JUDGMENT : K.M. JOSEPH, J. 1. These two writ petitions have been carried before us on the basis of the order passed by the learned Single Judge on 10.04.2018. The order passed by the learned Single Judge reads as follows: "Mr. Tapan Singh, Advocate present for the petitioner. Mr. Rajat Mittal, Advocate, present for the respondent. The moot question, which falls for consideration of this Court in these petitions, is whether the Court has any discretion to relax the condition of pre-deposit of 75% of the awarded amount, for challenging the award under Section 19 of the Micro Small & Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (in short 'the Act'). In WPMS No.1500 of 2015, a coordinate Bench of this Court has expressed the view that court has no discretion to accept the 75% of the awarded amount in the form of bank guarantee, however, it can permit the pre-deposit to be made in installments, if felt necessary. However, in WPMS No. 1378 of 2016, another coordinate Bench has held that the pre-deposit, required under Section 19 of the Act, can be permitted to be made in the form of bank guarantee and/or security. In such view of the matter, law needs to be settled on the said issue once and for all. Therefore, Registry is directed to place these matters before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for appropriate orders." Pursuant to the same, this Bench has been constituted. 2. We heard Mr. Tapan Singh, learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. Rajat Mittal, learned counsel on behalf of the respondent. 3. The controversy, which arises for our consideration, is whether under Section 19 of the Micro Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006, (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), the Court has any discretion in the matter of accepting 75% of the amount, awarded in the form of any bank guarantee or other security. Section 19 of the Act reads as follows:- "19. Section 19 of the Act reads as follows:- "19. Application for setting aside decree, award or order.-No application for setting aside any decree, award or other order made either by the Council itself or by any institution or centre providing alternate dispute resolution services to which a reference is made by the Council, shall be entertained by any court unless the appellant (not being a supplier) has deposited with it seventy-five per cent of the amount in terms of the decree, award or, as the case may be, the other order in the manner directed by such court: Provided that pending disposal of the application to set aside the decree, award or order, the court shall order that such percentage of the amount deposited shall be paid to the supplier, as it considers reasonable under the circumstances of the case subject to such conditions as it deems necessary to impose." 4. Learned Judges of this Court have expressed divergent views in this matter. In Writ Petition (M/S) No.1500 of 2015, a learned Single Judge (Justice Rajiv Sharma) was considering an application moved under the said provision. The learned Single Judge, after noticing Section 19, inter alia, held as follows: "8. According to the plain language of Section 19, no application for setting aside any decree, award or other order made either by the Council itself or by any institution or centre providing alternate dispute resolution services to which a reference is made by the Council, can be entertained by any Court unless the appellant (not being a supplier) has deposited with it seventy five per cent of the amount in terms of the decree, award or, as the case may be, the other order in the manner directed by the Court. The expression used in Section 19 is 'shall'. It is mandatory. The provisions of the Act are required to be read as it is, more particularly, when there is no ambiguity in the language of that section. The purpose of deposit of 75 per cent of the amount in terms of the award apparently is to discourage the filing of frivolous appeals." Thereafter, the learned Single Judge took the view as follows: "In view of the definite law laid down by Their Lordships of Hon. Supreme Court, the petitioners are required to deposit 75 percent of the awarded amount, in cash, before the District Judge, Dehradun. There is no illegality in the orders dated 12.01.2015 and 08.05.2015 passed by learned District Judge, Dehradun. 5. The learned Single Judge also referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of "Goodyear India Limited Vs. Norton Intech Rubbers Private Limited and another, (2012) 6 SCC 345 " and proceeded to take the view that, in view of the definite law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the petitioners are required to deposit 75% of the amount awarded in cash before the District Judge. 6. Another learned Single Judge (Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia) in WPMS No.963 of 2015, while disposing of the interim application, after referring to Section 19 of the Act held as follows: "The proviso to above Section definitely gives power to the court to release the amount, but it will not control the main provision of the Act. The petitioner is also a Government Company. The interest of respondent in whose favour the award has been made are well taken care of, if the petitioners are allowed to give a security. As an interim measure, it is provided that instead of the amount, the petitioners shall give a Bank guarantee of the 50% of the amount and for the remaining 50% it shall give a security other than a Bank guarantee to the satisfaction of the court below. It is further directed that proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1966 shall also be expedited without granting any undue adjournments. Interim relief application no.4538 of 2015 stands disposed accordingly." 