JUDGMENT : Shekhar B. Saraf, J. 1. This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India wherein the writ petitioner is a student of Kendriya Vidyalaya, Fort William, Kolkata. The writ petitioner had approached this Court by filing this writ petition being aggrieved by the action of the respondent authorities who had withdrawn his admit card subsequent to his having sat in one examination for the remainder of the examination. The same had been done on the ground that he did not have sufficient percentage of attendance. By an order dated March 16, 2017 and July 14, 2017 he had been allowed to sit in the remaining examination. 2. The facts giving rise to this writ petition are that the petitioner had been absent on several occasions and had only 52% attendance in the academic year 2016-17. The parent of the student had made a request to the Principal on February 9, 2017 explaining the reason for his lack of attendance and sought condonation of the same. The Principal in turn wrote to the Regional Officer, Central Board of School Education on February 10, 2017 recommending the condonation of shortage of attendance. 3. Subsequently, the petitioner had received the admit card and had taken the first test on March 8, 2017 in the subject of social science. Thereafter, abruptly without any explanation, the Board had sent a letter dated March 9, 2017 restraining the petitioner from appearing in the examination for the academic year. 4. The Board also by a letter dated March 10, 2017 had written to the Principal deprecating the fact that the admit card had been released to the petitioner without the approval of the Board. 5. Counsel on behalf of the writ petitioner placed reliance on judgment of the Calcutta High Court passed by His Lordship the Hon'ble Justice Biswanath Somadder in the case of Payel Sarkar v. Central Board of Secondary Education & Ors. AIR 2010 Cal 74 : (2010) 2 CHN 187 wherein His Lordship had considered the bye-law 14 of the Examination Bye-law 1995 and held that the Bye-law was merely indicative or illustrative and not exhaustive. The relevant paragraphs that include the said bye-law are provided below:- "15. AIR 2010 Cal 74 : (2010) 2 CHN 187 wherein His Lordship had considered the bye-law 14 of the Examination Bye-law 1995 and held that the Bye-law was merely indicative or illustrative and not exhaustive. The relevant paragraphs that include the said bye-law are provided below:- "15. In the facts of the instant case, the learned advocate for the Board submits that the Principal of the school, vide letter dated 5th February, 2010, informed the Board that the case for condonation of shortage of attendance had not been recommended since the writ petitioner remained irregular throughout the session without any valid reason and that she was not suffering from any of the diseases mentioned in the C.B.S.E. Byelaws. The learned advocate for the Board further submits that since the Principal of the School did not consider the writ petitioner's case for condonation of shortage of attendance arid make a recommendation, the Chairman of the Board could not use his discretionary power and allow the writ petitioner to appear for the ensuing AISSCE-2010. In this regard, learned advocate refers to Rule 14 of the Examination Bye-laws, 1995, relating to condonation of shortage of attendances, which reads as under:- "14. Rules for Condonation of Shortage of Attendance (i) If a candidate's attendance falls short of the prescribed percentage, the Head of the School may submit his name to the Board provisionally. If the candidate is still short of the required percentage of attendance within three weeks of the commencement of the examination, the Head of the Institution shall report the case to the Regional Officer concerned immediately. If in the opinion of the Head of the Institution, the candidate deserves special consideration, he may submit his recommendation to the Regional Officer concerned not later than three Weeks before the commencement of the examination for condonation of shortage in attendances by the Chairman, CBSE, who may issue orders as he may deem proper. The Head of the School in his letter requesting for condonation of shortage in attendance, should give the maximum possible attendance by a student counted from the day of commencing teaching of Class X/XII (beginning of the session) up to the 1st of the month preceding the month in which the examination of the Board commences, attendance by the candidate in question during the aforesaid period and the percentage of attendance by such a candidate during the aforesaid period. (ii) Shortage up to 15% only may condoned by the Chairman. Cases of candidates with attendance below 60% in class X or class XII, as the case may be, shall be considered for condonation of shortage of attendance by the Chairman only in exceptional circumstances created on medical grounds, such as candidate suffering from serious diseases like cancer, AIDS, TB similar serious diseases requiring long period of hospitalization. (iii) The Principal shall refer a case of shortage within the above prescribed limit of condonation to the Board, either with the recommendations or with valid reasons for not recommending the case. (iv) The following may be considered valid reasons for recommending the cases of the candidates with attendance less than the prescribed percentage: (a) prolonged illness; (b) loss of father/mother or some other such incident leading to his absence from school and meriting special consideration; and (c) any other reason of similar serious nature. (d) Authorised participation in sponsored tournaments and sports meets of not less than inter-school level and at NCC/NSS camps including the days of journeys for such participation shall be counted as full attendance." 