JUDGMENT AND ORDER : Heard Mr. S.N. Sarma, the learned Sr. counsel appearing for the petitioner. The learned counsel Mr. N. Dhar appears for the employee (respondent No.2) in the WP(C) No.2151/2006. The learned counsel Ms. P. Chakraborty appears for other the two employees (respondent No.2) respectively, in the WP(C) Nos.2150/2006 and 2152/2006. 2. These cases are inter-connected and the common challenge is to the analogous order dated 31.12.2005 (Annexure-G), of the Industrial Tribunal at Silchar, whereby approval was refused to the termination of the workmen (respondent No.2) of the Cachar Paper Mill, Panchgram, operating under the Hindustan Paper Corporation Ltd. (HPCL). The Management decided to discharge the workmen on the basis of the misconduct proved against the delinquents and sought approval for their termination, from the Industrial adjudicator by offering the due wages under the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as “the I.D. Act”). However the learned Presiding Officer of the Tribunal refused approval through elaborate examination of the evidence on record and surmising that the Management witnesses had failed to disclose prima facie basis, to accord approval for the Management?s decision. 3. The substance of the allegation against the three workmen Ranjan Roy, Nikanon Naiding and Biswajyoti Deb is that on 07.04.2002, these employees who were posted at other Check Gates, at different locations, left their place of posting and came to the Lailapur Check Gate, at a distance of 80 K.M. (approx), without any permission from the competent authority. At the Check Gate at Lailapur/Bhairabi on the Mizoram-Assam Border, the employees in a clandestine manner, made unauthorized changes in the entry Registers of three bamboo suppliers of the paper mill and made fresh entries incorporating new particulars and prepared 3 new Registers, at the Lailapur Check Gate. 4. When the above manipulation of bamboo supply records at the Border Check Gate was detected, investigation was conducted by the Vigilance Officer. The officer made enquiries and on 14.05.2002 (page-22), made his adverse conclusion. The relevant portion of the report is extracted here-in-below for ready reference:- “……………………… II) The below named officials posted at the place mentioned against their name in clandestine way came to Lailapur Gate from their allotted place of posting & managed to record fake entries in the suppliers registers maintained at Lailapur Check Gate Office. This reflects the malafide intention of the officials. This reflects the malafide intention of the officials. (1) Shri Ashok Roy – Posted at Tripura-Taliamura, around 300 K.M. away from Lailapur. (2) Shri Ranjan Roy – Posted at Bhairabi around 80 K.M. away from Lailapur. (3) Shri Biswajyoti Deb – Posted at Bhairabi around 80 K.M. away from Lailapur. (4) Shri Joygopal Debnath – Posted at Phulartal around 80 K.M. away from Lailapur, although not recorded fake entries in the suppliers entry register and not put any signatures in the registers but encouraged Sl. No.1, 2 & 3, in wrong doing. From scrutiny of the register entries of the supplier, it is transparent that In-charge Mizoram Bamboo procurement works Shri A.K. Bakshi, DM (Forestry) had periodically inspected the registers by putting his signature in the register as authenticity towards correctness of the entries. DM (Forestry) had failed to stop such illegal activities of the staff posted under his control and also suppressed fact to higher-up. From the above it is concluded that the above officials including Vankal and Naiding have abetted the suppliers for not bringing Mizoram bamboo through authorized Lailapur Forest Check Gate but to supply from elsewhere (near distance of Mill). Had DM (Forestry) & above staff not encouraged suppliers, the supplier would not have dared to supply bamboo from its designated source (Mizoram). They caused gain to supplier with malafide intention and are guilty for the same. …………………..”. 5. Because of the above vigilance conclusion, the charges were drawn up against the concerned employees on 21/24.06.2002 (Annexure-B) and they were asked to respond to the allegations. 6. The charges against three employees being relevant, are extracted as under:- Against Ranjan Roy “A. Sri Ranjan Roy, FS-II(SG), Code No.0437 whose place of posting was at Bhairabi (Mizoram) about 80 KM away from Lailapur vide Office order dated 03/05/02 left his place of work without any permission from the Competent Authority and visited Lailapur/Bairangtee Check gage office on 07/04/02 and in a clandestine manner organized unauthorized change of original Register containing records of Bamboo supplier M/s Deep Enterprise and made fresh entries in a new Register incorporating new particulars on 07/04/02 suppressing the fact of such destruction/ defacement of original records from the Competent Authority with malafide intention. Against the entry particulars of the aforesaid new Register Sri Ranjan Roy obtained the signatures of S/Sri Biswajyoti Deb, N. Naidling and R. Vankal. Against the entry particulars of the