7. Another learned Single Judge of this Court (Justice Alok Singh), again while passing the interim order, proceeded to pass the following order: "Meanwhile, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, it is provided that instead of making cash deposit of 75% of the arbitral amount, petitioner shall furnish security to the satisfaction of the District Judge of the entire amount of award. On furnishing security, learned District Judge shall proceed, in accordance with law, to decide the objections filed by the petitioner and shall make every endeavour to decide the objections in accordance with law, at their own merit without undue delay. CLMA No.5081 of 2014 stands disposed of." 8. Another learned Single Judge (Justice Sharad Kumar Sharma) in WPMS No.1378 of 2016 has taken a different view. CLMA No.5081 of 2014 stands disposed of." 8. Another learned Single Judge (Justice Sharad Kumar Sharma) in WPMS No.1378 of 2016 has taken a different view. The learned Single Judge has discussed the matter in the following paragraphs: "3. On a simple reading of Section 19, it contemplates that it creates a bar in entertaining an application challenging an award subject to the condition of deposit of 75% of awarded amount as contained in it. The basic intention of Section 19 is that the interest of the decree holder should be safeguarded before the appellate forum or as a consequence of appellate judgment, which may arrive at in pursuance to the judgment likely to be rendered by the appellate court and that is why the Legislature in all its wisdom has provided that under Section 19 along with the proviso which directs that the condition of 75% deposit would be subject to the condition as it deems necessary to be imposed by the Court. The terminology used in the proviso gives a latitude to the Court as to the manner in which the modalities of deposit of 75% is to be followed to meet the intention of Section 19 of the Act. 4. The Coordinate Bench of this Court in a judgment rendered in Writ Petition No.1500 (M/S) of 2015 has directed that mandatory deposit of 75% could be safeguarding the interest subject to the condition that the security is furnished to the satisfaction of the District Judge instead of making cash deposit of the entire awarded amount which may have financial implications on the appellant. The Coordinate Bench of this Court further proceeded to direct the District Judge to decide the objection filed by the petitioner without any undue delay. 5. The another Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No.963 (M/S) of 2015, while being conscious of the impact of Section 19 and considering its interaction has rendered a judgment whereby the learned Single Judge has directed that 50% of the amount shall be given as a bank guarantee and for the remaining 50%, it shall give by way of security other than the bank guarantee to the satisfaction of the court below, which was to be deposited before the Court seized with the jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Against the judgment rendered by learned Single Judge, a special appeal was preferred before the Division Bench. The Division Bench of this Court too, without observing anything contrary to the decision taken by the learned Single Judge laying modalities of deposit of amount as provided under Section 19, disposed of the appeal directing the District Judge to decide the arbitration appeal within stipulated time. 8. I am in respectful disagreement with the reasoning offered by learned counsel for the respondent for the reason that the Hon'ble Apex Court while considering the impact of Section 19 in the light of the judgment rendered by the Kerala High Court in Kerala S.R.T.C. vs. Union of India, has granted a latitude with regard to deposit, though has held the condition of deposit as condition precedent for preferring an appeal under the Arbitration Act. The payment to be made in installments is not an absolute direction issued by the Hon'ble Apex Court. It has yet again granted a discretion to the High Court to exercise its wisdom as to whether the deposit is to be made in any other mode in accordance with the proviso to Section 19 and to meet the purpose then only to come to the conclusion directing the appellant to deposit the amount before the court below and that is why the Hon'ble Apex Court has used the words "if felt necessary". 9. In the light of above, this writ petition is disposed of with the direction that the petitioner would deposit 50% of the amount by giving bank guarantee and for the remaining 50% it shall give a security other than a bank guarantee to the satisfaction of the court below. It is hoped and trusted that learned District Judge will make all endeavour to decide the appeal within a period of two months from today without granting any unnecessary adjournments to either of the parties." 9. In fact, it is brought to our notice by Mr. Rajat Mittal, Advocate that WPMS No.1378 of 2016 was directed against the constitutional validity of Section 19; but, the learned Single Judge, however, proceeded to dispose of the matter by giving relief to deposit the amount by way of bank guarantee. 