JUDGMENT : GOVERDHAN BARDHAR, J. 1. The instant criminal leave to appeal has been filed by the State of Rajasthan against the impugned judgment dated 13.05.2015 passed by the Court of learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Jhalawar, District Jhalawar in Sessions Case No. 37 of 2013, whereby the accused respondent has been acquitted of the charges framed against him under Sections 148, 452, 302/149 and 120B IPC and section 4/25 of the Arms Act. 2. Learned Public Prosecutor has also filed an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing criminal leave to appeal. For the reasons mentioned in the aforesaid application, same is allowed and the delay of 47 days in filing criminal leave to appeal is condoned. 3. The factual matrix of the case is that complainant Girraj s/o Purshottam (PW8), by caste Sen Nai, r/o Nalla Mohalla, Jhalawar submitted a written report ( E.P4) at 12:10 P.M on 19.03.1998 at S.R.G Hospital, Jhalwar to the SHO Police Station Kotwali, Jhalawar, to the effect that today at about 11:30 A.M when he was standing outside his shop (Sapna Hair Dresser) and his brother Chandra Prakash @ Chandu s/o Purshottam Ji Sen was sitting at the shop of Ghanshyam Ji Sharma. In the meanwhile four persons came from Ghantaghar. Out of these persons Bhanu was having country made pistol (desi katta), Rajendra Jhala was having 'rifle' and Shyama and Dhanji were having country made pistol (Katta) in their hands and then opened fire at his brother and assaulted at the head of his brother with a sword. Upon hearing sound of fire, Rajendra Kumar Joshi came rushing from a nearby betel shop and from the gate side of temple Sudharshan Prem and Bhanwar Singh (Lala) also came rushing to the spot. Thereafter accused persons ran away from motor-cycles. His brother was taken to the hospital by these four persons but on way to hospital his brother died. 4. On the basis of aforesaid report, a case bearing No. 140/1998 for the offence under Sections 148, 149, 302 IPC was registered at Police Station Kotwali, Jhalawar. After investigation, the police submitted charge-sheet against Raju @ Rajendra Singh, Raju @ Rajeshwar, Satyanarain, Lala @ Lal Chand, Anurag Singh @ Bichla, Bhanu Pratap @ Bhanu, Shyama @ Shyam Singh and Rajendra Singh @ Raja and Brij Raj Singh in the concerned court. After investigation, the police submitted charge-sheet against Raju @ Rajendra Singh, Raju @ Rajeshwar, Satyanarain, Lala @ Lal Chand, Anurag Singh @ Bichla, Bhanu Pratap @ Bhanu, Shyama @ Shyam Singh and Rajendra Singh @ Raja and Brij Raj Singh in the concerned court. The case being conclusively triable by the Court of Session was committed to it and from there it was transferred to the learned trial court. In support of prosecution case, statements of twenty two witnesses were got recorded and certain documents were got exhibited. Thereafter, the statement of the accused respondent was got recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C., 1973 In defence the accused respondent did produce any evidence. Learned trial court after hearing the final arguments of both the parties, acquitted the accused respondent for the charges levelled against him vide impugned judgment dated 13.05.2015. 5. Mr. R.S. Raghav, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State has argued that the learned trial court has erred in taking into consideration the statement of complainant and eye-witness of the occurrence Girraj (PW8). Learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the learned trial court erred in considering the statement of Khemraj (PW10) I.O in the matter. Khemraj (PW10) deposed that at the instance of accused respondent one 'sword' (Ex.P10) was recovered. Learned PP further submitted that the learned trial court has failed to consider the postmortem report (Ex.P7) of deceased Chandra Prakash. Co-accused Anurag Singh @ Bichla died during the course of trial as a result of which proceedings against him were dropped on 9.10.2004. Coaccused persons Rajendra Singh @ Raju s/o Laxman Singh, Raju @ Rajeshwar s/o Tulsiram, Satyanarain s/o Laxmi Chand, Lala @ Lal Chand s/o Ghanshyam were acquitted on 17.05.2004 by learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Fast Track, No. 3, Jhalawar, Co-accused persons Rajendra @ Raja s/o Onkar Singh, Dhan Singh s/o Tejpal Singh and Bhanu Pratap @ Bhanu s/o Deshraj were acquitted on 26.11.2014 by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Jhalawar. On query from Court, it is informed that against the Judgment of acquittal of co-accused Bhanu Pratap @ Bhanu s/o Deshraj passed on 26.11.2014 by learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Jhalawar. On query from Court, it is informed that against the Judgment of acquittal of co-accused Bhanu Pratap @ Bhanu s/o Deshraj passed on 26.11.2014 by learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Jhalawar, State had filed criminal leave to appeal which was dismissed as infructuous on the ground that he was murdered while he was transferred from Udaipur and so far as other Co-accused persons are concerned, no Criminal Leave to Appeal has been filed against the acquittal of Co-accused persons by the State. 