s Eldeco Housing Construction Ltd. Thus cause of action for institution of suit for specific performance against Appellant had arisen in second week of 1991 and atleast on 29.8.1991 and thereafter again on 15.5.1997 and earlier thereto since plaintiff knew that appellant has breached the agreement and since entire land stood transferred to M/s Ajanta Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd., there remained no occasion to perform part of agreement by transferring 25% land to Plaintiff. Even if we assume that time was not essence of agreement for sale dated 29.8.1988, admitted breach of agreement on the part of Appellant came to the knowledge of Plaintiff in 1991 and 1997, as said above, hence sending of notice to Appellant in 2004 and thereafter filing of suit apparently is barred by limitation. 24. Question, whether time is the essence of contract is one thing and different than the question of limitation when there is clear breach of terms of agreement. In order to determine whether suit for specific performance of an agreement for sale has been filed within limitation, the cause of action arose when Plaintiff got knowledge that now Defendant, by action to the knowledge of Plaintiff, has either specifically refused compliance of agreement or has created a condition or situation by his own act that its compliance is not possible and this has to be treated as refusal to comply with agreement. For the purpose of attracting time for commencement of limitation, Article 54, Schedule of L.A. Act, 1963 provides as under: Article Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run 54 For specific performance of a contract Three years The date fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. 25. There are two points for commencement of limitation under Article 54. 25. There are two points for commencement of limitation under Article 54. One is the date fixed for performance but when no such date is fixed then the second point is when Plaintiff has noticed that performance is refused. 26. In the present case no specific date for performance of agreement was mentioned since it provided that when land is developed only then occasion to transfer 25% of land to Plaintiff would arise. It was not mentioned as to within what time Appellant would develop disputed land and, therefore, to this extent we are in agreement with Court below that there was no time or date fixed in agreement for its performance hence there could not have been any occasion to treat time as essence for performance of agreement. 27. Even otherwise, in the matter of making time essential for performance of contract, Courts, time and again, have taken a very diluted view and the normal principle is that time is not the essence of contract. The concept, whether time is essence of contract or not has statutory significance by virtue of Section 55 of Contract Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1872”). It deals with the consequences of failure to perform any contract within time or before stipulated time. It reads as under: “55. Effect of failure to perform at a fixed time, in contract in which time is essential.—When a party to a contract promises to do a certain thing at or before a specified time, or certain things at or before specified times, and fails to do any such thing at or before the specified time, the contract, or so much of it as has not been performed, becomes voidable at the option of the promisee, if the intention of the parties was that time should be of the essence of the contract. Effect of such failure when time is not essential.—If it was not the intention of the parties that time should be of the essence of the contract, the contract does not become voidable by the failure to do such thing at or before the specified time; but the promisee is entitled to compensation from the promisor for any loss occasioned to him by such failure. Effect of acceptance of performance at time other than that agreed upon.—If, in case of a contract voidable on account of the promisor’s failure to perform his promise at the time agreed, the promisee accepts performance of such promise at any time other than that agreed, the promisee cannot claim compensation for any loss occasioned by the non-performance of the promise at the time agreed, unless, at the time of such acceptance he gives notice to the promisor of his intention to do so.” 28. Statute shows that intention to make time as essence, must be in a language which is unmistakable. Court in Govind Prasad Chaturvede v. Hari Dutt Shastri and another, (1977) 2 SCC 539 , held: “It is settled law that the fixation of the period within which the contract has to be performed does not make the stipulation as to time the essence of the contract. When a contract relates to sale of immovable property it will normally be presumed that the time is not the essence of the contract.” (emphasis added) 29. Court also said that language used in agreement should be such as to indicate an unmistakable terms that the time is the essence of the contract. The intention to treat time as essence of contract may be evidenced by circumstances which are sufficiently strong to displace the normal presumption that in a contract of sale of land stipulation as to time is not the essence of contract. 