JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. HS Paonam, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. N Bipin, learned advocate for the petitioners in WP(C) No. 388 of 2018 and WP(C) No. 399 of 2018, and also Mr. M. Hemchandra, learned senior counsel assisted by T. Momo Singh and Mr. Rohitkumar, learned counsel for the petitioners in WP(C) No. 390 of 2018 as well as Mr. S. Rupachandra, learned Additional-Advocate General, Manipur assisted by Ms. Joan Kipgen, Advocate for the State and official respondents. 2. In these three writ petitions, being WP(C) No. 388 of 2018, WP(C) No. 390 of 2018 and WP(C) No. 399 of 2018, the issues raised are intrinsically linked and as such are clubbed and heard together and disposed of by this common judgment and order. 3. WP(C) No. 388 of 2018 has been filed challenging the letter dated 2.5.2018 issued by the State Government to the Deputy Commissioner, Tamenglong District intimating that the meeting held on 15.1.2018 to consider the No Confidence Motion for removal of the Chairperson of the Autonomous-District Council, Tamenglong is void ab-initio and that the second proviso under section 23(2) of the Manipur(Hill Area) District Councils Act, 1971 (District Councils Act, 1971 for short) which places a bar on moving a fresh no-confidence motion within one year of defeat of such no-confidence motion shall not be applicable and, accordingly, directing the Deputy Commissioner to hold a fresh meeting of the ADC for consideration of removal of the Chairman, Tamenglong Autonomous District Council (ADC for short) by giving notice to all the elected members only. On the other hand, WP(C) No. 390 of 2018 has been filed seeking for a direction to the respondents to implement and give effect to the aforesaid letter dated 2.5.2018 challenged in writ petition, WP(C) No. 388 of 2018, by those who are in support of the no-confidence motion to remove the incumbent Chairman of the Tamenglong Autonomous District Council. WP(C) No. 399 of 2018 has been filed by the same set of petitioners who filed writ petition WP(C) No. 388 of 2018 challenging the notice dated 8.5.2018 issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Tamenglong for holding the meeting of District Council on 2.5.2018 to consider the resolution for removal of the Chairman of the ADC, pursuant to the Government letter dated 2.5.2018, challenged in WP(C) No. 390 of 2018. 4. 4. As we proceed to examine the issues raised in these petitions, it may be necessary to traverse back to the proximate past to understand the background in which the present issues have arisen and refer to the relevant facts. 5, The origin of the present litigation lies in a meeting notice dated 27.4.2017 issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Tamenglong pursuant to a requisition notice dated 28.3.2017 for removal of the Chairman of the Tamenglong Autonomous District Council. 6. The said meeting notice dated 27.04.2017 was challenged in WP(C) No. 337 of 2017 on the ground that the requisition notice dated 28.3.2017 was not submitted in accordance with Rule 7 of the Manipur (Hill Areas) District Councils Rules, 1972 which provides for delivery of notice in person to the Deputy Commissioner by one of the signatories. The said writ petition, WP(C) No. 337 of 2017 which was, dismissed with the direction that the Deputy Commissioner, before he proceeds with the convening of the meeting, shall verify from the records and get himself satisfied thereof as to whether the requisition notice had been served upon him in terms of Rule 7 of the Manipur (Hill Areas) District Councils Rules, 1972. 7. Thereafter, a meeting was again convened vide notice dated 24.06.2017 to be held on 30.06.2017 which was again challenged in WP(C) No. 455 of 2017. It may be also noted that another writ petition was also filed, being WP(C) No. 433 of 2017 seeking for a direction that the nominated members of the Tamenglong Autonomous District Council, being not elected members, should not be allowed to take part in the proceedings of the Council including the meeting for considering removal or election of the Chairman or Vice Chairman, as they do not have voting rights. 8. The aforesaid two writ petitions, WP(C) No. 433 of 2017 and WP(C) No. 455 of 2017 were heard together and disposed of by a common judgment and order dated 10.10.2017. In WP(C) No. 433 of 2017 this Court directed that nominated members of the Tamenglong Autonomous District Council do not have voting rights in any proceeding of the Autonomous District Council including in a meeting convened for electing or considering No Confidence Motion against the Chairman or Vice Chairman of the Tamenglong Autonomous District Council. 9. In WP(C) No. 433 of 2017 this Court directed that nominated members of the Tamenglong Autonomous District Council do not have voting rights in any proceeding of the Autonomous District Council including in a meeting convened for electing or considering No Confidence Motion against the Chairman or Vice Chairman of the Tamenglong Autonomous District Council. 9. The other writ petition being, WP(C) No. 455 of 2017 was allowed by quashing the meeting notice dated 24.06.2017 and Corrigendum meeting notice dated 24.06.2017. 10. The aforesaid common judgment and order dated 10.10.2017 passed by this Court in the aforesaid two writ petitions, was challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court by filing an SLP which dismissed it with the observation that the question of law has been kept open. The finding arrived at in WP(C) No. 433 of 2017 by this Court that the nominated members do not have voting rights was not disturbed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court has attained finality. In view of the above development, the entire process for removal of the Chairman of the Tamenglong Autonomous District Council was to be reinitiated without allowing the nominated members to take part in the meeting to consider No Confidence Motion. 11. Thereafter, on a requisition made by the 12 members of the District Council, the Deputy Commissioner issued a notice on 23.10.2017 for removal of the Chairman of the District Council, Tamenglong fixing the date of the meeting on 09.11.2017, which, however, was postponed until further order. Subsequently, in terms of a direction of this Court in W.P(C) No.98 of 2017, another notice was issued by the Deputy Commissioner dated 28.12.2017 convening the meeting on 15.01.2018 for removal of the Chairman of the District Council. 12. After the aforesaid notice was issued on 28.12.2017, convening the meeting for consideration of No Confidence Motion against the Chairman of the District Council on 15.1.2018, the State Government brought an amendment to the Manipur (Hill Areas) District Councils Act, 1971 by enacting the Manipur (Hill Areas) District Councils (Fourth Amendment) Act, 2018 by which Section 4 of the Principal Act was amended by adding Sub-section (4) which provided that the members nominated under Sub-section (3) of Section 4 shall have voting rights in all meetings of the District Council to which they are nominated, vide Section 2 of the Fourth Amendment Act. Another amendment was brought in by the aforesaid Fourth Amendment Act to Section 23 of the Act by adding two provisos to Sub-section (2) of Section 23. The aforesaid amendments read as follows :- “2. In Section 4 of the Manipur (Hill Areas) District Councils Act, 1971 (hereinafter) referred to as the Principal Act) after sub-section (3), the following sub-section shall be added namely:- “(4) The members so nominated under sub-section (3) shall have voting rights in all meetings of the District Council to which they are nominated.” 3. In sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Principal Act, the following provisos shall be added, namely:- “Provided that no motion for such resolution shall be brought against the Chairman or Vice-Chairman, as the case may be, within one year of his assumption of office as the Chairman or Vice-Chairman, as the case may be, of the District Council. Provided further that if a motion for such resolution is defeated, no motion for such resolution shall be brought within a period of one year from the date of such defeat of the motion.” Thus, the aforesaid Fourth Amendment Act, 2018 brought three changes in the District Councils Act, 1971. The first amendment permitted nominated members to vote. The second amendment provided that no motion for resolution for removal of the Chairman or the Vice-Chairman shall be brought against the Chairman or the Vice Chairman within a period of one year from the date of assumption of office. The third amendment provided that if a motion for no-confidence is defeated, no motion for such resolution shall be brought within a period of one year from the date of such defeat of the motion. 13. The aforesaid Fourth Amendment Act, 2018 was challenged before this Court in WP(C) No. 31 of 2018 by some of the petitioners with reference to the amendment of Section 4 of the Principal Act which conferred voting right to the nominated members. This Court by an interim order passed on 15.01.2018 in the said petition suspended the operation of the aforesaid provision granting voting right to the nominated members. It may be mentioned that as far as the other amendments made to sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Act were concerned, these were not challenged. 14. This Court by an interim order passed on 15.01.2018 in the said petition suspended the operation of the aforesaid provision granting voting right to the nominated members. It may be mentioned that as far as the other amendments made to sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Act were concerned, these were not challenged. 14. Though the said interim order was passed suspending the voting rights of the nominated members, the said meeting which was scheduled to be held on 15.01.2018 went ahead in which the two nominated members participated and were permitted to vote, as reflected in the proceedings of the meeting held on 15.01.2017. 15. In the minutes of the meeting, it is recorded that in the final tally of votes, the Presiding Officer (the Deputy Commissioner) excluded the 2(two) votes of the nominated members because of the interim order passed by the Court suspending the voting rights of the nominated members. It was also recorded that there was no simple majority on either of the sides, as 12 members supported the resolution and equal member of 12 members did not support, who walked out of the meeting. 16. The records of the proceeding of the meeting held on 15.01.2018 were submitted by the Deputy Commissioner on 16.01.2018 to the Principal Secretary, Tribal Affairs and Hills, Government of Manipur. Thereafter, the Deputy Secretary (TA& Hills) by her letter dated 22.01.2018 wrote to the Chief Executive Officer, Autonomous District Council, Tamenglong lifting the ban on financial transactions imposed earlier because of the No-Confidence Motion moved against the Chairman. 17. Purportedly in response to the aforesaid letter dated 22.01.2018, the Deputy Commissioner, Tamenglong wrote to the Principal Secretary (TA & Hills), Government of Manipur on 29.1.2018 giving additional information that the proceeding of the meeting was conducted and completed on 15.1.2018 as per the existing Act and subsequent amendments, and as the matter was put to vote, 11 members walked off along with Shri Namsinrei Panmei (the incumbent Chairman) while 14 members including the two nominated members were present and voted against the Chairman and accordingly, the motion for removal of Shri Namsinrei Panmei was passed by a simple majority of the total membership of the House, i.e., 14 out of 26 members. It has been also mentioned in the said letter dated 29.01.2018 of the Deputy Commissioner that the order passed by the High Court in WP(C) No. 31 of 2018 which suspended the Notification No.2/78/2017-leg/1: dated 12th January, 2018 which had granted voting rights to the nominated members was communicated to him verbally without any official papers, only after all proceedings of the House had been successfully conducted as per the existing Act. Accordingly, the Deputy Commissioner placed the matter to the Government for taking further necessary action. 18. Thereafter, the State Government issued an order on 31.1.2018 for removal of the incumbent Chairman by exercising the power conferred under sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Manipur (Hill Areas) District Councils Act, 1971. The said order dated 31.01.2018 passed by the State Government removing the incumbent Chairman of Tamenglong ADC was challenged in WP(C) No. 89 of 2018 and this Court in the said petition by an interim order dated 02.02.2018 suspended the aforesaid State Government order dated 31.01.2018. 19. After the interim order was passed by this Court suspending the order dated 31.01.2018, the Government of Manipur withdrew the aforesaid order vide order dated 5.2.2018. The said development was brought to the notice of this Court by the learned Addl. Advocate General on the next date of hearing and a copy of the said withdrawal order was placed before the Court. In view of above development and submission made by the Ld. Addl. Advocate General and other counsel for the parties, this Court held that once the impugned order dated 31.01.2018 by which the Chairman of District Council was removed, was withdrawn by the Government, the natural consequence which would follow is that the position obtaining before issuance of the impugned order dated 31.01.2018 will be revived. In other words, the aforesaid incumbent, Shri Namsinrei Panmei will be restored to his position as the Chairman of the Tamenglong Autonomous District Council. With the aforesaid observation, the said writ petition was closed. 20. Thereafter, the State Government through a letter dated 2.5.2018 directed the Deputy Commissioner, Tamenglong to hold a fresh meeting for consideration of removal of the Chairman, ADC by giving notice to all the elected members, in view of the orders passed in writ petition, WP(C) No. 31 of 2018 suspending the operation of Section 2 of the Fourth Amendment Act, 2018. In the said letter dated 2.5.2018 it is mentioned that No Confidence meeting held on 15.01.2018 is void ab-initio and the 2ndproviso to sub-section (2) of Section 23 placing an embargo on subsequent No Confidence Motion for a period of one year shall not be applicable. The Government took the view that since the meeting held on 15.01.2018 was void ab initio, the bar placed under the 2nd proviso to sub-section (2) of section 23 of the Principal Act shall not be applicable. 