aforesaid new Register Sri Ranjan Roy obtained the signatures of S/Sri Biswajyoti Deb, N. Naidling and R. Vankal. Sri Ranjan Roy deliberately, omitted to put his signature because he was aware of the unauthorized and illegal status of the changed Register. Sri Ranjan Roy (Place of his posting Bhairabi 80 KM away from Lailapur) had also signed against unfilled columns in the Register maintained at Lailapur/Vairangtee gate office in respect of Bamboo Supplier M/s H.S. Agency relating to the Entry particulars dated 12/04/02 in an unauthorized way and with a malafide intention. Also Shri Ranjan Roy had signed against the entries dated 18/04/02 in the Register maintained at Lailapur/Vairangtee check gate office of HPC/CPM in respect of Bamboo Supplier M/s H.S. Agency. Furthermore Sri Ranjan Roy had also recorded entries Sl. No.78 dated 18/04/02 to Sl. No.112 dated 20/04/02 in the Register maintained at Lailapur/Vairangtee Check Gate at Bhairabi 80 KM away from Lailapur/Vairangtee. The aforesaid unauthorized acts of Sri Ranjan Roy was with an ulterior motive and with a clear intention of illegally benefiting the Bamboo suppliers and causing loss to the Corporation in connivance with the Bamboo suppliers and HPC Officials discussed above. Sri Ranjan Roy, FS-II(SG), Code No.0437 has thereby failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion in his duty. Sri Ranjan Roy acted in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the Corporation. Shri Ranjan Roy is therefore allegedly guilty for committing the following misconducts under Standing Order applicable to him. 1. Defacement or destruction of official document -28(4) 2. Fraud and dishonesty -28(6) 3. Suppression of facts -28(9) 4. Unauthorized absence from place of posting -28(22) 5. Wilful damage or loss to the Corporation -28(25) 6. Commission of any act subversive of discipline and good behaviour or acting in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the Corporation “ -28(52) Against N. Naiding “B. You in a clandestine manner and in connivance with some HPC employees and the Bamboo suppliers organized unauthorized change of 03(three) Nos. of original Entry Registers containing records of 03(three) Bamboo suppliers namely 1. M/s J.M. Saha, 2. M/s Deep Enterprise and 3. of original Entry Registers containing records of 03(three) Bamboo suppliers namely 1. M/s J.M. Saha, 2. M/s Deep Enterprise and 3. M/s J. Bothra and also managed to make fresh entries in 03(three) new Registers incorporating new particulars on 07.04.2002 at Lailapur/ Vairangtee Check Gate office of HPC/CPM suppressing the fact of such change of original records from the Competent Authority with a malafide intention of illegally benefiting the Bamboo suppliers and causing loss to the Corporation. Your aforesaid acts amount to gross misconduct under the Standing Orders Nos. noted below :- 1. Willful defacement or destruction of official document -28(4) 2. Fraud and dishonesty -28(6) 3. Suppression of facts -28(9) 4. Wilful acts causing damage or loss to the Corporation -28(25) 5. Abetment -28(46) 6. Commission of any act subversive of discipline and good behaviour or acting in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the Corporation.“ -28(52) Against Biswajyoti Deb “C. Sri Biswajyoti Deb, Forest Supervisor(SG)-II, Code No.0436 whose place of posting was at Bhairabi (Mizoram) about 80 KM away from Lailapur vide Office order dated 03/05/02 left his place of work without any permission from the Competent Authority and visited Lailapur/Bairangtee Check gage office on 07/04/02 and in a clandestine manner organized unauthorized change of original Register containing records of Bamboo supplier M/s J.M. Saha and M/s Deep Enterprise in connivance with Sri Ashok Kr. Roy, Sri Ranjan Roy, Sri R. Venkal and Sri N. Naiding on 07.04.02 suppressing the fact of such defacement of original records with a malafide intention of illegally benefiting the Bamboo suppliers. Shri Biswajyoti Deb had also signed against unfilled entry columns in the Register maintained at Lailapur/Vairangtee Check Gate office in respect of Bamboo Supplier M/s H.S. Agency at Lailapur/Vairangtee Check Gate Office relating to the Entry particulars dated 12/04/02 in an unauthorized way and with a malafide intention. Also Shri Biswajyoti Deb had signed against the entries dated 18/04/02 in the Register maintained at Lailapur/Vairangtee check gate office of HPC, CPM in respect of Bamboo Supplier M/s H.S. Agency. All the above acts Sri Biswajyoti Deb had committed in connivance with the Bamboo suppliers and HPC officials discussed above in a clear intention of illegally benefiting the Bamboo supplier(s) and causing loss to the Corporation. Sri Biswajyoti Deb, has thereby failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion in his duty. All the above acts Sri Biswajyoti Deb had committed in connivance with the Bamboo suppliers and HPC officials discussed above in a clear intention of illegally benefiting the Bamboo supplier(s) and causing loss to the Corporation. Sri Biswajyoti Deb, has thereby failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion in his duty. Shri Biswajyoti Deb acted in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the Corporation. Shri Biswajyoti Deb is therefore allegedly guilty for committing the following misconducts under Standing Order applicable to him. 1. Willful defacement or destruction of official document -28(4) 2. Fraud and dishonesty -28(6) 3. Suppression of facts -28(9) 4. Absence from the place of work without permission and without sufficient cause -28(22) 5. Willful acts causing damage or loss to the Corporation -28(25) 6. Commission of any act subversive of discipline and good behaviour or acting in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the Corporation” -28(52) 7. In their response(s) the employees claimed that they acted under instruction of their supervisory officer (A.K. Bakshi) and reported at the Lailapur/Bhairabi Check Gate and changed the entries in the Registers for the concerned bamboo suppliers and also kept blank, certain columns in the new Registers, where new entries were made. As they acted on instruction of their controlling officer, the employees sought exoneration from the charges. 8. Those explanation was found to be unsatisfactory and accordingly Mr. D.B. Majumdar, the Manager (Commercial), was appointed as the Inquiry Officer. The employees participated in the proceedings and were afforded due opportunity. The exhibited documents and evidence of the two prosecution witnesses was considered by the Inquiry Officer. The charge of unauthorizedly leaving the place of work, to visit the Lailapur Check Gate and altering the entries for the Bamboo supplies in the new Registers and destruction/defacement of the original Registers, were found proved in the domestic inquiry. 9. The Inquiry Report was then furnished and even on this occasion, the delinquents took the plea that they acted on verbal instruction of their controlling officer. 10. The Disciplinary Authority then considered the materials on record and decided that the penalty of removal from service, under Clause 29(h) of the Standing Orders, be inflicted. Since the related Industrial Dispute was pending in the Silchar Tribunal, the Management offered one month?s wage to the workmen and applied for approval for the termination decision, under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act. 11. Since the related Industrial Dispute was pending in the Silchar Tribunal, the Management offered one month?s wage to the workmen and applied for approval for the termination decision, under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act. 11. The Management?s approval application(s) were registered respectively as the Misc. Case Nos.3, 4 & 5/2003, in the Industrial Tribunal, Silchar. Initially on 25.10.2005, the Tribunal after noticing certain infirmities in the Inquiry Report, declined the approval. The Management was however allowed to lead evidence and during the remanded process, two prosecution witnesses and documents were produced to justify the removal. The witnesses were cross-examined by the delinquents but they declined to adduce any defence evidence of their own. 12. When the approval plea was next considered, under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act, the facts of manipulation of the Registers and fraudulent recording of entries were found to be proved. However because of the non-availability of the original entry Registers (destroyed), the fact of making false entries in the new Registers were described as slip of pen, without any intention to cause financial loss to the HPCL. On this basis the approval was not granted. 13.1 Assailing the legality of the impugned decision, the learned Sr. counsel Mr. S.N. Sarma submits that when Section 33(2)(b) applications are considered by the Court, the Tribunal has to reach the appropriate conclusion by ruling out victimisation or unfair labour practice by the Management and the first endeavour of the Industrial Court must be to determine whether the domestic enquiry is valid on the touchstone of principles of natural justice. If this is satisfied, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal would be limited to examine the prima facie case for according approval. Moreover even if such approval is granted for the penalty, the remedy under the I.D. Act would still be available, to the concerned employees. 13.2 The learned lawyer for the Management next contends that the Industrial Tribunal misdirected itself in going beyond the limited jurisdiction under Section 33 of the I.D. Act and in fact the impugned findings are nothing but perverse finding, as the unauthorised entries recorded in the concerned registers were described as slip of pen. 13.3 As the learned Tribunal unnecessarily took into account that no financial loss has been caused to the Corporation by the delinquent employees and this was made the basis for rejecting the Section 33 applications, the Sr. counsel Mr. 13.3 As the learned Tribunal unnecessarily took into account that no financial loss has been caused to the Corporation by the delinquent employees and this was made the basis for rejecting the Section 33 applications, the Sr. counsel Mr. S.N. Sarma submits that for disciplinary action, misconduct itself is sufficient and resultant financial loss to the employer is not a mandatory condition, for imposing penalty. 