30. In Smt. Indira Kaur and others v. Shri Sheo Lal Kapoor, AIR 1988 SC 1074 , Court in para 6 said: “The law is well-settled that in transactions of sale of immovable properties, time is not the essence of the Contract.” 31. In Smt. Chand Rani (dead) by LRs. v. Smt. Kamal Rani (dead) by Lrs., (1993)1 SCC 519 , a Constitution Bench considered the question “whether time is the essence of contract or not” and held that in an agreement for sale of immovable property time is never recorded as essence of contract unless there is a specific stipulation or it clearly emerges by way of implication from agreement. Court said: “It is a well-accepted principle that in the case of sale of immovable property, time is never regarded as the essence of the contract. In fact, there is a presumption against time being the essence of the contract. ..... Court said: “It is a well-accepted principle that in the case of sale of immovable property, time is never regarded as the essence of the contract. In fact, there is a presumption against time being the essence of the contract. ..... It has to be ascertained whether under the terms of the contract the parties named a specific time within which completion was to take place, really and in substance it was intended that it should be completed within a reasonable time. An intention to make time the essence of the contract must be expressed in unequivocal language.” (emphasis added) 32. Constitution Bench in Smt. Chand Rani (supra) thus lays down three relevant factors to find out whether time is essence of contract or not and said: “From an analysis of the above case law it is clear that in the case of sale of immovable property there is no presumption as to time being the essence of the contract. Even if it is not of the essence of the contract the Court may infer that it is to be performed in a reasonable time if the conditions are: 1. from the express terms of the contract; 2. from the nature of the property; and 3. from the surrounding circumstances, for example: the object of making the contract.” 33. In M.P. Housing Board v. Progressive Writers and Publishers, (2009)5 SCC 678 , Court said: “It is fairly well-settled that the time is not normally an essence of any agreement qua immovable properties and even there was an express covenant of time being an essence, the overall agreement have to be looked at to determine whether the time was the essence. Whether the time is the essence of the contract would, therefore, be a question of fact to be determined in each case and merely expression of the stipulated time would not make time an essence of the contract.” (emphasis added) 34. The above view, we find, is reiterated in Smt. Swarnam Ramachandran and another v. Aravacode Chakungal Jayapalan, (2004)8 SCC 689 ; McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. and others, (2006)11 SCC 181 ; Balasaheb Dayandeo Naik (Dead) through Lrs. and others v. Appareheb Dattatraya Pawa, (2008)4 SCC 464 ; Martin F. D’Souza v. Mohd. The above view, we find, is reiterated in Smt. Swarnam Ramachandran and another v. Aravacode Chakungal Jayapalan, (2004)8 SCC 689 ; McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. and others, (2006)11 SCC 181 ; Balasaheb Dayandeo Naik (Dead) through Lrs. and others v. Appareheb Dattatraya Pawa, (2008)4 SCC 464 ; Martin F. D’Souza v. Mohd. Ishfaq, (2009)3 SCC 1 ; A.K. Lakshmipathy (Dead) and others v. Rai Saheb Pannalal H. Lahoti Charitable Trust and others, (2010)1 SCC 287; and, I.S. Sikandar (D) by L.Rs. v. K. Subramani and others, (2013)15 SCC 27 . 35. Law in the context of time whether an essence in contract or not is no more res integra, but in our view for the purpose of considering the question “whether suit in question was within the period of limitation”, the inquiry which has to be made is, when cause of action to file suit arose/arisen and from the date when such cause of action arose. Another question is, “whether suit in question is within the period of limitation or not had to be examined”. 36. As we have already said that no date was fixed for performance of agreement, hence Court was under an obligation to enquire as to when Defendant refused to perform his part under the contract and knowledge to that refusal was acquired by Plaintiff. 37. Refusal to perform under agreement is not to be literally construed as a direct denial on the part of Defendant to perform his part of contract. Refusal can be by direct action or statement or written document or by a conduct which would directly amount to refusal to perform the contract. The conduct must be so clear, unambiguous that any person of ordinary prudence can, in the given facts and circumstances, easily infer a conclusion that Defendant has placed himself in a position that he cannot perform his part of contract and that will amount to refusal of performance of contract by Defendant. 