21. The aforesaid Government letter dated 2.5.2018 directing the Deputy Commissioner for convening a meeting for consideration of the removal of the Chairman has been challenged in WP(C) No. 388 of 2018. 22. The Deputy Commissioner on the basis of the aforesaid Government letter dated 2.5.2018 issued a notice on 8.5.2018 notifying that the no confidence meeting held on 15.1.2018 for removal of the incumbent ADC Chairman has been declared void ab initio and a fresh notice was issued informing that a meeting will be held for resolution of removal of the incumbent Chairman on 25.5.2018. 23. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid notice dated 8.5.2018, issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Tamenglong, the same has been challenged in WP(C) No. 399 of 2018. 24. It may be stated that before the aforesaid meeting notice dated 8.5.2018 was issued by the Deputy Commissioner, the writ petition, WP(C) No. 154 of 2018 was filed by persons who were opposed to the present incumbent Chairman seeking for a direction to expeditiously implement the proceedings of the meeting held on 15.1.2018. However, in view of the aforesaid Government letter dated 02.05.2018 addressed to the Deputy Commissioner for holding a fresh meeting for consideration of the removal of the Chairman, ADC Tamenglong, the said writ petition, WP(C) No. 154 of 2018 was withdrawn. 25. It may be mentioned that WP(C) No. 390 of 2018 was filed on 8th May, 2018 by those supporting the no-confidence motion seeking for a direction to the official respondents to implement the letter dated 2.5.2018 issued by the Joint Secretary (TA & Hills), Government of Manipur expeditiously. 26. Since all these writ petitions are thus connected, this Court thought it appropriate to club and hear these together. 26. Since all these writ petitions are thus connected, this Court thought it appropriate to club and hear these together. While one set of writ petitioners are seeking initiation of process for removal of the Chairman, ADC Tamenglong as in WP(C) No. 390 of 2018, the other petitioners in other sets of writ petitions, WP(C) No. 388 of 2018 and WP(C) No. 399 of 2018 are claiming that there cannot be any fresh consideration for removal of the Chairman of the Tamenglong ADC by invoking the 2nd Proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 23 contending that in the meeting held on 15.1.2018, the no-confidence motion was defeated and hence, there cannot be a fresh no-confidence motion for another year. 27. In view of above conflicting stands of the two groups of petitioners in these petitions, an interim order was passed on 24.05.2018 directing that though the meeting to consider the no-confidence motion may be held on 25th May, 2018, the result of the same shall be kept in sealed cover and shall not be opened by the authority without specific leave of the Court. 28. It may be noted that none of the official respondents including the State Government has filed any affidavit-in-opposition in any of these writ petitions and as such the present petitions are considered on the basis of the pleadings in the writ petitions and submissions advanced before this Court and records produced before this Court. 29. As evident from above, the foremost important issue raised in these petitions is the applicability of the second proviso to Sub section (2) of Section 23 of the Manipur (Hill Areas) District Council Act, 1971 referred to above, which provides that if a no-confidence motion brought for removal of the Chairman or Vice-chairman is defeated, no such motion for such resolution shall be brought within a period of one year of such defeat of the motion. The other interrelated issues are as to whether there was a valid proceeding of the no-confidence motion held on 15.1.2018 and whether such a motion of no-confidence was defeated or not. 30. The fact remains that there was a meeting held on 15.1.2018 to consider the No Confidence Motion moved against the Chairperson of the Tamenglong ADC. The other interrelated issues are as to whether there was a valid proceeding of the no-confidence motion held on 15.1.2018 and whether such a motion of no-confidence was defeated or not. 30. The fact remains that there was a meeting held on 15.1.2018 to consider the No Confidence Motion moved against the Chairperson of the Tamenglong ADC. According to the petitioners in WP(C) No. 388 of 2018 and WP(C) No. 399 of 2018, the motion of no-confidence brought against the Chairman of the Tamenglong Autonomous District Council for his removal in the aforesaid meeting was defeated. According to them in that event, second proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the District Council Act, 1971 would come into operation and there cannot be another motion brought for removal of the Chairman before expiry of one year from 15.1.2018. On the other hand, it is the case of the petitioners in WP(C) No. 390 of 2018 as well as the official respondents that the meeting held on 15.1.2018 to consider the motion of no-confidence for removal of the Chairman of the Tamenglong Autonomous District Council was declared as void ab-initio by the State Government. As the meeting held on 15.1.2018 was declared void ab-initio, the question of any resolution moved for removal of the Chairperson of the ADC being defeated, does not arise. In that event, the restriction placed by the second proviso of sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the District Council Act as added by the 4th Amendment Act, 2018 will not be applicable as clearly mentioned in the impugned Government letter dated 2.5.2018. According to them, the aforesaid restraining proviso will be attracted only when the resolution moved for removal of the Chairperson of the Tamenglong Autonomous District Council was defeated. However, in the present case, as the meeting held on 15.1.2018 for considering the No Confidence Motion against the Chairman, ADC was declared void ab-initio by the State Government, the question of resolution being defeated or not does not arise and hence the aforesaid barring provision cannot be applicable. Accordingly, it has been contended that nothing prevents those persons who are desirous of removing the Chairperson of the Tamenglong ADC to bring a no-confidence motion against him again. 31. Accordingly, it has been contended that nothing prevents those persons who are desirous of removing the Chairperson of the Tamenglong ADC to bring a no-confidence motion against him again. 31. From the above rival stands taken by the contesting parties, it is of utmost importance to examine whether the decision of the State Government to declare the meeting held on 15.1.2018 to consider the no-confidence motion as void ab-initio, to be correct or not. If such decision of the State Government is valid, there would be no impediment to hold a fresh meeting to consider No Confidence Motion against the Chairperson as the Second proviso to sub section (2) of Section 23 of the District Council Act,1971 would not be applicable. On the other hand, if can be demonstrated, as contended by the petitioners in WP(C) No. 388 of 2018 and WP(C) No. 399 of 2018 that the decision of the State Government to declare the meeting held on 15.1.2018 as void ab-initio was wrong and illegal and that the motion brought against the Chairman of the Tamenglong ADC was indeed defeated as contended by them, the embargo placed by the second proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the District Council Act,1971 would be attracted and hence, there cannot be any resolution again for removal of the Chairman of the Tamenglong ADC for another one year w.e.f 15.1.2018. 32. In the light of the above, if the decision of the State Government to declare the meeting held on 15.1.2018 to be void ab initio is upheld, no further consideration in these petitions will be necessary as it will be deemed that no such meeting was ever held on 15.01.2018 and in that view, the question of defeat of the motion does not arise. In that event, the embargo placed by the 2nd proviso to subsection 2 of Section 23 of the Autonomous District Councils Act, 1971 will not come into operation and there would not be any bar to move any No Confidence Motion against the Chairperson, in which event, the meeting already convened on 25.5.2018 vide notice dated 8.5.2018 can proceed and necessary consequences would flow on the basis of the proceedings of the meeting held on 25.5.2018. 33. 33. On the other hand, if it is held by this Court that the said meeting held on 15.1.2018 is not void ab initio, the next question which will arise for consideration is whether the resolution moved for removal of the Chairman of the District Council in the said meeting was defeated or not. If it is found that the motion of no-confidence was defeated, obviously the interdict placed by the 2nd proviso would come into play and for that reason there cannot be any motion for no confidence against the Chairman for another 1 (one) year and the meeting already held on 25.5.2018 can not be given effect to. 34. Accordingly, we will first proceed to examine whether the meeting held on 15.01.2018 was validly declared as void ab initio by the State Government. 35. The ommon plea taken by the State/official respondents as well as the petitioners in WP(C) No. 390 of 2018 is that the aforesaid meeting held on 15.1.2018 was full of illegalities and irregularities which rendered the said meeting void ab initio. They contended that in the said meeting held on 15.01.2018, the nominated members of the District Council had taken part, which participation, was not permissible in view of the interim order dated 15.01.2018 passed in WP(C) No. 31 of 2018 by which the amendment made to the Principal Act granting voting right to the nominated members was suspended. 36. It has been contended by them that the meeting scheduled on 15.1.2018 was held at 11 am for removal of the Chairman of the Tamenglong Autonomous District Council where the two nominated members had also taken part in the vote. The Deputy Commissioner recorded the proceedings held on 15.01.2018 and forwarded to the Government on 16.1.2018. Subsequently, the Deputy Commissioner vide his letter dated 29.1.2018 furnished additional information to the State Government stating that the interim order passed by the High Court on 15.1.2018 was communicated to him orally that too, after the conclusion of the meeting in which the said two nominated members also voted, thus the motion of no-confidence motion was passed by a simple majority of 14 member out of 26 total membership of the Council. 37. 37. It has been thus, contended that the State Government, after considering the reports submitted by the Deputy Commissioner, issued the order on 31.01.2018 holding that the meeting scheduled on 15.01.2018 started from 11 am and 14 members including the two nominated members voted in favour of the resolution for removal of the Chairman and after the proceeding of the meeting concluded, the Deputy Commissioner, Tamenglong received information about the order dated 15.01.2018 passed by this Court in WP(C) No. 31 of 2018 which suspended the right of the nominated members to vote. Accordingly, by the aforesaid order dated 31.01.2018, the Government ordered the removal of the incumbent Chairman of the Tamenglong Autonomous District Council with immediate effect and further directed for election of a new Chairman. 38. The aforesaid Government order dated 31.01.2018 came to be immediately challenged by 3 (three) petitioners including the Chairman in WP(C) No. 89 of 2018 and this Court in the said writ petition passed an interim order on 2.2.2018 suspending the aforesaid Government order dated 31.01.2018. 39. Perhaps, due to the suspension of the Government order dated 31.01.2018 by this Court in WP(C) No. 89 of 2018, the Government was inclined to withdraw the aforesaid Government order dated 31.01.2018 and accordingly, issued an order on 05.01.2018 stating that the aforesaid Government order dated 31.01.2018 is withdrawn. When the aforesaid writ petition, WP(C) No. 89 of 2018 was taken up on 14.02.2018, the learned Addl. AG submitted before this Court that the Government order dated 31.01.2018 challenged in the writ petition has been withdrawn by the State Government by issuing the order dated 05.02.2018 and placed a copy of the same before the Court. Accordingly, this Court held that as the impugned order challenged in the writ petition has been withdrawn, the natural consequence which will follow is that the position obtaining before the issuance of the impugned Government order dated 31.01.2018 will be revived and the petitioner no. 3 therein, who was the Chairman of the Tamenglong Autonomous District Council, would be restored to his position as Chairman. The aforesaid order dated 14.02.2018 passed in WP(C) No. 89 of 2018 reads as follows: “Heard Mr. H.S. Paonam, learned senior counsel, assisted by Mr. N. Bipin, learned counsel for the petitioners. Heard also Mr. S. Rupachandra, learned Additional A.G for the State; as well as Mr. M. Hemchandra, learned senior counsel, assisted by Mr. The aforesaid order dated 14.02.2018 passed in WP(C) No. 89 of 2018 reads as follows: “Heard Mr. H.S. Paonam, learned senior counsel, assisted by Mr. N. Bipin, learned counsel for the petitioners. Heard also Mr. S. Rupachandra, learned Additional A.G for the State; as well as Mr. M. Hemchandra, learned senior counsel, assisted by Mr. Th. Roson, learned counsel for the private respondents. When this matter was taken up, it has been submitted by Mr. S. Rupachandra, learned Additional A.G, that the impugned order dated 31.01.2018, which has been challenged in this petition, has been withdrawn by the State Government by issuing the order dated 05.02.2018, a copy of which has been placed on record. In view of the above development, Mr. H.S. Paonam, learned senior counsel for the petitioners, submits that the present petition can be closed, however, with the observation that the position of the petitioner No. 3 as the Chairman of the Tamenglong Autonomous District Council will revive. On the other hand, Mr. S. Rupachandra, learned Additional A.G. as well as Mr. M. Hemchandra, learned senior counsel for the respondents submit that the same may not be necessary as it is the natural consequence. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the view that once the impugned order dated 31.01.2018 by which the incumbent Chairman of Tamenglong Autonomous District Council, namely, Shri, Namsinrei Panmei (petitioner No. 3) was removed, has been withdrawn by the order dated 05.02.2018, the natural consequence which will follow is that the position obtaining before issuance of the impugned order dated 31.01.2018 will be revived. In other words, the aforesaid incumbent, Shri Namsinrei Panmei (petitioner No. 3) will be restored to his position as the Chairman of the Tamenglong Autonomous District Council. With the above observation, the present petition stands closed.” 40. In other words, the aforesaid incumbent, Shri Namsinrei Panmei (petitioner No. 3) will be restored to his position as the Chairman of the Tamenglong Autonomous District Council. With the above observation, the present petition stands closed.” 40. Accordingly, the position which was obtaining at that stage was that, the Government withdrew the order dated 31.01.2018 by which the Government initially took the position that as the order of the interim order passed by this Court for suspension of the voting right of the nominated members was received by the Deputy Commissioner after the voting was over and since there were 14 votes against the Chairman of the Autonomous District Council including the two nominated members, the incumbent Chairman would cease to be the Chairman because of lack of confidence but the said order dated 31.01.2018 was withdrawn by the State Government thus, restoring his position as a Chairman, which position was obtaining before the holding of the No Confidence Motion against him on 15.01.2018. 41. It is the subsequent action of the State Government contained in the letter dated 02.05.2018 declaring that the meeting held on 15.01.2018 is void ab initio and directing for a fresh meeting for consideration of the removal of the Chairman of the Autonomous District Council and subsequent orders and actions which are the subject matter of dispute in this batch of writ petitions as referred to above. 42. It has been strenuously argued by learned Addl. AG that since in the meeting held on 15.01.2018, the nominated members of the Autonomous District Council were allowed to take part, whose voting rights were suspended by the Court in the writ petition by an interim order passed in WP(C) No. 31 of 2018, their participation would be illegal and as such, such meeting in which the nominated members participated would be void ab initio. That is perhaps the only ground on which the State Government declared the meeting held on 15.01.2018 as void ab initio as also reflected in the records produced before this Court. 43. Mr. M. Hemchandra, learned Sr. That is perhaps the only ground on which the State Government declared the meeting held on 15.01.2018 as void ab initio as also reflected in the records produced before this Court. 43. Mr. M. Hemchandra, learned Sr. Counsel for the petitioner in WP(C) No. 388 of 2018 while also taking similar line in asserting that the said meeting on 15.01.2018 is void ab initio, has gone further in submitting that even if the aforesaid meeting held is to be held valid as contended by the opposite contesting parties, the fact remains that the resolution moved against the Chairman of the Tamenglong Autonomous District Council was never defeated. He submits that there was no contest at all in the said meeting. He submits that the supporters of the Chairman who opposed the No Confidence Motion numbering 12 members including the incumbent Chairman had walked out before the conclusion of the meeting and as such there was no contest as they did not participate in the contest and since there was no contest, the question of defeat of the resolution does not arise. According to him, the second proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Act would be attracted only when the motion is defeated. He submits that the statute uses the word “defeat” which is an act of overthrowing in a contest. However, as there was no contest in the election, the issue of motion of being defeated does not arise. He submits that the perusal of the meeting would clearly show that the word “defeat” has not been used in the resolution taken in the said meeting as recorded in the proceedings of the meeting. He submits that the words “tie” or “equal number of votes” etc. are not used in the statute and it has not been clearly mentioned in the records of the proceeding of the meeting that the resolution for No Confidence was “defeated”. Hence, the question of invoking the 2nd proviso to Section 23(2) of the Act does not arise. Mr. Hemchandra submits that the supporters of the Chairman numbering 12 including the Chairman himself had walked off from the meeting before the meeting concluded and as such, they volunteered not to participate in the No Confidence Motion leaving the floor to the other members present who voted in support of the resolution against the Chairman. Mr. Hemchandra submits that the supporters of the Chairman numbering 12 including the Chairman himself had walked off from the meeting before the meeting concluded and as such, they volunteered not to participate in the No Confidence Motion leaving the floor to the other members present who voted in support of the resolution against the Chairman. He, therefore, submits that even if the meeting held on 15.01.2018 is held to be valid as contended by the writ petitioners in WP(C) No. 390 of 2018 and WP(C) No. 399 of 2018, the fact remains that there was no contest held at all and since there was no contest, it could not result in the defeat of the motion and accordingly, restraint placed by second proviso will not come into play. 44. In response, Mr. HS Paonam, learned Sr. Counsel for the petitioners in WP(C) No. 388 of 2018 and WP(C) No. 399 of 2018, has strenuously argued that the meeting held on 15.01.2018 could not have been declared as void ab initio by the authorities vide order dated 31.01.2018 even though participation by nominated members in the said meeting was illegal. He submits that the members of the District Council who were in support of the Chairman had duly taken part in the proceeding on the meeting held on 15.01.2018 and had objected to the presence of the nominated members. He also submits that after the meeting commenced at 11 am on 15.01.2018, while the debate was going on, the members were also informed of the passing of the interim order by this Court in WP(C) No. 39 of 2018 on the same day suspending the Fourth Amendment Act, 2018 giving voting rights to the nominated members, which order was passed in presence of the learned Addl. Advocate General. Mr. HS Paonam, learned Sr. Counsel further submits that interim order was duly communicated by the ld. Addl. AG from the Court premises to the Deputy Commissioner of Tamenglong when the meeting was going on, which fact is borne by the records in the proceedings of the meeting which was forwarded by the Deputy Commissioner. He submits that nothing is mentioned in the record of the said proceeding that the interim order of the Court was communicated to the Deputy Commissioner and all the members of the Autonomous District Council after the meeting for No Confidence Motion concluded. He submits that nothing is mentioned in the record of the said proceeding that the interim order of the Court was communicated to the Deputy Commissioner and all the members of the Autonomous District Council after the meeting for No Confidence Motion concluded. In fact, the proceedings of the meeting clearly record that as per the latest High Court’s order passed in WP(C) No. 31 of 2018 on 15.01.2018, the Notification dated 12th January, 2018 notifying the Manipur (Hill Areas) District Councils (Fourth Amendment) Act, 2018 was suspended. Accordingly, the Deputy Commissioner without taking into account the votes of two nominated members, recorded the final outcome of the motion for removal of the Chairman of the Autonomous District Council stood as follows : (i) those in favour of the Chairman numbering 12, including the Chairman had walked off and, (ii) those who are against the Autonomous District Council Chairman were 12 members (excluding the 2 nominated members) through voice vote and physical identification. The Deputy Commissioner clearly mentioned in the proceeding that there was no simple majority on either sides and accordingly, forwarded the matter to the Government for taking further necessary action. 45. Mr. HS Paonam, learned Sr. Counsel accordingly submits that records of the proceedings of the meeting held on 15.01.2018 clearly indicate that the Deputy Commissioner as well as the Council members were aware of the interim order passed by this Court suspending the voting rights of nominated members and as such in the final counting of votes, it was found that the resolution for removal of the Chairman was supported and passed by only 12 members. It was clear that there was no simple majority on either sides as recorded by the Deputy Commissioner thus, clearly indicating that resolution for removal of the Chairman had been not successful and thus, defeated. He submits that the fact that the resolution was not successful means that it has been defeated. In that view of the matter, no occasion arose for declaring the proceeding of the meeting held on 15.01.2018 as void ab initio. 46. He submits that the participation of the nominated members were illegal and as such, their voting ought to be ignored, which was correctly ignored by the Deputy Commissioner. However, their participation itself cannot render the meeting void ab initio. 47. Mr. HS Paonam, learned Sr. 46. He submits that the participation of the nominated members were illegal and as such, their voting ought to be ignored, which was correctly ignored by the Deputy Commissioner. However, their participation itself cannot render the meeting void ab initio. 47. Mr. HS Paonam, learned Sr. Counsel submits that earlier the State Government counted the votes of the 2 nominated members and issued the order on 31.1.2018 which was challenged in WP(C) No. 89 of 2018. He submits that the Government after realizing the said mistake had withdrawn the said order dated 31.01.2018 because of which the petitioners also withdrew the said writ petition challenging the said order dated 31.01.2018. 48. He submits that the authorities were compelled to withdraw the said illegal order dated 31.01.2018 on realizing their own mistakes. He submits that the order dated 31.01.2018 was passed by the State authorities by manipulation and by acting upon the subsequent letter written by the Deputy Commissioner on 29.01.2018, a copy of which is annexed as Annexure-A/12 in WP(C) No. 390 of 2018. 49. Mr. Paonam has submitted that the aforesaid subsequent letter dated 29.01.2018 of the Deputy Commissioner is an afterthought, written by the Deputy Commissioner at the instance of the State Government purportedly with reference to the earlier letter dated 22.01.2018 and the said letter dated 29.01.2018 written by the Deputy Commissioner does not form part of the proceedings held on 15.01.2018. He submits that the subsequent letter dated 29.01.2018 of the Deputy Commissioner is in variance with the earlier report submitted by the Deputy Commissioner on 16.01.2018 which contained the records of the proceedings of the meeting held on 15.01.2018. Accordingly, he submits that the issuance of the order dated 31.01.2018 by the State Government relying on the subsequent letter dated 29.01.2018 of the Deputy Commissioner to declare that the resolution for removal of the Chairman has been successfully passed, is factually and legally not correct, and as such, the said order dated 31.01.2018 could not have been passed declaring that the Chairman of the Autonomous District Council has been removed. 50. Mr. Paonam submits that the meeting was held on 15.01.2018 to consider the resolution for removal of the Chairman. 50. Mr. Paonam submits that the meeting was held on 15.01.2018 to consider the resolution for removal of the Chairman. However, there was a tie in which both the groups of Councilors who were supporting and were opposed to removal of the Chairman had equal numbers without counting the votes of the 2 nominated members as clearly reflected in the proceedings of the meeting. It is clearly evident that the said resolution for No Confidence Motion was not successful and hence, can be said to be defeated. Accordingly, he submits that as the said resolution was defeated, there cannot be another No Confidence Motion against the present Chairman of the Tamenglong Autonomous District Council for another year from the date of holding the meeting on 15.1.2018. 51. This submission on the part of Mr. HS Paonam, learned Sr. Counsel has been seriously contested by the learned Addl. AG, Mr. S. Rupachandra contending that the petitioner cannot approbate or reprobate and cannot blow hot and cold at the same time. Mr. Rupachandra contends that even though the petitioners represented by Mr. HS Paonam, learned Sr. Counsel had challenged the order dated 31.01.2018 which acted upon the proceedings of the meeting held on 15.01.2018 as illegal by filing the writ petition, W.P(C) No.89 of 2018, at the same time, he is now trying to justify the said meeting held on 15.01.2018 as valid. Mr. Rupachandra submits that the said writ petitioners cannot be allowed to take the plea that the order dated 31.01.2018 (which was revoked by the State Government) is illegal though the said order was based on the proceedings of the meeting held on 15.01.2018. The petitioners represented by Mr. Paonam did not accept the proceedings of the meeting held on 15.01.2018 which was the basis for passing of the order dated 31.01.2018 (challenged in WP(C) No. 89 of 2018) and now the same set of petitioners are claiming that the proceedings of the meeting held on 15.01.2018 is valid to take advantage of the embargo placed by the second proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Act. If the proceedings of the meeting held on 15.1.2018 is illegal, the Government order dated 31.1.2018 would be also illegal because of which the Government withdrew it. Conversely, if the proceedings of the meeting held on 15.1.2018 is valid, the Government order dated 31.1.2018 will also be valid. Mr. If the proceedings of the meeting held on 15.1.2018 is illegal, the Government order dated 31.1.2018 would be also illegal because of which the Government withdrew it. Conversely, if the proceedings of the meeting held on 15.1.2018 is valid, the Government order dated 31.1.2018 will also be valid. Mr. Rupachandra submits that it cannot come from the mouth of these petitioners now that the meeting held on 15.01.2018 is valid when they themselves had challenged the validity of the same meeting which was the basis for passing of the order dated 31.01.2018.Mr.Rupachandra, learned Addl. AG submits that in any event, since Mr. HS Paonam has also not denied that the participation in the nominated members of the said meeting held on 15.1.2018 is illegal, there is nothing wrong in declaring the said meeting held on 15.01.2018 as void ab initio. 