JUDGMENT : 1. "The petitioner is the first accused among the two accused in Crime F. No. DRl/HZU/48B/ENQ-39(INT-29)/2017,(DRI, Hyderabad) of Sanga Reddy District registered for the offences punishable under Section 9A r/w 25 A of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for brevity, "Act"). 2. The petitioner/A1 is in judicial custody since 15-11-2017 for the date of the offence 14-11-2017 from which the crime is registered. The contraband involved is Ephedrine and its salts. It is notified by SO834E dated 26-03-2013 as one of the controlled substances under the Act. So far as the controlled substance concerned, there is no table in the schedule given as to same is possible of ascertainment as to involvement of the small quantity or commercial quantity or in between. Even, in the table defining the small quantity and commercial quantity and in between, the said contraband Ephedrine is not shown. 3. Section 25A of the Act speaks that if any person contravenes an order made under Section 9A, he shall be punishable with Rigorous Imprisonment for a term which may extent to ten years and shall also be liable to fine which may extend to one lakh rupees, provided that the court may, for reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a fine exceeding Rs. One lakh. So far as Section 9A of the Act, which is incorporated by amended Act 2 of 1989 with effect from 29-05-1989 in the main Act of 1985 concerned, it speaks that if the Central Government is of the opinion that, having regard to the use of any controlled substance in the production or manufacture of any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance, it is necessary or expedient so to do in the public interest, it may, by order, provide for regulating or prohibiting the production, manufacture, supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein. Sub-section (2) provides that without prejudice to the generality of the power conferred by subsection (1), an order made there under may provide for regulating by licences, permits or otherwise, the production, manufacture, possession, transport, import inter-State, export inter-State, sale purchase, consumption, use, storage, distribution, disposal or acquisition of any controlled substance. 4. Sub-section (2) provides that without prejudice to the generality of the power conferred by subsection (1), an order made there under may provide for regulating by licences, permits or otherwise, the production, manufacture, possession, transport, import inter-State, export inter-State, sale purchase, consumption, use, storage, distribution, disposal or acquisition of any controlled substance. 4. Here, there is possession of the controlled substance acquired by purchase or otherwise that attracts Section 9A with the penal consequence provided by Section 25A of the Act for not a case of the petitioner/Al of he got licence or permit for having in possession of the said controlled substance. As, "Controlled Substance" is defined in Section 2 (Viid) of the Act by the said amendment in 1989, to mean any substance which the Control Government may, having regard to the available information as to its possible use in the production or manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances or to the provisions of any International convention, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be a controlled substance. It is already declared that controlled substance, as referred supra, with effect from 26-03-2018 by SO834E notification referred supra as item No. 2. 5. The petitioner went unsuccessful more than once for regular bail from the involvement of the controlled substance of Ephedrine of a quantity of 179 Kgs. The remand of the petitioner is since 15-11-2017 undisputedly. So far as the limitations for grant of bail provided by Section37 of the Act concerned, it speaks as follows: "37. Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) (a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable; (b) no person accused of an offence punishable for 2 [offences under Section 19 or Section 24 or Section 27 A and also for offences involving commercial quantity] shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless (i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and (ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. (2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of subsection (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force, on granting of bail." No doubt, as pointed out by the counsel for the petitioner, that among Section 37(1) and (2), Section 9A or 25A not covered. What are covered by sub-section (1)(b) of Section 37 are specifically offences under Sections 19, 24 or 27A of the Act irrespective of the quantity is small or commercial or in between the riders provided by Section 37 are applicable. It is not such a case. The other rider is if it involves a commercial quantity of any of the other penal sections of the contraband, in question, whether it is a narcotic drug or a psychotropic substance or even a controlled substance. 6. So far as the present one concerned, as referred supra, is a controlled substance, as specified supra, of duly notified and the offence is subsequent to that notification and, as referred supra, for this controlled substance, it is not specified as to what is small quantity and what is commercial quantity and what is in between. Thereby, what are the riders provided by Section 37(1)(a) and (b) including the clauses (i)(ii) of subsection 1(b) have no application. The only thing then to consider is Section 37(2) of the Act, which says the limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the CrPC or any other law for the time being in force, on granting of bail. 7. It is not shown by the learned Public Prosecutor that other than CrPC regarding the bail application covered by Section 439 and 437 for a non-bailable offence since the punishment provided herein is ten years and fine of Rs. one lakh and above and it is covered by Schedule II of CrPC of above three years punishment provided is a non-bailable offence. 