6. Heard learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State, perused the impugned Judgment passed by the learned trial court including the record of the case. 7. As per the case of the prosecution, eye-witnesses of the occurrence are Ghanshyam Sharma (PW5) and Shanti Lal (PW6). Ghanshyam Sharma (PW5) in examination-in-chief deposed that approx. 8-9 years ago at about 10-11 AM he was sitting in his hardware shop. Along-with him Gopalji, Shanti Lal and Chandu @ Chandra Prakash were also sitting. When they finished the tea, 3-4 persons came and opened fire. He did identify the persons who opened the fire because they were having colours on their complete face. Another eye-witness of the incident Shanti Lal (PW6) in examination-in-chief deposed that at about 10:00 A.M approx. 8-9 years ago, he was standing at his shop. In the shop of Ghanshyam Ji (PW5), Ghanshyam and Chandu (since deceased) were sitting. Shanti Lal (PW6) deposed that he was talking with them after standing in front of his shop. At that time 3-4 persons, who were having pistols, in their hands came there. Thus, in fear he ran away from there. Thereafter, he came to know that murder of Chandu had taken place. The persons who came, did identify them. In cross-examination Shanti Lal (PW6) deposed that he did see the accused respondent on the spot which was present in Court. 8. As per the case of the prosecution, Ajaj (PW7), Prem Chand (PW9) and Leeladhar (PW11) are eye witnesses of incident. Ajaj (PW7) deposed that in his presence no incident took place. Ajaj (PW7) further deposed that in front of him no-one opened fire. Ajaj (PW7) did support the prosecution story and turned hostile. Prem Chand (PW9) specifically deposed that Shyam Singh (accused respondent) who was present in Court is known to him very well. Ajaj (PW7) deposed that in his presence no incident took place. Ajaj (PW7) further deposed that in front of him no-one opened fire. Ajaj (PW7) did support the prosecution story and turned hostile. Prem Chand (PW9) specifically deposed that Shyam Singh (accused respondent) who was present in Court is known to him very well. Prem Chand (PW9) further deposed that accused appellant was involved in commissioning of the offence. The person whom he had called as 'Shyam' (accused respondent) was another Shyam and that one who is present in Court. This witness further deposed that accused respondent did open any fire on any person. Leeladhar (PW11) deposed that he did see the incident. Leeladhar (PW11) also did support the prosecution story and turned hostile. As the aforesaid witnesses did support the prosecution case. Thus, the learned trial court rightly disbelieved their credibility. 9. So far as recovery of 'sword' from the possession of accused respondent is concerned, prosecution has produced two witnesses; Investigating Officer Khem Raj (PW10) and Hemendra Singh (PW19). Investigating Officer Khem Raj (PW10) deposed that at the instance of accused respondent, recovery of 'sword' was made. But Hemendra Singh (PW19) deposed that in front of him no such recovery was made from the possession of the accused respondent and hence this independent witness turned hostile. Complainant Girraj (PW8) in examination-in-chief reiterated the averments made in written report (Ex.P4) but in cross-examination admitted that somebody else wrote the written report. Girraj (PW8) in cross-examination admitted that:- eSa eqyfteku dks igys ls ugh tkurk Fkk] vkt gkftj vnkyr eqyfte os ugha gS] ftUgksaus esjs HkkbZ ij geyk fd;k Fkk] ge esjs HkkbZ dks vLirky ys x;s rc esjs diM+ksa ij Hkh [kwu yx x;k Fkk] esjs HkkbZ lkgc nqdku esa vnaj cSBs Fks rFkk tks eqyfteku vk;s mUgksaus lkeus ls xksfy;ka pykbZ Fkh] HkkbZ lkgc ogha nqdku ds vanj fxj x;s Fks] uD'kk ekSdk jkr esa vLirky ls okil vkus ds ckn cuk;k FkkA Girraj (PW-8) in cross-examination admitted that:- ;g ckr lgh gS fd eqyfteku ds uke ekSds ij tks ekStwn Fks mUgksaus crk;s Fks] eSa eqyfteku dks igys ls ugha tkurk Fkk] eSa jk;Qy igpkuus Fkkus esa ugha x;k eSa jk;Qy o dV~Vs esa QdZ le>rk gwaA 10. Thus from the testimony of Girraj (PW8) it is clear that he has said nothing about the role of the accused appellant and to have noticed as to who was assaulting deceased with what weapon. The testimony of Girraj (PW8) is corroborated from any other evidence on record. Thus the testimony of Girraj (PW8) cannot be said to be trustworthy. 