52. Having heard the learned Counsel for the contesting parties and in the light of the facts discussed above, this Court would proceed to analyse the facts and to draw the conclusions as mentioned below. 53. As evident from above, the proceedings of the meeting held on 15.01.2018 is of crucial importance and as such, proper understanding of which, would help resolve the issues raised by the contesting parties. Accordingly, the minutes of the said meeting are reproduced herein below :- “PROCEEDINGS OF THE MEEETING HELD ON 15TH JANUARY 2017 11:00 A.M. FOR THE REMOVAL OF SHRI. NAMSINREI PANMEI THE INCUMBENT CHAIRMAN, ADC TAMENGLONG; PRESIDED OVER BY SHRI. ARMSTRONG PAME, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, TAMENGLONG DISTRICT; After all the 26 Members including (2 Nominated Members) gathered in the District Council hall for the meeting, the Deputy Commissioner took the attendance of all the Members. As per the Manipur (Hill Areas) District Councils Rules 1972, 10 (2) ; the incumbent Chairman was permitted to speak and defend himself against the motion; He brought out the issue that the voting rights of the Nominee is not acceptable due to the latest Hon’ble High Court order which bars the Nominated Members from voting. A complain letter on this regard was also submitted. The representative of the opposing group was also permitted to speak; whereby Shri. Alar thoitak spoke against the existing Chairman and briefly talked about the voting rights of the Nominee. Shri K Lianpibou on behalf of the incumbent Chairman spoke again and reiterated that nominated members have no voting rights. A complain letter on this regard was also submitted. The representative of the opposing group was also permitted to speak; whereby Shri. Alar thoitak spoke against the existing Chairman and briefly talked about the voting rights of the Nominee. Shri K Lianpibou on behalf of the incumbent Chairman spoke again and reiterated that nominated members have no voting rights. Finally after hearing from both sides the matter was put to vote; including the votes of the 2 Nominated Members as clearly given in the Notification No. 2/78/2017-leg/I; Dated 12th January 2018; whereby the Nominated Members are permitted to vote in all meetings of the District Council to which they are nominated. When asked to give voice vote; those in favour of the incumbent Chairman Shri Namsinrei Panmei the 12 members walked off. When asked to the remaining Members to give voice vote and count of hands for those against the incumbent Chairman; 14 Members (including the 2 Nominated Members Shri. Satkhojang Kipgeng & Shri Poulonthui Rongmei) raised their hands and physical counting was done and marked through the attendance sheet. However as per the latest Hon’ble High Court order in the case of Writ Petition (c) No. 31 of 2018 (Shri. Tuntangbou Guangta vs. The state of Manipur) order dated 15-01-2018; whereby the above Notification No.2/78/2017-leg/l; Dated. 12th January 2018, the Manipur (Hill Areas) District Councils (Fourth Amendment) Act 2017; 2(4) remains suspended. Hence without taking into account the votes of the two Nominee Members Hence the final outcome of the motion for removal of the incumbent chairman ADC, Tamenglong is here as below: 1. Those in favour of Shri Namsmrei Panmei as ADC Chairman Tamenglong : 12 Members walked off. 2. Those against Shri Namsinrei Panmei as ADC Chairman Tamenglong : 12 Members (Excluding the 2 Nominated Members) through voice votes and Physical Identification. Hence in view of the above, there is no Simple Majority on either of the Sides. The matter is now forwarded to the Government to take further necessary action as per the Act. The meeting concluded with words of thanks from the Presiding Officer. Attendance sheet enclosed.” 54. Hence in view of the above, there is no Simple Majority on either of the Sides. The matter is now forwarded to the Government to take further necessary action as per the Act. The meeting concluded with words of thanks from the Presiding Officer. Attendance sheet enclosed.” 54. A closer scrutiny of the aforesaid proceedings of the meeting held on 15.1.2018 would reveal the following : (i) As recorded in the minutes of the proceeding of the meeting, it is seen that the incumbent Chairman who was permitted to speak and defend against the motion had brought out the issue of the voting rights of the nominee as not being acceptable due to the latest High Court’s order. (ii) Even if the votes of the nominated members were apparently taken into account at the time of counting of votes, the records of the minutes of the meeting clearly indicate about the knowledge of the latest order of the High Court passed on 15.01.2018 in WP(C) No. 31 of 2018 whereby the voting right of the nominated members were suspended. (iii) For that very reason, the Deputy Commissioner while recording the minutes of the proceeding finally stated that in view of the order dated 15.01.2018 of the High Court in WP(C) No. 31 of 2018, without taking into consideration the votes of the 2 nominated members, the final outcome of the meeting for removal of the incumbent Chairman of the Tamenglong Autonomous District Council was given as, (i) 12 members in favour of the Autonomous District Council Chairman who walked off, (ii) 12 members who were against the Autonomous District Council Chairman, by excluding 2 nominated members, through voice votes and physical identification. (iv) The Deputy Commissioner, accordingly, in conclusion, made the crucial observation that on conclusion of the voting and proceedings of the meeting, there is no simple majority on either of the sides. (v) Thereafter, it was recorded that the meeting was concluded with words of thanks from the Presiding Officer. 55. From the above, it is evidently clear that even if the interim order passed by this Court on 15.01.2018 in WP(C) No. 31 of 2018 might not have been brought to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner before the commencement of the meeting or at the initial stage of the meeting, it certainly was brought to his notice before conclusion of the meeting. That is the reason why the Deputy Commissioner categorically made the observation and recording in the minutes of the meeting, the existence of the order passed by this Court in WP(C) No. 31 of 2018 dated 15.01.2018 and thus excluded the votes of the 2 nominated members in the final tally and by declaring that there is no simple majority on either of the sides. 56. It may be noted that the aforesaid WP(C) No. 31 of 2018 was moved as a motion item which was published in the supplementary cause list on 15.01.2018 after being mentioned in the Court. There were four other motion items listed in the cause list of the day. The first case in the motion was posted for hearing by a brief order. The second and the third cases were adjourned to another date because of non appearance of counsel for the petitioner. The fourth case was also adjourned on the prayer made by the counsel for the State. The other items in the cause list were also adjourned to different dates on various grounds mentioned in the brief orders. Thus, the contention of the learned Sr. Counsel for the petitioners in WP(C) No. 388 of 2018 and WP(C) No. 399 of 2018 that the interim order passed by this Court in WP(C) No. 31 of 2018 on 15.01.2018 was conveyed in time before conclusion of the no confidence meeting finds acceptance of this Court. 57 Thus, it would be very clear that in the said meeting held on 15.01.2018 though the two nominated members were initially allowed to take part, perhaps on the strength of the 4th Amendment Act, 2018 made, subsequently, on being informed of the interim order dated 15.01.2018 passed by this Court in WP(C) No. 31 of 2018 suspending the said 4th Amendment Act, their votes were not counted though were allowed to cast initially, in the final tally by the Deputy Commissioner, as reflected in the minutes of the meeting. If that is so, it would be clear that the No Confidence Motion moved against the Chairman of the Autonomous District Council Tamenglong was not successful. 58. If that is so, it would be clear that the No Confidence Motion moved against the Chairman of the Autonomous District Council Tamenglong was not successful. 58. The controversy has been compounded by the subsequent letter written by the Deputy Commissioner on 29.01.2018 on the basis of which the State Government took the decision that the motion of No Confidence, in fact, was carried out successfully as 14 members including the two members had cast their votes in favour of the motion of No Confidence purportedly before the interim order of this Court was communicated, and accordingly issued the Government order dated 31.01.2018 (though this order was subsequently revoked by the State Government). It would be, therefore, apposite to refer to the aforesaid letter dated 29.01.2018 written by the Deputy Commissioner on the basis of which the State Government took the earlier decision on 31.1.2018 that the motion for removal of the Chairman was passed by a simple majority. The aforesaid letter dated 29.01.2018 of the Deputy Commissioner reads as follows :- “DC(Tml) 11/542(CEO)/TADC)2010 GOVERNMENT OF MANIPUR OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER TAMENGLONG DISTRICT Tamenglong 29th January 2018 To Principal Secretary Tribal Affairs and Hills Government of Manipur Sub: Ref. to letter No 4/13/2017-Hills dated 22nd January 2918. from Dy. Secretary (TA& Hills), Regarding the Proceedings of the meeting held on 15th January 2018 at 11:00 a.m. for the removal of Shri Namsinrei Panmei the Incumbent Chairman, ADC Tamenglong and thereof: Sir, With regards to the above stated subject l am to state the following: 1. That the proceedings of the meeting was conducted and completed as per the existing act and it's subsequent Amendments; 2. That as the matter was put to vote ; 11 Members walked off along with Shri. Namsinrei Panmei While 14 Members (including the two Nominated Members) were present and voted against the existing Chairman ADC, Tamenglong; 3. Accordingly the motion for the removal of Shri. Namsinrei Panmei was passed by Simple Majority of the total Membership of the house i.e. 14 out of 26 Members. Accordingly the motion for the removal of Shri. Namsinrei Panmei was passed by Simple Majority of the total Membership of the house i.e. 14 out of 26 Members. In the matter of the Hon’ble High Court case of Writ Petition(c) No.31 of 2018 Shri. Tuntangbou Guangta vs. the State of Manipur) Order dated 15-01-2018; which suspended the Notification No 2/78/2017-leg/1: dated 12th January 2018; was communicated to me verbally without any official papers only after all proceedings of the house have been successfully conducted as per the existing Act. The matter is now put forth to the Government for taking further necessary action. Submitted for kind and necessary action. Yours faithfully, Sd/- Armstrong Pame Deputy Commissioner : Tamenglong District.” 59. A minute examination of the aforesaid letter dated 29.01.2018 written by the Deputy Commissioner on the basis of which the Government took a decision that the motion for no confidence against the Chairperson was successfully moved would reveal the following. In the said letter, it has been mentioned that: (i) when the matter was put to vote, 12 members including the Chairperson walked out, while 14 members including the nominated persons voted against the Chairman and accordingly the said motion for removal was passed by a majority of the total membership of the house i.e., 14 out of 26 members, (ii) the order dated 15.01.2018 passed by the High Court in WP(C) No. 31 of 2018 suspending the Notification dated 12th January, 2018 regarding the voting right of the nominated members was communicated to the Deputy Commissioner verbally without any official paper only after the proceeding of the house had been successfully conducted, (iii) it was further mentioned that the matter was forwarded to the Government for taking further necessary action. 60. This Court, however, finds the said subsequent letter dated 29.01.2018 written by the Deputy Commissioner not to be tenable for the following reasons: (i) The said letter dated 29.01.2018 was written after about 2 (two) weeks of the meeting held on 15.01.2018 of the Autonomous District Council and as such, it is not a contemporaneous document. 60. This Court, however, finds the said subsequent letter dated 29.01.2018 written by the Deputy Commissioner not to be tenable for the following reasons: (i) The said letter dated 29.01.2018 was written after about 2 (two) weeks of the meeting held on 15.01.2018 of the Autonomous District Council and as such, it is not a contemporaneous document. (ii) If the order dated 15.01.2018 of this Court passed in WP(C) No. 31 of 2018 had indeed been communicated to the Deputy Commissioner after the proceedings of the house had been concluded as mentioned in the subsequent letter dated 29.01.2018, this Court finds it difficult to reconcile the earlier recording and observation made by the Deputy Commissioner himself in the minutes of the meeting held on 15.01.2018 which was communicated by him to the State Government on the next day on 16.01.2018, in which it had been clearly mentioned of the latest order of the High Court dated 15.01.2018 passed in WP(C) No. 31 of 2018 was duly taken into account at the time of final tally or recording of the votes. The Deputy Commissioner by taking into account the aforesaid order dated 15.01.2018 of the High Court passed in WP(C) No. 31 of 2018 had excluded the votes of the 2 members as clearly mentioned in the concluding paragraphs of the minutes of the meeting and the Deputy Commissioner had categorically mentioned that there is no simple majority on either of the sides in the minutes of the meeting forwarded on 16.1.2018. (iii) While the Deputy Commissioner had categorically stated in the earlier minutes of the meeting that there was no simple majority in either sides, he states in his subsequent letter dated 29.1.2018 that the motion for removal of Sri Namsinrei Panmei was passed by a simple majority of the total membership of the House i.e., by 14 out of 26 members. He thus gives two contradictory versions of the same meeting held on 15.1.2018. 