13.4 Since none of the delinquents had seriously contested the charge and had pleaded for exoneration by taking the plea that they committed the acts alleged against them, on instruction of their Controlling Officer (Mr. A.K. Bakshi), the Sr. counsel submits that this is practically a case of admission, without any serious challenge to the charges of misconduct. 14.1 On the other hand, Mr. N. Dhar, the learned counsel for the delinquent in the WP(C) No.2151/2006 contends that penalty is proposed on his client without a formal charge-sheet and accordingly the counsel questions the finding dated 30.04.2003 (Annexure-D) of the Enquiry Officer to the effect that the charges have been proved and established, against the delinquent. 14.2 According to Mr. Dhar, the impugned decision is not liable to be interfered by the writ court since such verdicts can be challenged, only on the ground of perversity. 15.1 Representing the two employees in the WP(C) No.2150 and WP(C) No.2152/2006, Ms. P. Chakraborty, the learned counsel focuses her arguments on the fact that the delinquents were dictated by their Controlling Officer to reach the Lailapur Check Gate and to make the fresh entries and accordingly she submits that the binding circumstances through the dictates of the superior officer, should have been taken into account, by the disciplinary authority. 15.2 The learned counsel points out that similar penalisation for another delinquent Joygopal Debnath although was approved by the High Court in the WP(C) No.3081/2005 and it was upheld by the Division Bench, the entire matter is now pending in the Supreme Court and accordingly Ms. Chakraborty submits that the concerned issues are yet to be conclusively determined, by the highest court. 16. The submission made by the learned counsel for the parties have been earnestly considered and I have also examined the materials on record. 17. The key feature of the defence plea in all these cases is that the delinquents had acted as per the verbal instruction of their controlling officer. 16. The submission made by the learned counsel for the parties have been earnestly considered and I have also examined the materials on record. 17. The key feature of the defence plea in all these cases is that the delinquents had acted as per the verbal instruction of their controlling officer. But can this be a reasonable explanation as the concerned employees were posted at distant check gates and had left their place of duty to arrive at the Lailapur check gate for the purpose of destroying the original entries in the concerned registers and replacing them with fresh Registers with fraudulent entries, to benefit certain suppliers of bamboo to the paper mill. The charges were practically admitted and this is specifically recorded by the Enquiry Officer who conducted the enquiry against the delinquent Nikanon Naiding, who is connected with the WP(C) No.2151/2006. 18. It is relevant also to note that one R. Vankal was posted as the In-Charge of the Lailapur check gate. In the context of the visit of the Officer (A.K. Bakshi) and other staff posted at different check gates, R. Vankal mentioned that Ranjan Roy and Biswajyoti Deb are posted at Bhairabi and Ashok Roy is posted at Taliamura and Joy Gopal Debnath is posted at the Manipur check gates of the Paper Mills and all these staff had visited the Lailapur check gate on 07.04.2002 and made changes to the entries of 3 bamboo suppliers. 19. However notwithstanding the manipulation and fraudulent change of entries in the concerned registers at the Lailapur check gate, by employees who were posted elsewhere in other States, the learned Tribunal inexplicably described the change of entries, as act of slip of pen only because, financial loss was not caused to the HPC. Moreover adverse conclusion was drawn for non-production of the old registers by disregarding the fact that the old registers were destroyed, in order to make fraudulent entries to benefit the bamboo suppliers, in the new registers. 20. On the basis of such purported infirmities, the learned Tribunal refused to accord approval for discharge of the employees sought under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act. But in the process, the learned Presiding Officer totally overlooked the limited role of the industrial adjudicator in such matters. 21. 20. On the basis of such purported infirmities, the learned Tribunal refused to accord approval for discharge of the employees sought under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act. But in the process, the learned Presiding Officer totally overlooked the limited role of the industrial adjudicator in such matters. 