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2018 DIGILAW 412 (BOM)

Rambharose @ Ranga Pannalal Malviya v. Deputy Inspector General Of Prison (east Region), Nagpur

2018-02-09

M.G.GIRATKAR, R.K.DESHPANDE

body2018
JUDGMENT R.K. Deshpande, J -Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent of the learned counsels appearing for the parties. 2. The petitioner is undergoing sentence for life imprisonment upon his conviction for the offences punishable under Sections 147 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner has undergone the sentence for a period of 11 years 10 months and 13 days. His application for grant of furlough leave for a period of 28 days has been rejected by order dated 24-8-2017 by the Deputy Inspector General of Prison, Nagpur. 3. The petitioner was granted parole leave on 8-8-2008 but he surrendered himself late by 117 days on 3-3-2009. Lastly, when the petitioner was released on furlough leave on 7-9-2009, he was required to be brought back to the prison after 1055 days on 24-8-2012. According to the respondents, the petitioner had earlier approached this Court challenging the refusal to grant furlough leave and the Division Bench of this court to which one of us (Justice Giratkar) is a party. In Criminal Writ Petition No. 373/2017, this Court rejected the claim taking into consideration the fact that the petitioner was required to be brought back to the prison after a period of 1055 days from the date of the expiry of his furlough leave. 4. In the decision of the Division Bench of this Court delivered in Bharat @ Velji Govindji Panchal @ Lohar Vs. The State of Maharashtra and ors. in Criminal Writ Petition No. 1624/2004 and other connected matters dated 2-5-2006 relied upon by Ms. Trupti Udeshi, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, it is held in paragraph nos. 26 to 31 as under : 26. On an application for furlough being received, the authorities may consider whether to grant or refuse furlough after taking into consideration various factors, like, past record, reason for overstay, whether the prisoner was arrested or he had surrendered on his own, period of overstay, possibility of the prisoner again absconding, his conduct in prison in the last few years and other relevant factors. If the prison authorities are satisfied that the overstay was for good and sufficient reasons, for example, the prisoner could not report back in time as there was death in the family or there was earthquake or unprecedented flood or some other sufficient reason, the case of that prisoner for release on furlough can be considered. If the prison authorities are satisfied that the overstay was for good and sufficient reasons, for example, the prisoner could not report back in time as there was death in the family or there was earthquake or unprecedented flood or some other sufficient reason, the case of that prisoner for release on furlough can be considered. In cases of late surrender wherein the prisoner has voluntarily surrendered and the delay in surrendering was not unduly long and it was on account of sufficient cause or reason, such cases can certainly be considered. 27. We clarify that prisoners over staying period of furlough are of two types. Those who over stayed and are required to be brought back by use of police machinery is the first category, and, those who over stayed but surrender on their own accord, is the second category. 28. So far as first category is concerned, they have no right to claim furlough thereafter and authorities would be justified in rejecting their application on that ground. 29. So far as prisoners over staying but surrendering on their own accord they can apply for furlough and the authorities may or may not grant them furlough depending upon the period of over stay and the explanation given by them. 30. So far as the first category is concerned, we have already held that the prisoners have no right to claim furlough and authority would be justified in rejecting their application on that ground. 31. Regarding second category i.e. prisoners over staying but returning on their own accord, grant of the furlough has been left by us to the discretion of the authorities depending upon the facts and circumstances like the period of over stay, the explanation given and the conduct of the prisoner in jail after his return. 5. In the case of Murlidhar Ramchandra Bhalerao Vs. State of Maharashtra and anr. , (2011) AllMR(Cri) 2132, relied upon by Ms. Trupti Udeshi, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, it is held in paragraph no. 7 as under : 7. Prisoners time and again claim that furlough is a right granted to them. Even assuming it is a right, once they have been given this right and they avail of it, they have a corresponding duty to report back to the prison in time. 7 as under : 7. Prisoners time and again claim that furlough is a right granted to them. Even assuming it is a right, once they have been given this right and they avail of it, they have a corresponding duty to report back to the prison in time. The prisoner cannot conveniently forget this duty and then again come to the Court claiming that they have a right to be released on furlough. The prisoner cannot abuse the right and then again claim the same relief from the Court. Once he abuses this right, he loses the right to claim the very same relief as of right. 6. The petitioner falls in the category of prisoners who overstayed the furlough leave and was required to be brought back to the prison by arresting him. In such a situation, the grant of furlough leave no longer remains a matter of right but it becomes a matter of discretion of the authority whether to permit the petitioner to proceed on furlough leave and if the discretion is based upon the relevant considerations, there will hardly be any scope to interfere in the matter. 7. We have seen in the present case that the authorities have acted on the basis of police verification report found to be adverse against the petitioner. Authorities have also taken into consideration the fact that the proposed surety though is ready to take surety but incompetent to exercise control over the petitioner. The authorities have taken into consideration the fact that there is likelihood of disturbance to public peace and tranquility and there is possibility of petitioner not to surrender on due date. 8. We have seen in the present case that the Division Bench of this Court had set aside the order passed by the respondent removing the name of the petitioner from remission register permanently on the ground that the petitioner was absconding for 1055 days. Now the name of the petitioner is restored in the remission register, however, that would not have an effect on the question of discretion to be exercised by the authority concerned in granting or refusing to grant parole or furlough leave. 9. In view of the above, we do not find reason to interfere in the discretion of the authority. The petition is dismissed.