61. This Court would give more credence to the correctness of the state of affairs of what transpired in the meeting/ proceedings of the No Confidence motion held on 15.01.2018 as reflected and recorded in the minutes of the proceedings of the meeting as communicated by the Deputy Commissioner on 16.01.2018 to the State Government quoted above and not to the subsequent report by him submitted on 29.1.2018. 62. 62. The subsequent report submitted by the Deputy Commissioner on 29.1.2018 describing the proceeding of the meeting flies in the face of the report forwarded on 16.1.2018 in which the Deputy Commissioner mentioned about the existence of the High Court’s order dated 15.01.2018 passed in WP(C) No. 31 of 2018 and exclusion of the vote of the two nominated members. In fact, the subsequent report dated 21.1.2018 is in direct contradiction to the factual position of the proceeding as portrayed in the earlier proceeding submitted on 16.1.2018. Therefore, this Court would hold that the subsequent letter dated 29.01.2018 written by the Deputy Commissioner giving an entirely different and contradictory picture of the proceedings of the meeting held on 15.01.2018 cannot be said to contain truthful account of the proceedings of the meeting held on 15.01.2018 and as such, it is liable to be ignored. 63. Further, it is not clear under what circumstances and context the aforesaid letter dated 29.1.2018 was written by the Deputy Commissioner. There is a reference in the said letter to a Government letter dated 22.1.2018. However, in the Government letter dated 22.1.2018, the Government neither sought any further report from the Deputy Commissioner regarding the proceedings of the meeting held on 15.1.2018 but the said letter seems to be related to certain instruction issued by the Government relating to removing of ban on financial transactions imposed by the State Government earlier vide letter dated 31.1.2017 in the light of the impending meeting to consider the No Confidence Motion against the Chairman. Therefore, in the light of the above, this Court is not inclined to accept the credibility and the purpose of the aforesaid letter dated 29.1.2018 which gives a contrary contradictory report of what actually transpired in the meeting held on 15.1.2018. 64. Therefore, in the light of the above, this Court is not inclined to accept the credibility and the purpose of the aforesaid letter dated 29.1.2018 which gives a contrary contradictory report of what actually transpired in the meeting held on 15.1.2018. 64. In that view of the matter, this Court would hold that the meeting to consider the no confidence motion against the Chairman was held on 15.01.2018 and before conclusion of the meeting, the interim order dated 15.01.2018 passed by this Court in WP(C) No. 31 of 2018 was brought to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner and that though the two nominated members were initially allowed to cast their votes in favour of the motion, the Deputy Commissioner on coming to know of the Court’s order suspending the voting rights of the nominated members, their votes were excluded at the time of final tally of votes and declaration of result, which had been truthfully recorded by the Deputy Commissioner in the minutes of the meeting, as communicated to the State Government on 16.01.2018. It is very clearly recorded in the minutes of the meeting on 15.01.2018 as forwarded to the State Government on 16.01.2018 that no confidence motion moved against the Chairman of the Autonomous District Council was not carried out successfully as there was equality of votes on both the contesting sides. 65. In such a situation, where there is equality of votes between those who are moving the no confidence motion as opposed to the same, whether the said no-confidence motion can be said to be “defeated” within the meaning of second proviso of sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Act, will be considered subsequently, as this Court would like to address the issue first as to whether the meeting held on 15.01.2018 in which two nominated members were allowed to take part can be said to be void ab initio as held by State Government, which is opposed by the petitioners in WP(C) No. 390 of 2018 and WP(C) No. 399 of 2018, but supported by the petitioners in WP(C) No. 388 of 2018. 66. It is now well settled that an entire impugned action may not be declared bad and illegal if such portion of the act which is bad in law can be separated from the remaining without compromising with the basic attributes and nature of the act in question. 66. It is now well settled that an entire impugned action may not be declared bad and illegal if such portion of the act which is bad in law can be separated from the remaining without compromising with the basic attributes and nature of the act in question. In other words, if the grains can be separated from the chaffs, the entire transaction need not be declared bad and illegal based on the doctrine of severability. Doctrine of severability is a well settled principle of interpretation of statute under which, when a statute is in part void, it will be enforced as against the rest, if it is severable from what is invalid. Though this doctrine is normally applied while interpreting statutes, the principle is adopted in dealing with situations afflicted with irregularities and illegalities, which are questioned. 67. The doctrine of severability has been held to be applicable even in interpreting executive orders by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as far back in 1958 in the case of Sewpujanrai Indrasanarai Ltd. Vs. Collector of Customs and Others, AIR 1958 SC 845 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court applied the principle of severability as follows : “19.We are, therefore, of the view that the Collector of Customs had no jurisdiction to impose any of the two conditions mentioned above. What then is the result? On behalf of the appellant it has been argued that the order being a composite and integrated order, it is not severable; and secondly, it is contended that on an application for a writ of certiorari, the superior Court must quash the whole order when it is found to be bad and in excess of jurisdiction even as to a part thereof The question of severability does not present any great difficulty. It has been the subject of consideration in more than one decision of this Court, and in the recent decision in R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India, 1957 S.C.R. 930: ((S) AIR 1957 SC 628 ) (D) the principles governing it have been summarised. It has been the subject of consideration in more than one decision of this Court, and in the recent decision in R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India, 1957 S.C.R. 930: ((S) AIR 1957 SC 628 ) (D) the principles governing it have been summarised. Applying those principles we find no difficulty in holding that the invalid conditions imposed by the Collector are not so inextricably mixed up that they cannot be separated from the valid order of confiscation and fine in lieu thereof; there is also no doubt that the Collector would have passed the order of confiscation and fine in lieu thereof on his finding that the gold was smuggled gold, even if he realised that the conditions he was imposing were invalid; it is also clear that the conditions do not form part of a single scheme which can be operative only as a whole. Learned counsel for the appellant has referred us to the sixth rule enunciated in Chamarbaugwalla's decision (D) (supra) and has contended that if the invalid conditions are expunged, what remains of the impugned order cannot be enforced without making an alteration or modification as to the time limit fixed, and therefore the whole order must be struck down as void. We are unable to agree. The sixth rule aforesaid is based on the ground that the Court cannot make alterations or modifications in order to enforce what remains of a statute after expunging the invalid portions thereof; otherwise it will amount to judicial legislation. No such consideration arises in the case before us. There is no legal difficulty in enforcing the rest of the impugned order after separating the invalid conditions there from; on the passing of the order of confiscation, the gold vests in Government and S. 183 does not make it obligatory on the Collector to fix a time limit for payment of the fine in lieu of confiscation. It is really for the benefit of the owner that a time is fixed for payment of the fine. Even if the time limit is altered, by no stretch of imagination can it be said that such alteration amounts to judicial legislation. For these reasons we agree with the Division Bench of the High Court that the invalid conditions imposed by the Collector in this case are severable from the rest of the impugned order.” 68. Even if the time limit is altered, by no stretch of imagination can it be said that such alteration amounts to judicial legislation. For these reasons we agree with the Division Bench of the High Court that the invalid conditions imposed by the Collector in this case are severable from the rest of the impugned order.” 68. This doctrine has been also invoked by the Courts in deciding validity of contracts as in Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd. Vs. Jain Studious Ltd., (2006) 2 SCC 628 where in the Supreme Court held that partial invalidity in contract will not ipso facto make the whole contract void or unenforceable. Wherever a contract contains legal as well as illegal parts and objectionable parts can be severed, effect has been given to legal and valid parts striking out the offending parts. The aforesaid observation was made keeping in mind that a contract must be read as a whole and it is not normally not open to dissect it by taking out a part treating it to be contrary to law. However, it is equally settled that if the contract is in several parts, some of which are legal and enforceable and some are unenforceable, lawful parts can be enforced provided they are severable as observed in para Nos. 15, 16 and 17 of the judgment which are reproduced herein below : “15. It is no doubt true that a court of law will read the agreement as it is and cannot rewrite nor create a new one. It is also true that the contract must be read as a whole and it is not open to dissect it by taking out a part treating it to be contrary to law and by ordering enforcement of the rest if otherwise it is not permissible. But it is well-settled that if the contract is in several parts, some of which are legal and enforceable and some are unenforceable, lawful parts can be enforced provided they are severable. 16. The learned counsel for the petitioner, in my opinion, rightly submitted that the court must consider the question keeping in view settled legal position and record a finding whether or not the agreement is severable. If the court holds the agreement severable, it should implement and enforce that part which is legal, valid and in consonance of law. 17. 16. The learned counsel for the petitioner, in my opinion, rightly submitted that the court must consider the question keeping in view settled legal position and record a finding whether or not the agreement is severable. If the court holds the agreement severable, it should implement and enforce that part which is legal, valid and in consonance of law. 17. In several cases, courts have held that partial invalidity in contract will not ipso facto make the whole contract void or unenforceable. Wherever a contract contains legal as well as illegal parts and objectionable parts can be severed, effect has been given to legal and valid parts striking out the offending parts.” 69. In service jurisprudence also, this doctrine has been recognised and applied as had been done in the case of Ramdan Charan Vs. Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur, (2009) 17 SCC 642 where in it was held that such conditions which are illegal can be separated and such illegal conditions cannot be enforced. It has been also held in Joginder Pal and Others Vs. State of Punjab and Others, (2014) 6 SCC 644 that wherein the selection process certain irregularities were detected for such reason, the entire selection process is not vitiated. In the aforesaid case, certain manipulations, forgery and fraud by way of unfair practice were committed by some candidates. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the entire selection process may not be disturbed if the tainted candidates could be separated as observed in para Nos. 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 and 40 which are reproduced herein below : “33. The question that falls for consideration is as to whether the entire process could be labelled as vitiated because of purported manipulations, forgery and fraud? Or, to put it otherwise, once the non-tainted persons are segregated from tainted ones, would it still be justified to quash the entire selection, even when non-tainted made into the service because of their merit? 34. It was argued by Mr. Raju Ramachandran and Mr. Gurminder Singh, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants, that the mandate of Inderpreet Singh Kahlon2 was limited to one aspect only, namely, to segregate the cases of tainted candidates from non-tainted ones, if it was possible. 