8. Once such is the case, for no other law fixing any limitation other than the CrPC in a non-bailable offence to consider, if at all on merits, for the entitlement or not. 9. No doubt, A2 also moved a bail application in Crl.P. No. 3571 of 2018 before this court, which is in January, 2018 for regular bail. 8. Once such is the case, for no other law fixing any limitation other than the CrPC in a non-bailable offence to consider, if at all on merits, for the entitlement or not. 9. No doubt, A2 also moved a bail application in Crl.P. No. 3571 of 2018 before this court, which is in January, 2018 for regular bail. This court (myself) by order, dated 04-06-2018 dismissed the same with observation in paragraph 3 that from perusal of the material on record it no way discloses non application of Section 37 of the Act for not able to show the twin conditions of reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is not likely to be convicted and he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail, which are the conditions cumulative and needless to say, not alternative. Hence, the bail application is dismissed. In fact, this court did not go through in detail the aspects, referred supra, nor the counsel or the Special Public Prosecutor brought to the notice of the court, particularly from the inadvertence about the non-application of the riders in Section 37(1) of the Act. In so observing as if Section 37 (1) of the Act is applicable. 10. Thereby, that dismissed order no way comes in the way not only for the petitioner/Al but also for filing any fresh application by that unsuccessful petitioner/A2, if at all he chooses. 11. Now coming to the limitations for grant of bail under CrPC in a non-bailable offence, if at all on merits, is one thing and any entitlement to default bail is another thing. 12. Here the impugnment is purely on entitlement of the default bail invoking Section 167 CrPC. Before going into Section 167 CrPC, it is necessary, particularly, to read Section 36A subsection (4) and its proviso of the Act. 12. Here the impugnment is purely on entitlement of the default bail invoking Section 167 CrPC. Before going into Section 167 CrPC, it is necessary, particularly, to read Section 36A subsection (4) and its proviso of the Act. So far as Section 36A of the Act concerned, sub-section (4) and its proviso reads as follows: "(4) In respect of persons accused of an offence punishable under section 19 or Section 24 or Section 27A or for offences involving commercial quantity the references in subsection (2) of Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), thereof to "ninety days", where they occur, shall be construed as reference to "one hundred and eighty days": Provided that, if it is not possible to complete the investigation within the said period of one hundred and eighty days, the Special Court may extend the said period up to one year on the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period of one hundred and eighty days." As per which, what are the limitations provided in Section 37 (1)(b) are provided in sub-section (4) of Section 36A in saying the 90 days period or 60 days period to be read as 180 days arises when the quantity involved is a commercial quantity or any quantity irrespective of its quantitative contraband, if it is covered by Sections 19 or 24 or 27A of the Act. 13. As discussed supra, the case involved the contravention from the possession of contraband of a controlled substance covered by a notified controlled substance, referred supra, which is without permit or licence cannot possess as per Section 9A, referred supra, and is punishable under Section 25A, referred supra. So far as the same is concerned, it is not covered by the special provision under Section 36A (iv) and its proviso to read the remand period of 60 days or 90 days into 180 days. Thereby, it is only to consider what is the remand period for the offence punishable up to ten years with fine of one lakh and above, whether 60 days or 90 days, as the case may be, under Section 167 (2) of CrPC. 14. Thereby, it is only to consider what is the remand period for the offence punishable up to ten years with fine of one lakh and above, whether 60 days or 90 days, as the case may be, under Section 167 (2) of CrPC. 14. In this regard, this court in Crl.P. No. 5575, 5576 and 5596 of 2018 by a common order, dated 07-06-2018, in A.V. Rama Rao and others categorically observed by scanning the law update including of the latest three judge bench expression of the Apex Court in Rambeer Shokeen v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2018) 4 SCC 405 , apart from the earlier three Bench, though same not referred in Rambeer Shokeen's case supra, of Rajesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam 2017 (9) SCALE 24 . The operative portion of the judgment in this regard for more clarity is reproduced hereunder. "7. The law is fairly settled at least from the Constitution Bench expression of the Apex Court in Sanjay Dutt v. State through CBI, Bombay (1994) 5 SCC 410 . Undisputedly, in these cases, the punishment provided for any of the offences is only up to 10 years and