JUDGMENT : 1. These two Criminal Revision Cases are filed by the State represented by the Inspector of Police for Vigilance and Anti Corruption Wing, Tiruchirappalli aggrieved by the order of discharge passed by the Special Court for trial of cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act, Tiruchirappalli. 2. The respondents in Crl.R.C(MD)Nos.840 and 841 of 2017 are V.Janagiraman, a public servant arrayed as first accused and his wife Vasanthy arrayed as second accused respectively. 3. The final report which resulted in the investigation of complaint registered in Crime No.6/AC/2001 on the file of the Vigilance and Anti Corruption Wing, Tiruchirappalli disclosed the first accused as a public servant working as Sub Registrar (Admn.), Office of Deputy General of Registration, Tiruchirappalli was found acquired wealth disproportionate to his known source of income in the name of his wife Vasanthy while serving as Sub Registrar at various places in Trichy District, during the period between 1989 to 1993. 4. The investigation has revealed that during the check period between 01.04.1989 and 31.12.1993, his known source of income through monthly salary and the income of his wife through transport lorries was Rs.32,25,534/- including the consideration of a landed property at Vilpatti sold by the accused during the check period. The expenditure of his family during the check period assessed as Rs.15,24,621/- and likely savings Rs.17,00,913/- whereas the value of the assets held by A.1 and A.2 put together was Rs.48,31,417/- at the end of the check period. This being nearly 97.05% over and above the known source of income, after obtaining sanction from the competent authority, final report to try the first accused for offence under Section 13(1)(e) punishable under Section 13(2) of P.C. Act and against second accused for offence under Section 109 IPC read with 13(1)(e) read with 13(2) of P.C. Act, laid before the Special Court for trial of cases under P.C. Act, Tiruchirappalli. The prosecution has listed 75 witnesses and 77 documents, which they proposed to rely to prove the case. 5. The Trial Court has taken cognizance of the case, served copies of documents to the accused and has heard the accused and the prosecution, before framing charge. 6. The petitions in Crl.M.P.No.47 of 2011 and Crl.M.P.No.48 of 2011 filed by the accused to discharge, have been considered by the Trial Court and allowed on the ground that the investigation is incomplete and lack prima facie evidence. 6. The petitions in Crl.M.P.No.47 of 2011 and Crl.M.P.No.48 of 2011 filed by the accused to discharge, have been considered by the Trial Court and allowed on the ground that the investigation is incomplete and lack prima facie evidence. The investigation officer has not given opportunity to A.2 to explain her source to purchase the properties which stand in her name. The civil suit in O.S.No.217 of 1994 filed by A.2 against A.1 for declaration and injunction, has not been taken into consideration by the investigation officer. The first accused and the second accused have separated in the year 1989 and executed deed of separation in the year 1992. The income of A.2 derived through the transport business availing loan under hire purchase, her bank statement of accounts showing adequate income to acquire the properties on her own and the income tax returns filed by her, were ignored by investigation officer. Hence, discharged both the accused. 7. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor questions the legality of the above order on the ground that the Trial Court has taken into consideration facts which are not relevant to the case or documents created by the accused subsequent to registration of case against them. Alleging that in the discharge petition, the Trial Court has traversed beyond the scope of Section 239 Cr.P.C., by conducting mini trial. The materials placed before the Court which were collected in the course of investigation would reveal prima facie ground to prosecute them. If, the prosecution prove them in the trial, it will end up in conviction. 8. Per contra, the learned counsels appearing for the respondents defend the impugned order, citing Judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and High Courts. 9. The learned senior counsel appearing for A.2 would contend that list of assets shown in Annexure II of the final report stand in the name of A.2. The lorries were purchased availing loan from financiers. The house property inherited by her and renovated before the check period. The landed properties at Kodaikanal were purchased from out of income derived from the transport business. The bank statement of A.2 would establish copious income and property accounted. Further, she has also filed income tax returns duly disclosing her income. While so, the investigation officer has filed truncated final report which has been rightly pointed out by the Trial Court and allowed the discharge petition. 10. The bank statement of A.2 would establish copious income and property accounted. Further, she has also filed income tax returns duly disclosing her income. While so, the investigation officer has filed truncated final report which has been rightly pointed out by the Trial Court and allowed the discharge petition. 10. The learned senior counsel also submitted that under Section 17(1) of P.C. Act, the second proviso mandates investigation of disproportionate assets cannot be done without the order of the Superintendent of Police. Whereas in this case, the Inspector of Police, Department of Vigilance and Anti Corruption had done the investigation without the order of the Superintendent of Police, hence the investigation gets vitiated. 11. The learned counsel appearing for A.1 (public servant) emphasizes that the properties shown under Annexure II do not belong to him. He has not purchased those properties through A.2. In fact, A.2 has left him in the year 1989 and living separately. She is running transport business. The Vigilance Department after investigation accepted the explanation offered and decided to drop further proceedings. Later, after change of the investigation officer, ignoring the explanation and the decree passed in O.S.No.217 of 1994, has filed final report. The Trial Court after considering the documents and the statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. has given the reason for discharge in paragraphs 33 and 34 of the common order. When the prosecution has failed to segregate the income of A.1 from the income of A.2, the order of discharge passed by the Trial Court is legally sustainable. 12. Point for consideration: “Whether the Trial Court order of discharge is beyond the scope of Section 239 Cr.P.C. in the light of records placed by the prosecution?” 