34. It was argued by Mr. Raju Ramachandran and Mr. Gurminder Singh, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants, that the mandate of Inderpreet Singh Kahlon2 was limited to one aspect only, namely, to segregate the cases of tainted candidates from non-tainted ones, if it was possible. It was their submission that after this task was successfully accomplished by the Committee, there was no occasion to go into the second aspect, which was not part of any direction of this Court in Inderpreet Singh Kahlon2. It was further argued that the findings on two aspects are self-contradictory. Once it was accepted that some of the candidates were innocent, who entered the service by virtue of their merit and not because of any extraneous considerations and these candidates should be segregated as well, such a finding to the effect on the second aspect that the entire selection process was vitiated could not be arrived at. 35. We find force in the aforesaid argument advanced by the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant in these set of appeals. The two conclusions of the High Court appear to be antithetical. Once it is found that segregating tainted from non-tainted is possible and is achieved also, other conclusion is incompatible with the first one. 36. We have already narrated the background in which judgment in Inderpreet Singh Kahlon2 was rendered by this Court. Those were the appeals filed against the Full Bench judgment in Amarbir Singh wherein the Court had held that the action of the Government in cancelling the entire selection process was justified. This very conclusion of the Full Bench was challenged by the appellants in Inderpreet Singh Kahlon1 with specific plea that it was not a case for cancelling the entire selection process and, in the first instance, the Court should have attempted to find out as to whether cases of the candidates who were tainted could be segregated from those who were unblemished. The court was convinced with the submission. While setting aside the judgment and remanding the case back, the Court went to the extent of holding that by clubbing together tainted as well as non-tainted persons, two unequal classes were clubbed together and it amounted to violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The court was convinced with the submission. While setting aside the judgment and remanding the case back, the Court went to the extent of holding that by clubbing together tainted as well as non-tainted persons, two unequal classes were clubbed together and it amounted to violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. It was also held that no attempt was made in this direction, namely, whether there was a possibility of segregating the two classes of persons. The Court found that as the relevant records were still available a fair investigation into the whole affair was possible. 37. We would like to reproduce hereunder some portions of the judgment of S.B. Sinha, J. in Inderpreet Singh Kahlon touching upon this aspect: (SCC pp.383-85 & 388, paras 43, 45-46, 50-51 & 59) “43. Apart from inferences drawn on certain facts and in particular the circumstances enumerated by the High Court which have been repeated by the learned counsel for the State before us, it is difficult to accept that it was demonstrated by the State that it was absolutely impossible for it to separate the innocent people from the tainted ones. * * * 45. If fraud in the selection process was established, the State should not have offered to hold a reselection. Seniority of those who were reselected ordinarily could not have been restored in their favour. Such an offer was evidently made as the State was not sure about the involvement of a large number of employees. 46. A distinction moreover exists between a proven case of mass cheating for a board examination and an unproven imputed charge of corruption where the appointment of a civil servant is involved. * * * 50. In those cases also tainted cases were separated from the non-tainted cases. Only, thus, in the event it is found to be impossible or highly improbable, could en masse orders of termination have been issued. 51. Both the State Government as also the High Court in that view of the matter should have made all endeavours to segregate the tainted from the non-tainted candidates. * * * 59. Only, thus, in the event it is found to be impossible or highly improbable, could en masse orders of termination have been issued. 51. Both the State Government as also the High Court in that view of the matter should have made all endeavours to segregate the tainted from the non-tainted candidates. * * * 59. In a case of this nature, thus, the question which requires serious consideration is as to whether due to the misdeed of some candidates, honest and meritorious candidates should also suffer.” 38.After noticing the aforesaid features, the directions which are given for setting up of the Committee to go into the issue are contained in para 94, which reads as under: (Inderpreet Singh Kahlon case2, SCC p.- 400) “94. The impugned judgment as also the orders of the State Government and the High Court are, thus, liable to be set aside and directions are issued. Although the impugned judgments cannot be sustained, we are of the opinion that the interest of justice would be sub-served if the matters are remitted to the High Court for consideration of the mattes afresh. However, with a view to segregate the tainted from the non-tainted, and that in the interest of justice the High Court should be requested to constitute two independent Scrutiny Committees – one relating to the executive officers and the other relating to the judicial officers.” 39. It becomes crystal clear that the concern of the Court was that for the misdeeds of some candidates, honest and meritorious candidates should not suffer. Therefore, endeavour should be made to segregate the tainted candidates from those who were without any stigma and had been selected because of their sheer merit and not on account of any illegal considerations. We would also like to reproduce some of the parts of the concurring judgment authored by Justice Dalveer Bhandari (as His Lordship then was) with the aforesaid message, eloquently and impeccably: (Inderpreet Singh Kahlon case, SCC pp. 414-15, paras 118 & 124-25) “118. Undoubtedly, in the selection process, there have been manipulations and irregularities at the behest of R.S. Sidhu, the then Chairman, Punjab Public Service Commission. On careful scrutiny of the facts and circumstances of the case, in my considered opinion, the High Court ought to have made a serious endeavour to segregate the tainted from the non-tainted candidates. Undoubtedly, in the selection process, there have been manipulations and irregularities at the behest of R.S. Sidhu, the then Chairman, Punjab Public Service Commission. On careful scrutiny of the facts and circumstances of the case, in my considered opinion, the High Court ought to have made a serious endeavour to segregate the tainted from the non-tainted candidates. Though the task was certainly difficult, but by no stretch of imagination, it was not an impossible task. * * * 124. The High Court has not considered the case in the proper perspective. The consequences of en masse cancellation would carry a big stigma particularly on cancellation of the selections which took place because of serious charges of corruption. The question arises whether for the misdeeds of some candidates, honest and good candidates should also suffer on en masse cancellation leading to termination of their services? Should those honest candidates be compelled to suffer without there being any fault on their part just because the respondents find it difficult to segregate the cases of tainted candidates from the other candidates? The task may be difficult for the respondents, but in my considered view, in the interest of all concerned and particularly in the interest of honest candidates, the State must undertake this task. The unscrupulous candidates should not be allowed to damage the entire system in such a manner where innocent people also suffer great ignominy and stigma. 125. This Court had an occasion to examine a similar controversy in the case of Onkar Lal Bajaj's case (supra). In that case, there were serious allegations of political patronage in allotment of retail outlets of petroleum products, (LPG distributorships and SKO-LDO dealerships).This Court laid down that how could a large number of candidates against whom there was not even insinuation be clubbed with handful of those who were said to have been allotted dealerships/distributorships on account of political connection and patronage? This Court clearly stated that the two were clearly un-equals. Equal treatment to un-equals is nothing but inequality. This is the most important principle which has been laid down in this case by this Court. The Court further observed that to put both the categories, tainted and the rest, on par is wholly unjustified, arbitrary and unconstitutional, being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Equal treatment to un-equals is nothing but inequality. This is the most important principle which has been laid down in this case by this Court. The Court further observed that to put both the categories, tainted and the rest, on par is wholly unjustified, arbitrary and unconstitutional, being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In somewhat similar circumstances, in this case, the Government, instead of discharging its obligation, unjustly resorted to the cancellation of all the allotments en masse by treating un-equals as equals without even prima facie examining their cases. Those officers whose services were affected because of en masse cancellation have not been given an opportunity to represent before the concerned authorities. In the case of Onkar Lal Bajaj4 there were 413 cases and the task was indeed difficult to segregate the cases of political connection and patronage with other cases. But, even then, this Court while, setting aside the order of the Government cancelling the allotment, appointed a Committee of two retired Judges, one of this Court and another from the Delhi High Court, and they were requested to examine all 413 cases and decide the matter after getting the report from that Committee appointed by the Court.” 40. In view of the above, the issue of entire selection process having been vitiated would have arisen only if the findings of the Committee were that it was not possible to distinguish the cases of tainted from the non-tainted ones and there was a possibility that all of them would have got the benefit of wrong doings of Mr. Sidhu and his accomplices. Fortunately for these appellants, it is not so as they have been found innocent. The appellants get ensconced, earning a safe place, once they are removed from the category of nefarious persons. Though the tainted candidates have rightly received their comeuppance, but the innocent persons cannot be punished with them. Sidhu and his accomplices. Fortunately for these appellants, it is not so as they have been found innocent. The appellants get ensconced, earning a safe place, once they are removed from the category of nefarious persons. Though the tainted candidates have rightly received their comeuppance, but the innocent persons cannot be punished with them. Thus, it is difficult to accept the fallible conclusion of the High Court.” 1 : Amarbir Singh v. State of Punjab, (2003) 5SLR 398 (P&H) 2 : Inderpreet Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab, (2006) 11 SCC 356 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 444 4 : Onkar Lal Bajaj v. Union of India, (2003) 2 SCC 673 From the above, we can clearly state that the doctrine of severability though had been invoked as one of the methods of interpreting statutes, this principle has been widely applied in other fields of jurisprudence as discussed above. 70. The question which has arisen for consideration before this Court is whether the entire proceeding of the no confidence motion held on 15.01.2018 is vitiated by the presence and participation of two nominated members who were not entitled to take part in the same. In the alternative, whether it is still permissible to sustain the proceedings of the meeting held on 15.01.2018 if the participation and vote cast by the two nominated members could be segregated, separated and ignored as they were not entitled to participate in the said meeting, or whether, the act of participation and voting by two nominated members could be separated without causing any disturbance in the character and attribute of the remaining portion of the proceeding and if so, whether, it will be permissible to sustain and uphold the remaining proceedings of the meeting. 71. While examining the above issues, a question may arise as to whether this doctrine of severability can be applied to any meeting where votes are cast to decide any issue as in the present case. This Court is of the view that the applicability of this principle would depend on the facts of each case. 71. While examining the above issues, a question may arise as to whether this doctrine of severability can be applied to any meeting where votes are cast to decide any issue as in the present case. This Court is of the view that the applicability of this principle would depend on the facts of each case. If the participation of the non eligible members in the meeting is so intrinsically linked to the proceedings of the meeting and any decision so taken in the meeting that it is an inalienable part of the decision and it is not possible to distinguish, separate and segregate the involvement and the participation and voting by such ineligible members in the meeting, the entire meeting or proceedings of the meeting would be vitiated. This doctrine may not be applicable where the offending and non-offending portions of the meeting are so intrinsically linked that it may not be possible to separate these two elements. As for instance, where the vote is a secret ballot where the identity of the voter cannot be ascertained, in such a situation, the doctrine of severability cannot be at all applicable. On the other hand, if the participation, involvement and voting by ineligible candidates could be clearly separated, segregated, without changing the character and nature of the remaining part of the proceeding, this Court is of the view that such remaining part of the meeting may not be declared bad as well and can be sustained and acted upon. In such a situation, the doctrine can be applicable, as in the present case. 72. As discussed above, in the present case, what is clearly noticeable is that the nominated members were allowed to take part in the voting and such voting was not done in a secret manner. The method of secret ballot was not adopted in the meeting. The votes cast by the two nominated members were clearly identifiable from others, as the votes were counted by way of raising hands and head count which was done by the Deputy Commissioner. The Deputy Commissioner also had clearly recorded in the minutes of the meeting that the votes cast by the two nominated members can be separated which he did, while submitting the minutes of the meeting. The Deputy Commissioner also had clearly recorded in the minutes of the meeting that the votes cast by the two nominated members can be separated which he did, while submitting the minutes of the meeting. In his concluding paragraph of the record of the proceedings of the meeting which he forwarded to the Government on 16.1.2018, he had clearly mentioned the number of persons who had voted in favor of the resolution by excluding the two votes cast by the nominated members. 