38. In the present case Defendant-Appellant under the agreement dated 29.7.1988 had to perform first of all development of land and after such development transfer 25% land to Plaintiff. Defendant could have developed land and transferred 25% only when land remained with him. 38. In the present case Defendant-Appellant under the agreement dated 29.7.1988 had to perform first of all development of land and after such development transfer 25% land to Plaintiff. Defendant could have developed land and transferred 25% only when land remained with him. However, it is an admitted fact on the part of Plaintiff himself that entire land without development was transferred by Defendant-Appellant vide sale-deed dated 18.9.1989 to M/s Ajanta Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. This is also admitted by Plaintiff that he got knowledge of aforesaid transfer in second week of August, 1991 and got a copy of aforesaid sale-deed and came to know that Defendant-Appellant has concealed the terms and conditions of agreement dated 29.7.1988 from M/s Ajanta Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. and it was not made aware that Defendant-Appellant was under a reverse contract of transfer of 25% of land after its development to Plaintiff from whom entire land was purchased. This is a fact admitted by Plaintiff in earlier plaint filed in Original Suit No. 815 of 1991. Thus in terms of Article 54, Schedule to L.A. Act, 1963, limitation of three years to file suit for specific performance would commence from second week of August, 1991 or in any case on 29.8.1991 when admittedly Original Suit No. 815 of 1991 was filed in the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division). Period for limitation expired on 29.8.1994 and once limitation expires, there is no provision of revival or renewal by acknowledgment hence remedy to file suit for specific performance was not available and suit in question filed in 2004, therefore, is clearly barred by limitation. Even otherwise no such evidence constituting acknowledgment on the part of Defendant-Appellant which may have the effect of resuming of limitation is shown to us. 39. Learned counsel for plaintiff-respondent contended that suit of 1991 was dismissed by Court below but it observed that since Plaintiff has not sought any relief for specific performance, suit has to be dismissed and remedy lies to Plaintiff to file a suit for specific performance, therefore, cause of action to file suit in question should be taken to have arisen when earlier Suit No. 815 of 1991 was dismissed by Trial Court vide judgment dated 3.5.2003. Since suit in question was filed within one year from the date of dismissal of earlier suit, it cannot be said to be barred by limitation. 40. Since suit in question was filed within one year from the date of dismissal of earlier suit, it cannot be said to be barred by limitation. 40. We find no substance in this argument for the reason that judgment in Original Suit No. 815 of 1991 cannot be construed as to provide a cause of action to Plaintiff to file suit for specific performance. This remedy was available to Plaintiff when earlier suit was dismissed. He did not avail said remedy and allowed period of limitation to expire. Once period of limitation expires, the same cannot be extended or deemed to be extended even by a Court’s order. Moreso, Court below has dismissed suit of 1991 for the reason that proper reliefs were not sought by Plaintiff. If by that time Plaintiff had already rendered his remedy barred by limitation, that will not revive and atleast no binding judicial authority or statutory provision has been placed before us to show that such limitation will revive. We, therefore, answer Point-1 in affirmance holding that suit in question was barred by limitation and Trial Court has clearly erred in law in taking an otherwise view and thus finding to this extent is reversed accordingly. 41. We also answer Point-2 formulated above by holding that in agreement for sale dated 29.7.1988, no date was specified for performance by Defendant-Appellant but it was referable to an action on the part of Defendant-Appellant, i.e., development of land and transfer of 25% of land after development to Plaintiff was to be made from the date land is developed and that can be treated to be point for commencement of performance of agreement. 42. We answer Point-3 by holding that in the plaint in question Plaintiff has not specified that any cause of action has arisen within the period of limitation which had already expired as we have discussed above and demonstrated, therefore, reversing the finding and conclusion of Court below that suit was not barred by limitation, we hold that suit in question was barred by limitation as prescribed under Article 54, Schedule to L.A. Act, 1963. 43. Now we come to Point-4, whether there was compliance of Section 16 of S.R. Act, 1963 so as to justify decree of specific performance in favour of Plaintiff with regard to direction for execution of sale-deed by enforcing agreement for sale dated 29.7.1988. 