13. The final report in this case is filed after verifying the credible information received regarding properties acquired by A.1 in his name and his wife name (A.2) during the check period. The final report is filed only after affording opportunity to the public servant to explain the source. A.1 has also given his explanation, which is relied by the prosecution as document listed as serial No.73. The statements of A.1 and A.2 recorded and same is enclosed and relied by the prosecution as document No.77. The explanation given by the accused regarding the source of income is found not satisfactory. A.1 has also given his explanation, which is relied by the prosecution as document listed as serial No.73. The statements of A.1 and A.2 recorded and same is enclosed and relied by the prosecution as document No.77. The explanation given by the accused regarding the source of income is found not satisfactory. The statements given by the vendors of the lorry Mr.Amirthalingam (L.W.9), brother of A.2 Sarvananababu (L.W.14), son of A.1 and A.2 J.Rajaram (L.W.15) and other witnesses from whom the accused say she got loan to purchase the lorries disclosed that these vehicles were purchased during check period. The investment and the income found to have derived from these lorries does not match the value of assets acquired in the name of A.2. Further, the statement of D.Devadoss (L.W.2) directly implicates A.1 for abusing his office as Sub-Registrar to get the property at Vilpatti Village, Kodaikanal registered in the name of his wife Vasanthy on 06.08.1991. 14. The statements of witnesses would indicate that the alleged separation of A.1 and A.2 as early as 1989 and subsequent registration of dissolution of marriage deed are false. Particularly, the brothers of A.2, Saravanababu (L.W.14) and Venkatachalapathi (L.W.13), in their respective statements have not provided any information which are sufficient to believe the explanation of A.2 that she was able to earn sufficiently through the transport business and with the financial assistance of her brothers and others, she was able to acquire the properties listed in Annexure II. Contrarily, their statements would indicate that the transport business was not running profitable. The income was enough only to meet the expenditure. However, A.2 had money to purchase properties between 1989 to 1993 investing huge money. 15. The statement of R.Elangovan (L.W.17) who is the sister's husband of A.2 has stated that A.1 and A.2 are living together. No doubt, this is contrary to statement of Saravanababu (L.W.14) and J.Rajaram (L.W.15). The prosecution has reasons to reject the statements of L.W.14 and L.W.15 and accept the statement of L.W.17, since the statements of Karuppaiah (L.W.5) reveals that A.1 has misused his address 168-A, Salem Road, Namakkal for the lorry he purchased in his wife name. The statement of Mr.Jothi @ Jothi Nageswaran (L.W.8) reveals that A.1 was present along with A.2 when he sold 90 acres of land at Kodaikanal in parts on various dates between 1991 to 1994 to A.2. The statement of Mr.Jothi @ Jothi Nageswaran (L.W.8) reveals that A.1 was present along with A.2 when he sold 90 acres of land at Kodaikanal in parts on various dates between 1991 to 1994 to A.2. Therefore, the separation of A.1 and A.2 is only a make belief explanation. The alleged divorce deed registered at Sub Registrar Office in the year 1994 also will not have any effect in the prosecution for very obvious reason. An Hindu marriage is not a contract between parties to get dissolved through deed without a decree by competent Court. The parties belong to Hindu Kavara Naidu community. There is no evidence to presume customary divorce prevail in this community. This document has been created and registered by A.1 and A.2 by abusing his position as Sub Registrar, that too much after registration of case against them for amassing wealth illegally. 16. The Trial Court without considering the entire documents relied by the prosecution has faulted the investigation as incomplete. The Trial Court has deliberately closed its eyes to the incriminating materials against the accused. By citing Judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and High Courts which are not relevant to the facts involved in this case, the Trial Court perversely allowed the discharge petitions. In this regard, it is suffice to extract the observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander and Another reported in (2012)9 SCC 460 , which is apt to the case in hand and conspicuously missed the notice of the Court below. The relevant portion is extracted as below: “19. ... ... ... The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. At that stage the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not. It the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. ... ... ...”. 17. Section 239 Cr.P.C. reads as under: “239. When accused shall be discharged.--- If, upon considering the police report and the documents sent with it under section 173 and making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused, and record his reasons for so doing”. 18. The materials placed by the prosecution along with final report if proved, the conviction of the respondents is certain. The Trial Court has erroneously relied Judgments pronounced after trial to appreciate documents at pre-trial stage. While doing so, it has miserably failed to consider all the documents, but selectively looked at certain self serving explanations given by the accused. 18. The materials placed by the prosecution along with final report if proved, the conviction of the respondents is certain. The Trial Court has erroneously relied Judgments pronounced after trial to appreciate documents at pre-trial stage. While doing so, it has miserably failed to consider all the documents, but selectively looked at certain self serving explanations given by the accused. More particularly, the suit filed in collusion between the parties, the divorce deed executed and registered which is void on the face of it and the income tax returns boosting the income which never derived as stated. All the above documents are after registering the criminal case. The Court below has conveniently ignored this facts to pass the improper and perverse order of discharge. 19. The contention of the learned counsel appearing for A.1 that investigation by the Inspector of Police without the order of the Superintendent of Police which is violation to Second Proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 17 of P.C. Act found to be incorrect. The prosecution documents serial No.69 and 70 reveal that the Superintendent of Police has issued authorisation letters dated 16.09.2001 and 04.04.2003 to the concerned Inspectors to conduct investigation in compliance to the provisions of P.C. Act, 1988. Hence, for the reasons stated above, the Criminal Revision Cases are liable to be allowed. 20. As a result, the Criminal Revision Cases are allowed. The common order dated 26.06.2013 passed in C.M.P.Nos.47 and 48 of 2011 in Special Case No.91 of 2011 by the Special Court for Trial of Cases under Prevention of Corruption Act, Tiruchirappalli is set aside. The Trial Court is directed to frame charge by 30.11.2018 and complete the trial within 9 months. The respondents herein are directed to appear before the Trial Court on 30.11.2018 to answer the charges and co-operate for the timely disposal of the case.