73. In that view of the matter, this Court is of the firm opinion that the doctrine of severability can be made applicable in the present situation where the votes cast by the nominated members can be identified and isolated and segregated. What the law requires in the present case is that, such a no-confidence motion must be supported by a simple majority of the total membership of the Council by not counting the two votes cast by the nominated members. In the present case, it can be clearly ascertained as to the number of elected Councilors who supported the no-confidence motion and they were found to be only 12 out of the total membership of the Council. Though the total membership of the Council in the District Council including Tamenglong is 26, which includes 2 nominated members, it goes without saying that the total membership has to mean only 24 elected members as the two nominated members who do not have voting rights nor cast their votes can be included in the total membership of the Council. Hence, the simple majority would mean more than 12 (twelve) i.e., 13 or more votes which would be required to pass any resolution to make it simple majority. 74. It is now the admitted position of all the parties including the State Government that the two nominated members could not be allowed to take part in the meeting held for consideration of no confidence motion as they had been already denied such right by the order passed by this Court in the earlier order dated 10.10.2017 passed in WP(C) No. 433 of 2018 and WP(C) No. 455 of 2017 and also after suspension of voting rights, which was granted by the Fourth Amendment, which amendment was suspended by this Court by an interim order passed on 15.01.2018 in WP(C) No. 31 of 2018. Therefore, even if the two nominated members were initially allowed to take part in the meeting by virtue of the 4th Amendment of 2018, subsequently, after the said amendment was suspended by this Court, on the day of holding the meeting, even during the course of the meeting, two votes cast by the two nominated members who could not have taken part in the meeting could not have been counted. Even if they had cast their votes, these have to be ignored. From the record of the minutes of the meeting held on 15.01.2018 which had been forwarded by the Deputy Commissioner on 16.01.2018 it is clearly mentioned that though the said two nominated members were allowed to take part in the meeting purportedly on the basis of the Fourth Amendment Act and as such their participation could not be said to have been illegal at the beginning of the meeting as their participation was based on the Fourth Amendment Act. However, once the Fourth Amendment was suspended by this Court and the same was duly intimated to the Deputy Commissioner as reflected in the proceedings of the meeting held on 15.01.2017, they could no more take part in the no confidence motion and even if they had taken part and voted, these are to be ignored i.e., the two votes cast by the two nominated members out of total members in the said meeting. 75. It may be noted that the record of the minutes of the proceeding of the meeting held on 15.01.2018 does not indicate that it was a secret ballot in which the identity of the Councilors would not have been known, in which event, it would have been practically impossible to identify or segregate the votes cast by the nominated members. That is not the situation here. The method adopted was that the votes cast by each of the councilors including nominated members were clearly identifiable. Though there was voice vote (which would make it impossible to segregate the votes of the nominated members), there was also counting by heads as mentioned in the record of the proceedings. In fact, the Deputy Commissioner, so records by mentioning the 12 votes cast in favour of the no-confidence motion, by not counting the two votes of the two nominated members. Therefore, there was no difficulty in identifying, segregating the votes cast by the nominated members. In fact, the Deputy Commissioner, so records by mentioning the 12 votes cast in favour of the no-confidence motion, by not counting the two votes of the two nominated members. Therefore, there was no difficulty in identifying, segregating the votes cast by the nominated members. Had it been only voice voting, the matter could have been otherwise. In fact, what has happened and recorded by the Deputy Commissioner is that though the two members cast their votes along with 12 other members who were in support of the motion for no confidence, the Deputy Commissioner being the Presiding Officer later on, at the time of the conclusion of the meeting excluded the votes cast by the two nominated members on being informed of the order dated 15.01.2018 passed in WP(C) No. 39 of 2018. Thus, the votes cast by the nominated members being easily identifiable and separable were indeed segregated and ignored at the time of final tally of the votes cast in favour or against the no confidence motion. The segregation and separation of their votes, did not in any manner affect the votes cast by the other remaining elected councilors. The votes of the elected members stood as they were, not being clouded by the separation of the two votes of the nominated members. 76. In view of the above, this Court would hold that since the votes cast by the nominated members who became ineligible to take part in the proceeding could be identified and segregated clearly from the other remaining votes, it cannot be said that the entire proceeding of the meeting held on 15.01.2018 would be vitiated by their presence and voting. 77. This Court has come to the aforesaid conclusion for the reason that when the two nominated members were allowed to take part in the meeting held on 15.01.2018, they were legally entitled to do so in view of the Fourth Amendment amending Section 4 of the Manipur (Hill Areas District Council) Act by adding subsection 4 which granted voting rights to the nominated members. Therefore, when the two nominated members took part in the meeting in the initial stage their participation could not have been said to be illegal. Therefore, when the two nominated members took part in the meeting in the initial stage their participation could not have been said to be illegal. However, the moment the order passed by this Court on 15.01.2018 suspending the aforesaid amendment passed in WP(C) No. 31 of 2018 was brought to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner and the Council members, the nominated members could not have continued to take part in the said meeting and could not have cast their votes and even if they had taken part in the meeting and cast their votes, such votes could not have been counted in the final tally, which in fact happened as recorded in the minutes of the meeting. Even if the nominated members had taken part and cast their votes, by applying the doctrine of severability, the proceedings of the meeting can be sustained. 78. This Court would like to make it clear that the conclusion arrived by this Court in holding that the meeting held on 15.01.2018 need not be disturbed and declared void ab initio, is based on the examination and analysis of the record containing the minutes of the proceeding of the meeting, as forwarded by the Deputy Commissioner on 16.01.2018. This Court has ignored and not taken into account the subsequent additional information furnished by the Deputy Commissioner on 29.01.2018. As already mentioned above, this Court has taken a view that the additional information furnished by the Deputy Commissioner in the subsequent letter dated 29.01.2018 is not supported by the facts as narrated earlier and in fact, the said subsequent letter is contradictory to the factual position recorded in the minutes of the meeting. That being the position, this Court does not find credence in the subsequent letter dated 29.01.2018 more so as the same was written after about 2 (two) weeks of the holding of the election and hence, the same is ignored. As the Government order dated 30.01.2018 was based on the subsequent additional information furnished by the Deputy Commissioner on 29.01.2018, it could not have been sustained in law, and as such, the State Government in their wisdom withdrew the said order dated 30.01.2018. 79. As the Government order dated 30.01.2018 was based on the subsequent additional information furnished by the Deputy Commissioner on 29.01.2018, it could not have been sustained in law, and as such, the State Government in their wisdom withdrew the said order dated 30.01.2018. 79. It may be also mentioned that the stand of the State Government as well as the petitioners in WP(C) No. 390 of 2018 is that since the two nominated members have taken part in the meeting though they were not entitled to do so, the meeting is vitiated. As already discussed above, since the interim order of the Court passed in WP(C) No. 31 of 2018 suspending the Fourth Amendment Act,2018 was communicated during the consideration of no confidence motion and before its conclusion, even if assuming that the two nominated members had cast their votes before interim order of the Court was communicated, it would not make any difference in as much as the meeting was yet to be formally concluded and even on conclusion of the meeting, the vote cast by the nominated members could be segregated and not counted, as discussed above, and as such, the initial participation by the nominated members would not vitiate the entire proceeding of the meeting held on 15.01.2018 which otherwise, did not suffer from any other illegality. 80. Accordingly, this Court would hold that the entire proceedings of the meeting held on 15.01.2018 cannot be said to be void ab initio. Such portion of the meeting which were illegal and not in accordance with law, viz., the participation and casting of votes by the two nominated members, could be separated and segregated and ignored without affecting or changing the nature and character of the remaining portion of the proceeding. In view of above, this Court would hold that the declaration of the meeting held on 15.01.2018 as void ab initio by the State Government cannot be said to be valid in the eyes of law. 81. Having arrived at this conclusion, the next issue to be decided is whether the failure to carry through successfully the no confidence motion against the Chairman because of equality of votes on either sides, can be considered to be a “defeat” for the purpose of invoking the second proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the District Councils Act, 1971. 82. 82. In order to decide the aforesaid issue, it may be necessary to examine the relevant provisions of the District Councils Act, 1971as amended from time to time. Rule 23(2) of the Manipur (Hills Areas) District Councils Act, 1971 as amended by the 1st Amendment Act, 1975, as notified on 2.6.1975 reads as follows:- “(2) The Chairman of the District Council upon a resolution passed by a simple majority of the total membership of the Council may be removed by the Government for reasons to be recorded in writing.” Further, amendment to Section 23(2) was made adding two provisions vide the Fourth Amendment Act, 2018 notified on 12.1.2018 which are reproduced again as follows:- “Provided that no motion for such resolution shall be brought against the Chairman or Vice-Chairman, as the case may be, within one year of his assumption of office as the Chairman or Vice-Chairman, as the case may be, of the District Council. Provided further that if a motion for such resolution is defeated, no motion for such resolution shall be brought within a period of one year from the date of such defeat of the motion.” 83. The aforesaid two provisos, more particularly the 2nd Proviso, have been added to avoid frequent moving of No Confidence Motion against the Chairman or Vice-Chairman as the case may be. It may be also noted that such a provision was also incorporated in the Manipur Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 which is applicable in other valley districts of Manipur, which are not covered by the Manipur (Hill Areas) District Council Act, 1971. It is provided Under Section 57(4) (b) of Manipur Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 that if the motion of No Confidence against the Adhakshya or Up-Adhakshya or both is once rejected, no fresh motion of no-confidence against the Adhakshya or Up-Adhakshya or both, as the case may be, shall be brought before the Zilla Parishad within a period of one year from the date of such rejection of the motion as reproduced below:- “54.(a)............ “(b) If the motion of no confidence against the Adhakshya or Up-Adhakshya or both is once rejected, no fresh motion of no-confidence against the Adhakshya or Up-Adhakshya or both, as the case may be, shall be brought before the Zilla Parishad within a period of one year from the date of such rejection of the motion.” Similar provision is also provided in respect of Pradhan and Up-Pradhan under section 30(1) of the aforesaid Panchayati Raj Act, 1994, which reads as follows: “30.(1) Every Pradhan and every Up-Pradhan shall be deemed to have vacated his office forthwith if a resolution expressing want of confidence in him is passed by a majority of not less than two-third of the members of the Gram Panchayat present and voting, at a meeting specially convened for the purpose. The requisition for such special meeting shall be signed by not less than half of the total number of members of the Gram Panchayat and shall be delivered to the prescribed authority. The prescribed authority within seven days from the date of receipt of the requisition, convene a special meeting of the Gram Panchayat. The meeting shall be held on a day not later than fifteen days from the date of issue of the notice of the meeting. The meeting shall be presided over by the prescribed authority. In the initial two years of their term as Pradhan and Up-Pradhan of a Gram Panchayat, no such motion of no confidence shall be moved against them. If the motion of no confidence is once rejected, no fresh motion of no confidence shall be brought before the Gram Panchayat within a period of one year from the date of such rejection of the motion.” Similarly, it has been provided under Section 12Kof the Manipur Municipalities Act, 1994, as inserted by the Manipur Municipalities (Tenth Amendment) Act, 2016, notified on 16.3.2016 that if the motion of no confidence against the Mayor or Deputy Mayor as the case may be, is defeated, no fresh motion of no confidence against the Mayor or Deputy Mayor or both, as the case may be, shall be brought within a period of one year from the date of such defeat of motion. Section 12K reads as follows:- “12K. Section 12K reads as follows:- “12K. If the motion of no confidence against the Mayor or the Deputy Mayor, as the case may be, is defeated, no fresh motion of no confidence against the Mayor or the Deputy Mayor or both, as the case may be, shall be brought before the Municipal Corporation, within a period of one year from the date of such defeat of the motion.” 