Research › Search › Judgment

J&K High Court · body

2018 DIGILAW 41 (JK)

Satvinder Singh v. State of J&K

2018-02-01

BADAR DURREZ AHMED, MOHAMMAD YAQOOB MIR

body2018
JUDGMENT : BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J. 1. The present batch of appeals arises out of the common judgment dated 15.07.2011 delivered by a learned Single Judge of this Court. The controversy pertains to the advertisement notice No. 6 of 1997 for the post of ‘Technician Grade-III). The appellants alongwith others had applied pursuant to the said notice and had participated in the selection process. They were, however, not selected. They, therefore, filed writ petitions in the years 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001. Some other petitions were also filed by the other persons who were also not selected. A common judgment dated 01.06.1999 was delivered by a learned Single Judge of this Court in respect of all those ‘other’ writ petitioners. Based on that decision, the writ petitions filed by the present appellants were allowed by separate orders in the years 1999, 2000 and 2001. In respect of some of the judgments which were delivered in favour of some of the appellants herein, Letter Patent Appeals were preferred by the Service Selection Board before a Division Bench of this Court. Those LPAs were also decided in favour of the appellants herein on 16.11.2002. That decision dated 16.11.2002 was a common judgment in respect of the appellants herein as also the ‘other’ writ petitioners, which we have referred to above. 2. The State of Jammu and Kashmir filed Special Leave Petitions selectively in respect of the decision dated 16.11.2002 in some of the LPAs and not in respect of others. Only some of the LPAs which had been preferred vis-à-vis the appellants herein were the subject matter of the Special Leave Petitions on the part of the State or the Service Selection Board before the Supreme Court. 3. From the above narration of events, it is evident that:- (a) There was no appeal filed vis-à-vis some of the appellants herein in whose favour the Single Bench of this Court had decided; (b) There were some LPAs in respect of some of the appellants herein, which were decided by the Division Bench on 16.11.2002 in favour of the appellants herein, against which no Special Leave Petition was preferred before the Supreme Court; (c) A few of the Special Leave Petitions filed before the Supreme Court involved some of the appellants herein as respondents (initial or by way of impleadment). 4. From this, it is evident that insofar as Serial Nos. 4. From this, it is evident that insofar as Serial Nos. 1 and 2 above are concerned, the orders passed by the Single Bench and the Division Bench, respectively, have become final as no appeals were preferred against the same. Insofar as Serial No. 3 is concerned, that forms the subject matter of the decision of the Supreme Court dated 26.10.2005 and would obviously be governed by that decision. 5. Therefore, one way or the other, the benefit of the decisions of the Single Bench, the Division Bench or the Supreme Court, as the case may be, had to be given to the appellants herein. Since they were not so given, a second set of petitions was filed in the years 2005, 2006 and 2007. However, it may be pointed out that this set of writ petitions was filed subsequent to the contempt petitions having been disposed of as not being maintainable. It may also be necessary to point out that 125 candidates have been given the benefit of the Supreme Court decision on the one hand while on the other hand the appellants herein had been denied the benefit of the judgments in their favour. 6. The learned Single Judge by way of the impugned judgment dated 15.07.2011 examined the Supreme Court decision and in that context considered as to what meaning is to be ascribed to the word ‘petitioners’ as appearing in the said Supreme Court order. The learned Single Judge held that the Supreme Court order dated 26.10.2005 would govern only those writ petitioners, who were before this Court and whose writ petitions ultimately reached the Supreme Court or whose writ petitions were pending and subsequently disposed of by the Supreme Court. According to the learned Single Judge, this would not include the cases of those writ petitioners, who were prompted by the order of the Supreme Court and thereafter, approached this Court and filed fresh petitions to get similar benefits as granted by the Supreme Court. The learned Single Judge also interpreted the Supreme Court’s order to the effect that it would not apply to such candidates whose claims suffer from laches as there would be inordinate delay in the filing of the writ petitions. It is in this context that the learned Single Judge dismissed the petitions filed by the appellants herein. 7. The learned Single Judge also interpreted the Supreme Court’s order to the effect that it would not apply to such candidates whose claims suffer from laches as there would be inordinate delay in the filing of the writ petitions. It is in this context that the learned Single Judge dismissed the petitions filed by the appellants herein. 7. We do not agree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge for the simple reason that the learned Single Judge did not note the fact that when the Supreme Court order dated 26.10.2005 came to be passed, the present appellants had already succeeded either before the Single Bench or the Division Bench, or were parties to the Supreme Court decision. The second round of writ petitions that were filed by the appellants herein cannot be construed as being delayed inasmuch as they had already succeeded in the first round and the cause of action had arisen afresh because the 125 persons were appointed and the present appellants were denied consideration. 8. Since the plea was raised on the part of the respondents that the Supreme Court decision would apply only to those persons, who were writ petitioners, in respect of which the appeal before the Supreme Court had been preferred, we put it to the learned counsel for the respondent to take a stand as to whether the decision of the Supreme Court would be in rem or in personam. No clear cut answer was forthcoming from the respondents. In any event, the decision of the Supreme Court, if it is to be regarded as one in rem, these appeals would, in any event, be covered and the benefit cannot be denied to the appellants. If, on the other hand, it is to be regarded as a decision in personam, then also the appellants would be entitled to the relief because they had judgments in their favour which had attained finality either before the learned Single Judge or before the Division Bench and, of-course, by virtue of the Supreme Court decision in which some of them were parties. 9. We are also informed that there are 28 available vacancies and the appellants are less than 28 in number and, therefore, if they fulfill the criteria as laid down by the Supreme Court then all of them can be accommodated. 10. 9. We are also informed that there are 28 available vacancies and the appellants are less than 28 in number and, therefore, if they fulfill the criteria as laid down by the Supreme Court then all of them can be accommodated. 10. Consequently, we direct that the appellants who had obtained more than the cutoff marks secured in the 1997 selection be considered for filling the unfilled vacancies. The exercise be completed within eight weeks. 11. The appeals are accordingly disposed of.