16. In view of what has been observed hereinbefore, I am of the opinion that condonation of shortage of attendance by the Chairman, only in exceptional circumstances created on medical grounds, such as candidates suffering from serious diseases like cancer, AIDS, T.B. or similar serious diseases requiring long period of hospitalisation in terms of the above quoted Bye-law, is wholly inapplicable in the facts of this case. This Bye-law is merely indicative or illustrative and not exhaustive. This, indeed, is a special case which brings out an extraordinary situation and cannot be dealt with or said to fall squarely within Bye-laws 14(i) & (ii) of the Examination Bye-laws, 1995. The words, "medical grounds", in the referred context, should be read in its generic form. Special learning disability, per se, may not; be a life-threatening 'serious disease', but it is definitely a disability of such a nature which the Chairman can consider as an exceptional one, for condonation of shortage of attendance. The words, "medical grounds", in the referred context, should be read in its generic form. Special learning disability, per se, may not; be a life-threatening 'serious disease', but it is definitely a disability of such a nature which the Chairman can consider as an exceptional one, for condonation of shortage of attendance. The Principal of Kendriya Vidyalaya, Fort William, is, therefore, directed to treat the case of the writ petitioner as a special case, in view of the observations made hereinbefore and forward her recommendation for condonation of shortage of attendance to the Chairman of the Central Board of Secondary Education forthwith, so as to enable him to take a decision in the matter." 6. Counsel on behalf of the respondent authorities stressed that when the attendance is below 60% the specific approval of the Chairman is required as per the Bye-laws and relied on C.B.S.E. & Anr. v. P. Sunil Kumar & Ors. reported in (1998) 5 SCC 377 ; Regional Officer, CBSE v. Ku. Sheena Peethambaran & Ors. reported in (2003) 7 SCC 719 ; Central Board of Secondary Education v. Nikhil Gulati & Anr. reported in (1998) 3 SCC 5 . 7. In the case of P. Sunil Kumar & Ors. (supra) the students of an unaffiliated institution had been allowed to appear at the examination conducted by the Board under the order of the Court and then the High Court had compelled the Board to issue certificate in favour of the students who had taken the examination. The above action had been deprecated by the Supreme Court holding that the same would tantamount to subversion of law and the Supreme Court would not justify the order issued by the High Court on misplaced sympathy in favour of the students. 8. In the aforesaid judgment, the Supreme Court had deprecated the practice of the High Court to allow un-deserving students to take the examination when they had no legal basis for doing so. The relevant portion of the judgment is provided below: "We are conscious of the fact that our order setting aside the impugned directions of the High Court would cause injustice to these students. The relevant portion of the judgment is provided below: "We are conscious of the fact that our order setting aside the impugned directions of the High Court would cause injustice to these students. But to permit students of an unaffiliated institution to appear at the examination conducted by the Board under orders of the Court and then to compel the Board to issue certificates in favour of those who have undertaken examination would tantamount to subversion of law and this Court will not be justified to sustain the orders issued by the High Court on misplaced sympathy in favour of the students. In view of the aforesaid premises, we set aside the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court as well as the interim orders issued by the Single Judge in several petitions out of which the writ appeals arose and the writ petitions filed by the respondents stand dismissed. These appeals are allowed but in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs." 9. Subsequently, in the case of Ku. Sheena Peethambaran & Ors. (supra) a student who had not cleared the Class-IX examination had been allowed to take the Class-X examination by an order of the High Court. The relevant portion of the judgment is delineated below: "6. This Court has on several occasions earlier deprecated the practice of permitting the students to pursue their studies and to appear in the examination under the interim orders passed in the petitions. In most of such cases it is ultimately pleaded that since the course was over or the result had been declared, the matter deserves to be considered sympathetically. It results in very awkward and difficult situations. Rules stare straight into the face of the plea of sympathy and concessions, against the legal provisions." 