for one of the offences upto life and thus the charge sheet must be filed from the very wording of Section 167 of Cr.P.C within 90 days from the date of respective remand and, if not filed, for that default, in non-compliance with the statutory period to file the final report under Section 173 CrPC read with 167 (2) CrPC., the accused are entitled to the 'default bail', which is an indefeasible right to avail. Even there is no any controversy as to the default bail is to be granted is not from the date of default till filing of charge sheet as a default bail once granted will enure till end of trial, that cloud is also cleared by the Apex Court. Even there is no any controversy as to the default bail is to be granted is not from the date of default till filing of charge sheet as a default bail once granted will enure till end of trial, that cloud is also cleared by the Apex Court. It was way back in 1996 in the expression covered by Mohamed Iqbal Madar Sheikh v. State of Maharashtra (1996) 1 SCC 722 the Apex Court deprecated the practice of some Courts keep the application for 'default bail' pending for some days so to file charge sheet in the meantime for such a course must be very strongly and vehemently discouraged, and it is reiterated that no subterfuge should be resorted to, to defeat the indefeasible right of the accused for 'default bail' when the statutory period for filing the charge sheet or Challan expires and for timely non-submission of the charge sheet or Challan in Court. 8. In fact, in Uday Mohanlal Acharya v. State of Maharashtra (2001) 5 SCC 453 , the Apex Court also referring to the Constitution Bench judgment in Sanjay Dutt (supra), scanned the law, and laid down 6 guidelines which read as follows: "1. Under Sub-section (2) of Section 167, a Magistrate before whom an Accused is produced while the police is investigating into the offence can authorize detention of the Accused in such custody as the Magistrate thinks fit for a term not exceeding 15 days on the whole. 2. Under the proviso to the aforesaid sub-section (2) of Section 167, the Magistrate may authorize detention of the Accused otherwise than in the custody of police for a total period not exceeding 90 days where the investigation relates to offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years, and 60 days where the investigation relates to any other offence. 3. On the expiry of the said period of 90 days or 60 days, as the case may be. an indefeasible right accrues in favour of the Accused for being released on bail on account of default by the investigating agency in the completion of the investigation within the period prescribed and the Accused is entitled to be released on bail, if he is prepared to and furnishes the bail as directed by the Magistrate. 4. an indefeasible right accrues in favour of the Accused for being released on bail on account of default by the investigating agency in the completion of the investigation within the period prescribed and the Accused is entitled to be released on bail, if he is prepared to and furnishes the bail as directed by the Magistrate. 4. When an application for bail is filed by an Accused for enforcement of his indefeasible right alleged to have been accrued in his favour on account of default on the part of the investigating agency in completion of the investigation within the specified period, the Magistrate/court must dispose of it forthwith, on being satisfied that in fact the Accused has been in custody for the period of 90 days or 60 days, as specified and no charge-sheet has been filed by the investigating agency. Such prompt action on the part of the Magistrate/court will not enable the prosecution to frustrate the object of the Act and the legislative mandate of an Accused being released on bail on account of the default on the part of the investigating agency in completing the investigation within the period stipulated. 5. If the Accused is unable to furnish the bail as directed by the Magistrate, then on a conjoint reading of Explanation I and the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 167, the continued custody of the Accused even beyond the specified period in Para (a) will not be unauthorized, and therefore, if during that period the investigation is complete and the charge-sheet is filed then the so-called indefeasible right of the Accused would stand extinguished. 6. The expression "if not already availed of" used by this Court in Sanjay Dutt v. State through CBI, (1994) 5 SCC 410 must be understood to mean when the Accused files an application and is prepared to officer bail on being directed. In other words, on expiry of the period specified in Para (a) of the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 167 if the Accused tiles an application for bail and offers also to furnish the bail on being directed, then it has to be held that the Accused has availed oi his indefeasible right even though the court has not considered the said application and has not indicated the terms and conditions of bail and the Accused has not furnished the same". 9. 