JUDGMENT : 1. The appeal is directed against an order of August 14, 2009 by which the writ petition of the first respondent-erstwhile employee was allowed and the perceived letter of termination issued by the employee was regarded as a letter of complaint. 2. Two questions are involved in this appeal: “Whether the letter dated October 8, 2001 issued by the first respondent to the appellant was a letter of resignation and whether the representations of the first respondent for the correction of his age in his service-records ought to have been allowed by the employer.” 3. The letter of October 8, 2001 has been quoted in the order under appeal. Such letter contains four short paragraphs and the first two refer to the transfer of the first respondent and the precarious medical condition of the first respondent’s wife. The last two paragraphs of the letter of October 8, 2001 record as follows: “In case noting (sic, nothing) is possible for you in consideration to my above proposal in that case please consider this letter as a notice to my resignation from the service of company as per terms and conditions if (sic in) vogue. “After long twenty five years of service I have been thrown to such a situation that I have been compelled to write you my resignation though it was not my intention at all if I am allowed to work in my present place.” The single Bench perceived such letter not to be a letter of resignation. The observation of the single Bench in such regard is that the resignation was not voluntary. Much emphasis was laid by the single Bench on the first sentence of the last paragraph to discern therefrom that it was not the intention of the first respondent to resign from his service. However, despite noticing that the first respondent did not intend to resign, the immediate following sentence in the judgment and order impugned observes that the “Resignation was conditional upon an answer in the negative to the earlier prayers made by him, in the selfsame letter which do not appear to have at all been considered by the authority......” 4. An employee had been transferred from one place to another. The employee may have had good grounds to make a representation against the transfer, but the discretion of the employer is absolute in such a situation. An employee had been transferred from one place to another. The employee may have had good grounds to make a representation against the transfer, but the discretion of the employer is absolute in such a situation. The employee made out some grounds, which ought to have been considered favourably by the employer; but the employee issued an ultimatum to the employer that should the request for undoing the transfer not appeal to the employer, the employee would be left with no option but to resign. To boot, the same letter was required to be treated as a notice of resignation. 5. In such a situation, it was open to the employer to either accept the excuses and undo the order of transfer or to reject the same and insist on the transfer. It is evident from the tenor of the letter dated December 4, 2001 issued by the employer in response to the letter of October 8, 2001 that the matter pertaining to the transfer of the employee was not open for reconsideration. Once such was the decision on the transfer, the desire of the employee in terms of the letter dated October 8, 2001 became effective: such letter had to be treated as his letter of resignation. 6. Implicit in the order impugned is the perception of the single Bench that the letter dated October 8, 2001 was issued in anger and in haste and not in a collected frame of mind. Even in such a situation, the stand of the employer in this case must be appreciated since the letter of December 4, 2001 did not give immediate effect to the notice of resignation but gave prospective effect to it after more than a month: from January 7, 2002. This left the employee with the time to reflect on his decision and upon receipt of the letter dated December 4, 2001, if the employee chose to change his mind, the employee had till January 7, 2002 to withdraw his letter of resignation. 7. Since it is the undeniable position that the employer’s response of December 4, 2001 was received by the employee long prior to January 7, 2001, the obstinacy on the part of the employee comes through. He was not repentant for his decision or in having rushed off a hasty letter of resignation. 7. Since it is the undeniable position that the employer’s response of December 4, 2001 was received by the employee long prior to January 7, 2001, the obstinacy on the part of the employee comes through. He was not repentant for his decision or in having rushed off a hasty letter of resignation. He had time to reflect and deliberate upon his conduct and yet he chose not to withdraw his letter of resignation prior to January 7, 2002. In the light of such conduct of the employee, it did not lie in his mouth to challenge the letter or the contents thereof or his unequivocal intention to resign as evident from his letter of October 8, 2001. Under no circumstances could such letter be construed not to be a letter of resignation. 8. In the context of such letter, the respondent has referred to a judgment reported at DESU vs. Tara Chand, 1978 (2) SLR 425 where the Delhi High Court construed an apparent letter of resignation not to be a letter of resignation. However, the matter turned on the contents of such letter and the letter itself indicated that the employee had been “compelled by the cruel behaviour and unfair conduct” of his superior officers to resign for the sake of saving the lives of his family members and himself. The circumstances in which the letter in that case was construed to be a letter of complaint and not a letter of resignation are not the same as in this case where, particularly, the employer gave the employee a chance to reconsider the position and the employee refused to take up such offer. 9. The adamant stand of the first respondent herein is further evident from the fact that on December 15, 2001, after his letter of resignation was accepted with prospective effect by the employer, the employee renewed a previous request for correction of his date of birth. It appears that the employee’s date of birth was recorded to be about five years later than what it ought to have been and it is not necessary at this stage to go into the circumstances which resulted in the age of the employee being shown five years younger than what it may actually have been at the time of his joining service. 10. 10. The previous representations of the employee on the subject of correction of his date of birth resulted in the employer seeking appropriate documents. There are earlier letters on record issued by the employee saying that his certificates had been burnt. However, by the letter dated December 15, 2001, after his letter of resignation was accepted with prospective effect by the employer, the employee furnished copy certificates apparently evidencing his date of birth. 11. The appellant herein is agreeable to look into the veracity of the documents and extend such benefits as may be due to the first respondent if his date of birth is corrected and it appears that at the time of the first respondent’s resignation from service with effect from January 7, 2002, he had attained the age of 57. 12. In view of such fair stand of the appellant, the first respondent should supply copy documents pertaining to his date of birth to the Kolkata office of the appellant within a fortnight from date and Kolkata office will process the same and issue a response within four weeks of the receipt thereof and without insisting on originals that may have been submitted to the company earlier. 13. On the aspect of whether the letter of October 8, 2001 issued by the first respondent to the appellant was a letter of resignation, the order impugned is set aside and such letter is accepted as a letter of resignation and the subsequent action of the appellant to accept the same with effect from January 7, 2002 is endorsed. 14. The appeal is allowed to the above extent, but by leaving the first respondent free to obtain the limited relief that may be available to the first respondent in view of the fair stand of the appellant regarding the first respondent’s date of birth. 15. FMA No. 2695 of 2013 is disposed of as above without any order as to costs.