10. Mr. In fact, it is brought to our notice by Mr. Rajat Mittal, Advocate that WPMS No.1378 of 2016 was directed against the constitutional validity of Section 19; but, the learned Single Judge, however, proceeded to dispose of the matter by giving relief to deposit the amount by way of bank guarantee. 10. Mr. Tapan Singh, Advocate would contend that there is discretion with the Court acting under Section 19 and it is not mandatory that the party should deposit the amount of 75% in cash. It can be done also by way of bank guarantee or security. He also drew our attention to the fact that, in fact, respondent in this case has challenged the order passed by learned Single Judge in WPMS No.1378 of 2016 by way of a S.L.P. and the following order was passed:- "Heard learned counsel for the parties. The impugned order is modified to the extent that 50% amount may be deposited instead of giving bank guarantee by the respondents. The same be released to the petitioner against a bank guarantee. The special leave petition stands disposed of. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of." 11. Therefore, in the light of this development also, he would submit that Section 19 must be interpreted as conferring the discretion on the Court to order pre-deposit of 75% by way of security, which may include the bank guarantee. 12. Per contra, Mr. Rajat Mittal, Advocate would submit that Section 19 is clear as it mandates the deposit of the amount in cash. He also drew our attention to Section 19 of the Act. He further drew our attention to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Goodyear India Limited Vs. Norton Intech Rubbers Private Limited and another, (2012) 6 SCC 345 . He also placed reliance upon the judgment of the Kerala High Court in the matter of "Managing Director, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Union of India" where the writ petition was filed challenging the validity of Section 19 of the Act. 13. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that, under Section 19, the Court has no discretion in the matter of ordering deposit of 75 % of the amount, except by way of cash. This result is inevitable on a reading of Section 19 itself. 13. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that, under Section 19, the Court has no discretion in the matter of ordering deposit of 75 % of the amount, except by way of cash. This result is inevitable on a reading of Section 19 itself. It is settled law that the duty of the Court is to give effect to the intention of the legislature. The intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the words which are used in the provision. If the words used in a statutory provision on a plain interpretation can be given effect to, then even if it may result in some injustice, it must be implemented. It is another matter that if the provisions of a statute are capable of two or more interpretations, the Court may choose the interpretation which does not result in an absurdity or in injustice. 14. This question is essentially not res-integra, as it has, in fact, been considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the decision of Goodyear India Limited Vs. Norton Intech Rubbers Private Limited and another, (2012) 6 SCC 345 , wherein, the Special Leave Petition was directed against the order passed under Section 19. One of the contentions, which were taken before the Hon'ble Apex Court, was that the petitioners therein must be permitted to deposit the amount by way of bank guarantee. We, in this regard, refer to paragraph nos. 7 & 8. "7. In the two special leave petitions, which have been filed by M/s Goodyear India Ltd., once again themain thrust of the submissions made by Mr. M.G. Ramchandran, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, was with regard to interpretation of the provisions of Section 19 of the 2006 Act. According to him, one of the questions of law which arise for consideration in these proceedings is: whether the requirement under Section 19 of the 2006 Act, regarding deposit of seventy-five per cent of the amount in terms of the award made under the said Act, is absolute, perverse, capricious or arbitrary in nature? Coupled with the said question, another submission was made by Mr Ramchandran as to the interpretation of the expression "in the manner directed by such court", which appears at the end of Section 19, just before the proviso. 8. Mr. Coupled with the said question, another submission was made by Mr Ramchandran as to the interpretation of the expression "in the manner directed by such court", which appears at the end of Section 19, just before the proviso. 8. Mr. Ramchandran sought to interpret Section 19 within the meaning of such expression by submitting that the said expression provided the court with the discretion to alter the provisions relating to the deposit of seventy-five per cent amount as predeposit, for the appeal to be taken up for consideration. According to Mr Ramchandran, the said expression could also be understood to include securing of the amount by way of bank guarantee or otherwise, having regard to the onerous and stringent conditions involved". 