44. 43. Now we come to Point-4, whether there was compliance of Section 16 of S.R. Act, 1963 so as to justify decree of specific performance in favour of Plaintiff with regard to direction for execution of sale-deed by enforcing agreement for sale dated 29.7.1988. 44. In a suit for specific performance it is a fundamental requirement that plaintiff must aver about his readiness and willingness to perform the contract according to its true construction. Section 16(c) of S.R. Act, 1963 contemplates such requirement and reads as under: “16. Personal bars to relief.— .... (c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. Explanation.—For the purposes of clause (c),— (i) where a contract involves the payment of money, it is not essential for the plaintiff to actually tender to the defendant or to deposit in Court any money except when so directed by the Court; (ii) the plaintiff must aver performance of, or readiness and willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction.” 45. This requirement is mandatory. In Ouseph Varghese v. Joseph Aley and others, (1969)2 SCC 539 , Court said: “A suit for specific performance has to conform to the requirements prescribed in Forms 47 and 48 of the 1st Schedule in the Civil Procedure Code. In a suit for specific performance it is incumbent on the plaintiff not only to set out the agreement on the basis of which he sues in all its details, he must go further and plead that he has applied to the defendant specifically to perform the agreement pleaded by him but the defendant has not done so. He must further plead that he has been and is still ready and willing to specifically perform his part of the agreement.” 46. In Jagarnath Mishra v. Uma Mishra, 1984 All LJ 1, a Division Bench of this Court, said: “Where in a suit for specific performance there was an omission of the averment in the plaint that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, the omission rendered the plaint without a cause of action for the suit and the suit was liable to the dismissed.” 47. We find that in the plaint, at different places, in a general and vague manner, Plaintiff has stated that he was awaiting for performance of part of contract on the part of Defendant and was ready and willing to comply his part but simultaneously the fact supporting that Plaintiff was really willing and ready to seek enforcement of contract are absent. In the plaint of earlier suit there is an admission on the part of Plaintiff that M/s Ajanta Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. got land in dispute developed through M/s Eldeco Housing Construction Ltd. Therefore, when Suit No. 815 of 1991 was filed, land was already developed but there is nothing to show that Plaintiff at any point of time immediately thereafter informed Defendant asking him to comply his part of contract by allotting 25% of land to Plaintiff or members nominated by him offering the price/consideration of 25% of land on no profit no loss basis. It is admitted fact that neither at any point of time there was any offer on the part of Plaintiff nor Defendant was ever informed as to whether land was to be re-transferred to Plaintiff himself or any member or members nominated by it and in this regard as per own admission of Plaintiff first notice sent to Defendant-Appellant is dated 8.1.2004 and second is dated 7.2.2004. Agreement for sale was executed on 29.7.1988. Land in dispute was already developed, may be by third party before 29.8.1991, when Plaintiff filed earlier Original Suit No. 815 of 1991, but, thereafter till January, 2004, i.e., for more than 12 years there was no communication on the part of Plaintiff to Defendant asking him to perform his part of contract and re-transfer 25% of land and also it did not give any other details. Thus we have no manner of doubt that requirement of showing readiness and willingness in the manner it is required under Section 16(c) was not discharged by Plaintiff-Respondent. 48. Pleading with regard to “readiness and willingness” is not a matter of technical requirement but it is a matter of substance which has to be demonstrated by plaintiff, if challenged by defendants that plaintiff is not in condition of “readiness and willingness” for execution of sale-deed and all other conditions precedent were not satisfied. Plaintiff has to plead that whatever was required to be performed by him, was performed by him. 49. Plaintiff has to plead that whatever was required to be performed by him, was performed by him. 49. The term “willingness” and “readiness” though appears to be synonymous but there is essential difference between two terms. Legislature when has used two words which apparently show some similarity then intention of legislature has to be found out in using two similar terms for the reason that legislature does not provide surpluses and words are not essentially repeated by legislature unless required for some specific performance. Here legislature has used two words “readiness” and “willingness”. Meaning thereby it had an intention to cover every aspect of matter which may be within the ambit of both terms keeping in view the minutest difference in implication and meaning of two terms. 