9. Of which, guideline No. 3 is very clear that on the expiry of the said period of 90 days or 60 days, as the case may be, an indefeasible right accrues in favour of the accused for being released on bail on account of default by the investigating agency in completion of the investigation within the period prescribed and the accused is entitled to be released on bail, if he is prepared to, and furnishes the bail, as directed by the Magistrate. From guideline No. 4, when an application for bail is furnished by an accused for enforcement of his indefeasible right, alleged to have been accrued in his favour, on account of default on the part of the investigating agency in completion of the investigation within the specified period, the Magistrate Court must dispose of it forthwith, on being satisfied that in fact the accused has been in custody for the period of 90 days or 60 days, as specified, and no charge sheet has been filed by the investigating agency. Such prompt action on the part of the Magistrate Court will not enable the prosecution to frustrate the object of the Act and the legislative mandate of an accused being released on bail on account of the default on the part of the investigating agency in completing the investigation within the period stipulated. After that expression, the Apex Court again in Union of India v. Nirala Yadav 2015 (4) SCJ 57 : (2014) 9 SCC 457 reviewed the entire case law and reiterated the law laid down in Uday MohanlaJ Acharya (supra) by referring to the Condition No. 3 supra. 10. From the above, it is the duty of the Court if charge sheet not filed within the statutory period, to release the detenu on bail. For that even an oral application is enough if at all accused wants to apply. There are some expressions saying even default bail granted when there is a subsequent filing of charge sheet, the procedure contemplated if at all to cancel the bail and to take custody is as per CrPC. It is crystal clear there from of only the bail sought to be cancelled as contemplated by Section 439 (2) and 437(4) CrPC, once the default bail is availed by the accused for non submission of the charge sheet. It is crystal clear there from of only the bail sought to be cancelled as contemplated by Section 439 (2) and 437(4) CrPC, once the default bail is availed by the accused for non submission of the charge sheet. So far as the application for default bail is filed during pendency of filing of the charge sheet concerned that practice is already deprecated way back by the Apex Court in Mohamed Iqbal (supra). So far as the recourse if at all to take for cancellation of the°bail concerned, the expression of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Sanjay Dutt (supra) reads as follows: "(2)(b) The "indefeasible right" of the Accused to be released on bail in accordance with Section 20 (4)(bb) of the TADA Act read with Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in default of completion of the investigation and filing of the Challan within the time allowed, as held in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur is a right which enures to, and is enforceable by the Accused only from the time of default till the filing of the challan and it does not survive or remain enforceable on the challan being filed. If the Accused applies for bail under this provision on expiry of the statutory Period (of 180 days) or the extended period, as the case may be, then he has to be released on bail forthwith. The accused, so released on bail may be arrested and committed to custody according to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The right of the Accused to be released on bail after filing of khe challan, notwithstanding the default in filing it within the time allowed, is governed from the time of filing of the challan only by the provisions relating to the grant of bail applicable at that stage." 11. Once the law is clear also reiterating the Constitution Bench expression in Sanjay Dutt (supra) and another expression in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and others v. State of Maharashtra and others (1994) 4 SCC 602 that were referred in Uday Mohanlal Acharya (supra) and again in Nirala Yadav (supra). The accused, the movement entitled to default bail as a part of duty of the Court to grant even otherwise once applied the Court must grant. The accused, the movement entitled to default bail as a part of duty of the Court to grant even otherwise once applied the Court must grant. Law is also very clear from the expressions that so far as the default bail concerned, Court has no right to go into the merits of the meritorious entitlement or not of the bail, but for the concession to be availed, once opted of the statutory right. The issue again came in the recent past for consideration before another three judge Bench of the Apex Court in Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam 2017 (3) ALT (Crl.) 141 (SC). A perusal of the lengthy judgment reiterating the law shows the Hon'ble 3 Justices Madan B. Lokur, Prafulla C. Pant and Deepak Gupta written the different judgments, particularly in relation to the offence punishable with imprisonment to the maximum of ten years, the period to be reckoned is 60 days or 90 days. Two of the Hon'ble Justices Madan B. Lokur and Deepak Gupta held in majority the period to be reckoned is 60 days and not 90 days. 12. In the judgment of Hon'ble Justice Madan B. Lokur, it was observed in the very 1st and 2nd Paragraphs of the beginning of the Judgment as follows: "1. In measure for Measure the Duke complains (in the given situation): "And liberty plucks justice by the nose". 1 The truth is that personal liberty cannot be compromised at the altar of what the State might perceive as justice-justice for one might be perceived as injustice for another. We are therefore unable to agree with learned Counsel for the State that the Petitioner is not entitled to his liberty through what is commonly referred to as 'default bail' or that the justice of the case should persuade us to decide otherwise. 