15. The Hon'ble Apex Court has proceeded to discuss the matter in paragraph no. 11, which reads as follows:- "11. Having considered the submissions made, both on behalf of the petitioner and on behalf of the respondents, we do not see any reason to interfere with the views expressed, both by the learned Single Judge, as also the Division Bench with regard to Section 19 of the 2006 Act. It may not be out of place to mention that the provisions of Section 19 of the 2006 Act, had been challenged before the Kerala High Court in Kerala SRTC v. Union of India, where the same submissions were negated and, subsequently, the matter also came up to this Court, when the special leave petitions were dismissed, with leave to make the predeposit in the cases involved, within an extended period of ten weeks. We may also indicate that the expression "in the manner directed by such court" would, in our view, indicate the discretion given to the court to allow the predeposit to be made, if felt necessary, in installments." 16. The aforesaid discussion leaves us with no doubt that the Hon'ble Apex Court has also understood Section 19 as meaning that pre-deposit has to be made in cash. 17. The object, which is sought to be achieved by the said Act, cannot be overlooked. The preamble of the Act reads as follows:- "An Act to provide for facilitating the promotion and development and enhancing the competitiveness of micro, small and medium enterprises and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto." 18. Section 19 figures in Chapter V. Chapter V relates to delayed payments to micro and small enterprises. The preamble of the Act reads as follows:- "An Act to provide for facilitating the promotion and development and enhancing the competitiveness of micro, small and medium enterprises and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto." 18. Section 19 figures in Chapter V. Chapter V relates to delayed payments to micro and small enterprises. Section 15 deals with the liability of the buyer to make payment. Section 16 fixes the date from which and rate at which interest is payable. Section 17 provides that, for any goods supplied or services rendered by the supplier, the buyer shall be liable to pay the amount with interest thereon as provided under Section 16. Section 18 contemplates reference of any dispute to the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council. Section 18 reads as follows:- "18. Reference to Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council- (1)Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, any party to a dispute may, with regard to any amount due under section 17, make a reference to the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council. (2) On receipt of a reference under sub-section (1), the Council shall either itself conduct conciliation in the matter or seek the assistance of any institution or centre providing alternate dispute resolution services by making a reference to such an institution or centre, for conducting conciliation and the provisions of sections 65 to 81 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall apply to such a dispute as if the conciliation was initiated under Part III of that Act. (3) Where the conciliation initiated under subsection (2) is not successful and stands terminated without any settlement between the parties, the Council shall either itself take up the dispute for arbitration or refer to it any institution or centre providing alternate dispute resolution services for such arbitration and the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall then apply to the dispute as if the arbitration was in pursuance of an arbitration agreement referred to in sub-section (1) of section 7 of that Act. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council or the centre providing alternate dispute resolution services shall have jurisdiction to act as an Arbitrator or Conciliator under this section in a dispute between the supplier located within its jurisdiction and a buyer located anywhere in India. (5) Every reference made under this section shall be decided within a period of ninety days from the date of making such a reference." 19. It is, thereafter, the Section 19 makes its appearance. 20. This Court cannot be oblivious to the object and the purpose which is sought to be achieved, which is the promotion, development and enhancing the competitiveness of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises. Dissecting Section 19 itself, the plain words used in Section 19 are that 75% of the amount in terms of the decree award or the order as the case may be, has to be deposited. From a plain reading of the words, it cannot admit of any dispute that the legislature has intended that it has to be the deposit of the amount in terms of cash. Quite clearly Section 19 does not contemplate any power with the Court to permit deposit of the amount by way of bank guarantee or any other form of security. Had the intention of the legislature been that the Courts have freedom and discretion in the matter and can permit deposit of the amount by way of security or bank guarantee, nothing stopped the legislature from indicating its mind in the said direction. This view receives clear fortification from the words used in the proviso. The proviso clearly contemplates that pending disposal of the application for setting aside decree, award or order, the Court can order such percentage of the amount deposited to be paid to the supplier, as it considers it reasonable under the circumstances of the case subject to such conditions as it deems necessary to impose. The percentage of the amount, which is deposited, can only be consistent with the reasoning that, under the main provision of Section 19, the amount is available in cash. The percentage of the amount, which is deposited, can only be consistent with the reasoning that, under the main provision of Section 19, the