21. This Court had the occasion to examine the scope and ambit of power of the Tribunal, under Section 33(2)(b) in the case of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Vs. Presiding Officer reported in 2005(4) GLT 635 and we can benefit here by the Court?s ratio in the following two paragraphs of the judgment:- “…………………… 6. Section 33 of the Act contemplates prior permission or approval, as the case maybe, in respect of a disciplinary measure that an employer seeks to or has imposed on a delinquent workman. The object behind the enactment of Section 33 has always been understood to-be to ensure that there is no victimization or unfair labour practice in respect of a workman against whom disciplinary action is sought to be taken or has been imposed, in a situation where there is already an industrial dispute pending, involving such a workman. It is in keeping with the object behind Section 33 that the scope, sweep and extent of the powers of the Industrial Court under Section 33 must be understood. Punishment proposed or imposed in respect of which prior permission or approval, as may be, has been sought, may or may not be preceded by a domestic enquiry. On the ratio of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Lord Krishna Textile Mills (supra) and Lala Ram (supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the first endeavour of the Industrial Court must be to find out whether the domestic enquiry held is valid on the touchstone of the principles of natural justice. On the ratio of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Lord Krishna Textile Mills (supra) and Lala Ram (supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the first endeavour of the Industrial Court must be to find out whether the domestic enquiry held is valid on the touchstone of the principles of natural justice. If the domestic enquiry held against the respondent workman is found to be valid, the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court under Section 33(2)(b) would be limited to seeing whether a prima facie case for according approval has been made out or not and in proceeding in the matter the Industrial Court may consider: (a) "Whether the standing orders justify the order of dismissal, (b) Whether an enquiry has been held as provided by the standing order, (c) Whether the wages for the month have been paid as required by the proviso, and (d) Whether an application has been made as prescribed by the proviso." [Lord Krishna Textile Mills Vs. Its Workmen reported in AIR 1961 SC 860 ] To the above areas of examination another significant and permissible area of adjudication would be to see whether the punishment imposed is byway of victimization or unfair labour practice. The determination to be made by the Industrial Court under Section 33(2)(b) in a situation where the domestic enquiry has been found to be valid will naturally have to be on the basis of the records of the domestic enquiry. If, however, a domestic enquiry has not been held or if held is found to be invalid, the Industrial Court will have to allow evidence of the contesting parties to be adduced before it and it is only on an appraisal of such evidence that the question as to whether approval should be granted or not under Section 33(2)(b) has to be reached. Though in the second situation, the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court under Section 33(2)(b) may, at first blush, appear to be broader than in the first, in reality there is no fundamental difference in the scope and extent of the power to be exercised as in both the situations. The ultimate conclusion of the Industrial Court under Section 33(2)(b) has to be reached from the stand point of whether there has been any victimization or unfair labour practice in the disciplinary measure that has been imposed by the employer. The ultimate conclusion of the Industrial Court under Section 33(2)(b) has to be reached from the stand point of whether there has been any victimization or unfair labour practice in the disciplinary measure that has been imposed by the employer. The justification of the punishment imposed must be necessarily tested by the Industrial Court under Section 33(2)(b) from the above stand-point as any other view may have the effect of impairing a possible adjudication under Section 10 of the Act, recourse to which would still be available to the concerned workman even in a case where approval has been granted under Section 33(2)(b). 7. The distinction noted above is fine and in some cases the dividing line may appear to be thin. The question of victimization or unfair labour practice being adopted may in a given case be inextricably linked up with the question of justification of the punishment and in such cases the dividing the between the limited power of the Industrial Court under Section 33(2)(b) and the broader power under Section 10 may get obliterated. However, what must be emphasized is that the distinction is real and discernible and therefore must be maintained and the task of identification of the distinction or the dividing line must be left to the discretion of the Industrial adjudicator to be exercised after due and proper application of judicial mind. What must be emphasized is that care must be taken not to render the provisions of Section 10 nugatory. ......................” 