50. Words ‘ready’ and ‘willing’ have been defined in “Concise Oxford English Dictionary”, Twelfth Edition, on pages 1196 and 1652, respectively, as under: “ready”-1. in a suitable state for an activity or situation; fully prepared, Made suitable and available for immediate use. 2. willing to do something. 3. in such a condition as to be likely to do something. 4. easily available or obtained; within reach. 5. immediate, quick, or prompt.” “willing”-ready, eager, or prepared to do something. Given or done readily.” 51. In “Collins Cobuild Advanced Learner’s English Dictionary”, Fourth Edition 2003, latest reprint 2004, words “readiness” and “willing” are defined on pages 1189 and 1666, respectively, as under: “readiness”-1. If someone is very willing to do something, you can talk about their readiness to do it. 2. If you do something in readiness for a future event, you do it so that you are prepared for that event.” “willing”-1. If someone is willing to do something, they are fairly happy about doing it and will do it if they are asked or required to do it. 2. Willing is used to describe someone who does something fairly enthusiastically and because they want to do it rather than because they are forced to do it.” 52. In “The World Book Dictionary” Volume Two, 2011 World Book, words “readiness”; “ready”; and, “willing” have been defined on pages 1737 and 2393, respectively, as under: “readiness”-1. the condition of being ready; preparedness. 2. quickness; promptness. 3. ease; facility. 4. willingness.” “ready”-1. prepared for action or use at once; prepared. 2. willing. 3. quick; prompt. 4. quick in thought or action. 5. likely; liable. 6. the condition of being ready; preparedness. 2. quickness; promptness. 3. ease; facility. 4. willingness.” “ready”-1. prepared for action or use at once; prepared. 2. willing. 3. quick; prompt. 4. quick in thought or action. 5. likely; liable. 6. easy to get it; very easy to reach; immediate available.” “willing”-1. ready; consenting. 2. cheerfully ready. 3. freely done or offered; voluntary. 4. of, having to do with, or using the will; volitional.” 53. In “The New Lexicon Webster’s Dictionary Of The English Language”, 1987 by Lexicon Publications, Inc., words, “readiness”, “ready” and “willing” have been defined on pages 831 and 1125, respectively, as under: “readiness”-the state of being ready; willingness, lack of hesitation.” “ready”-1. in a state fit for immediate action; immediately available whenever needed; in an emotional state adapted to a possible set of circumstances, willing; quick and easy; forward, prompt. 2. the state of being fit or poised for immediate action or use.” “willing”-working, helping etc. readily; done, given etc. readily; favourably disposed; of the power of the will.” 54. In “Black’s Law Dictionary”, Eighth Edition, South Asian Edition-2015, words “ready, willing, and able” have been defined on page 1291 as, “legally and financially capable of consummating a purchase”. 55. In “Mitra’s Legal & Commercial Dictionary”, Sixth Edition, Published by Eastern Law House Pvt. Ltd., Second Impression-2014, expression “ready and willing” has been defined on page 727 as under: “The expression ‘ready and willing’ implies not merely the disposition but also the capacity to do the act.” 56. In P. Ramanatha Aiyer’s “Concise Law Dictionary (Abridged Edition) With Legal Maxims, Latin Terms and Words & Phrases”, Third Abridged Edition Reprint 2010, expression “readiness and willingness” has been defined on page 977 as under: “Readiness and willingness. To come within the expression “readiness and willingness” in S. 51 of the Contract Act (9 of 1872), it is not necessary for a person to prove that on the due date he had the goods actually in his possession. To come within the expression “readiness and willingness” in S. 51 of the Contract Act (9 of 1872), it is not necessary for a person to prove that on the due date he had the goods actually in his possession. It is quite sufficient if he is able to prove that he had control of the requisite goods or that he had the capacity to deliver them to the purchaser when called upon to do so, in other words, that he was in a position to fulfil his part of the contract on the due date on a demand being made by the purchaser.” “The expression ‘readiness and willingness’ means continuous readiness-dictionary and willingness to pay the balance price as and when the appropriate occasion for the same arises and the expression cannot be treated as a strait jacket formual.” 