2. We are therefore unable to agree with learned Counsel for the State that the Petitioner is not entitled to his liberty through what is commonly referred to as 'default bail' or that the justice of the case should persuade us to decide otherwise. 2. The facts in these petitions are not in dispute and we need not go into them in any great detail since we are really concerned with the interpretation of the words "imprisonment for a term not less than ten years" appearing in Clause (i) of proviso (a) to Section 167 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 as amended in 1978." Further, in Paragraphs 33 to 43 and 49, it is observed by the learned Judge in dealing with the default bail as an indefeasible right what is referred supra and, particularly, at Paragraphs 41 and 43 in the beginning words it reads as follows: "41. We take this view keeping in mind that in matters of personal liberty and Article 21 of the Constitution, it is not always advisable to be formalistic or technical. The history of the personal liberty jurisprudence of this Court and other constitutional courts includes petitions for a writ of habeas corpus and for other writs being entertained even on the basis of a letter addressed to the Chief Justice or the Court. 43. This Court and other constitutional courts have also taken the view that in the matters concerning personal liberty and penal statutes, it is the obligation of the Court to inform the accused that he or she is entitled to free legal assistance as a mater of right.........." In the conclusion Para at 49, it is observed as follows: "49. The petitioner is held entitled to the grant of 'default bail' on the facts and in the circumstances of this case. The trial Judge should release the petitioner on 'default bail' on such terms and conditions as may be reasonable. However, we make it clear that this does not prohibit or otherwise prevent the arrest or rear rest of the petitioner on cogent grounds in respect of the subject charge and upon arrest or re-arrest, the petitioner is entitled to petition for grant of regular bail which application should be considered on its own merit. We also make it clear that this will not impact on the arrest of the petitioner in any other case." 13. We also make it clear that this will not impact on the arrest of the petitioner in any other case." 13. Coming to the separate judgment written by another Judge, Hon'ble Justice Prafulla C. Pant, referring to the expressions supra, particularly, from Paragraphs 21 to 31, on the issue of entitlement of the default bail, it is observed referring to the provisions and at Para 22 of the legal position regarding bail under Section 167 (2) of the CrPC. Was cemented by the Constitution Bench of this Court which has inter-alia held in the case of Sanjay Dutt (supra) of the same is indefeasible right of the accused to be released on bail in accordance with the provisions, in default of completion of investigation and filing of the challan within the time allowed, as held in Hintendra Vishnu Thakur (supra) and it is a right which enures to and is enforceable by the accused only from the time of default till filing of the challan and it does not survive or remain enforceable on the challan being filed. If he applies for bail under the provision after expiry of the period, he has to be released on bail forthwith. The accused, so released on bail, may be arrested and committed to custody according to the provisions of the CrPC. The right of the accused to be released on bail, after filing of the challan, notwithstanding the default in filing it within the time allowed, is governed from time to time of filing of the challan only by the provisions relating to the grant of bail, applicable at this stage. Also referred the expression of the Apex Court in Uday Mohanlal Acharya (supra) that referred the 3 Judge Bench expression of the Apex Court of 1996 in Dr. Bipin Shanthilal Panchal v. State of Gujarat (1996) 1 SCC 718 , where it is observed that the accused has not made application for enforcement of his right of default bail but raised the contention only in the Apex Court thereby formulated the question thus whether accused was entitled to be released on bail under section 167 (2) of CrPC., not having made an application when such right has accrued, can exercise that right at a later stage of the proceeding and answered in the negative. It also referred another expression of the Apex court in Mohamed Iqbal (supra) of where default bail application filed for the indefeasible right must be disposed of immediately by the Courts to grant with no lapse of time and also referred Hintendra Vishnu Thakur (supra) the case under TADA Act, and concluded that at Para No. 26 that requirement of application claiming a statutory right under Section 167 (2) of CrPC. is a prerequisite for grant of default bail. Such application has to be made before the Magistrate for enforcement of the statutory right and in the cases under Prevention of Corruption Act or whether there are special Courts to deal with before those Courts and in the facts of the case as petitioner never sought for default bail before the Court concerned, he is not entitled to the same by saying the issue raised for the first time before the Apex Court. 