22. What is important to note here is that the learned Tribunal in refusing to accord approval to the punishment, did not record any finding that the punishment was by way of victimization or unfair labour practice. In fact fault was found on the quality of the evidence forgetting altogether that the decision of the Management to penalize the delinquents, was preceded by a due process of showcause and a domestic enquiry. In a situation where the employees had participated in the proceeding and were afforded due opportunity to defend the charge, the penalization approval should have been decided within the permissible arena of jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act. But no attempt was made by the Tribunal to determine whether the delinquents were being victimized or subjected to unfair labour practice. But no attempt was made by the Tribunal to determine whether the delinquents were being victimized or subjected to unfair labour practice. Most importantly, despite adequate evidence for the prima facie satisfaction, the learned Tribunal rendered a perverse verdict, by disregarding the relevant materials. 23. In so far as the specific argument of Mr. Dhar that his client (Nikanon Naiding) is being penalized without issuing the formal charge-sheet and simply on the basis of a show-cause notice, we can answer this question by referring to the ratio in Krishna Chandra Tandon Vs. Union of India reported in (1974)4 SCC 374 . Here the concerned delinquent was issued the show-cause notice on 21.06.2002 (Annexure-B), which described without any ambiguity, the misconduct alleged against the workman. Clear reference was made to willful defacement or destruction of official documents, fraud and dishonesty, suppression of facts, abatement, acts subversive of discipline and good behaviour. Moreover which specific clause of Standing Orders have been violated, were also indicated in the said show-cause notice issued to Nikanon Naiding. The response of the delinquent furnished on 15.07.2002 indicates that he had no difficulty in understanding the charge and in fact his response was shown to be the written statement of defence, against the memorandum of charge. Thus the delinquent harboured no confusion on the nature of the charge and in fact formally responded to the show cause notice issued against him, leading to the departmental proceeding. In Krishna Chandra Tandon (supra), the Supreme Court categorically stated that there is no magic in the word charge-sheet and therefore I am of the considered opinion that in the absence of any prejudice being caused to the delinquent, no advantage can be gained by him merely because, formal statement of allegations were not furnished in the concerned proceeding. 24. On the issue of the charge-sheet it will be also be appropriate to note that the charge-sheet need not contain the details of the documents or the names of the witnesses proposed to be examined to prove the charge or a list to that effect unless, there is a specific requirement under the Rules. In fact a charge-sheet is not expected to be a record of evidence and what is required to be ensured is to provide a fair opportunity to the delinquent, to defend the charges. In these cases adequate compliance of the legal requirement is seen. 25. In fact a charge-sheet is not expected to be a record of evidence and what is required to be ensured is to provide a fair opportunity to the delinquent, to defend the charges. In these cases adequate compliance of the legal requirement is seen. 25. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court has no hesitation to declare that the refusal by the Industrial Tribunal to accord approval to the removal of the workmen from service was unjustified. In such circumstances, this Court has the option to remit back the matter for according the approval as sought by the Management. But considering the long duration of the litigation and also the ratio in Cholan Roadways Ltd. Vs. G. Thirugnanasambandam reported in (2005)3 SCC 241 and our own Court?s verdict in the General Manager, Hindustan Paper Corporation Ltd. Vs. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal reported in 2006 (Suppl.) 1 GLT 420 and the conclusion drawn, approval is found to be merited to the Management’s decision. Therefore this Court accords the approval to the order of punishment. However, the employees are at liberty, to take recourse to any other remedial measure under the I.D. Act. 26. Before parting with the records, it would be appropriate to note the fact that the respondent No.2 Ranjan Roy in the WP(C) No.2150/2006 has died during the pendency of this case, but since this Court allowed the application of the Management, the death of the litigant will have no bearing on the Court’s conclusion. But if the legal heirs are interested to pursue this matter further, they are at liberty to do so. 27. With the above order, the three cases are allowed in the manner indicated without any order on cost.