11. Rajendra Kumar (PW14) in cross-examination admitted that Dhan Singh and Shyam Singh did open fire upon Chandu but opened fire in air. But he further deposed that in the Court at Ramganj Mandi against him a case related to committing of murder of Anurag Singh was going on and in that case accused respondent was witness against him. Thus credibility of this witness cannot be relied upon without corroborative evidence. Bhanwar Singh (PW9) deposed that accused appellant was present at the spot. Accused respondent was in the list of such persons who opened the fire. He did open fire. Shyam Singh who opened fire was the person who was present in Court. Sudharshan (PW18) deposed that accused respondent who was present in Court was present at the spot. The persons who committed the murder of Chandu were different. Dr. Kundmal Jain (PW8) who was posted as Junior Specialist in S.R.G Hospital, Jhalawar admitted the postmortem report (Ex.P7). Dr. Kundmal Jain (PW8) in cross-examination deposed that injuries No. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 were sufficient to cause death. Injury No. 5 could have been received only when fire could have been made from front. 12. It is mandatory on the part of the prosecution to establish and prove the criminal culpability beyond reasonable doubt to fasten guilt but the afore-discussed evidence reflects that prosecution has miserably failed to adduce material and reliable evidence against the respondent. Nothing is positive in the evidence of the prosecution to connect the accused with the alleged crime. 13. In the case of Sukliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2010) 15 SCC 745, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under :- "6. Nothing is positive in the evidence of the prosecution to connect the accused with the alleged crime. 13. In the case of Sukliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2010) 15 SCC 745, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under :- "6. The settled position of law regarding the powers to be exercised by the High Court in an appeal against the order of acquittal is that though the High Court has full powers to review the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based, it will interfere with an order of acquittal because with the passing of an order of acquittal the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused is reinforced. The High Court should be slow in disturbing the finding of the fact arrived at by the trial court. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal case is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted". In Narendra Singh and Another v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 , the Apex Court has recognized presumption of innocence as a human right and has gone on to say that: "30. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had been adhered to by the High Court. Xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had been adhered to by the High Court. Xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. We, thus, having regard to the postmortem report, are of the opinion that the cause of death of Bimla Bai although is shrouded in mistery but benefit thereof must go to the appellants as in the event of there being two possible views, the one supporting the accused should be upheld." The decision taken by this Court in the aforementioned case, has been further reiterated in State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180 , wherein this Court observed thus: "Generally the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to re-appreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, or the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not. The principle to be followed by the appellate court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference." 14. In the aforesaid scenario, we are of the considered view that prosecution has not succeeded in establishing its case beyond contours of reasonable doubt, so we do not find any reason to disturb the findings of the trial court. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference." 14. In the aforesaid scenario, we are of the considered view that prosecution has not succeeded in establishing its case beyond contours of reasonable doubt, so we do not find any reason to disturb the findings of the trial court. Therefore, the criminal leave to appeal filed by the State against acquittal is devoid of any merit, hence the same is dismissed.