10. In another instance, the Supreme Court in the case of Nikhil Gulati and Anr. (supra) declined to interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution with the following observation:- "1. Occasional aberrations such as these, whereby ineligible students are permitted, under court orders, to undertake Board and/or University examinations, have caught the attention of this Court may a time: To add to it further, the Courts have almost always observed that the instance of such aberrations should not be treated as a precedent in future. Occasional aberrations such as these, whereby ineligible students are permitted, under court orders, to undertake Board and/or University examinations, have caught the attention of this Court may a time: To add to it further, the Courts have almost always observed that the instance of such aberrations should not be treated as a precedent in future. Such casual discretions by the Court is nothing but an abuse of the process; more so when the High Court at its level itself becomes conscious that the decision was wrong and was not worth repeating as a precedent. And yet it is repeated time and again. Having said this much, we hope and trust that unless the High Court can justify its decision on principle and precept, it should better desist from passing such orders, for it puts the "Rule of Law" to a mockery, and promotes rather the "Rule of Man". 2. All the same, fond hopes were raised in the minds of the students herein. Therefore, we decline to interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution. The SLPs are, accordingly, dismissed." 11. I have heard counsels appearing on behalf of the parties and perused the materials on record. 12. In the present case, the petitioner's request for condonation had been sent to the respondent authorities one month prior to the starting of the examination. The petitioner was provided the admit card, and he was allowed to take the first examination. Subsequently, the Chairman, CBSE sent a direction to withhold the admit card of the candidate and not allow him to appear in the Board examination. It may be noted that no specific reasons were assigned in the letter dated March 9, 2017 as to why the said condonation would not be allowed except for the fact that the candidate was not eligible to appear for the examination due to shortage of attendance and not being covered under Rule 14 of the Examination Bye-laws of the Board. 13. In the Supreme Court judgments of P. Sunil Kumar (supra) and Ku. Sheena Peethambaran & Ors. (supra), the factual matrix was completely different as those students has no legal basis whatsoever to sit for the examination. In one case, the student had not even cleared Class-IX examination and had been allowed to sit in the Class-X examination. In the other case, the students of an unaffiliated institution had been allowed to appear in the examination. (supra), the factual matrix was completely different as those students has no legal basis whatsoever to sit for the examination. In one case, the student had not even cleared Class-IX examination and had been allowed to sit in the Class-X examination. In the other case, the students of an unaffiliated institution had been allowed to appear in the examination. Accordingly, it is clear that these two cases wherein the Supreme Court had deprecated the action of the High Court is distinguishable to the present facts and circumstances of the present writ petition. There is no dispute that the student was legally entitled to sit for the examination except for the fact that his attendance was on the lower side. Furthermore, in the event the condonation of the shortage of attendance was to be rejected the same should have been done before the examination started. Having allowed the student to sit in the first examination, it would not be right on the part of the Board to abruptly stop him from taking the remaining tests in the examination. 14. Reliance is placed on the judgment in Payel Sarkar (supra) wherein a coordinate bench of this High Court had held that Bye-law 14 is merely indicative or illustrative and not exhaustive. What follows from the said judgment is that serious illnesses that are not provided in the Bye-laws itself can also be taken into consideration for condoning lack of attendance. 15. It may also be noted that the petitioner had been allowed to take the examination by the interim order passed in this writ petition (Grade sheet-cum-Certificate of Performance was produced before this Court). 16. In view of the above, I am of the view that this case should be treated as special case keeping in mind that the rejection of the condonation of delay took place midway through the examination. Accordingly, the Board is directed to declare his result and provide him with his Grade sheet-cum-Certificate of Performance within a period of one week from date. This short period has been provided as the student would miss the bus once again in joining Class-XI (it may be noted that he has already missed one year). 17. Counsel on behalf of the respondents is requested to communicate this order to the Board for necessary action. 18. Parties to act on the server copy of this order. This short period has been provided as the student would miss the bus once again in joining Class-XI (it may be noted that he has already missed one year). 17. Counsel on behalf of the respondents is requested to communicate this order to the Board for necessary action. 18. Parties to act on the server copy of this order. With the above direction the writ petition is disposed of.