amount is available in cash. If the argument is accepted that it can be by way of security, it would only not be contrary to the plain words used in the proviso; but, it would also defy the clear object of the Act, which is to ensure that the unit in question, which is Micro, Small or Medium Enterprises, survives. Therefore, apart from receiving light from the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court and following it, we would think that the arguments of the petitioner are contrary to the provisions contained in Section 19 of the Act. 21. We are unable to subscribe to the view taken by the learned Single Judge in WPMS No.1378 of 2016 that the discretion has been granted to the High Court (apparently by virtue of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court) to exercise its wisdom as to whether deposit is to be made in any other mode in accordance with the proviso to Section 19 and to meet the purpose, then only to come to the conclusion directing the appellant to deposit the amount before the Court and this is why the Hon'ble Apex Court has used the words 'if felt necessary'. 22. The words 'if felt necessary' are not a part of Section 19. What the Hon'ble Apex Court, apparently, has intended in paragraph no. 11, which we have extracted, is that, in a given case if the Court feels it necessary, it can extend the facility of making the deposit of 75% of the amount in installments. There is no other discretion which is accorded to the Court under Section 19. In other words, we make it clear that, when an Appeal is maintained under Section 19, the pre-deposit of 75% of the amount must be made by depositing the amount in cash. Deposit cannot be made in the form of security, be it even bank guarantee. 23. Therefore, we are also of the view that the learned Single Judge was not correct in holding that the terminology used in the proviso gives a latitude to the Court as to the manner in which the modality as to deposit 75% of the amount is to be followed to meet the intention of Section 19 of the Act. 23. Therefore, we are also of the view that the learned Single Judge was not correct in holding that the terminology used in the proviso gives a latitude to the Court as to the manner in which the modality as to deposit 75% of the amount is to be followed to meet the intention of Section 19 of the Act. 24. We also notice that Mr. Rajat Mittal, Advocate, in fact, is correct in drawing our attention to the judgment of Kerala High Court, which had upheld the validity of Section 19 and where various contentions were taken regarding the validity primarily on the basis of the burden that it would cast and has held that full effect be given to it in the form of obligation to make pre-deposit of 75% amount in cash. The Division Bench of the Kerala High Court has upheld the same and the Special Leave Petition filed against the said judgment stood dismissed as is, in fact, noted in Goodyear India Limited case also. Therefore, having regard to the aforesaid discussion, we are of the clear view that the learned Single Judge, while deciding Writ Petition No.1378 of 2016, was in error and we uphold the view which was taken by the learned Single Judge in stay application 7069/2015 in WPMS No.1500 of 2015. 25. Mr. Tapan Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the order passed by the Apex Court in Special Leave Petition filed against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in WPMS No.1378 of 2016. The reliance placed is misplaced. The said order has already been adverted to. We do not think that the Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down law within the meaning of Article 141. In such circumstances, we do not see as to how the petitioners can be permitted to draw support from the aforesaid order. Accordingly, we hold that judgment in WPMS No.1378 of 2016 cannot be treated as having laid down good law and we uphold the reasoning supplied in WPMS No.1500 of 2015. We also take the view that the learned Single Judge in WPMS No.1378 of 2016 was not correct in the view there taken regarding powers under Section 19. The reasoning given by the learned Single Judge does not appear to us sound in law and cannot be treated as good law. 26. We also take the view that the learned Single Judge in WPMS No.1378 of 2016 was not correct in the view there taken regarding powers under Section 19. The reasoning given by the learned Single Judge does not appear to us sound in law and cannot be treated as good law. 26. However, we do note the view of the Hon'ble Apex Court, as laid down in paragraph no. 11, that the expression "in the manner directed by the Court", indicates that discretion is available to the Court to allow the pre-deposit in cases where it feels necessary in installments. 27. Learned counsel for the respondent pointed out that, in fact, an Appeal would be maintainable against the order passed under Section 19 of the Act read with Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1966. 28. Since this question has been raised, whether the Appeal is a proper remedy having regard to the relief sought in writ petition which is to challenge an order passed by the Court rejecting the application filed by the writ petitioner to permit it to make a pre-deposit by way of security and dismissing the appeal, we feel that, after having answered the question, the writ petitions must go back to the learned Single Judge for determination of the question raised in the writ petitions. It is, accordingly, ordered.