14. Coming to the 3rd separate judgment of the Apex Court in Rakesh Kumar (supra), written by Hon'ble Justice Deepak Gupta, it is mentioned that having the privilege to go through the independent judgments authorized by the other 2 learned Judges supra and in formulating 2 issues for answer as to what is the statutory period for the offences punishable up to 10 years is 60 days and without even making application he entitled to the default bail, leave about any oral request is enough, and answered the same from Paragraph Nos. 1 to 30, in particular, at Para No. 27 by referring of the expressions referred supra that a reading of the aforesaid judgments leaves no manner of doubt that if the accused files an application for grant of default bail and is willing to furnish bail, then he is deemed to have exercised his right to avail the bail and his right cannot be defeated by filing the charge sheet thereafter. 15. Thus, the law is clear from the said expression that once an application is made by the accused, after expiry of the statutory period of remand from non-filing of the charge sheet, he is entitled to the default bail and such a right cannot even be defeated by filing of charge sheet thereafter. 15. Thus, the law is clear from the said expression that once an application is made by the accused, after expiry of the statutory period of remand from non-filing of the charge sheet, he is entitled to the default bail and such a right cannot even be defeated by filing of charge sheet thereafter. So, the filing of the application either orally or in writing is a prerequisite, if not the Court chosen to grant the default bail, and once such an application is there, in recognition of his indefeasible right, he is entitled to the default bail and that can no way be delayed even in its disposal, as referred supra. 16. This Court in Singamala Shankarnar v. State of A.P. 2007 (1) ALT (Crl.) 226 categorically observed that where the imprisonment is ten years and below the period of filing charge sheet from the date of remand is 60 days, from which there is indefeasible right to claim default bail accrues and for that conclusion referred several earlier expressions of the Apex Court even. 17. In the latest expression of the Apex Court, three Judge Bench in Rambeer Shokeen v. State (NCT of Delhi) ( 2018 (4) SCC 405 ), again it came for consideration the scope of law for the default bail and it is observed by the Apex court that the accused is entitled after expiry of the period for filing the charge sheet statutorily provided to the default bail. However, under any provision once there is provided for extension of time to file charge sheet and such application is filed pending, the court must dispose of that application first before considering the entitlement of default bail and it is only therefrom to consider the entitlement as that entitlement depends upon consideration or not of the time sought for extension to file final report. It also referred the expressions in Sanjay Dutt (supra), Hintendra Vishnu Thakur (supra), Niraln Yadav (supra) and Uday Mohanlal Acharya (supra) in particular, leave about the expressions earlier to the Sanjay Dutt (supra) Constitution Bench, in general. Even from this expression, latest in point of time, it is crystal clear of the default bail entitlement concerned, it need not be to go into the merits but to recognize the indefeasible right once the statutory period is lapsed and no application for extension filed much less pending." 15. Even from this expression, latest in point of time, it is crystal clear of the default bail entitlement concerned, it need not be to go into the merits but to recognize the indefeasible right once the statutory period is lapsed and no application for extension filed much less pending." 15. The above expression clearly speaks so far as the default bail concerned, court need not go into the merits of the matter for entitlement on merits the concession of bail or not. Here, from the above expression, which referred catina of expressions of the Apex Court, for the default bail of offence punishable upto ten years, which includes ten years, cannot be considered as above ten years and the remand period is only 60 days and only for the offences punishable above ten years, remand period is 90 days. 16. In the case on hand, the punishment provided by Section 25A of the Act, as referred supra, speaks punishment of maximum ten years with fine of Rs. one lakh or above. So it punishable up to ten years and the remand period is maximum 60 days and this court way back in the year 2007 in Singhamala Sankaranath's case, which is reproduced supra, also interpreted the same of the offence punishable upto ten years including ten years remand period is 60 days and only those above ten years remand period is 90 days. Even the majority opinion of the Apex Court in Rakesh Kumar Paul's case supra, also crystalised the same, as referred supra, by reproducing all the observations in Crl.P. No. 5575 of 2018 and batch. Therefore, the law, as on date, is very crystally clear that for the offence punishable under Section 25A of the Act, the remand period is only 60 days and not even 90 days under Section 167 (2) CrPC leave about the fact that the Section 36A (4) and the limitations under Section 37(1)(b) of the Act have no application to it. 17. 17. From this, needless to go into the merits and on merits even went unsuccessful by the petitioner for regular bail, from the indefeasible statutory right of bail, leave about the duty of the court to grant, if at all from the date of default after expiry of the said statutory period till filing of charge sheet such a limitation is not even applicable, as referred supra, if it is an application filed by the accused/detenu showing that there is a default statutorily committed by non-filing of the final report within the statutory period and he is entitled to the default bail that default bail to be granted on his application is like a regular bail and not even till filing of charge sheet. 