57. Apparently the above two terms, to some extent, are overlapping, but one can find a marked distinction between two inasmuch as while “willingness” is a mental process, “readiness” refers to something to do with translating that into action and is preceded by necessary preparation for being in a position to be ready. Willingness must be something to do mainly with a person’s mental process to do an act but readiness implies close proximity of such willingness and ultimate physical manifestation. Readiness must, in all cases, be backed by willingness and its imminent physical action is demonstrated when it is about to be put into action. Readiness is a total equipment of a person who is ready to do the thing before he actually does it. Willingness is when a person claims that he is interested to do something but readiness demonstrates and reflects capacity of such person to perform after completion of all other requisite acts or having taken requisite steps which put him into the stage of readiness to put the final act into execution having performed of preceding act on his part. For example, a person claims that he is ready and willing to get sale-deed executed but has no sufficient fund for payment of consideration to seller then it cannot be said that he is ready to perform or he is in a state of readiness to perform. For example, a person claims that he is ready and willing to get sale-deed executed but has no sufficient fund for payment of consideration to seller then it cannot be said that he is ready to perform or he is in a state of readiness to perform. Similarly, if some other act is required to be performed by purchaser which he is not done then also it cannot be said that he is in a position to readiness to perform the ultimate act. 58. In N.P. Thirugnanam v. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao and others, (1995) 5 SCC 115 , Court said: “Section 16(c) of the Act envisages that plaintiff must plead and prove that he had performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than those terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. The continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of specific performance. ..... the factum of his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract is to be adjudged with reference to the conduct of the party and the attending circumstances.” 59. In J.P. Builders and another v. A. Ramadas Rao and another, (2011)1 SCC 429 , Court said: “The words “ready” and “willing” imply that the person was prepared to carry out the terms of the contact. The distinction between “readiness” and “willingness” is that the former refers to financial capacity and the latter to the conduct of the plaintiff wanting performance. Generally, readiness is backed by willingness.” 60. In P. D’Souza v. Shondrilo Naidu, (2004) 6 SCC 649 , Court said: “It is indisputable that in a suit for specific performance of contract the plaintiff must establish his readiness and willingness to perform his part of contract. .... The readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform his part of contract would also depend upon the question as to whether the defendant did everything which was required of him to be done in terms of the agreement for sale. “ 61. In R.C. Chandiok and another v. Chuni Lal Sabharwal and others, (1970) 3 SCC 140 , Court said that readiness and willingness cannot be treated as a straight jacket formula. “ 61. In R.C. Chandiok and another v. Chuni Lal Sabharwal and others, (1970) 3 SCC 140 , Court said that readiness and willingness cannot be treated as a straight jacket formula. This has to be determined from the entirety of the facts and circumstances relevant to the intention and conduct of the party concerned. It is settled law that even in the absence of specific plea by the opposite party, it is the mandate of the statute that plaintiff has to comply with Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act and when there is non-compliance with this statutory mandate, the Court is not bound to grant specific performance and is left with no other alternative but to dismiss the suit. It is also clear that readiness to perform must be established throughout the relevant points of time. 62. The facts as discussed above and exposition of law with regard to compliance of Section 16(c), in our view, leave no manner of doubt in recording our conclusion that there was no compliance of requirement of Section 16(c) on the part of Plaintiff-Respondent and Trial Court having failed to consider this aspect in correct perspective has proceeded illegally and findings recorded in this regard are liable to be reversed and we reverse accordingly. We answer Point-4 in favour of Appellant and against Plaintiff-Respondent. 63. No other point has been argued. 64. In view of above discussion and findings returned by us on four points for determination, we have no hesitation in holding that judgment and decree passed by Court below, assailed in this appeal, cannot be sustained. 65. In the result, appeal is allowed. Judgment and decree dated 25.11.2010 passed in Original Suit No. 234 of 2004 is hereby set aside and Original Suit of Plaintiff-Respondent is dismissed. 66. Appellant shall be entitled to costs throughout.