84. The underlying purpose of making such provision is that the functioning of the Chairperson or Vice-Chairperson, the Adhakshya or Up-Adhakshya, Pradhan or Up-Pradhan, the Mayor as the case may be, should not be unduly disrupted because of frequent moving of No Confidence Motion against them as frequent motion of no confidence distracts these functionaries from discharging important crucial statutory functions as they would be more concerned with safeguarding their positions than discharging public duties. Accordingly, the legislature in its wisdom had enacted these provisions to protect these important functionaries from the undue disruption in their functioning. It may be noted that Manipur (Hill Areas) Autonomous District Council was enacted in 1971 when perhaps political stability at the district level was not much encountered and statute originally did not contain this provision. However, because of instability brought in by frequent motion of no-confidence against these functionaries, the legislature in its wisdom considered it appropriate that similar provision should be also incorporated in the Manipur (Hill Areas) District Council Act, 1971 as provided in other local areas bodies under the Manipur Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 and Manipur Municipal Act, 1994. 85. As mentioned above, accordingly, if No Confidence Motion which was moved on 15.01.2018 against the Chairman is held to be defeated, the embargo placed by the second proviso to Section 23(2) of the District Councils Act, 1971 will come into play. The moot question is, whether the No Confidence Motion moved on 15.01.2018 can be said to have been defeated. The word “defeat” means “failure to win or to be successful” as defined in Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (New 8th Edition). It has been also defined by Cambridge Dictionary as also to mean “to cause someone or something to fail”(http//dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/defeat). Black’s Law Dictionary (10th Edition) defines “defeat” as follows:- “1. To deprive (someone) of something expected, usu. by an antagonistic act<to defeat the opponent in an election>. 2. To annul or render (something) void<to defeat title>. 3. It has been also defined by Cambridge Dictionary as also to mean “to cause someone or something to fail”(http//dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/defeat). Black’s Law Dictionary (10th Edition) defines “defeat” as follows:- “1. To deprive (someone) of something expected, usu. by an antagonistic act<to defeat the opponent in an election>. 2. To annul or render (something) void<to defeat title>. 3. To vanquish : to conquer (someone or something)<to defeat the armies>. 4. To frustrate (someone or something) <the expenditures defeat the bill’s purpose.” Therefore, from the above, one can say that defeat is a word used to indicate failure to succeed failure to win or succeed or to cause someone to fail. The word “defeated“ has been used in the District Councils Act, 1971. This word has to be understood from effect or consequence of a thing done or performed. It may be observed that the words used in the Manipur Panchayati Raj Act as well in the Municipalities Act, 1994 for similar situation is “rejected”, and though different words have been used, the provisions have similar effect and consequence, that if No Confidence Motion is rejected, no fresh confidence or lack of confidence shall be brought before the Zilla Parishador the Panchayat or the Municipalities as the case may be, within the period of one year from the date of such rejection. It is to be observed that these statutes have used different words of “defeated” and “rejected” to carry the same meaning with same consequence. Therefore, one need not be too punctilious with the use of the word, “defeat” in the District Councils Act, 1971. What is of importance is the result or consequence or final outcome of the motion for no confidence. If any motion of no confidence could not be carried through, it can also mean that it has been defeated or rejected, for the reason that failure to win or to be successful also means defeat as also defined in the dictionaries. “Defeat” does not necessarily mean that such a motion has to be opposed by a larger number of votes. Certainly, opposing a motion of no confidence by a larger number of votes clearly amounts to defeat of the motion. However, such defeat of the motion cannot be confined only to situation where the those opposing no confidence motion has a larger number. Certainly, opposing a motion of no confidence by a larger number of votes clearly amounts to defeat of the motion. However, such defeat of the motion cannot be confined only to situation where the those opposing no confidence motion has a larger number. It will also suffice, if because of tie or equality of the votes, the No Confidence Motion is not carried through. What the rules require for such No Confidence Motion to be successful under the Manipur (Hill Areas) District Council Act, 1971 is that such No-Confidence Motion should be passed by a number consisting of no less than simple majority of the total membership of the Council. What the Rule requires is that any such resolution for No Confidence Motion to be successful, must be passed by a simple majority of the total membership of the Council, as otherwise, it can be said to be unsuccessful or defeated, as provided under sub-section (2) of section 23 of the Manipur (Hill Areas) District Council Act, 1971. 86. Therefore, in the context of the section 23 of the District Council Act, 1971, it is evidently clear that if a resolution moved for removal of the Chairman of the District Council is not supported by a simple majority of the total membership of the Council, such a resolution can be said have failed or been defeated. 87. In the present case, it is not in dispute that there are 26 Councils members in the Tamenglong Autonomous District Council of which 2(two) are nominated members, who cannot take part and cast their votes for the reasons already discussed above. Hence, the effective total number of total membership for the purpose of votes will be 24, which is also not disputed by any of the contesting parties. Accordingly, in order to make a resolution for no confidence to be successful, it must be supported and passed by a minimum 13 members of the Council. In the present case, as seen from the records of the proceeding of the meeting held on 15.01.2018, only 12 elected members cast their votes in support of the No Confidence Motion, thus clearly showing that there was no support of the simple majority of the total membership of the Council. It is irrelevant as to whether the remaining elected members abstained from vote or walked out at the time of casting vote. It is irrelevant as to whether the remaining elected members abstained from vote or walked out at the time of casting vote. What is relevant or material and necessary under Section 23(2) is that there must be 13 elected members of the District Council who must support such a motion to be carried through. If such a motion could not be carried through after being placed to vote, it can be said that such a motion has not been successful. It can be also stated without any doubt that such a motion has failed or has been defeated. 88. To ascertain as to whether the motion for no confidence moved against the Chairman has been successful or unsuccessful or defeated, one has to look only at the proceeding of the meeting held on 15.01.2018 as forwarded by the Deputy Commissioner to the State Government on 16.01.2018. 89. This Court has already quoted in full the minutes of the meeting held on 15.01.2018 wherein it has been clearly mentioned by the Deputy Commissioner in the concluding portion of the proceeding that without taking into account the votes of the two nominee members, the final outcome of the motion for removal of the incumbent Chairman of the Tamenglong Autonomous District Council was as follows:- (i) those in favour Shri Namsinrei Panmei as ADC Chairman, Tamenglong -12 members who walked out. (ii) those against Shri NamsinreiPanmai as ADC Chairman- 12 Council Members excluding the two nominated members, both on voice vote and physical identification by the Deputy Commissioner. The Deputy Commissioner further went on to record that in view of the above, there was no simple majority on either of the sides, and thereafter, the Deputy Commissioner forwarded a copy of the proceeding of the meeting to the State Government for taking further action. 90. It is, thus, clear from the minutes of the meeting held on 15.01.2018 that the resolution for no confidence moved against the Chairman could not be carried as it was not supported by the simple majority of total membership of the Council. It can be unambiguously stated that there was no support by the simple majority of the total membership of the council to the No Confidence Motion moved against the Chairperson of the ADC, Tamenglong. It can be unambiguously stated that there was no support by the simple majority of the total membership of the council to the No Confidence Motion moved against the Chairperson of the ADC, Tamenglong. Hence, it can be said that the said no-confidence motion was defeated within the meaning of the provisions under section 23 of the Manipur (Hill Areas) District Council Act, 1971. 91. From the above factual positions obtaining as discussed above, this Court would hold that in the meeting held on 15.1.2018, though the two nominated members were allowed to take part and cast their votes, their votes which could be easily identified and segregated and were to be ignored in the final tally of the votes which was done by the Deputy Commissioner resulting in equality of votes of the two groups which supported the no-confidence motion and who did not support the no-confidence motion, being 12 each and hence, the no confidence motion was not carried through and it could be said to have been defeated. 92. In that event, the provisions of the second proviso to sub-section 23 (2) would come into effect. Hence, there cannot be any fresh motion for no-confidence against the incumbent Chairman for another one year w.e.f. 15.1.2018. 93. In that view of the matter, the subsequent meeting convened on vide notice dated 8.5.2018 and which was held on 25.5.2018 cannot be given effect to as the same is contrary to the second proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the said Act. 94. It has been submitted by the Addl. AG as well as the petitioners in WP(C) No. 390 of 2018 that during the pendency of these petitions in the meantime, one elected council member who was opposing the no-confidence motion and supporting the present incumbent Chairman has expired and as such, the effective strength of the supporters of the Chairman has been reduced to 11(eleven) only. On the other hand, the 12(twelve) elected councilors who had supported the no-confidence motion remain intact at 12(twelve). Accordingly, it has been submitted that it would be against all democratic norms that a person who does not command the majority votes would be allowed to continue as a Chairman and as such, the result of the meeting held on 25-5-2018 ought to be allowed to be declared. 95. Accordingly, it has been submitted that it would be against all democratic norms that a person who does not command the majority votes would be allowed to continue as a Chairman and as such, the result of the meeting held on 25-5-2018 ought to be allowed to be declared. 95. This Court is of the view that, once it has been held that the second proviso to sub-section (2) to Section 23 of the District Councils Act, 1971 becomes applicable, it would be immaterial as to whether at any subsequent stage after the initial no-confidence motion has been defeated, the incumbent Chairman loses support either due to death or resignation of any supporting member or declaration of lack of support by any Councilor, as the statute does not contemplate any such situation. The contention of the learned Addl. AG and the petitioners in WP(C) No. 390 of 2018 could be accepted only if the statute also provide such contingency that if after the defeat of the no-confidence motion, if death or resignation occurs of any of the supporters of Chairman or there is declaration of lack of support for the Chairman/Vice-Chairman as the case may be, a fresh no-confidence motion can be moved notwithstanding defeat of the no-confidence motion. In absence of such specific provision in the Act, it would not be permissible to circumvent the specific provisions of the statute by taking into consideration such contingency. As mentioned above, the District Councils Act, 1971 has not provided any such provision or provide for such contingency. The language of the statute is clear that in the event of defeat of no-confidence motion against the Chairman/Vice Chairman, no fresh no-confidence motion shall be made one year of the defeat of the no-confidence motion. Even otherwise also, whether the Chairman enjoys the support of the majority of the elected members or not, can be ascertained only through a vote and not otherwise, but such voting is not permissible to be held for one year from the date of defeat of the motion of no-confidence. 96. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, this Court finds merit in WP(C) No. 388 of 2018 and WP(C) No. 399 of 2018 and accordingly, the same are allowed. For the same reasons this Court does not find merit in WP(C) No. 390 of 2018 and accordingly, the same is dismissed. 97. 96. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, this Court finds merit in WP(C) No. 388 of 2018 and WP(C) No. 399 of 2018 and accordingly, the same are allowed. For the same reasons this Court does not find merit in WP(C) No. 390 of 2018 and accordingly, the same is dismissed. 97. Consequently, this Court holds that the no-confidence motion moved against the incumbent Chairman of the Tamenglong Autonomous District Council on 15.1.2018 was defeated, as the said no-confidence motion was not successfully carried out. Resultantly, no-confidence motion against the incumbent Chairman cannot be moved against him for another period of one year w.e.f. 15.1.2018 and as such, subsequent meeting convened and held on 25.5.2018 in terms of the notice dated 8.5.2018 for considering the no-confidence motion against the incumbent Chairman of the Tamenglong Autonomous District Council are declared void. No order as to cost.