18. When such is the case, whatever the contention of the learned public Prosecutor in opposing the default bail saying charge sheet already filed in the case on hand, even it is long after 60 days, by the time the present bail application is for consideration is untenable, more particularly, for the fact that the petitioner even earlier before the Special Judge in Crl.M.P. No. 49 of 2018, dated 18-1-2018, filed the application under Section 167 (2) CrPC for the default bail from the fact that his remand is since 15-11-2017 and the default bail application is on 18-1-2018 and the charge sheet not filed in between and more than 60 days by then expired. 19. Having regard to the above, once the default bail, indefeasible right to have the remedy of the concession to come out from the custody, moved within the statutory time, the subsequent filing of charge sheet is not even a bar as observed supra, referring to Rakesh Kumar Paul's case, referred supra, and even that difficulty does not arise in the case on hand because the present impugnment is from the dismissal of the default bail application by the learned Special Judge in Crl.M.P. No. 49 of 2018, needless to say further this court another Bench also directed the learned Special Judge in Crl.P. No. 4790 of 2018, dated 30-04-2018, to give disposal of that default bail application in Crl.M.P. No. 49 of 2018 pending within ten days there from and undisputedly even by that date the default bail application was disposed of by dismissal which is the impugnment herein. 20. 20. Having regard to the above, bail is granted in view of Section 167 CrPC read with Chapter 33 of CrPC. 21. Accordingly, the Criminal Petition is allowed granting default bail subject to the following conditions: 1. Petitioner shall execute a self-bond for Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only] with two sureties each for the like sum each to the satisfaction of the learned Judge (concerned Court). The bond to be obtained is not only to appear before the Court for enquiry or trial and even after trial to appear before revisional or appellate Court or other superior Court - vide decision-Pre-Legal Aid Committee, Jamshedpur v. State of Delhi 1982 (2) APLJ 43 (SC); so that at stage committal or other proceedings obtaining of fresh bond from accused and even affidavits of sureties of bonds and solvency earlier produced are ratifying and in existence and enforceable, without even insisting his further presence, such recourse quickens the proceedings at other stages before that Court or other Court without loss of time and it also to some extent complies with the requirement of Section 437A Cr.P.C. 2. Petitioner shall report before the investigating officer on every Wednesday and Sunday between 05:00 P.M to 06:00 PM before filing of charge sheet and thereafter once in a month on every first Sunday, for assurance of his availability to safeguard the interest of the prosecution of jumping bail and interference with witnesses until further orders being passed by the learned trial Judge relaxing the same, empowering him by virtue of this order. 3. Petitioner shall attend before the Court of law regularly in enquiry and trial without fail, if not his bail shall be cancelled forthwith, without any further order so that, the learned Judge concerned can also issue NBW by canceling the bail from the power under Section 439 (2) Cr.P.C. delegated by this order during pendency of proceedings before the Court. 4. Petitioner shall not leave the State pending enquiry/trial without prior permission of the learned trial Judge. 5. 4. Petitioner shall not leave the State pending enquiry/trial without prior permission of the learned trial Judge. 5. Petitioner shall furnish his full address with property and bank account particulars and submit his passport/s if any, after enlargement of bail on the next hearing date before the Court concerned (for collecting by police as part of their duty to investigate-also the means of accused and to furnish the same in the final report of investigation to enable the trial Court in the event of considering the need of awarding compensation under Section 357 Cr.P.C. so to award from such material and evidence, apart from securing presence and obtaining of bond with sureties under Section 437A Cr.P.C etc.), failing which it is open to the learned Judge concerned by virtue of the power conferred by this order to cancel the bail. 6. The bail now granted is since a regular one till end of trial (without prejudice to the right to cancel meanwhile in case of need and/or for non-compliance of conditions supra) any absence of petitioner/s as accused for hearing/enquiry or trial, issuance of non bailable warrant-NBW (unless canceled before execution) and even its execution and production of accused as per the NBW; that does not tantamount to cancellation of bail including from the wording of Sec. 439(2) Cr.P.C. and as such in such event no fresh bail application can be entertained. As it tantamounts to only cancellation of bail bonds earlier executed, (leave about the power of the Court to issue surety notices by forfeiting bonds and for imposing penalty on the bonds forfeited); the proper course is to direct the accused to work out the remedy to pay penalty on the previous forfeited bonds as per Section 441 to 446 Cr.P.C. and to submit fresh solvency with self bond for enlarging him by release fro custody on payment of penalty of the earlier bonds forfeited without need of enforcing against earlier sureties again. As a sequel, the miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed." Criminal Petition is allowed.